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Abstract 
This research presents for the first time a partial translation and study of Imam Badr al-Dīn al-
Zarkashī’s work, al-Ijāba li-Īrādi mā Istadraktahu ʿĀ’isha ʿAla al-Ṣaḥābah—The Corrective: 
ʿĀ’isha’s Rectification of the Companions. It critically analyses from the perspective of ḥadīth 
criticism a number of sections presenting ʿĀ’isha’s refutations and corrections of key Companions 
including, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās, Zayd b. Thābit and Abū Hurayra, applying 
classical ḥadīth methodology to the scrutiny of narrators by way of impugnment and validation (al-
jarḥ wa al-tʿadīl) in an effort to re-construct and re-present ʿĀ’isha as a central authority in Islamic 
knowledge production.  
 
This study constitutes a major rethinking of the Muslim ḥadīth and jurisprudential traditions by 
evaluating how ʿĀ’isha responded to ḥadīths that were circulating around her and being ascribed, 
often incorrectly, as authoritative statements of the Prophet. From her critique of overwhelmingly 
male Companions of the Prophet, the study elicits a methodology for ḥadīth criticism which is sure 
to challenge classical approaches; additionally, it unearths the scholarly acumen of this great female 
Companion and mother of the believers, in its discussion of a number of legal positions which ʿ Ā’isha 
held in contradistinction to many of the male authorities among the Companions.  
This interdisciplinary study goes further than many existing studies of ʿĀ’isha in its highlighting of 
the way her traditions have been effectively marginalised through the canonisation process which led 
to the establishment of the canonical corpus, especially al-Bukhārī’s Ṣaḥīḥ. This resulted in ʿĀ’isha’s 
voice being tragically erased from the heart of the Muslim legal and hadith tradition. This study serves 
as a model for how the voice of ʿĀ’isha may be given renewed life and significance in the way it re-
centres her traditions and thinking. A crucial aspect of this study is its contributing to expanding the 
horizons of a number of Islamic disciplines. Its contribution to the study of ḥadīth lies in suggestions 
of re-conceptualising the canonisation of ḥadīth, in the suggestion to extend the criteria of scrutiny of 
narrators to the Companions, and, most importantly, in the development of an emergent methodology 
of ʿĀ’isha in the scrutiny of the actual statements (matn) of traditions, not just the chains of 
transmission (isnād). The contributions of this study to the development of the Muslim legal tradition 
(fiqh) also lies in a framework that emerges from this research based on the pattern of how ʿĀ’isha 
approaches juridical matters. The implications for this are many, especially regarding women and 
their spiritual and daily life and practice.  
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Introduction 
 
We know her as ʿĀ’isha bint Abū Bakr, third and most beloved wife of Muḥammad, Prophet 
of Islam. Her name is oft repeated in the Islamic tradition, but like so many made into paragons, 
what is presented and what is concealed is outside of their control. Who we know ʿĀ’isha as 
today is but a fraction of what there is to know of her. This study presents a partial translation 
of al-Ijāba li-Īrādi mā Istadraktahu ʿĀ’isha ʿAla al-Ṣaḥābah by the esteemed scholar, Imām 
Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, in which he collected over 200 correctives made by ʿĀ’isha of her 
contemporaries. In doing so, this research aims to provide a new perspective on this key 
protagonist in not only the history of Islam, but also the shaping of its varying branches of 
knowledge, most importantly, the Prophetic tradition (ḥadīth) and how they are handled – in 
terms of evaluating both the content of the statements and in analysing the narrators of such 
traditions – and the development of Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh).  It seeks to excavate the voice 
of ʿĀ’isha by reconstructing key events from her life in details that are most often obscured, 
with the intention of allowing a more panoramic vision of who ʿĀ’isha was and thereby also 
broadening the parameters of what this paragon of female Muslim piety can offer to Muslim 
women as they envisage their own futures inspired by her.  
 
Drawing on the example she sets in her correctives, this research explores a number of 
possibilities; a) the possibility of engaging the ḥadīth canon and seeking to re-conceptualise it 
in a manner that is reflective of its current status and that posits a formal re-opening of the 
ḥadīth canon in a manner that allows a broader range of traditions to be heard without 
undermining the integrity of the authenticity of the ḥadīth canon, b) the extraction of emergent 
methodologies, exemplified by ʿĀ’isha in both critical analysis of ḥadīth and in approaching 
juristic matters, directly impacting on the ḥadīth and fiqh traditions.  
 
Importantly, in order to achieve this through the textual study of al-Ijāba, a methodology for 
translating ḥadīth had to be developed, and is also presented in this research. 
 
The Vision 
 
Second only to the Quran, the ḥadīth tradition is a central source of guidance in the lives of 
most Muslims. Unlike the Quran, however, it is an amorphous body of work, purporting to 
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transmit the words and actions of the Prophet Muḥammad. The problem of ḥadīth authenticity 
has always been acknowledged by Muslims1, but even so, by the 5th/11th century, Sunni Islam 
had largely come to accept an authoritative corpus made up of six collections, the Ṣiḥāḥ, 
deemed the most reliable representation of the Prophetic teaching. This process of canonisation 
was concluded several centuries after the life of the Prophet Muḥammad, but ultimately could 
not foreclose reference to other collections of ḥadīth, because the corpus could not, and was 
never meant to, reflect the entirety of the Prophetic tradition. In fact, two schools in particular, 
the Ḥanafis and the Twelver Shiʿa, continued to consult collections of ḥadīth transmitted by 
scholars affiliated with their own schools’ collections that much more closely reflected their 
own interpretive positions. The status of the Ṣiḥāḥ was therefore never entirely secure.  
  
It seems that as well as continued reference to alternative, non-canonical sources of tradition, 
there emerged, after the formation of the Ṣiḥāḥ, endeavours to record traditions that had not 
quite made the grade for inclusion in the canonical corpus. These collections are well-known, 
and have been viewed as addenda to the Ṣiḥāḥ.2  The exclusion of many ḥadīth from the Ṣiḥāḥ, 
it seems, also prompted some scholars, to produce alternative compilations with the ostensible 
aim of  undermining the status of the canonical corpus.3  Of these is the compilation of Imām 
 
1 This is attested by the numerous endeavours of classical Muslim scholars who emerged by the end of the first century after 
the Prophet’s passing, and whose aim was to separate the authentic from the inauthentic ḥadīth. The process required the 
formation of a credible science, with its own language, rules and boundaries. Early pioneers included Ibn Ishāq (d. 150/767), 
and Mālik b. Anas (d. 197/796). By the third century scrutiny of the chains of transmission led to voluminous works collecting 
the biographies of narrators, creating the genre of the Ṭabaqāt, the most well-known of which is the work of Ibn Saʿd (d. 
230/845) and the development of ‘ilm al-rijāl, the science of studying individual transmitters of the Prophetic traditions to 
investigate the veracity of their statements and the probity of their characters. By the fourth century, criticism of traditions 
began to develop its own technical terminology, an endeavour for which al-Tirmidhī (d. 279/892) is given much credit (for 
more on his role see ‘Ḥadīth’, EI2. It was at this time that more systematised works were produced, leading to the emergence 
of the distinct field of the Sciences of Tradition (ʿUlūm al-ḥadīth). The first of these was Abū Muḥammad al-Rāmahurmuzī’s 
(d. 360/971) al-Muḥaddit̲h̲ al-Fāṣil Bayna al-Rāwī wa al-Wāʿī, with the best known written a few centuries later by Ibn al-
Ṣalāḥ (d. 643/1245), Ulūm al-ḥadīth. 
2 For example, Al-Mustadrak of al-Ḥākim al-Nishapurī (d. 403/1014). 
3 Even al-Bukhārī and Muslim were met with criticism for the many more traditions that they excluded; the fear of their critics 
was that those traditions would be neglected or even lost entirely. Perhaps from this pressure, they both compiled works which 
also contained authentic traditions not recorded in their Ṣiḥāḥ. Brown (2007) succinctly documents the criticisms both 
traditionists faced by their contemporaries (see Brown, J. 2007. The Canonization of al-Bukhārī and Muslim: The Formation 
and Function of the Sunnī Ḥadīth Canon. Leiden: Brill). Even when the two texts gained canonical status, al-Dāraquṭni (d. 
385/995) penned, Kitāb al-ilzamāt wa al-Tatabbuʿ as a critique, which was taken so seriously that much of what al-Dāraquṭni 
objected to in the two texts was removed (Brown, J. 2004. ‘Criticism of the Proto-Ḥadīth Canon: Al-Dāraquṭni’s Adjustment 
of the Ṣaḥīḥayn’, Journal of Islamic Studies, 15(1), pp.1-37. 
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Badr al-Dīn al-Zarkashī, al-Ijāba li-Īrādi mā Istadraktahu ʿĀ’isha ʿAla al-Ṣaḥābah—The 
Corrective: ʿĀ’isha’s Rectification of the Companions. The book is a collection of 220 ḥadīths 
reported by ʿĀ’isha, third wife of the Prophet Muḥammad, and its title reveals much about its 
author’s agenda. Al-Zarkashī selected only those narrations of ʿĀ’isha in which she refuted, 
corrected, contradicted or further explained ḥadīths that were being circulated by other, 
invariably male, companions of the Prophet. Many of these challenges of ʿĀ’isha were never 
privileged with a place in the Ṣiḥāḥ corpus, particularly al-Bukhārī and Muslim’s collections, 
despite meeting the highest standards of authentication, and despite obviously constituting a 
counter-narrative to those which were deemed worthy of inclusion. In those instances where 
they have been collected, they have, on occasion, been overlooked in favour of the statements 
of other Companions.  
 
Al-Ijāba constitutes a significant moment in the history of the ḥadīth tradition. Yet despite its 
ostensible significance, academia still awaits both an English translation and a detailed 
exploration of the text. Even in the Arabic language, scholarship is all but perfunctory, with 
little more than a conversion of the manuscript to print by way of a critical edition completed 
by M. B. Arül in 1999, and then a second translation based on this into Turkish also by Arül in 
2000. In fact, the text was almost lost entirely, as Arül describes in the preface to his critical 
edition: only two manuscripts existed of al-Ijāba, one he happened to stumble upon in a library 
in Istanbul, and one in Damascus which was accidentally discovered by al-Afghānī in 1939.  
 
The imperative for such a text to be made more widely available as an aid in critically revisiting 
the ḥadīth tradition lies particularly in the question of reliability of the various Companions 
and their narrations of ḥadīth. This is especially so when they have come into conflict with 
those of other Companions, and in questioning the premise that they are all equally reliable. It 
also allows for the reestablishment of ʿĀ’isha as a central and leading authority in ḥadīth and 
gives an insight and opportunity into excavating her methodology towards ḥadīth. This is 
important, not only for feminist scholarship but for the study of ḥadīth literature more 
generally, where scholars such as Fazlur Rahman (1979), and Harald Motzki (2004) have 
already written about the urgency with which the study of ḥadīth needs to be made relevant 
once more.  
 
Reinstating the voice of ʿĀ’isha to the very core of the ḥadīth literature would be a step in the 
direction of normalising a female voice at the epicentre of the Islamic tradition. This move goes 
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beyond the typical feminist hermeneutical approaches in interpreting the Quran. Beyond 
interpreting the tradition from the position of women, it is imperative that the voices of women 
like ʿĀ’isha be permitted to form the very tradition itself. The Prophet’s wives especially were 
intended to be the torchbearers of the Prophet’s legacy, and were in fact divinely instructed to 
be so in the Quran: ‘Remember (wadhkurna) [and proclaim] what is recited in your houses of 
God’s revelations and wisdom for God is All-Subtle, All-Aware.’4  Abdullah Yusuf Ali (2006), 
in his translation of this verse, asserts that the subject of the imperative ‘to remember’ 
(udhkurna) are the wives of the Prophet, and that the command goes beyond simply 
remembering, but extends to a command to ‘recite’, ‘teach’, ‘make known’ and ‘publish’ the 
message which they learn in their homes from the Prophet, the ‘fountain of spiritual 
knowledge’. 
 
With this in mind, it is hoped that the translation and study of a text that centres the voice of 
ʿĀ’isha as one that is crucial to the future of Islam will encourage the expansion of the Muslim 
imaginary such that it can conceive of gender egalitarian thinking and praxis. The drivers of 
such a shift will be Muslim women primarily, perhaps in collaboration with other marginalised 
groups, for it is they who have the most to gain from the overthrow of patriarchal interpretations 
of Islam and its sacred texts. Of relevance here is the work of Ernesto Laclau and Chantal 
Mouffe around the notion of the radical democratic imaginary. Anna Marie Smith expounds 
Laclou and Mouffe’s contention that egalitarian and rights discourses are fundamental to the 
reconstruction of collective identities; that exploitation and oppression are not enough to 
engender resistance; that subordinated groups need to be given critical tools to both dismantle 
structures of power that are oppressive and to construct alternative worlds (Smith, 1998, p.67). 
Crucially, though, Laclau and Mouffe (ibid) underline that being the object of domination does 
not in itself suffice to activate the agent into resistance. Instead, they argue for a distinction to 
be noted between relations of subordination and relations of oppression. Relations of 
subordination indicate an individual is subjected to the will of a dominator but does not 
consider the dominator to be preventing them from realising their full potential and agency. In 
contrast, in relations of oppression, the individual is fully aware of the constraints the 
relationship puts upon them. Laclau and Mouffe (ibid) contend that for a subordinated subject 
to become an oppressed one, a number of steps must first occur; the subordinated individual 
must find a compelling discourse on the matter, that not only provides an account of their 
 
4 Quran, al-Aḥzāb, 33:34 
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condition but also provides the critical tools needed to be able to imagine an alternative space, 
free from the restrictions and constrictions of the dominant group and its subordinating 
structure, in which they can reach their full potential and identity, and also to provide them 
with the ability and means to connect with others in order to achieve this radical vision.  
 
This study allows for a reconsideration of constructions of female Muslim piety, through 
reconstructions of ʿĀ’isha, and thereby representations of Muslim women and their needs in 
the Islamic tradition. The potential of al-Ijāba, to be utilised as a powerful tool around which 
collectives can be brought together to learn about ʿĀ’isha from a perspective that has hitherto 
been denied, is immense. As is discussed in the final Conclusion of this thesis, I presented 
preliminary findings from this study amongst Muslim women in the community, and their 
feedback was electric with excitement at the possibilities of broadening their horizons and 
possibilities, and deepening their religious literacy,  through the statements and behaviours of 
ʿĀ’isha. 
 
The Literature 
 
While there has been no English translation or study made available of al-Ijāba, it has been 
cited in a number of works, and adopted for varying purposes. Denise Spellberg (1994) makes 
most extensive mention of the text in her book, Politics, Gender, and the Islamic Past: The 
Legacy of ʿ Ā’isha bint Abī Bakr. She notes al-Zarkashī’s efforts in casting ʿĀ’isha as more than 
just the favourite wife of the Prophet, but as an integral contributor to Islamic knowledge, the 
most important transmitter, citing the tradition of the Prophet, which al-Zarkashī also quotes in 
his introduction, ‘Take half of your religion from Hummayra’. 5   She rightly frames al-
Zarkashī’s work as a response to Shiʿa polemic, which had hitherto elevated the position of 
Khadīja, the first wife of the Prophet, and Faṭima, his daughter. While she notes that in doing 
so he goes against some from within his own, Shafiʿī school who advocated a preference for 
Faṭima over ʿĀ’isha (ibid. p.175), she does not explore the reasons for this fully, nor is there 
any mention of the position of ʿĀ’isha within other schools of thought, especially the Ḥanafi 
school, wherein she was considered an expert on jurisprudence (faqīha). 
 
5 A nickname given to ʿĀ’isha by the Prophet, meaning ‘little red one’. This could be a reference to her red hair or to the red 
tint to her fair skin as a result of sunburn. Whatever the explanation, it was a title of great endearment from the Prophet to his 
most beloved wife. Whilst this particular tradition has been widely rejected as fabricated (see Ibn Qayyim al-Jawzīyyah, Al-
Manār al-munīf, pp.60-61), the unique scholarly standing of ʿĀ’isha remains undisputed within Sunni scholarship. 
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Asma Sayeed (2013, p.28) cites al-Ijāba in her book, Women and the Transmission of Religious 
Knowledge in Islam, as a means to highlight the scholarly contributions of ʿĀ’isha, especially 
her correcting of Prophetic narrations that were being misinterpreted or misquoted. Sayeed 
does not engage any analysis or translation of the text. Muhammad Akram Nadwi (2013, p.220) 
notes the text in his, al-Muḥaddīthāt, claiming to have combined it along with two similar 
works in a volume titled al-Istiʿāb li ma istadrakathu ʿĀ’isha ʿala al-aṣḥāb. It has not been 
possible to locate this text despite a thorough search; I contacted his educational institute but 
even they appeared to have no knowledge of the title. Zainab Alwani (2013) makes something 
of an effort to propose a methodology that can be extracted from the legacy of ʿ Ā’isha. In doing 
so, she references al-Zarkashī’s al-Ijāba, but is brief in her effort. 
 
Most significant however, is the survey of Fatima Mernissi in, The Veil and the Male Elite 
(1991, p.77), wherein she presents al-Zarkashī’s text as one which casts doubt over the dogma 
that asserts absolute probity of the Companions. Mernissi investigates the historicity of 
particular ḥadīth narrations, contextualising and scrutinising some narrators of ḥadīth who 
displayed what she considered misogynistic tendencies. Paying particular attention to the 
ḥadīths of Abū Hurayra, a character venerated in the ḥadīth tradition, and the most proliferous 
narrator of the Prophet’s teachings, Mernissi drew attention to the fact that Abū Hurayra had 
only witnessed the final two years of the Prophet’s life.6 He therefore missed virtually all of 
the key events of the Prophet’s life, yet somehow still narrated more traditions than any other 
senior Companion of the Prophet. Interestingly, Mernissi is not the first to question the 
proliferous nature of Abū Hurayra’s narrations. We gather from al-Bukhārī that even in his 
own lifetime, Abū Hurayra was challenged and forced to defend himself against accusations of 
lying: ‘You [people] say that Abū Hurayra is excessive in narrating from the Messenger of 
God. You say the Immigrants (Muhājirūn) and the Helpers (Anṣār) do not narrate from the 
Messenger of God the likes of which Abū Hurayra narrates. My Muhājir7 brothers were busy 
in the market while I used to stick to Allah’s Apostle content with what fills my stomach; so I 
 
6 Abū Hurayra is recorded as saying, ‘I enjoyed the company of the Messenger of God for three years…’ al-Bukhārī, Chapter: 
Virtues and Merits of the Prophet and his Companions, Section: The Signs of Prophethood in Islam, ḥadīth No. 3591. The 
lunar calendar as would have been customary for the Companions, would have measured 2 solar years and 3 lunar ones. 
7 Muhājir referred to an Immigrant, who moved from Makkah to Medina in the period just before the Prophet Muḥammad 
emigrated to Medina up until the time of the conquest of Makkah in 8/630. See, P.J. Bearman, Th. Banquis, C.E. Bowworth, 
E. van Donzel, W. P. Heinrichs Bowworth, ‘Muhād̲j̲ir’, See, Andrews, P.A and Ansari, S, ‘Muhād̲j̲ir’, E12. 
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used to be present when they were absent and I used to remember when they used to forget, 
and my Anṣārī 8 brothers used to be busy with their properties while I was one of the poor Ahl 
al-Ṣuffa9. I used to remember the narrations when they used to forget. No doubt, Allah’s 
Apostle once said, ‘Whoever spreads his garment till I have finished my present speech and 
then gathers it to himself, will remember whatever I will say.’ So, I spread my coloured garment 
which I was wearing till Allah’s Apostle had finished his saying, and then I gathered it to my 
chest. So, I did not forget anything of the statements of the Messenger of God’s narrations.’10 
What is important though, is that Mernissi’s critique essentially opens up the possibility of re-
examining the credibility of reports already canonised within the Ṣiḥāḥ. Mernissi questions the 
role of Abū Hurayra, his motivations and the reception of his behaviour among his 
contemporaries, reviewing four of his narrations in the process. My study builds on this by 
extending her approach both in terms of the number of traditions analysed and in terms of the 
number of Companions included within the discussion. 
 
Mernissi also highlights the need for the science of ḥadīth to be instrumentalised for the purpose 
of assessing the credibility and reliability of Companions of the Prophet, who until now have 
been considered virtually infallible in Sunni Islam. Indeed, her call is simply to revive the 
classical tradition of ḥadīth criticism, but to encompass the Companions in this tradition too. 
This study will build on this important contribution by examining the process of ḥadīth 
authentication, and in particular to examine notions such as  the ‘uprightness’ of the 
Companions (ʿadālat al-Ṣaḥāba), which meant that they were exempt from scrutiny in the 
science of impugnment and acceptance (al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl). 
 
It becomes clear then, that this study is not only occupied with discovering the many 
manifestations of ʿĀ’isha that have been constructed and reconstructed throughout the 
historiography of Islam, but also with the mechanics of the ḥadīth literature. This is of great 
importance as feminist scholarship on ḥadīth—with the exception of the efforts of Mernissi 
 
8 Anṣārī singular of anṣār, meaning Helper. These were those Muslims of Medina who aided those who migrated to their city 
and supported the Prophet and his Companions from Makkah. See, Watt, M. EI2. 
9 Ahl al-Ṣuffa also referred to as aṣḥāb al-ṣuffa translates as ‘people of the bench’ and referred to those Companions who lived 
in the portico of the Prophet’s Mosque in Medina. They were made up of Muslims that had emigrated to Medina from various 
places who did not have the means nor connections to establish themselves in the new city so would seek refuge in the Prophet’s 
mosque. The Prophet would encourage others to look after the ahl al-Ṣuffa and would ensure to see to their needs through any 
charity or gifts he received too. See, Tottoli, R. EI3. 
10 al-Bukhārī Chapter: Sales and Trade, ḥadīth No. 263, 
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mentioned above—largely falls short of this. This might be because the ḥadīth are not neatly 
compiled in one volume as the Quran is, but also because the Quran as the verbatim Word of 
God takes precedence over the ḥadīth and so serves as a potentially more powerful means to 
validate and legitimise gender egalitarian positions. However, it is paramount that Islamic 
feminist scholarship engages more with the ḥadīth tradition, not only because ḥadīth are often 
cited as counter arguments to feminist exegesis of the Quran but also because it is the ḥadīth 
tradition which informs juridical texts and Islamic legal tradition most.  
 
Thus far, the approach to ḥadīth taken by Islamic feminist scholars has been less concerned 
with the history and development of ḥadīth and an interrogation of that process, and more 
concerned with treating ḥadīth as an accepted authority in Islam which takes a ‘norm-
providing’ position. As Sa’diyyah Sheikh (2004, p.100) puts it, ḥadīth are approached as a 
‘religio-cultural text which provides a mirror into the dominant conceptions of gender and the 
category of woman within a formative period of the Muslim legacy, as well as the ways in 
which these become ideologically functional subsequently in defining religious ideals of 
gender’. They are, therefore, tools to understanding and creating norms, and as such their 
history, and development needs to be thoroughly interrogated. Interest in the history of ḥadīth 
appears to only go so far as identifying women transmitters of ḥadīth. Asma Sayeed (2103) 
masterfully narrates the story of the role of women in the transmission of sacred knowledge in 
Islamic history in her Women and the Transmission of Religious Knowledge in Islam. She 
writes of the authority of the female Companions beyond the household of the Prophet and of 
their pivotal role in the preservation and transmission of Prophetic traditions, going on to chart 
the rise and then fall of female engagement with scholarship by the end of the 1st/6th century, 
followed by a further resurgence in the mid-4th/10th century, and then a second decline in the 
10th/16th century. She acknowledges a number of social, cultural, political, and legal factors 
that each played a part in the story of female scholarship but does not question the actual texts 
of ḥadīth. Hers is a survey of the social and intellectual history of Muslims and the role women 
have been permitted to play within that. 
 
To resurface female presence in the historical preservation and transmission of Islamic sacred 
knowledge is undoubtedly an important endeavour if female representation is to be reinstated, 
but falls short of the mark as these women’s biographies oftentimes appear unreal and their 
achievements outside the possibility of replication. In keeping these women presented as 
exceptional, this does little to combat what Malti-Douglas (1992, p.54) refers to as ‘sacred 
  9 
history as misogyny’, in which women are primarily viewed in a particular, unflattering light: 
oftentimes more like honorary men than exemplary women. Indeed, ʿĀ’isha herself falls prey 
to such benevolent misogyny. Farīd al-Dīn al-ʿAṭṭār (d. 617/1220) said regarding ʿĀ’isha, ‘If 
it is permissible to take two-thirds of the religion from ʿĀ’isha, the truthful, then it is also 
permissible to receive religious benefit from one of her handmaidens…When a woman [walks] 
on the path of Allah like a man, then it is not possible to call her a woman’11 (Arberry, 1990, 
p.40). Therefore, while it remains an important endeavour, it is not sufficient to evoke the 
memory of these women as there simply do not seem to be enough of them to be considered a 
norm, or at least that is how their stories are relayed, in seeking to reinstitute the role of women 
in the very production of knowledge, not simply in its proliferation. To engage in highlighting 
biographies only is limiting for the fact that often little is known about the individual beyond 
their name, dates and place of birth and death, and the names of any prominent teachers or 
students they may have had. As such there is little by way of inspiration for the Muslim woman 
eager to connect with a role model from her religious heritage. It also leaves enough space 
around each individual female to have her story represented in a manner that continues to 
buttress patriarchal narratives of Islamic tradition. Furthermore, in terms of feminist 
scholarship, as Lerner (1986, pp.176-177) pointed out in her criticism of similar attempts by 
feminist biblical scholars, the visibility of a few counter cultural models is not evidence of a 
scriptural tradition being inherently gender egalitarian, or holding women in high regard let 
alone as equals to men. In short, such efforts are crucial, but not sufficient in establishing a 
robust and genuine argument for an egalitarian assertion of the tradition. 
 
The preoccupation of Muslim feminists with grounding their work in the Quran due to its 
central position in Islam as the unadulterated word of God has been well articulated by 
Chaudhry (2015, pp.94-99). To be able to confidently ground a gender-just reading of Islam in 
 
11 Farīd al-Dīn al-ʿAṭṭār wrote these words when addressing his inclusion of Rabʿiah al-Baṣrī in his Tadhkirāt al-Awliya’ in 
which he recorded the names and biographies of illustrious Sufi saints. The quote starts with him saying ‘If anyone says, ‘Why 
have you included Rabia in the rank of men?’, my answer is that the Prophet himself said, ‘God does not regard your outward 
forms’….’ (Arberry, 1990, p.40). It seems then, that there is an implicit acceptance of the constructed nature of gender; if a 
woman can sometimes be regarded as a man, who in this sense has become a sort of standard of excellence, then all that 
prevents other women from attaining the same is access to resources and education. While constructions of gender are not the 
primary focus of this research, it would be interesting to interrogate these constructions within Islam, taking into consideration 
Judith Butler’s insights on how gender categories are historically contingent and in a continuous process of re-creation that is 
performed on the level of the individual and society in numerous ways, including clothing, behaviour, legal regulations etc. 
See, Butler, J. 1999. Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. New York and London: Routledge. pp.32-33. 
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the Quran is to assert a gender egalitarian episteme. She further notes that the ḥadīth have not 
been systematically engaged with by Muslim feminist scholars due to their secondary standing 
before the Quran in the Muslim community and also because of their amorphous and nebulous 
nature. In addition to this, the very text itself is treacherous terrain for the scholar seeking to 
research it; ḥadīth compilations number in their thousands and carry different weights of 
authority, they are not conveniently found in one single volume like the Quran, and some ḥadīth 
are accepted by some Muslims while being rejected by others. Of course, there is also the issue 
of authenticity; a charge that the Quran is never met with, at least not within the Muslim 
community. Furthermore, Chaudhry (ibid) posits that Muslim feminists may have avoided the 
ḥadīth because they are the sayings of the Prophet who was a product of his social and historical 
context. Thus, unlike God’s words, which can be separated from the patriarchal society in 
which they were revealed by means of a historicisation and contextualisation, the Prophetic 
tradition cannot be so easily absolved of the patriarchal practices it inherently reflects. The 
Prophet is and remains a product of his society and times, with paradoxical results. On the one 
hand, he is constructed as one who inaugurated practices counter to misogynistic trends 
prevalent in his community: He outlawed female infanticide and instituted the dowry (mahr) 
to be paid from the groom to the bride, he ensured women were granted a portion of inheritance 
instead of being part of the inheritance. On the other hand, he engaged in practices and norms 
of his seventh century social milieu. Chaudhry cites his polygamous marriages to between ten 
and twelve women and his lack of endorsement for female leadership in Medina as examples. 
Despite the Prophet’s context and his being a product of that context, feminist scholars mine 
the Prophetic biographies (sīrah) and ḥadīth in search of evidence of what Chaudhry terms, 
‘counter-patriarchal’ (ibid, p.92) practices of the Prophet, as evidence of a legitimate space for 
gender-egalitarian practices in Islam. She astutely notes that such a methodology may be open 
to criticism for being agenda-driven, and as such biased, but further argues that such 
accusations could just as legitimately be levelled at the classical Islamic scholarly tradition and 
its approach to ḥadīth historically. It is noted that traditional Islamic scholars would evince 
their opinions with ḥadīth that best supported their arguments, irrespective of whether those 
ḥadīth were strong or weak; they merely had to ensure they were not fabricated. For Chaudhry, 
‘…Quran commentators and jurists drew on prophetic practice selectively to argue for a 
particular legal position or Quranic interpretation, making prophetic practice fit into their own 
framework rather than portray the Prophet Muhammad as a complex person’ (ibid, p.93). She 
argues that the utilisation of prophetic practice to support a given stance is not new. What is 
new is the drive to utilise prophetic tradition through a lens of gender-egalitarian principles. 
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Chaudhry therefore sets the grounds and argues for the continuation of the traditional approach 
of Islamic scholars in seeing the prophetic tradition as a malleable one, as well as to utilise it 
in the contemporary age with the view to attaining gender parity through it and correcting 
patriarchal and misogynistic interpretations. This methodology is encapsulated by Sheikh 
(2004, p.100) as applying feminist hermeneutics, which she defines as ‘a theory or method for 
interpretation which is sensitive to and critical of sexism’. 
 
Islamic feminist scholarship’s application of a feminist hermeneutics is largely structuralist in 
nature. By asserting that patriarchal interpretations of Islam are a product of male scholarship, 
exercised in patriarchal and misogynistic societies, the claim is not that the text is patriarchal 
but that the minds engaging it are. And yet, there have been post-structuralist efforts by Muslim 
feminist scholars such as Ziba Mir-Hosseini, Azizah al-Hibri, and Leila Ahmad who have 
looked more broadly at other institutions and processes, such as the development of 
jurisprudence as it intersects with the various social milieus that different times and places 
presented, as well as the power structures of each context including those in the present, with 
an aim to identify strategies for change. Milne (1989) considered structuralist analyses of 
feminist hermeneutics as applied to the Bible. She wrote, ‘When the text to be analysed is the 
Bible, however, the possibility for change is severely limited because the textual corpus is 
fixed. The canonical collection cannot be changed by adding feminist writings to it’ (p.32). 
This would probably hold true for feminist hermeneutics as applied to the Quran too, but with 
the ḥadīth literature, there is an exciting opportunity to reopen the canon and possibly reinstate 
sound ḥadīth that have been overlooked and obscured, and to make space for those ḥadīth that 
may have been sound by the highest standards, but simply not included in the canonical corpus. 
 
Revisiting the canonised ḥadīth is not only of importance for the feminist study of Islam, but 
also for the relevance of the study of ḥadīth. Writers such as Fazlur Rahman (2002), Harald 
Motzki (2004), and Israr Khan (2010) to name but a few have articulated well the urgency with 
which the study of ḥadīth needs to be revised. Rahman (2002, pp.43-68) writes at length in his 
preeminent book Islam about the development of the ḥadīth, on how the Sunna was understood 
as the living tradition and how that was co-opted by the verbal tradition in the processes of 
canonisation. He observes this process did not take place in a vacuum, and that it too was prey 
to the political environment of its times, shaped by the dominant polemics amongst the 
scholarly classes across the various Muslim schools, particularly between the rationalists (Ahl 
al-Kalām) and the traditionists (Ahl al-ḥadīth). The history of this process lays bare the 
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weaknesses within the canon due to the polarising effects of the polemics within which it was 
developed. Rahman asserts that these weaknesses are utilised by some modernists who would 
seek to do away with ḥadīth as a whole, but that this is a call to a fruitless endeavour since the 
ḥadīth is paramount in providing context and historicity to the Quran. Additionally, there does 
not now exist an alternative source for understanding prophetic teaching inasmuch as there no 
longer exists a living tradition separate to the oral/written one. Despite this, the concerns of 
such modernists, he argues, are legitimate but rather than seeking to abandon ḥadīth altogether, 
Rahman instead argues, ‘…a candid and responsible investigation into the development of the 
Ḥadīth by the Muslims themselves is a desideratum of the first order. Whatever can be achieved 
in this way will be a sheer gain, for it will reveal the intimate connection between the 
Community and the Prophet on the one hand, and between the doctrinal and the practical 
evolution of the Community and the growth of the Ḥadīth on the other. It will illuminate the 
relationship between these three and will clear the way for proper future development’ (ibid, 
p.67). 
 
Resisting Labels: On Positionality 
 
While it is intended that this research contributes to Islamic feminist scholarship, it is important 
to address the various approaches within Islamic feminist scholarship and where this research 
is positioned within this discourse, and indeed where it extends beyond feminist scholarship of 
any stripe.  
 
While the term Islamic feminism came into more popular circulation in the 1970’s-80’s, many 
scholars have highlighted the heritage of gender egalitarian struggles within the numerous non-
Western traditions and cultures within which Islam is embedded. Mir Hosseini (1999, 1996, 
2013) illustrates this in the efforts of women in Iran who rallied against the patriarchal 
impositions of the post-revolution theocracy, while Shuruq Naguib (2015) brings to attention 
the works of Bint al-Shāṭī, who never declared an affiliation with feminism but espoused the 
ideals of a society in which women are treated as fully equal human beings to men. In other 
words, there is an acute awareness amongst many scholars within Islamic feminist scholarship 
of the efforts of women from within Islam’s history, who have appealed to the Muslim to realise 
a society which is just and delivers fair treatment and opportunities irrespective of gender. This 
reality has led to what Seedat (2013) has delineated as two positions amongst academics 
regarding Islam and feminism. Firstly, there are those who would denounce any such 
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partnership and believe Islam to be inherently patriarchal and as such incompatible with 
feminism. Haideh Moghissi (1999) is paradigmatic here, when she argues that despite the 
historical efforts of women to find a gender egalitarian space within Islam, these efforts have 
not been so widely popular or successful, because the religion is inherently patriarchal and any 
attempts to ‘read’ another interpretation into the text are a futile endeavour. Conversely, there 
are also those opponents to a convergence between the two on the grounds of incompatibility, 
who reject the need for feminism as a futile Western human construct that cannot be imposed 
on the perfect Divinely inspired teachings of Islam, as is argued by Zeenath Kausar (2006). 
Secondly, there are those who see a convergence between the two paradigms, though Seedat 
astutely notes that they too can be split into three positions.  
 
Firstly, there are those that not only support this but consider it an inevitable partnering, 
especially as more Muslim women take to reclaiming the narrative. It is interesting to note 
nonetheless that even Margot Badran (2009, p.143), who is a strong advocate of such a view, 
maintains the term ‘gender activism’ to describe the efforts of many Muslim women, 
acknowledging the suspicion with which some Muslims, both male and female, regard 
feminism because of its ‘Western associations’. She admits the reason why a significant 
number of apparently feminist Muslim women reject the term is because it is confining and 
potentially misleading.  
 
The second approach, which includes the likes of wadud and Barlas, roots gender-just readings 
of the Quran not in a feminist methodology but from a faith-based perspective which upholds 
justice as a core component of the faith. Mernissi (1991, p.viii) asserts, ‘The quest for dignity, 
democracy and human rights, for full participation in the political and social affairs of our 
country, stems from no imported Western values but is a true part of the Muslim tradition’. 
These female Muslim scholars root the impetus of their work within the Muslim tradition and 
its tenets, rather than in feminism per se, while at the same time, they accept that feminism 
provides a language and theory through which they are able to best articulate their assertions. 
Nonetheless, they maintain a distance from the term feminism and actively reject and resist the 
thrusting of the term onto their work.12 The third position on the convergence between Islam 
 
12 While wadud seems to have become more accepting of the term, Barlas still maintains that her work should not be read 
merely as feminist. Barlas rejects the term ‘Islamic feminism’ as a master signifier and warns against its hegemonic imposition 
on the Islamic tradition in a manner that threatens to obfuscate the heritage of women’s resistance to patriarchy, and to readings 
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and feminism is what Seedat (2013, p.406) refers to as ‘taking Islam for granted’. Proponents 
of such a position, including Kecia Ali, engage with Islamic texts as their subjects, and 
feminism as their method for analysis. Ali (2006, p.153) argues that Muslim feminists are now 
a part of the Islamic scholarly landscape, such that whether their works and conclusions are 
being accepted and mainstreamed or not, they continue to ‘push at its boundaries and reshape 
its contours’. This position, Seedat (2013, p.418) observes, ‘pays less attention to the 
hegemonic politics of feminism and more attention to its critical discourse’. 
 
Given this range in positions regarding Islam and feminism, and the nature of their 
convergence, it is important then to pause to consider the position of this research and its 
engagement with the various paradigms. Both Seedat and Barlas have expounded on the need 
to maintain a critical distance between Islam and feminism, which warrants some discussion 
in clarifying the position of this research too.  
 
Barlas has been in a consistent debate with Badran, who insists on defining Barlas’s work as 
feminist, while Barlas has determinedly argued otherwise. She questions her resistance, asking 
herself, when the phenomenon of Islamic feminism has become an actual reality, why does she 
remain so averse to accepting the classification?  In answering her own question, she brings to 
the fore the politically hegemonic nature of feminism as a discourse. She argues (2008, p.22) 
‘…it is the very inclusivity of feminism - its attempt as a meta and master narrative about 
equality - that I find both imperialising and reductive’. Barlas, wadud, and Seedat have all 
spoken of feminism in two distinct forms; as an analytic construct, and as a political hegemony. 
Even while acknowledging the contribution of feminism as an analytical tool, they caution that 
a distance must be kept between Islam and feminism, arguing that feminism remains 
inadequate in serving the gender equality concerns in Islam, and caution that it precludes other 
ways of understanding gender that reside outside of the Eurocentric, in non-Western and anti-
colonial cultural paradigms (Seedat, 2013). 
 
Not only have Muslim female scholars seeking to enliven debate and understanding of Islam 
and gender just readings of the tradition highlighted the shortcomings of feminism as an 
 
of gender-just readings that are not born from a Western liberal perspective. See, Barlas, A., 2008. Engaging Islamic Feminism: 
Provincialising Feminism as a Master Narrative. In: A. Kynsilehto. ed. Islamic Feminism: Current Perspectives. Tampere: 
Juvenes Print. pp.15-25 
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analytical tool and as an imposition of a political hegemony, there are also those who have 
highlighted the artificial impression feminist readings may give of a lack of female voices 
within the Islamic tradition and history. The assertion of a feminist hermeneutics to reading the 
Quran has led Naguib (2010) to argue that this imposition enacts a sort of epistemic violence 
upon the tradition. She argues that insisting on a feminist hermeneutic of the Quran is to 
obscure earlier voices of Muslim women, and to project a false notion of Muslim women being 
silent prior to the advent of modernity. Certainly, the history of the first Islamic community 
and the presence of Khadīja bint Khuwaylid upon first revelation, through to Ḥafṣa bint ʿUmar 
as the central authority in the unification of the Quran, would attest to Naguib’s assertion. 
Additionally, a number of lesser known female figures have also been recognised and 
acknowledged for their contribution to the scholarly heritage of Islam. This insistence upon a 
feminist hermeneutic of the Quran, according to Naguib (2010, p.19), creates a false dichotomy 
wherein on the one hand, there is a tradition which is inherently patriarchal, and on the other, 
a feminist reading which liberates the tradition of patriarchal interpretation. Naguib argues that 
this dichotomising of the issue, puts feminist readings outside the communal perspective, and 
if a study is not accepted by the very community it seeks to inform, then she questions what 
value can be given to such work. 
 
Thus while this research benefits from the articulations of feminist hermeneutics as applied to 
the Quran, and the works of Muslim scholars, who may or may not subscribe to the term Islamic 
feminism, it will seek to grow in the gap between feminist assertions and the tradition, or rather 
the ḥadīth tradition more specifically. It is not to be positioned in opposition to traditional 
readings of the ḥadīth, but rather as a complementing completion of the tradition—a means to 
reading the tradition whole, while understanding and advocating for the fact that continued 
revisiting of the tradition means that it is always in the process of becoming. This research is 
seeking to re-centre the voice of ʿĀ’isha and is entirely based around the work of the male 
scholar, al-Zarkashī. Thus, the argument of binaries is already at the very core of this work 
subverted, while at the same time not denying the influence of patriarchal readings, and 
interpretations which have favoured the Muslim male experience over that of the Muslim 
female. It is, in other words, an effort in providing a reading that is not oblivious to the 
complicatedness of the gender implications at play—after all, every corrective of ʿĀ’isha is in 
response to a male companion (except in the case of Fatima, which is exceptional for a number 
of reasons, as explained in Chapter Six), but that also acknowledges the nuances. ʿĀ’isha’s 
voice has been suppressed, and yet it is the work of this man, al-Zarkashī, upon whom this 
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research relies in exhuming her voice, while simultaneously needing to be vigilant of al-
Zarkashī’s own contextual influences on how he read the text. 
 
Chapter Summaries 
 
In Chapter One, this study introduces Imām al-Zarkashī and his text and seeks to interrogate 
the possibility that al-Zarkashī had foreseen the fate that awaited the statements of ʿĀ’isha and 
sought to forestall it by compiling this work and then dedicating it to the Qāḍi al-Quḍāt, 13 
Chief Judges, Qāḍi Burḥān al-Dīn b. Jamāʿah (d. 790/1388), who was one of the most 
distinguished Shafiʿī jurists in Mamluk Egypt, descended from a family well-established within 
the religio-judicial system of the Mamluk dynasty. To have had his ear was to potentially have 
direct impact on the prevailing judicial system. The chapter also introduces the central figure 
of the text, ʿ Ā’isha bint Abū Bakr, and considers how her history has been reported, constructed 
and reconstructed by generations of Muslim scholarly elites and wider community and what 
the implications of these various constructions have had on the take-up of her statements and 
positions and their link to broader constructions of Muslim womanhood. 
 
Acknowledging the role of the ḥadīth in the constructions of ʿĀ’isha and the treatment of her 
statements, in Chapter Two this study seeks to understand the history of ḥadīth and its 
development into a self-contained discipline. Additionally, Chapter Two considers the criteria 
against which ḥadīth are accepted or rejected with a view to examining how this might have 
led to the marginalisation of ʿĀ’isha’s statements and positions. However, the validation of the 
ḥadīth is not the only relevant factor, for the process of canonisation must also be considered. 
This dimension is discussed with reference to both who participates in the process—it is in fact 
a male-led endeavour—and by considering the potential of extra-canonical ḥadīth collections 
in disrupting the hierarchy represented by the Ṣiḥāḥ in order to allow a broader representation 
of ḥadīth that meet the standards set by ḥadīth scholars. To this end, I have analysed the ḥadīth 
texts as Canon I and Canon II types, in accordance with the definition for each as schematised 
by Gerald T. Sheppard (1987). While Sheppard’s schematising of the canon is highly useful, 
this study seeks to heed the cautions of Kendall Folkert (1989) in seeking to apply canon, 
 
13 Qāḍi al-Qudāt was a term adopted by the Abbāsids and is believed to have been of Persian origin. Schacht posits, ‘It has 
been suggested that the office of Chief Qadi [chief justice] …is of Persian origin and the translation, into an Islamic context, 
of the Zoroastrian Mobedan Mobed.’ (1950, p.10) 
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centring biblical texts, onto non-Biblical sources and as such will extend the notion of canon 
types, to include a Canon III type. Where Sheppard coined Canon I to mean those texts which 
are not of themselves an authority but imbibed with authority by scholars, and Canon II to 
mean those texts which have gained such status that they are in and of themselves authoritative, 
independent of scholarly endorsement, I propose retaining Canon I as described by Sheppard, 
while dividing Canon II into two: Canon II retaining its definition, but with the additional 
Canon III, illustrating the separate and elevated status of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, which have 
their distinct history, process, and status from the other canonised ḥadīth texts. 
 
It may be the case that al-Zarkashī intended to challenge the canon with his work. The 
production of ḥadīth literature was certainly not halted by the rise in prominence of certain 
texts over others. As such, in translating and probing the text, this research may be viewed as 
an attempt to re-open and expand the canon in the way that it centralises the voice of ʿĀ’isha. 
This will also require a historical analysis of the life of ʿĀ’isha and understanding of the ways 
in which her persona has been constructed and then reconstructed over the centuries, and the 
impact this would have had on the position of her statements vis-a-vis other Companions of 
the Prophet. Additionally, this chapter considers the impact of Shiʿa-Sunni polemics on the 
construction of ʿĀ’isha and how these in turn influenced her position within the ḥadīth 
tradition. In understanding the canonisation process in ḥadīth, this study has sought to 
interrogate prevailing narratives that remain Shafiʿī/ʿAshaʿri centric. Works on canonisation of 
ḥadīth by authors such as Brown (2007) and El Shamsi (2013) fail to sufficiently address the 
works of ḥadīth which ran counter to the canon-culture, most significantly, the works produced 
by Ḥanafi scholars who as proponents of the ahl al-ra’y, held a different perspective regarding 
ḥadīth to the ahl al-ḥadīth stance, to which the Shafiʿīs subscribed. 
 
Chapter Three explicates the methodology adopted for translating the text and presents an 
approach for translating ḥadīth that could be transferable to the translation of any ḥadīth text. 
The value of doing this emerges from the fact that there is nothing available in the existing 
literature regarding methodologies for the translation of ḥadīth, and nor is there adequate 
reflection on the part of those engaged in translating Islamic texts, especially the ḥadīth, on 
translation decisions they have made. Instead there are vague and rather obscure claims to 
‘simple’ and ‘authentic’ interpretations without clarity on what either implies. Chapter Three 
is therefore not only an important explanation of the methodology utilised in this research, it is 
also an intervention in the wider field of ḥadīth translation. The chapter also delineates which 
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parts of al-Ijāba have been translated given that, for the purposes of this study, translation of 
the whole text is not needed. 
 
The next three chapters are concerned with analysing the translated ḥadīth. Chapter Four 
foregrounds ʿĀ’isha’s refutations of all the Companions, except for Abū Hurayra and Faṭima 
bint Qayṣ, and maps the responses of ʿĀ’isha from a juristic position. The argument is made 
that not only does she have a clear approach to assessing ḥadīth, but also a methodology that 
underpins her legal rulings, leading to a case for an emergent juristic framework. Chapter Five 
analyses ʿĀ’isha’s responses to statements made by Abū Hurayra and elicits her criteria for 
rejecting or accepting a statement, and how that has been applied by her on Companions of the 
Prophet. Chapter Six focuses on the ḥadīth of Faṭima bint Qayṣ and ʿĀ’isha’s response to her. 
This response is an anomaly within the text for a number of reasons: it is the only ḥadīth 
wherein ʿĀ’isha is refuting a female Companion; it is also the only time that ʿĀ’isha is not 
impugning the narrator or denying the facts being relayed. ʿĀ’isha’s only contention with 
Faṭima is that the latter is seeking to make a precedent out of her claim that would negatively 
affect all female divorcees. Both ʿĀ’isha and Fatima’s possible motivations and the principles 
behind their positions are considered. Furthermore, the treatment of Faṭima’s statement by 
various men from amongst her peers as well as scholars from later generations are investigated, 
providing some insight into how her gender impacted on their response. ʿĀ’isha’s response is 
interesting for what it reveals of her principles that I describe as exhibiting an ethic of care. 
This ethic of care, a commitment to ensuring the best and most wholesome conclusion/outcome 
for the Muslim community, bearing in mind the particular limitations of those who are largely 
marginalised and therefore unprivileged and disadvantaged in many ways, becomes 
increasingly apparent in all of her responses, and is in line with the Quranic ethos and Prophetic 
mission. 
 
The analysis and findings of Chapters Four, Five, and Six culminate in the conceptualisation, 
in Chapter Seven, of an emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha in approaching the ḥadīth. 
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Chapter One: The Woman, The Man, The Text 
 
This chapter provides an introduction to the three foci of interest in this research in 
chronological order. Firstly, ʿĀ’isha bint Abū Bakr is introduced and three crucial events in 
her life are presented: her age at marriage to the Prophet, the case of slander against her, and 
the Battle of the Camel. These events have been selected for a number of reasons. Each was a 
controversial moment in the life of the Prophet and/or ʿĀ’isha, and most certainly in the 
ongoing life of Muslims who have to contend with each controversy. The particularly young 
age of ʿĀ’isha upon her marriage to the Prophet, offends modern sensibilities, and has been the 
subject of much scholarly engagement. It is not the objective of this chapter to conclude truths 
regarding her age at marriage, but to observe the ways in which the ḥadīth canon has been 
engaged, and the implications of this engagement on just how fluid the canon is, albeit only 
informally. This has further implications for the discussion in Chapter Two when considering 
the ḥadīth canon and the argument for a formal opening of the canon that allows for the re-
interrogation of the ḥadīth recorded therein, the prioritising of statements of Companions who 
were more senior, more learned, and better placed to comment on Prophetic tradition, and in 
engaging authentic ḥadīth that are not privileged with the same treatment of canonised ḥadīth, 
simply because they reside outside of the canon as it is currently conceptualised. 
 
Both the slander against ʿĀ’isha and her role in the Battle of the Camel, are presented in some 
detail for the wealth of information they provide. Both incidents being intensely severe upon 
ʿĀ’isha and those around her, reveal the remarkable mettle of her character. The slander 
illustrates the depth of her reliance on God and connection with the Quran, both in terms of her 
seeking succour in its verses through the trying time, and in the subsequent verses revealed as 
a result of her ordeal. In turn what these verses reveal of women’s rights and the preferential 
treatment towards accused women as a Divinely endorsed epistemic position, and the precedent 
set by ʿ Ā’isha in leaving her husband’s home, retreating to the home of her parents for recovery 
from illness and the emotional distress of what was occurring, all encourage and support 
women in vulnerable domestic situations to be supported, allowed freedom of movement, and 
to have the benefit of doubt in their favour. 
 
The Battle of the Camel took place after the death of the third Caliph, ʿUthmān ibn ʿAffān, 
when civil strife had reached a peak. It is distinct from the Slander of ʿĀ’isha, not only for 
having taken place after the life of the Prophet, but also for how seldom modern retellings of 
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the history of the earliest generation of Muslims make mention of it, and when they do, how 
the story is sanitised beyond recognition, despite its being recorded in ḥadīth collections like 
those of al-Bukhārī and Muslim. By re-visiting the story as relayed in authentic ḥadīth and by 
the early historian al-Ṭabarī, the details of the incident are presented to grant an understanding 
of  ʿĀ’isha that will be considered in the translation process as discussed in Chapter Three, and 
in considering the implications this has on constructions of ʿĀ’isha.  
 
Constructions of ʿĀ’isha have a direct impact on the boundaries of what constitutes an ideal 
Muslim woman. As a paragon of Muslim womanhood, the behaviours and actions of ʿĀ’isha 
which run counter to patriarchal assertions of the ideal Muslim woman, become dangerous and 
threatening, and are first to fall foul in the sanitised retellings of the Battle. This is considered 
in more detail later in this chapter, in the section entitled, ʿĀ’isha and the Construct of 
Muslimah Piety. 
 
These events are considered in order to better understand who ʿĀ’isha was and to examine the 
historiography of these cases for what they reveal of varying demands and pressures Muslim 
scholars were contending with and the broader implications this had on how she was 
constructed and her stories told, as well as the implications of these constructions for Muslim 
women. Each story has the potential to reveal her a critical and independent thinker, an astute 
leader, a woman with political acumen and ambitions, a scholar, dissenting rebel, teacher, a 
woman made independent of her parents and husband in her reliance upon God alone. Each of 
these in turn opening up possibilities for Muslim women, most of which run counter to 
patriarchal expectations of Muslim women, both in the domestic and public domains.   
 
The details relayed in the brief biography of ʿĀ’isha and in the presentation of the three 
aforementioned incidents, reflect the points on which all major accounts agree. What is 
presented is based on sound traditions recorded by al-Bukhārī and Muslim, as well as the works 
of early biographers and historians, most notably the Tārīkh of al-Ṭabarī. As such, the 
controversy is not in the relaying of the incidents in full now, but in the scandalous removal of 
the details by others. Thus, the chapter also engages in ground-clearing by reinstating histories 
as they were initially recorded. 
 
Next, al-Zarkashī is introduced, with the aim of understanding who he was and his standing as 
a scholar. Speculations about what motivations lay behind his penning of the text are given in 
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light of the socio- political context in which he wrote. Finally, the text, al-Ijāba, is introduced, 
with a discussion of the story of the manuscript and the remarkable discovery of it. 
 
ʿĀ’isha bint Abū Bakr 
 
ʿĀ’isha was born in Makkah in the year 614, nine years before the Prophet’s migration to 
Medina. She was the daughter of Abū Bakr al-Ṣiddīq, the close friend and successor to the 
Prophet, who was honoured with the title of al-Ṣiddīq, the Truthful one, by the Prophet, a title 
his daughter would also be conferred with following the incident of the slander.14 She was also 
given the agnomen, Umm ʿAbdullah. Al-Zarkashī notes in his introduction, there is some 
discrepancy as to what initiated the Prophet’s naming her thus; some have recorded that she 
gave birth to a still born child, and as such was named after the deceased child. He concludes 
the stronger opinion appears to be that the Prophet named her so after her nephew, ʿAbdullah 
b. al-Zubayr, son of her sister Asmā’ bint Abū Bakr, towards whom she felt deep affection. 
 
ʿĀ’isha was the third wife of the Prophet, marrying him after the death of his first wife Khadīja, 
at the suggestion of Khawla bint Ḥakīm, an early convert to Islam. ʿĀ’isha did not live with 
him until after the migration to Medina. She was to become famed as his most beloved wife, 
exemplified most poignantly in his final days of illness when he pined to be with her, as well 
as in the stories of a relationship which was playful and mutually enriching. In his last few 
days, she was to nurse the Prophet dutifully, and he was to then be buried in her chamber upon 
passing.  
 
After approximately twelve years of marriage she became a widow. During the Caliphate of 
her father, and then the ten-year rule of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, she appears to have remained 
disengaged from political affairs, though she remained active within the Muslim community, 
responding to their questions and queries pertaining to the faith. However, during the unrest of 
ʿUthmān b. ʿ Affān’s Caliphate,15 she joined the dissenting voices against him, but was outraged 
 
14 See, Quran, al-Nūr, 24:11. 
15 ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān’s nepotistic leadership style aggravated resentment amongst other Companions and Successors. His 
disposal of war booty and land, and selection of governors in a manner that favoured his own kin led to widespread 
disgruntlement that festered into an outright rebellion. He was finally besieged in his home as protests turned to riots, and he 
was murdered by some of those protesting. Whilst there were many Companions who had by now stopped defending him, or 
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at his murder. Feeling that his murderers had not been brought to justice, she raised an army of 
a thousand men from Medina, flanked by Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr, and marched against the fourth 
Caliph, ʿAlī b. Abū Ṭālib to Basra. They seized control of Basra, and a battle was to ensue 
between the two camps that came to be known as the Battle of the Camel (Ḥarb al-Jamal), due 
to ʿĀ’isha’s presence on the battlefield in the litter of a camel. ʿĀ’isha was not to find victory 
on the battlefield though, and while Ṭalḥa and al-Zubayr lost their lives, she returned to Medina 
and lived out the rest of her life in relative quietude. She passed away in the year 58/678, in 
Ramadan, twenty years after the defeat. Though it had been her wish to have been buried beside 
her husband and father, ʿUmar had been buried in that place and so she took her final resting 
place in al-Baqīʿ cemetery. 
 
Reconstructions of ʿĀ’isha 
 
ʿĀ’isha, much like any iconic figure, including the Prophet, has seen her persona constructed 
and reconstructed repeatedly over time in response to a plethora of demands on her character.16 
Whether it is intra-Muslim conflict such as that between Shiʿas and Sunnis, or external 
criticisms, political pressures, or internal questioning, the image of ʿĀ’isha has been revisited 
and reconstructed to meet these demands. A number of key flash points appear in the story of 
her life which are often first to be subject to some revision. These are her age at marriage to 
Muḥammad, the case of the slander against her and her involvement in the Battle of the Camel. 
It is useful to consider how each of these incidents has been revised in light of contemporary 
pressures. This revision that is often engaged in by scholars as they grapple with newly 
involving challenges to Muslim praxis and religious literacy starkly illustrate how the ḥadīth 
canon, despite the claim for its rigidity, is in fact informally laid open. In order to meet these 
needs, the canon is compromised though this is never overtly admitted, as shall be 
demonstrated, but until this translates into a flexible position towards the ḥadīth canon, extra-
canonical ḥadīth collections remain outside the discourse and alternative readings are still not 
privileged with scholarly attention, let alone a normative position in the life of the community. 
 
were even aggrieved by him and speaking out against him, there is no evidence to suggest that any of them sanctioned his 
killing. For more see, Madelung, W. 1994. The Succession to Muhammad: A Study of the Early Caliphate. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press. pp.78-113. 
16  For an interesting overview of how ʿĀ’isha has been utilised in modern attempts at creating an ideal Arab Muslim woman, 
see Elsadda, H. (2001). Discourses on Women’s Biographies and Cultural Identity: Twentieth-Century Representations of the 
Life of ‘A'isha Bint Abī Bakr. Feminist Studies, 27(1), 37–64. 
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Observing these reconstructions of ʿĀ’isha both illustrates the critical engagement that does 
take place with the canon as well as affirms the need to scrutinise narrators of ḥadīth traditions 
from among the Companions.  
 
Such an endeavour additionally exposes the tragic removal of ʿĀ’isha’s agency—the voice 
may be hers but the pen that recorded it and wrote its explanation belonged to someone else. 
As Denise Spellberg (1994, p.12) notes, while a ḥadīth may be reported as the word of ʿĀ’isha, 
and its chain of narrators (sanad) may present her as the source origin for the tradition too, 
‘ḥadīth and khabar represent the triumph of both selectivity and the pen as the arbiters of 
communal Islamic truths’. In other words, while ʿĀ’isha may appear doubly bound to a 
tradition by being both the subject of the tradition and the authoritative seal in its chain of 
narrators, the process of ḥadīth collection, and the subsequent canonisation process means that 
the selectivity of scholars engaged in the process have the winning hand. Noting then that the 
process has been entirely dominated by men further skews the readings that will have been 
created of her statements. By observing these flash points from her life, and observing their 
periodic reconstructions, including the disparities in the narratives, it is hoped that something 
of a more authentic understanding of ʿĀ’isha can be achieved. The translation of al-Ijāba will 
take the emerging character of ʿĀ’isha into consideration then, when translating her words. 
 
Furthermore, these particular case studies allow pause for reflection on the variance that exists 
between the accountability of prominent male Companions and the accountability of prominent 
female Companions. In the case of lesser known Companions and their narrations, it would be 
fair to assert that the gender of the companion was inconsequential, all that was required was 
confirmation of their having been in the company of the Prophet. ʿ Ā’isha was the most beloved 
wife of the Prophet, honoured with the title of Mother of the Believers; she experienced a 
personal intervention from God, exonerating her in the face of a suspecting community; her 
intelligence and intellectual inquisitiveness were praised by the Prophet; and yet there are far 
too many instances where her statements are overlooked in favour of those of male 
Companions who seem above scrutiny. It could be argued that, as a prominent wife of the 
Prophet, one should expect her to be the subject of more scrutiny, especially with respect to 
ḥadīth transmission. Yet the scrutiny is not applied fairly. Instead it appears to be the case that 
Companions such as Abū Hurayra for example, who was marked for the shortcomings in his 
memory, or Abū Bakra, who had been flogged on the orders of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb for 
contempt of court due to false testimony, find themselves absolved of shortcomings that 
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otherwise render one impugned, while ʿĀ’isha, who is never charged on any such grounds is 
side-lined. There is a kind of collective amnesia when it comes to the indiscretions of male 
Companions while the misfortunes of a female Companion are fortified as opportunities 
through which to attack the Prophet, as in the case of the age of ʿĀ’isha upon marriage, or as 
instances of suspicion which forever negatively impinge on ʿĀ’isha’s reputation, such as 
resulted from the slanderous campaign against ʿĀ’isha or her defeat at the Battle of the Camel. 
Only ʿĀ’isha’s defeat becomes a cause for humiliation and embarrassment, both for her and by 
extension to all women seeking or in a position of leadership. The misdemeanours, failures or 
shortcomings of her male counterparts are never taken as defects rooted in their biology. With 
sectarian polemics thrown into the mix too, resulting in heavily iconic depictions of key 
Companions, ʿĀ’isha is once again either valorised, such as in Sunni Islam, or denigrated, such 
as in Shiʿa Islam; both sides constructing images of key Companions in response to the other’s 
praise or criticism of an individual, as well as in line with their own episteme.  
 
Additionally, it appears that male Companions are allowed to be multifaceted and complex 
without relinquishing their authority or reliability, while the female Companions are projected 
as uncomplicated, a homogenous group with few distinguishing markers between them. 
Perhaps it is because of attitudes like this that sweeping statements regarding women are found 
littered throughout the ḥadīth corpus, such as the supposed statements of the Prophet claiming 
that at the end of time, when the anti-Christ appears, the majority of his followers will be 
women, or that the Prophet witnessed Hell and found most of its inhabitants to be women.17 
By analysing the three key issues in the telling of ʿĀ’isha’s story, I will not only be mapping 
the journey that the construction of her persona travels, but also attempt to retrieve her voice, 
and consider how these key events are framed in the Muslim imaginary on the basis of her 
gender. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Age at Marriage to the Prophet Muḥammad 
 
 
17 For a discussion on the sound ḥadīth oft-quoted regarding the demography of Paradise being made up of more men than 
women, see Geissinger, A. (2017), ‘Are men the majority in Paradise, or women?’: Constructing gender and communal 
boundaries in Muslim b. al-Hajjaj’s (d. 261/875) Kitab al-Janna. In: S., Guenther, Lawson, T., Christian, M. eds. Eschatology 
and concepts of the Hereafter in Islam. Leiden: Brill. Vol. 1, pp.311-340. Additionally, for an insight into the impact of 
misogynistic statements attributed to the Prophet, see, Şekatli Tuksal, H. 2013. Misogynistic Reports in the Hadith Literature. 
In: E. Aslan, Hermanses, M., Medeni, E. eds. Muslima Theology: The Voices of Muslim Women Theologians.  
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Kecia Ali (2014) charts the historiography of key events pertaining to the life of the Prophet in 
her book, The Lives of Muḥammad. In this book she dedicates an entire chapter to the age at 
which ʿĀ’isha married him. It is recorded by both al-Bukhārī and Muslim that she was six or 
seven when the marriage was contracted and nine or ten when the marriage was consummated. 
Ali skilfully reviews the way in which this has been treated by both Muslims with a positive 
vested interest in the story, as well as by those antagonistic to Islam—those writing in pre-
modern times as well as more recently, in order to identify the possible external influences that 
shaped the narrative. 
 
As for the age of ʿĀ’isha upon marriage, Ali (2014, p.133) notes that it is not until the mid-
twentieth century that the age of ʿĀ’isha becomes a concern. Up until this point, the issue of 
controversy was that her marriage meant that the Prophet was polygamous for the first time. 
Having been faithfully married to Khadīja alone, for more than twenty years, on her passing he 
married Sawdah, and then soon after, ʿ Ā’isha. For pre-modern Muslim writers, neither the issue 
of initiating a polygamous marriage nor ʿĀ’isha’s reportedly young age at marriage appear to 
have been an issue requiring clarification or justification. For Sunni scholars, it was a fact that 
ʿĀ’isha was a child at marriage, even though some variability in her specific age is evident. 
Spellberg (1994, p.28) notes that the debate between Sunnis and Shiʿas regarding the 
succession of the Prophet upon his death spilled over to colour all other polemics too. The 
argument as to whether Abū Bakr was the rightful successor or ʿAlī embroiled the two women 
who acted as the link between them and Muḥammad, namely ʿĀ’isha and Faṭima respectively, 
into competing diatribes too. Such positioning of these two females within the partisan, 
politically charged debates between Sunnis and Shiʿas, meant that every aspect of their 
biographies became subject to political discussion and scrutiny, including the age of ʿĀ’isha 
upon marriage.  
 
One hundred and fifty years after her death, Ibn Sʿad produced a list of qualities unique to 
ʿĀ’isha, presented in her own words. One of her claims to uniqueness amongst the wives of 
Muḥammad was that she was the only virgin he married. While any claim to status based on 
such an unstable property is problematic, it was one held in enough esteem to be mentioned 
and reasserted throughout history. Shiʿa scholars also noted the virginal status of Faṭima, 
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raising her to the station of the Virgin Mary,18 with ʿAlī Shariʿati stating that despite marriage 
and childbirth, she remained a virgin always. Not only was she granted permanent virginal 
status, she was also exempt from monthly periods. She was relieved ‘from such pollution, as 
He [God] removed from her all abomination, and purified her into a total purification’ (Ordoni, 
2008, p.58). It is asserted in both Shiʿa and Sunni tradition that not only did Faṭima never have 
a monthly period, she additionally did not experience post-natal bleeding.19 In contrast not only 
is ʿĀ’isha’s virginal status momentary, there were some Shiʿa who placed a question-mark on 
her virginity at her marriage to the Prophet. It has been asserted that the only one to have 
relayed the age of six or seven years at marriage for ʿĀ’isha was ʿĀ’isha herself, as recorded 
in al-Bukhārī and Muslim. Some Shiʿa scholars have stated that the fact that she alone narrates 
her age makes this an unreliable narration, uncorroborated by other such narrations by other 
Companions. This, in conjunction with the aspersion that she may have had a relationship with 
Jubayr b. Muṭʿim to whom she was betrothed before Muḥammad sent his proposal, would give 
ample reason to early biographers and ḥadīth collectors to place as young an age as possible 
for ʿĀ’isha upon marriage. If she was only six or seven years at marriage, when could she have 
had the opportunity to have been in a relationship with someone else? 
 
I am not interested in investigating what the true age of ʿĀ’isha was at marriage,20 but to 
consider the ways in which the issue has been moulded through time by various writers. Kecia 
Ali considers modern, contemporary Muslim attempts at reconciling the issue of ʿĀ’isha’s age 
at marriage in her, Sexual Ethics and Islam, and uses the issue to map changing attitudes 
amongst Muslims towards sex and marriage, and ‘the appropriateness of applying medieval 
standards in modern life’, raising questions about the relevance and accuracy of historical 
information. I would argue that this is also a useful exercise in adducing and highlighting 
informal Muslim practices of undermining canonised texts like al-Bukhārī, when external 
 
18 In one Shiʿa tradition Amr-Tasri narrates in Arjāḥ al-Maṭālib that the Prophet was asked about the meaning of Batūl. 
Someone said to him: ‘Messenger of God, we have heard you say that Maryam is Batūl and Faṭima, too, is Batūl’. Batūl 
meaning a Virgin (Ordoni, 2008. p.58). 
19 Ordoni references both Sunni and Shiʿa sources claiming that Faṭima did not bleed, neither menstrual nor postpartum. 
20 For a more detailed discussion on the age of ʿĀ’isha upon marriage see, Ḥadīth miqdār ʿumr al-sayyidah ʿĀ’isha yawm al-
zawāj by Salah al-Din b. Ahmad al-Idlib (2018) available from: http://idlbi.net/marriageage/ and, Aisha (ra): The case for an 
Older Age in Sunni Hadith Scholarship by Arnold Yasin Mol (2018) available from: https://yaqeeninstitute.org/arnold-yasin-
mol . The latter is part of a series on the Age of ʿĀ’isha upon marriage, whereby a range of views can be found, including 
those who argue that the question is irrelevant and that hold that she was six years old at marriage and nine years old at 
consummation, and that such concerns are a reflection of modern sensibilities and insecurities. 
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factors call for such re-evaluation. It is interesting to observe the way in which the age of 
ʿĀ’isha is dealt with specifically from the point of textual evidence. One claim is that while 
ḥadīth collectors like al-Bukhārī applied the strictest of criteria to a tradition before grading it, 
the attitude with which each tradition was approached could vary according to the topic it 
conveyed. If the topic at hand was to do with historical information, there could be a degree of 
relaxedness towards the criteria, but the strictest of attitudes was reserved for those traditions 
conveying the practices or laws of Islam.21 As such then, those ḥadīth conveying the age of 
ʿĀ’isha upon marriage, were not scrutinised beyond their chain of narration, which was found 
to be sound, because the age did not alarm earliest collectors of ḥadīth, and nor were they 
particularly invested in such details therefore inaccuracies could occur. 
 
In addition to casting doubt over the validity of her age due to a laxity in attitude of ḥadīth 
compilers to historical information, there is also the attempt at refuting this claim by measuring 
it against other historical statements. Her age is recalibrated by taking into consideration 
statements made by ʿĀ’isha and others regarding historical events and estimating accordingly 
what her age would have been at the time the event took place and thereby what her age would 
have been at marriage too. Reşit Haylamaz (2008) has penned an internet article on this topic 
while engaging this approach. He takes into consideration her being named as amongst the 
earliest to accept Islam, and notes that only a certain level of maturity beyond infancy would 
qualify for her name to be amongst those granted the honour. He notes that Asmā’, ʿĀ’isha’s 
older sister, is reported by al-Nawawī (d. 676/1277) and others as being fifteen years old when 
she became Muslim, and ʿĀ’isha was around ten years younger, making her five, six or seven 
when accepting Islam. Her marriage took place another ten years after this, placing her age at 
marriage at fifteen, sixteen or seventeen years. He further uses other traditions recorded in al-
Bukhārī where ʿĀ’isha speaks of witnessing certain Quranic revelations to the Prophet. In this 
instance, it is ʿĀ’isha’s bearing witness to the revelation of verse 46 of the 54th chapter of the 
Quran, al-Qamar. If she truly were six years old at marriage, it would have meant she was only 
four or five years old when this revelation occurred. Haylamaz argues that this is far too young 
 
21 Laxity regarding ḥadīth scrutiny has been well documented and critiqued, both by classical and contemporary scholars. 
Where ḥadīth discussed the rights of God and legal rulings, a stricter approach was taken, but ḥadīth pertaining to other matters 
were not given the same scrutiny. For a succinct survey on authenticity and ḥadīth criticism as it developed historically, see, 
Brown, J. 2011. Even If It’s Not True, It’s True: Using Unreliable Hadiths in Sunni Islam. Islamic Law and Society. 18 (1), 
pp1-52. Also see, Siddiqi, M. Z, 1993. Hadith Literature: Its Origin, Development, and Special Features and Criticism. 2nd 
Edition. Cambridge: The Islamic Texts Society. 
  28 
an age to be truly cognisant of the enormity of what was happening and then to relay it so well 
years later. Instead, he argues that taking her age as around seventeen at marriage means she 
would have been twelve to fourteen years old; a much more likely scenario he contends. 
Haylamaz similarly uses other events and observations of ʿĀ’isha’s to calculate her age, each 
time arriving at the conclusion that she must have been older at the time of marriage to the 
Prophet.  
 
It is interesting to note that in his book, ʿĀ’isha: The Wife, The Companion, The Scholar, 
Haylamaz (2014, pp.3-4) writes that Muṭʿim b. ʿAdī was very close to ʿĀ’isha’s father, Abū 
Bakr, due to the two of them being amongst the small number of people who were experts in 
genealogy. Due to this closeness to Abū Bakr, Muṭʿim b. ʿAdī frequented the home of Abū 
Bakr often and because, ‘Mecca in those days was so small that people knew each other 
intimately…Mutʿim b. Adiyy could foresee the future of Aisha—her nature, attitude and 
behaviour. He dreamed of having a daughter-in-law like Aisha who was intelligent respectful, 
polite and pure.’ His ‘foreseeing’ how ʿ Ā’isha would develop indicates that she was very young 
when his interest in her for his own son took place. He also treats it less as a betrothal and more 
as a request from Muṭʿim b. ʿAdī which was not openly responded to by Abū Bakr, and one 
which just faded as an option due to the religious developments of Abū Bakr’s family, which 
in that climate were politically charged. Being amongst the earliest converts to Islam, meant 
that they were ostracised and boycotted by the dominant disbelieving Quraish and their allies 
in Makkah. Yet, Haylamaz, also argues in his online article that a betrothal did occur and that 
it is also indicative of ʿĀ’isha having been of marriageable age when Muṭʿim showed interest 
in her for his own son, rather than any deep foresight on his part on the future character of 
ʿĀ’isha. It is curious that Hayalamaz accuses orientalists of creating the controversy around 
the age of ʿĀ’isha upon marriage as ‘outsiders’ to the tradition, further claiming that Muslims 
themselves had not been troubled by this, understanding it purely as a custom of the time. This 
is not entirely accurate though, as Muslims have questioned this and continue to do so. This is 
evident in a number of online forums, and live events where Muslims are given the opportunity 
to present their questions to scholars or their peers—the topic comes up repeatedly.  
 
One such online occurrence is at a recorded event where the Pakistani scholar Javed Ahmad 
Ghamadi (2016) was asked about this issue. He responded that the age of ʿĀ’isha upon 
marriage was neither a reflection of any Quranic edicts, nor of any Prophetic standard 
(Sunnah). Instead he argued that it is purely a reflection of its time in history. That said, he 
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further argued that while the age of ʿĀ’isha is commonly accepted as being six years due to the 
narrations of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, he asserted that these statements are being made on the 
basis of oral reports hundreds of years after the event occurred. He therefore examined the issue 
from a reasoned perspective. He reminds his audience that the Prophet was by now a widower 
with young children, and it was another Companion, Khawla who recommended ʿĀ’isha to 
him as a wife. Ghamadi asks the audience what logical sense would this suggestion make when 
he needed a wife to help him with his household and children, if she was younger than the 
children he had?  He goes further to argue that in Arabic, because of the way numbers are 
written where the unit is written first and then the ten, that the ten may have been lost in 
transmission and so the six and the nine are what remain of the narration of her actual age of 
engagement and marriage, sixteen and nineteen. This is a plausible argument, though not one 
given much attention. He too, like Haylamaz, makes no mention of the implications of this on 
the status of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, and the liberty they are permitting themselves with these 
texts. It seems that when scholars are responding to a controversial topic, it is the prerogative 
of the scholar to interrogate and question critically the authenticity of statements found in the 
canonised texts. 
 
The Slander Against ʿĀ’isha 
 
As has been mentioned, one of the distinguishing attributes of ʿĀ’isha’s life as narrated by her 
and recorded by al-Ṭabarī, is that God proclaimed her innocence in the Quran. This is in 
reference to an incident which elicited a campaign of slander against ʿĀ’isha and caused much 
distress to her and her family, as well as to the Prophet. This critical moment in not only 
ʿĀ’isha’s life, but that of the Prophet and the nascent Muslim community too, came to be 
known as ḥādithat al-‘Ifk, the Incident of the Slander, and occurred in 7/628 when the Prophet 
and his Companions were returning from an expedition to Banū Muṣṭaliq, on which ʿĀ’isha 
had accompanied the Prophet. ʿĀ’isha’s own lengthy narration of the event is recorded by al-
Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ.22 She reports having been part of the caravan of travellers with the 
Prophet, and that she had made the journey concealed in the palanquin (ḥawdah) upon a camel, 
as the journey took place after the revelation commanding the veiling of the Prophet’s wives. 
She reports the group stopping on the way back to Medina, and so she went to relieve herself 
away from the camp. Upon returning to where her litter had been dismounted from her camel, 
 
22 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Military Expeditions, Section; The Narration of the Slander, ḥadīth No. 4141. 
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she realised she had misplaced her necklace. Suspecting she had dropped it when she had gone 
to relieve herself, she turned and retraced her steps to find her lost property. In the meantime, 
the expedition was called to resume its travel. When the litter was mounted back upon the 
camel, those carrying it had not noticed ʿĀ’isha missing, on account of her light weight. Upon 
returning, she found the expedition had left, and so she decided to wait, expecting that soon 
enough her absence would be detected, and they would return to find her. She reported, while 
waiting she fell asleep and was found the following morning by Ṣafwān b. al-Muʿaṭṭal al-
Sulamī al-Dhakwānī,23 a young soldier who was lagging behind the group. He recognised the 
young wife of the Prophet, and according to ʿĀ’isha, as recorded by al-Bukhārī, no words 
passed between them other than Ṣafwān reciting the Istirjā’24 to awaken ʿĀ’isha. When she 
awoke, he simply dismounted his camel and caused it to kneel so that she could mount it. He 
then proceeded to lead the camel back in the direction of Medina. The sight of the young, 
beautiful wife of the Prophet, riding into Medina on a camel, led by the handsome young soldier 
Ṣafwān, set the city ablaze with gossip. ʿĀ’isha expressly identifies ʿAbdullah b. Ubay b. 
Salūl25 as the instigator of the slander, stoking the flames of scandal at every opportunity who, 
incidentally, was also recognised as coveting the position of leadership the Prophet enjoyed in 
Medina (Abbott, 1985, p.29).  
 
The incident took its toll on the household of the Prophet and he became withdrawn from 
ʿĀ’isha. He then sought council from his companions, Usāma b. Zayd,26 and ʿAlī b. Abū 
 
23 Ṣafwān b. al-Muʿaṭṭal al-Sulamī al-Dhakwānī plays little more than this cameo role in Muslim history. He is reported to 
have been a resident of Medina who embraced Islam around the time this incident took place, after which he took part in many 
military campaigns, including the battle of the ditch (al-Khandaq) alongside the Prophet. Eventually he died the death of a 
martyr, though there are conflicting reports as to when this occurred. For more see, Juynboll, G.H.A, EI2. 
24 Reciting the words, innā lillāhi wa innā ilayhi rājiʿūn, ‘Verily, to God do we belong and to God do we return’. This is a 
statement Muslims are encouraged to say upon loss, or difficulty. This is based on the verses of the Quran whereby God says, 
‘And certainly, We shall test you with something of fear, hunger, loss of wealth, lives and fruits, but give glad tidings to al-
Ṣābirīn, the patient. Those who, when afflicted with calamity, say: ‘Truly, to Allah we belong and truly, to Him we shall 
return.’. They are those on whom are the Ṣalawāt (i.e. who are blessed and will be forgiven) from their Lord, and [they are 
those who] receive His mercy, and it is they who are the guided ones’. Quran, al-Baqara, 2:155-157. 
25 ʿAbdullah b. Ubay b. Salūl is widely perceived amongst Muslims as the leader of the hypocrites in Medina. Were it not for 
the arrival of the Prophet, ʿAbdullah b. Ubay b. Salūl, more commonly referred to as ʿAbdullah b. Ubay, was likely to have 
become the next leader of Medina. Though he professed belief in Islam, his actions and alliances cast doubt on the depth of 
his belief, making his profession of belief little more than a political manoeuvre. For more, see, Watt, W.M, EI2. 
26 Usāma b. Zayd was a beloved Companion of the Prophet, admired for his youthful zeal and dedication to Islam. The Prophet 
famously turned him away from joining the army on its way to the battle of Uhud on account of his young age, but acts of 
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Ṭālib,27 as to whether or not he should divorce ʿĀ’isha. Usāma is reported to have supported 
ʿĀ’isha and to have testified in her favour as the Mother of the Believers in whom he had never 
witnessed anything untoward. ʿAlī on the other hand was far from sentimental about the issue 
and assured the Prophet he need not let this trouble him, and that there were plenty of other 
women to take as wives instead of her. This is the point often cited as the beginning of the 
antagonism between ʿĀ’isha and ʿAlī. The Prophet then turned to Barīra,28 the maidservant of 
ʿĀ’isha, who would have been most privy to ʿĀ’isha’s character and personal conduct. The 
only fault Barīra had to report was that ʿĀ’isha would be absentminded about the dough at 
night, forgetting to cover it and thus leaving it exposed for the goats to come and eat from, but 
other than that there was no complaint nor criticism to be made of her mistress. A month went 
by in such trepidation and anxiety for the Prophet and ʿĀ’isha, who astonishingly remained 
unaware of the slanderous campaign being whipped up against her—she had fallen sick upon 
their return from the expedition and as such was largely bed-bound. Her only clue to something 
having gone awry was her sensing a reduction in the sympathy and attention she was used to 
receiving from her husband, particularly when she was unwell. 
 
When ʿĀ’isha became aware of the gossip that was consuming the community, she was 
overtaken by grief. She pleaded with her parents to intercede on her behalf to the Prophet, but 
their reticence to do so exposed their own doubts that had spawned due to the rumours. The 
Prophet too, entered upon her and expressed to her what had been said to him regarding her 
alleged misconduct with Ṣafwān, and that if the claims were unfounded then he was praying 
for her to be Divinely exonerated and if she was guilty, then he implored her to repent, so that 
she may find God forgiving. ʿĀ’isha was left stunned and denounced all hope in receiving 
support from anyone - not her parents, not her husband, not her community, and invested her 
 
dedication like these greatly endeared Usāma to the Prophet. Both of his parents were also cherished by the Prophet. His father, 
Zayd b. Hāritha had been the adopted son of the Prophet, and his mother, Umm Ayman (Barakah) had been the servant of the 
Prophet’s parents, who had entrusted him to her care upon their passing. The Prophet freed her, but she remained in the service 
of him and his family. She is also famed for having accompanied the Prophet on many battles. Usāma inherited the bravery of 
his parents and also grew not only to take part, but to lead armies into battle too. For more see, Vacca, V, EI2. 
27 ʿAlī b. Abū Ṭālib was the cousin and son in law of the Prophet, being married to Muḥammad’s favourite daughter, Fatima. 
He was also the fourth Caliph after ʿUthman b. ʿAffān. He was one of the first to convert to Islam, aged only ten or eleven 
years. He was a crucial member of the inner circle of the Prophet, being a counsel, an envoy, and a military commander for 
the Prophet in his lifetime. For more see, Veccia Vaglieri, L, EI2. 
28 Barīra was a slave woman whose owner had permitted her to buy her own freedom over nine (or five) annual instalments, 
so she appealed to Aisha for help. ʿĀ’isha agreed and so bought and freed Barīra, but she remained in the service of ʿĀ’isha. 
She outlived ʿĀ’isha and died during the caliphate of Yazid. For more, see, Robson, J. EI2. 
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trust in God, alone to exonerate her. She hoped maybe for a message to be delivered to the 
Prophet via a dream. In a fashion that can only be described as typical of ʿĀ’isha, she found 
succour in the words of the Quran and responded to the Prophet in this desperate situation with 
the words of God saying, ‘By God, I find no similitude more befitting for me and you, than 
that of the father of Joseph [who when afflicted] said, ‘For me is a beautiful patience, indeed 
God is Whose Help is sought against that which you allege’’.29 She then turned from everyone 
and lay down on her bed. At this point, the Prophet started to be overtaken as was customary 
when he began to receive revelation. When the moment passed, he smiled, and proclaimed, 'Oh 
ʿĀ’isha! God has exonerated you!’. Upon hearing this wonderful news, ʿĀ’isha’s mother 
entreated ʿĀ’isha to get up and go to the Prophet. But she was too fatigued by the experience, 
physically and emotionally, and instead responded, ‘By God, I will not get up to go to him. I 
praise no one except God, the Most Majestic’. At this, ʿĀ’isha reports that God revealed ten 
verses exonerating her and exposing those guilty of spreading the false accusations.  
 
It is interesting that very little is written about this issue other than relaying the story as given 
above as a factual account as given above. In recent years the story of the slander has been 
given somewhat more attention, primarily in speeches delivered by popular preachers. A 
cursory search on the topic on YouTube provides over sixty unique results, with a range of 
speakers, from the well-known so called ‘celebrity’ preachers to lesser-known individuals 
speaking on the topic. Interestingly, they are all commentaries by men. 
 
In popular Islamic literature too, there is little between the various accounts, and most provide 
a retelling of the story as given in the words of ʿĀ’isha, as recorded by al-Bukhārī. In the 
earliest depictions of the story, there seems to be somewhat more embellishment of the story 
with small but significant details. Ibn Kathīr (d. 774/1373), in his al-Sīrah al-Nabawīyya 
narrates the story as recorded by Ibn Isḥāq (d. 150/767), which is also virtually identical to Ibn 
Hishām’s (d. 218/833) version. Details that he provides include the collusion of Ḥamna bint 
Jaḥsh in the spreading of the rumour, citing her relationship as sister to rival co-wife, Zaynab 
bint Jaḥsh, as a motivation in her seeking to dislodge ʿĀ’isha from her prized position as 
favourite wife, in order for that honour to be granted to Zaynab instead. However, Ibn Kathīr 
notes in his narration of the story that when the Prophet went to enquire of ʿĀ’isha’s character 
 
29 Quran, Yusuf: 12:18. 
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from Zaynab, she only attested to ʿĀ’isha’s praiseworthy character and strongly advocated for 
her. For this, ʿĀ’isha showed an everlasting gratitude to Zaynab (Abbot, 1985, p.33).  
 
In Ibn Kathīr’s narration it seems clear also that while ʿĀ’isha was confident in what the 
outcome was to be for her when it became manifest that the Prophet was receiving revelation, 
her parents were equally concerned that she may finally be exposed as guilty. He records 
ʿĀ’isha as saying ‘I knew that I was innocent and that God would not harm me. However, I 
swear by Him who bears ʿĀ’isha’s soul in His Hand, that as soon as the Messenger of God 
recovered, I thought my parents would expire for fear that confirmation of what people had 
been saying would come from God’ (Abbott, 1985, p.220). It is clear in these early portrayals 
of events, that while there was some support of ʿ Ā’isha, such as that shown by Zaynab, Usāmah 
and Barīrah, the overwhelming response seems to be one of accepting the rumour. By the time 
Safi ur-Rahman Mubarakpuri wrote his biography of the Prophet, the highly popular Sealed 
Nectar, in 1979, he reported that the response to the slander was varied. Additionally, he 
omitted the response of ʿAlī, which caused great pain to ʿĀ’isha and resulted in a long-held 
grudge on her part. He also makes no mention of ʿĀ’isha’s curt response to the Prophet when 
he does not show confidence in her. 
 
Omissions and reframing continue in Reşit Haylamaz’s, ʿĀ’isha: The Wife, the Companion, 
the Scholar (2014, pp.93-127), in which he makes a number of assertions that appear to 
contradict earlier versions of the story. He argues that ʿĀ’isha’s family decided to abstain from 
informing her about the rumour that was consuming the community of Medina, as they did not 
in fact believe the rumours. In fact, he goes further and asserts that most of the Companions 
had indeed rejected the allegations. Had this truly been the case, the slander would have failed 
and the event would not have caused the distress and discord that it did within the Prophetic 
household and Medinan society at the time, and it most certainly would not have heralded in 
Divine intercession which went on to give stern warning to the Muslim community. But 
Haylamaz does not stop there; he then equates ʿĀ’isha to the Virgin Mary, strongly associated 
by Shiʿa Muslims with Faṭima, as previously illustrated. He writes, ‘It was not the first time 
that a monument of chastity had been vilified—now ʿĀ’isha was like the Virgin Mary’ (p.96). 
He revisits this image of ʿĀ’isha in his concluding remarks too, writing of Mary and Joseph as 
two, alongside ʿ Ā’isha who were slandered and then exonerated. He states, ‘-though in the case 
of Joseph, he was justified by one close to him, and in the case of Mary, she was acquitted by 
her infant son - ʿ Ā’isha was declared innocent by the direct words of God in the Quran’ (p.108). 
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Thus, she is not only like them, she is perhaps even a degree above them for her exoneration 
did not come from the uttering of another human, however miraculously that manifested, her 
exoneration came from God’s own intervention and revelation. 
 
None of these depictions though focus on the resilience of her character or on the conviction 
of her self-belief. Not even Haylamaz, who has elevated ʿĀ’isha’s status to surpass that of 
Mary and Jesus, considers this event as testimony to the sheer independent strength and 
resilience of ʿĀ’isha. Unsurprising as this may be, why this is the case must be interrogated. 
The question must be asked; has she been limited by her gender? As a woman, that category 
so often essentialised, there are limits to the courage she can be seen to embody in situations 
of domestic disharmony.  She is astute despite her illness, in sensing the shift in attitude in her 
husband; she has the strength to leave the home she shares with him to go to her parents to 
recover from her illness, wary that his emotional distance is not helping her recovery. When 
the horrendous rumours are revealed to her, distraught as she is, she is sobered by the Prophet’s 
adjuring her to repent if the rumours are indeed true. Her refusal to do so displays not only a 
woman of mettle and strength, but also one with a strong sense of justice and belief in the 
triumph of truth. She will not be cowed into a position of false culpability by a slanderous 
campaign being led by a power-hungry man, and being spread by opportunistic enemies, even 
if that means standing alone without parents, or husband sharing her self-confidence to support 
her. Her tears run dry the instant the Prophet suggests she repents, and she instead places all 
her trust in God alone to absolve her. She emotionally and physically turns away from both her 
parents and husband, willing to be alone in her defence of her truth. When the revelation to 
exonerate her arrives, her response in not going to the Prophet as her mother suggests, is 
probably the moment at which history is witnessing ʿĀ’isha go from young naive wife, to 
grown, wary woman. She is noted as forgiving Hassān b. Thābit, the poet, for his part in the 
slanderous campaign, and is even recorded as being somewhat fond of the aged man later in 
life, but for never forgetting. One day, Hassān was reciting poetry in praise of her, saying 
‘chaste and proud, her light will never be put out by the least suspicion. In the morning she will 
rise without slandering her neighbour…’, to which ʿĀ’isha laughingly replied, ‘Unlike you!’ 
(Dermenghem, 1930, p.283). 
 
Here is a woman who rode the unexpected turning tide that frenzied into a potentially 
catastrophic event for her but came through stronger, if bearing her battle wounds. The Quranic 
verses of Sūrah al-Nūr that her ordeal beckoned, not only exonerate her, serving as an eternal 
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reminder of her innocence and warning to the community of believers against such 
reprehensible behaviour, but they also came with verses calling for the safeguarding of all 
Muslim women from such slander evermore. God states, ‘And those who accuse the ones who 
are free, chaste females, and after that bring not four witnesses, then scourge them eighty 
strokes and never accept their testimony…’30 For the first time, a burden is placed on men to 
furnish evidence for their claims against women in a time and place wherein such accusations 
can turn them into social pariahs, further weakened in society as disreputable. The verses 
continue: ‘And those who accuse their wives - and there are no witnesses but themselves - let 
the testimony of them be four testimonies sworn to God that he is among the ones who are 
sincere and a fifth, that the curse of God be on him if he had been among the ones who lie. And 
it will drive off the punishment from her if she bears witness with four testimonies sworn to 
God that he is among the ones who lie and the fifth, that the anger of God be on her if he has 
been among the ones who are sincere.’31 These verses are  quite remarkable in that it is often 
argued that the Quran does not see the testimony of a man and woman as equal. Based on the 
verse 2:282, ‘And call in to witness from among your men two witnesses; but if there are not 
two men, then one man and two women from among those whom you choose to be witnesses, 
so that if one of the two errs, the second of the two may remind the other…’ many have inferred 
that the testimony of a woman is half that of a man’s,32 and yet the verses revealed in response 
to the slander against ʿĀ’isha are in complete contradiction to such a claim. If the man brings 
forth an allegation against his wife, he is to swear four times that he is telling the truth and a 
fifth time to invoke the curse of God upon himself if he is in fact lying. But to counter this, a 
woman need simply do the same in her defence and on the fifth time call for the anger of God 
to befall her if her husband is in fact correct. If she does so, there is no deadlock—her word is 
taken over his. If one is truly going to extrapolate implications for the rest of those sharing the 
same gender as ʿĀ’isha, it would be from this extraordinary event. Her ordeal has resulted in 
an eternally recorded verse that in effect allows for the testimony of a woman to be taken over 
 
30 Quran, al-Nūr, 24:4. 
31 Quran, al-Nūr, 24:6-10. 
32 For more on the issue of women’s testimony as being half that of a man, particularly with regards to how this has been 
interpreted and understood from a legal perspective (fiqhi) as compared through Quranic exegesis (tafsīr) see, Fadel, M. 1997. 
Two Women, One Man: Knowledge, Power, and Gender in Medieval Sunni Legal Thought. International Journal of Middle 
East Studies. 29(2). pp185-204.  A pertinent discussion on the topic of women’s testimony (shahādah) and its value is the 
matter of women’s transmission (riwāyah) of Prophetic tradition, for its function as a type of testimony for which women’s 
transmissions are equal to men’s. This issue is explored in depth in; Sayeed, A. 1994. Gender and Legal Authority: An 
Examination of Early Juristic Opposition to Women’s Hadīth Transmission. Islamic Law and Society. 16(2), pp.115-150.  
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that of her husband. ʿĀ’isha is not a representation of the weaknesses inherent in women, but 
of their strength and likely honesty. The verses also correct a systemic imbalance against 
women in society by giving them the benefit of the doubt, and thereby the final word on the 
matter. 
 
The story of the slander of ʿĀ’isha reveals much about her character and provides ample 
material based on the revelations that she inspires that both exonerate her and strengthen the 
position of women but is sadly never a position from which the story is told. 
 
The Battle of the Camel: The Fitnah 
 
The recounts of the Battle of the Camel, also known as the first Tribulation (Fitnah), are 
possibly the most prejudiced in sectarian ideologies. Retellings from Sunni sources depict an 
entirely justified, albeit perhaps somewhat mistaken, motivation on the part of ʿĀ’isha and her 
generals, Ṭalḥa and Zubayr, in seeking to hold ʿAlī accountable for the murder of the previous 
Caliph, ʿUthmān. There is no malice on either side, but a deeply held conviction on the part of 
both parties of being correct. Shiʿa retellings have a significantly different perspective on the 
event. ʿĀ’isha is depicted as having a deep-seated hatred for ʿAlī, in fact so blinded is she by 
her hatred for him that she overlooks all decorum and sets out to wage war at the first given 
opportunity. A rereading of the sources allows for a more nuanced understanding; one that 
recognises that this is not an event reflecting the intellectual or scholarly contribution of the 
individuals involved, nor is it necessarily a tale of their spiritual status or religious 
commitments, but rather this is a story of politics, centred around the assassination of a ruler 
who was accused of nepotism and corruption, influenced by the political aspirations of vested 
interests. It is in fact a tale of politics, and the politics of any given individual is only as good 
as the information they have at hand, the advisors at their disposal and the judgements they 
make accordingly.  
 
The story is here reconstructed at length and with much detail. This is for a number of reasons: 
firstly, it is the first time that ʿĀ’isha is portrayed as having individual agency not derived from 
her father or brother. She is not framed as the daughter of Abū Bakr, nor as the wife of the 
Prophet. Her brother, Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr is aligned with the opposing side. She takes 
steps with the advice of Ṭalḥa and Zubayr, but she ultimately makes her own decisions. It is, 
in short, a rich account in which the possibilities of hearing ʿĀ’isha’s voice are increased. This 
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leads to the second reason for the length of this section: despite the potential of this story in 
unearthing a number of possibilities for understanding the politics of that time, the attitudes 
towards gender, and the personalities of those involved, this story is often sanitised beyond 
recognition. In the sanitisation process the voice of ʿĀ’isha is often the first victim, with many 
of her recorded statements from the event being removed from retellings. Many of these 
statements have been reinstated below.  
 
In reconstructing this incident in detail, the aim is to resurrect the voice of ʿĀ’isha. Gayatri 
Spivak (2010, pp.21-81) writes of the subaltern voice, asking famously if she could speak. 
Whilst, Spivak writes in relation to the colonised women of India, particularly those from the 
Hindu and untouchable communities, she illustrates and questions the processes imposed by 
colonisation that seeks to silence these women’s voices. Similar processes are evident in the 
patriarchal effort that is not seeking to entirely obscure ʿĀ’isha – that would be an impossible 
task – but does certainly seek to make certain interventions in her history and thereby, her 
projection as an ideal Muslim woman. The Battle of the Camel and its subsequent burial/partial 
disclosure is evidence of how even the voice of a figure as central to a tradition as ʿĀ’isha’s 
can be obscured. Between the powerful hegemonic assertion of the ideal pious Muslim woman 
that ʿĀ’isha is perceived to model, and the politically conflicting arguments of the Sunni-Shiʿa 
divide, the voice of ʿĀ’isha herself is silenced.  
 
Huda Sharawi (1986, p.131) once stated, ‘Men having singled out women of outstanding merit, 
put them on a pedestal to avoid recognising the capabilities of women.’ Indeed, this treatment 
of outstanding women is a common occurrence. The Algerian writer and filmmaker, Assia 
Djebar (d. 2015) bemoaned the poor treatment of Algerian women following the defeat and 
expulsion of French colonialists after they had been so crucially pivotal in ridding Algeria of 
French occupation. Zahia Smail Salhi (2008, p.81) writes, ‘…[Djebar] calls them voiceless 
‘fire carriers,’ who despite the grandeur of their acts did not possess a discourse. What is the 
reason for their silence? Why not give body to their work through the power of the word? Why 
not externalise their heroism through discourse? And most importantly, how could they be 
speechless revolutionaries?’. These same assertions and questions could be put regarding 
ʿĀ’isha. She is exemplified as a Muslim woman paragon and in doing so her story is also 
chastened of all that would complicate, contradict, and make ambiguous the narrow image of 
the pious Muslim woman. In the combating discourses that rail around her, whether that be 
Sunni, Shʿia or other agenda-driven orientation, she is reduced into a silenced subject to be 
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spoken about and for, but seldom given the opportunity for the full force of her actions and 
words to speak for herself. As a result, then, the role ʿĀ’isha plays in the Battle of the Camel 
is one of a character that disrupts hegemonic discourses of Muslimah33 piety. Therefore, the 
battle can be framed as a discursive tool for upending and interrogating dichotomising 
discourses of gender roles and in establishing personal and political agency of Muslim women. 
 
The precursor to the discord that would culminate in the Battle of the Camel was the 
appointment of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān as the third Caliph following the death of ʿUmar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb. As the twice son-in-law of the Prophet34 and a close friend to him too, this was a 
welcomed selection, but his preferential treatment of family and clan members soon disgruntled 
other Companions such as ʿAbdul Raḥmān b. ʿAwf, who had also been considered for the role 
of Caliph after ʿUmar’s death, as well as ʿAmr b. al-ʿAs, and ʿAmmār b. Yāsir, all of whom 
had felt violated by ʿUthmān’s treatment of them. Discontent spread fast, and many, including 
the Mothers of the Believers, began to call for ʿUthmān to be held to account. ʿAmmār b. Yāsir 
was the half-brother of Umm Salamah, another wife of the Prophet, and her home became a 
gathering place for the disgruntled to voice concerns. ʿUthmān demanded an end to this 
growing collective gathering at the house of Umm Salamah, a demand which the latter flatly 
rejected. It was then that ʿĀ’isha intervened: she is reported to have taken a hair of the Prophet, 
his shirt and sandal, and holding them up exclaimed to the people, ‘How soon indeed you have 
forgotten the practice of your Prophet (Sunnah), while these—his hair, shirt and sandal—have 
not yet perished!’ This, it would appear, angered ʿUthmān greatly, but forced him into retreat 
on the matter. It is also identified by Abbott as the moment at which ʿĀ’isha openly and 
publicly joined the opposition, a position she had not had to take under the caliphate of either 
her father, Abū Bakr, or of ʿUmar (Abbott,1998, pp.108-109). ʿ Ā’isha and ʿUthmān were again 
at loggerheads when he dismissed evidence that was presented to him of the misconduct of 
Walīd b. ʿUqbah, the governor of Kufah, and also the half-brother of ʿUthmān. Those 
presenting the evidence, upon being summarily dismissed by ʿUthmān, appealed to ʿĀ’isha, 
who accused ʿ Uthmān of ‘withholding punishment and intimidating witnesses’. Another public 
 
33 Muslimah being the female of Muslim in Arabic and meaning Muslim woman. 
34 ʿUthmān was married to the Prophet’s daughter Ruqayyah. Following her death, he then married the Prophet’s other 
daughter, Umm Kulthūm, thus earning him the nickname, Dhū al-Nurayn, The Possessor of Two Lights. Additionally, he 
partook in both major migrations, first to Abyssinia and then to Medina. He was amongst the Prophet’s closest Companions, 
and his conversion as a man from a powerful family and of wealth and influence, had a positive influence on those around 
him, and garnered more conversions besides his. See, Levi Della Vida, G. And Khoury, R.G. in EI2 
  39 
disagreement ensued between the two of them until ʿUthmān finally retorted, ‘What have you 
to do with this? You were ordered to stay at home’ (ibid. p.111). This is an interesting tactic 
on ʿ Uthmān’s part in undermining the legitimacy of ʿĀ’isha’s holding him to account. At a loss 
for any real argument to defend himself against her complaints, he steers the argument to the 
validity of her opinion on the matter and moreover the validity of her involvement in public 
affairs; as a wife of the Prophet, he argues, she has been commanded not to venture out of the 
home. It seems he is the first to invoke the seclusion of the wives of the Prophet as a tool of 
censorship against them, but he is by no means the last to have resorted to such tactics. 
Nonetheless, despite ʿUthmān’s aspersions on the acceptability or rather not, of ʿĀ’isha’s 
political agency, the argument was won by ʿĀ’isha, and he was forced to replace his Kufan 
governor, even if with another relative, Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀs. 
 
Resentment spread amongst the citizens of ʿUthmān’s caliphate, eventually growing into an 
outright rebellion that led to the assassination of ʿUthmān. Three candidates were up for 
selection as the next Caliph: Ṭalḥa, Zubayr and ʿAlī. All three had been previously considered 
and overlooked for the position. Ṭalḥa was the cousin of ʿ Ā’isha, and she was reported as being 
in favour of his selection, while Zubayr was her brother-in-law, and father to ʿAbdullah, her 
nephew whom she favoured as a son and for whom she had high ambitions. ʿĀ’isha was away 
in Makkah on pilgrimage at the time of the murder and appears to have been confident that one 
of her two preferred choices for Caliph would prevail over ʿAlī’s selection; her confidence was 
to be found misplaced. Al-Ashṭār,35 had been a central force in the rebellion against ʿUthmān 
himself and was present in Medina at the time of his demise. He was a politically influential 
man who had pledged allegiance to ʿAlī. There are traditions revealing that he held his sword 
over Sʿad b. Abī Waqqāṣ, Ṭalḥa and Zubayr to force them to do likewise (al-Ṭabarī, 1997, 
Vol.16, p.4-5). Al-Ṭabarī notes that Ṭalḥa and Zubayr pledged allegiance unwillingly and that 
it had even been reported by some that Zubayr did not pledge allegiance at all (ibid. p.7). 
 
After five days of deliberation, ʿAlī was declared Caliph (ibid. p.12). News of the murder 
reached ʿĀ’isha in Makkah and, on her return to Medina, she was informed of ʿAlī’s selection 
 
35 His real name was Mālik b. al-Harith but was named al-Ashṭār, meaning ‘the man with inverted eyelids’ after being wounded 
at the battle of Yarmūk (15/636).  He is best known as the indefatigable warrior and as a central political agitator against 
ʿUthmān. The historian, Ibn ʿAsākir (d. 571/1175), even names al-Ashṭār as one of the murderers of ʿUthmān.  For more see, 
‘al-Ashṭār’, Veccia Vaglieri, L EI2. 
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as Caliph. She was clearly surprised at this turn of events, having not expected him to accede 
to the position. She then retreated to Makkah, arrived at the Ḥijr, and addresses the crowd: 
 
‘People of Makkah! The mob of men from the garrison cities and the 
watering places and the slaves of the people of Medina have conspired 
together. They have charged this man who was killed yesterday with deceit, 
with putting young men in high positions where older ones had been before, 
and with reserving certain specially protected places for them, although they 
had been arranged before him and could not properly be changed. 
Nevertheless, he went along with these people, and in an attempt to pacify 
them he withdrew from these policies. When they could find neither real 
argument nor excuse, they became irrational. They showed their hostility 
openly, and their deeds did not fit their words. They spilled forbidden blood, 
they violated the sacred city, they appropriated sacred money, and they 
profaned the sacred month. By Allah! One of ʿ Uthmān’s fingers is better than 
a whole world of their type. Save yourselves from being associated with 
them, and let others punish them and their followers be scared off. By Allah! 
Even if what they reckon against him were a crime, he would have been 
cleared of it, as gold is cleaned of its impurities or a garment of its dirt, for 
they have rinsed him [in his own blood] as a garment is rinsed of water.’ 
(ibid. pp.38-39) 
 
Cries of agreement and promise to uphold her words rang out through the crowds, an almost 
foregone conclusion with Makkah having been the hometown of ʿUthmān. But she was not 
without detractors, those who would point out the contradiction in her statement and her 
previous opposition to the now-slain Caliph. This was an accusation she met with repeatedly 
over the course of this whole saga, but against which she steadfastly asserted that, though she 
had opposed his actions as Caliph and sought to rectify him, she had never intended for his 
blood to be shed, believing him to be genuine when he repented for his misdeeds. In fact, al-
Balādhūri records an exchange between al-Ashṭār and ʿĀ’isha when ʿUthmān was under siege 
by opponents, in which al-Ashṭār questions her as to whether or not she would sanction the 
killing of ʿUthmān. She resolutely responded, ‘God forbid that I should command the shedding 
of the blood of the Muslims and the killing of their Imām’ (Abbott, 1998, p.122).  
 
  41 
Nonetheless, ʿAlī’s apparent inaction in bringing to justice the assassins of ʿUthmān, coupled 
with his heavy-handed deposition of all of the governors instituted by ʿUthmān, earned him the 
enmity of many, who in turn flocked to Makkah, either physically or by expressions of support, 
to take up their grievances by joining ʿĀ’isha. These included ʿAbdallah b. ʿĀmir al-Ḥaḍrami, 
the governor of Makka, and Yaʿla b. Umayyah, the governor of Yaman. Each of these men had 
a following and revenue which they put to the service of ʿĀ’isha’s call. It is noteworthy that 
Muʿāwiyah, the governor of Syria, whom ʿAlī had tried to remove, also raised a similar call to 
that of ʿĀ’isha. He likewise called for ʿAlī to be held accountable, and had reached out to 
Zubayr, urging him to come to Syria so that they could declare Zubayr Caliph. Importantly, 
there is no evidence of Muʿāwiyah and ʿĀ’isha colluding, or even having communicated on 
the matter.  
 
Four months after the fall of ʿUthmān, Zubayr and Ṭalḥa requested leave of ʿAlī to make the 
pilgrimage. He agreed, and they were finally able to flee to Makkah and join up with ʿĀ’isha 
(al-Ṭabarī, 1997, Vol.16, p.32). After some deliberation on the course of action, it was decided 
that that three of them would ride to Basra with the support of an army of three thousand. 
ʿĀ’isha had initially asked the other wives of the Prophet to join her, and as long as the plan 
had been to meet with ʿAlī in Medina, they had all agreed. But when the plans changed, they 
soon declined to travel to Basra, except for Ḥafṣah bint ʿUmar, who had wanted to go but was 
prevented by her brother, ʿAbdallah. The only voice of dissent amongst the wives of the 
Prophet was Umm Salamah, who had long left ʿĀ’isha and the rest of the wives soon after the 
death of ʿUthmān. When the rest of the wives of the Prophet had made a U-turn back to 
Makkah, Umm Salamah had continued to Medina, where she also placed her one and only son, 
ʿUmar, at the service of ʿAlī.  
 
The journey to Basra was a long one and proved arduous enough to create a condition of 
conflicting political motivations and rifts, the arousal of doubts, and even the diminishing of 
numbers, all of which had an incremental effect on the psyche and confidence of ʿ Ā’isha. When 
they arrived at Ḥaw’ab, ʿĀ’isha heard the howling of stray dogs, causing her to be instantly 
struck with fear. Howling dogs were superstitiously seen as a bad omen. There are reports that 
the moment triggered a recollection in ʿĀ’isha of the Prophet warning his wives that the dogs 
of Ḥaw’ab would be found barking at one of them (ibid. p52). The severity of this warning, 
and how directly it addresses ʿĀ’isha, appears to vary from narration to narration in accordance 
with the stance of the author and on which side of the sectarian battle line they found 
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themselves. Nonetheless, according to al-Ṭabarī, ʿĀ’isha became determined not to proceed as 
a result of this inauspicious occurrence. The caravan was grounded at Ḥaw’ab for a full day as 
she pleaded to return to Medina, her resolve now shaken. Zubayr and others tried and failed to 
persuade her that the guide had mistaken the place for Ḥaw’ab and that they were in fact 
nowhere near there. It was only when the false alarm of ʿAlī’s close approach was raised that 
they were able to proceed.  
 
Within no time they were stationed on the outskirts of Basra and proceeded to make contact 
with the leaders and those of influence. ʿĀ’isha began to write letters to elucidate their stance 
and to garner support in Basra just as she had in Makkah (ibid. pp.74-76). While there was 
support for them in the city, the governor, ʿUthmān b. Ḥunayf, was resistant. He came out to 
meet with them with the intentions of repelling them. To his surprise, he found that they had 
moved closer to the city, and were now camped at al-Mirbad, a market and camel camp 
southwest of the city. There was much arguing and dissent between the governor, Zubayr and 
Ṭalḥa, and rising discontent among the crowd, at which point ʿĀ’isha stood to raise her voice 
once more. Al-Ṭabarī describes her as having ‘a strong voice—it could be extremely loud, like 
the voice of a woman of high rank’. Rising, she cleared the air with the praise and glorification 
of God, before proceeding: 
 
‘The people used to accuse ʿUthmān of crimes he never did. They would 
belittle his governors and then come to us in Medina to ask our advice over 
tales they told us about them, expecting good words from us to solve things 
[i.e reconciliation]. But, whenever we looked into the matter, we would find 
him innocent, God-fearing, and faithful and would find them lying, 
treacherous, and deceitful, attempting to do the opposite of what they were 
showing. Then, when they became strong enough to rely on greater numbers, 
they did so. They attacked his house and desecrated sacred blood, sacred 
property, and the sacred city without blood debt or excuse. Therefore what is 
now imperative—and you have no alternative—is to arrest the killers of 
ʿUthmān and establish the authority of the Book of Allah Almighty, which 
says, ‘Have you not seen those who were given a part of the Book being 
called to the Book of God for it to judge between them?’36 (ibid. pp.60-61)  
 
36 Quran, Āl ʿImrān, 3:23. 
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ʿĀ’isha was successful in splitting the audience, and in eliciting the support of many who were 
present. She was unable, however, to persuade them all, and that demand to silence earlier 
raised by ʿUthmān, was hurled once more at her. This time it was Jāriyah b. Qudamah al-Saʿdi, 
a faithful supporter of ʿAlī: ‘Mother of the Believers, by God! The killing of ʿ Uthmān b. ʿ Affān 
is a lesser matter than your coming out from your house on this accursed camel, exposing 
yourself to armed combat! God did curtain you off and gave you sanctity. Anyone who thinks 
you should be fought, also thinks you should be killed. If you have come to us obedient, then 
return home! If you have been forced by someone to come to us, then seek help from the people 
[against him]!’ (ibid. p61). The verse to which both he and the instigator of this taunt, ʿ Uthmān, 
referred are in al-Aḥzāb,37 one that will be weaponised against her again in due course.38 The 
claim of Jāriyah is an interesting one: that ʿĀ’isha’s exit from seclusion is worse than the 
murder of the Caliph. While this might be read as mere hyperbole it clearly also betrayed an 
important truth: that the death of ʿUthmān was tragic and unfortunate but it was also a danger 
that came with the territory of politics and power. The Prophet himself was finally overcome 
by the poisoning of his enemies. To this extent, ʿUthmān’s murder, as tumultuous and tense as 
it was, did not threaten social norms. ʿĀ’isha’s actions, however, did threaten the social norms, 
particularly for a community of believers who were still attempting to establish their mores and 
practices. By relinquishing the private, internal, domestic sphere of the home, and entering in 
so audacious a manner into the public/political sphere, and that too with military intent, was to 
unmoor long established traditions regarding gender and politics; it was perceived as an ill-
planned attempt at re-grounding the new Muslim community. In the end, Basra was overcome, 
its governor captured, and there was some appetite among the rebels to execute him. Save for 
the intervention of ʿĀ’isha that would have occurred.  
 
 
37 Quran, al-Aḥzāb: 33:33, ‘And abide in your houses and do not display yourselves as [was] the display of the former times 
of ignorance. And establish prayer and give zakah and obey Allah and His Messenger. Allah intends only to remove from you 
the impurity [of sin], O people of the [Prophet's] household, and to purify you with [extensive] purification.’ 
38 Al-Ṭabarī (1997, Vol.16, pp.79-80) also records that amongst the letters ʿ Ā’isha had sent out to various notables and leaders, 
one was to Zayd b. Ṣuḥān, who rejected her offer, and instead sided with ʿAlī, writing back, ‘From Zayd b. Ṣuḥān, to ʿĀ’isha 
bint Abū Bakr al-Ṣiḍḍīq, beloved of the Messenger of God. After greetings. If you withdraw from this undertaking and return 
home, then I will be your devoted son. If you don’t, I will be the first to break from you’. He is then recorded as saying, ‘May 
Allah have mercy on the Mother of the Faithful! She was ordered to stay at home, and we were ordered to fight. But she didn’t 
do what she was ordered, and instead ordered us to do that [stay at home], while she did what we were ordered to do, and told 
us not to do that [fight]!’.  Incidentally, he died in the Battle of the Camel, fighting against ʿĀ’isha. 
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Having consolidated their win over Basra, they intended on Kufa as their next target. Letters 
and messengers were now dispatched towards the new destination. Kufa’s governor, Abū Mūsa 
al-Ashʿari insisted on remaining neutral on ʿĀ’isha and ʿAlī, who was also petitioning the 
leader for support. However, the fight for neutrality was lost, as Zayd b. Ṣuḥān, leader of the 
Kufan tribe of ʿAbd al-Qays, had joined forces with al-Ashṭār, whose initial pledge of 
allegiance to ʿAlī in Medina had been so crucial. A large army was raised from Kufa to join 
ʿAlī. 
 
With ʿĀ’isha’s army in Basra, and ʿAlī’s just outside Kufa in Dhu Qār, ʿAlī sent an envoy to 
initiate talks with the other side. ʿĀ’isha, Zubayr and Ṭalḥa all asserted that their only demand 
was the bringing to justice of the killers of ʿUthmān, to which they were told to pledge 
allegiance to ʿAlī and then the killers would be served their dues. Negotiations then proceeded 
for the next three days. It is likely that ʿ Ā’isha was weary of battle. She was averse to the illegal 
bloodshed of fellow Muslims, and was acutely aware of the tensions in her own camp that so 
harrowed her at Ḥaw’ab, and that had only been intensified since with the lack of response to 
letters that she had sent calling for support from beyond Basra and Kufa, to Syria, Medina and 
Yamamah. A peace deal brokered without any further bloodshed would be the ideal scenario. 
But just as there were bands of differing motivations and intentions in ʿĀ’isha’s camp, there 
were also varying motivations and intentions in ʿAlī’s. There were those who were also 
inextricably culpable in the murder of ʿUthmān, and for whom a peace deal could herald bad 
news, among them al-Ashṭār, and the uterine brother of ʿĀ’isha, Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr. 
Thus, despite leaders of both sides seemingly progressing towards a satisfying conclusion to 
their negotiations, violence broke out on 10th Jumād al-Thāni 36/4th December 656 (ibid. 
p.102).  
 
It is reported that Kaʿb b. Sūr led the camel carrying ʿĀ’isha into the battle in the hopes that 
her presence would quell the fight, but this was to no avail. Despite many Basrans fleeing the 
battlefield, ʿĀ’isha commanded Kaʿb to part from her and to head to the frontlines, calling for 
peace and admonishing the fighters with citations of the Quran to stop the violence. But Kaʿb 
was quickly struck down, and so she was left to shout her orders, to command her army as best 
she could. Both her generals, Zubayr and Ṭalḥa, were lost to the crowd. She was effectively 
the commander of the army, ordering and rallying her force, and so the fight became most 
fierce around her camel. Later, ʿĪsa b. Hittan would say there was no other way to describe the 
palanquin within which ʿĀ’isha sat, except as a hedgehog for all the arrows that had pierced it.  
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She imbued courage and bravery, displaying immense leadership as she rallied her troops and 
bolstered their morale according to the skills for which each tribe was reputed (ibid. pp.134-
136). But the fight grew more intense, and seventy lives were lost around the camel that carried 
her. ʿAlī, well versed in battle tactics and thoroughly experienced in warfare, realised that as 
long as the camel stood, the battle would not end. He therefore called for all energy to be 
diverted to striking the legs of the camel. When this was achieved, down came the camel and 
with it, all that ʿĀ’isha had fought for. Neither Ṭalḥa nor Zubayr survived the battle. The total 
number who lost their lives in that battle was recorded to be in excess of six thousand (ibid. 
p.144). 
 
ʿAlī proved himself to be gracious in the matter of ʿĀ’isha and organised for her return to 
Makkah in the company of forty prominent Basran women, riding beasts and provisions, 
headed by her brother, Muḥammad. This ensured an honourable home-going as a mark of 
respect for ʿĀ’isha. He returned her to Makkah where she wished to stay until performing the 
Ḥajj, after which she was to return to her home in Medina, destined never again to participate 
in political affairs. The final word on the matter relayed by al-Ṭabarī, framed as a concluding 
lesson, are the words of ʿAmmār b. Yāsir, who remarked to ʿĀ’isha after the cessation of 
fighting: ‘Mother of the Faithful, how far this march is from the pact that was made for you!’39 
She is said to have replied, ‘By God! As I always knew, you are a great speaker of truth.’ 
‘Praise be to God, who has judged in my favour by your tongue.’ With that, the narrative of 
the saga of the Battle of the Camel is brought to a close. 
 
This event has been relayed here in much length and is justifiable for the wealth of information 
it provides, and for the censorship which all too often plagues this story in its retellings. In one 
prominent fatwa website, where someone has asked for clarification on the deaths of ʿUthmān 
and ʿAlī, the question is entitled, ‘Necessity of refraining from discussion of the disagreements 
that occurred among the Companions of the Prophet’ (https://islamqa.info/en/127028). Instead 
of answering the question, the questioner is given a litany of statements from the Quran and 
prominent scholars of Islam, to not speak ill of the Companions of the Prophet. The matter is 
entirely avoided. In cases where the matter is not avoided, such as in the aforementioned work 
of Haylamaz (2014), the event is entirely sanitised. It is nothing more than the ‘Muslims’ test 
with their brothers’ and there is never a degeneration of decorum or politeness, and the intention 
 
39 Again, alluding to Quran, al-Aḥzāb, 33:33. 
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is solely to seek justice and reinstate peace. The blame is exclusively upon the single character 
of ʿAbdallah b. Saba, a dastardly and convenient figure for blame, upheld as a hypocrite 
amongst the ranks. 
 
The story of the Battle of the Camel and its gradual sanitisation at the pens of biographers and 
storytellers, has meant that ʿĀ’isha is stripped of the complexity that made her human. Her 
confidence upon entering the fray and the conviction with which she took up an oppositional 
stance to ʿAlī, her political acumen in seeking to support Ṭalḥa and Zubayr for Caliphal power, 
her trepidations and doubts as the convoy left Makkah and moved towards Basra, her insistence 
on avoiding unnecessary bloodshed even on the battlefield, and her defiance and conviction in 
her position even once she was captured are all elided.  
 
But before her silencing, there is her voice and the Battle of the Camel provides a rich case 
study for it. Her understanding of her people and how to sway public opinion is on full public 
display in her first speech against ʿUthmān, where she rallies the people to hold him to account 
and ensure that he upholds his role with integrity and honesty. Her use of the Prophet’s artefacts 
as a means to invoke the love of the people for their Prophet and reminding them of her 
proximity to him as wife and now keeper of these intimate objects, is politically astute. In her 
second rousing speech to her party en route to Basra, reminding them that ʿAlī is now in need 
of being held to account, she is just as able to quell the disorder and disillusionment beginning 
to grip those around her and restore their motivation and courage for the most part. That she 
does this by summoning the Quran, is so very typical of ʿĀ’isha’s approach to living faithfully 
and is a recurring practice that appears in al-Ijāba too. Her ability to calm the anxieties and to 
dispel the doubts of those who have followed her, whilst she herself is also gripped by such 
trepidations, knowing the severity before God of Muslims turning their weapons on one 
another, is evidence of her quality and calibre as a leader. By removing this complicated 
narrative from depictions of the Battle, it is easy to mould her story into one of a grave mistake 
made by a Mother of the Believers, or to that of a proto-feminist army commander, rather than 
that of a committed leader of the Muslims, seeking justice and a faithful outcome for her 
community. 
 
Both she and Umm Salamah provide a centre for dissenting voices to be expressed by opening 
up their homes for meetings to take place; a practice they will have remembered from the 
Prophet who would hold counsel (shūra) in his home, making room for opposing perspectives 
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to be heard and considered. Her sending letters to influential and powerful local leaders 
displayed her understanding of how political alliances are built and won and was likely a 
practice she will have observed from the Prophet. The democratic organisation of her home is 
not, in any case, a new arrangement. Her house was also the site of a counsel formed to decide 
on ʿUmar’s successor upon his death. ʿĀ’isha had been accustomed to having proximity to 
power and easy influence as one who was consulted by the Prophet, her father Abū Bakr, and 
his successor ʿUmar. However, with ʿUthmān’s nepotism and the residual antagonisms 
between her and ʿAlī, this proximity to power was incrementally removed. Another way had 
to be sought, and with growing dissent amongst citizens around her and their positive response 
to her declarations, she would have been emboldened to take this uncharted path of political 
dissent through public disobedience and organisation.  
 
While the battle was not won, her willingness to take risks and to do so while putting her own 
life in danger too, would be reason enough for men in a similar situation to be hailed as heroes, 
even in defeat. Subaltern studies have provided many examples of the breech between popular 
and national histories in its highlighting of the construction of history as a process that is driven 
by the social and political elite of the time (Shrivastava, 2017). This is resonant here, in the 
writing of Muslim historians and biographers who clearly viewed this episode in the life of 
ʿĀ’isha as one of embarrassment. They took their lead from those who would chastise and seek 
to shame ʿĀ’isha by invoking seclusion for the wives of the Prophet, seeking always to 
maintain and promote a particular hegemonic image of Muslimah piety. Rather than allowing 
themselves to be inspired by her bravery and courage, they sought to excuse, displace and 
distance the subversiveness of ʿĀ’isha’s actions. Freed from such a framing which casts her 
actions as problematic, embarrassing or threatening, ʿĀ’isha’s story can finally be allowed the 
full force of its subversive and empowering potential, particularly for women. 
 
The notion that her defeat at the Battle of the Camel somehow cowed her into a submissive 
position is erroneous. She simply takes another course. Still using her powerful voice and her 
sharp intellect, she becomes the disruptive educator and instructor in Medina, taking her 
subversive message into a different mode of operation. Perhaps she was chastened in the 
moment when the battle was lost, and it is true that she does not raise an army again or stand 
in overt defiance in the public political domain, but she continues to raise her voice, she remains 
embattled in safeguarding the boundaries and practice of Islam. And still, despite her loss at 
the Battle of the Camel, there are many victories to be celebrated, not least that this event and 
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ʿĀ’isha’s role in it, allows hegemonic discourses of Muslimah piety to be disrupted. The binary 
gender roles that have been erected and justified through the scholarship of Muslim male 
scholars, in keeping with their contexts and interpretations, when met by the revolutionary and 
insubordinate actions of ʿ Ā’isha during this time of great civil unrest in the Muslim community, 
cannot interpret away the diametrically opposing image that is conjured by ʿĀ’isha in this time, 
to that of the pious Muslim woman. She refuses to either be silenced or censored by those who 
insisted that the Quran called for the seclusion of the Wives of the Prophet. At most this story 
is used as a justification for the impermissibility of women’s political leadership; at worst it is 
ignored in its entirety. While this attempt to subalternate the story of her political agency may 
have succeeded to a degree, the subversive nature of her actions could not be entirely erased. 
Her role and actions remain in the earliest books on the history of Islam, and while they may 
find themselves re-told in sanitised adaptations since, the traces of her action allow for 
destabilising discourses on gender roles and both personal and political agency of Muslim 
women.  
 
ʿĀ’isha and the Construct of Muslimah Piety 
 
Each of the case studies from the life of ʿĀ’isha and the ways in which each has been carefully 
constructed and reconstructed by biographers, scholars, historians, storytellers and traditionists 
illustrates the myriad of ways in which ʿĀ’isha’s name and story have been co-opted and 
adapted according to the ebbs and flows of differing times and places and the demands they 
made on Muslim memory. As with many iconic figures, ʿĀ’isha serves as more than just a 
historical character. She acts as a signifier of what Muslim women can be, and moreover how 
Muslim women can and should enact their piety, or what can be simply referred to as Muslimah 
piety.  
 
These incidents from the life of ʿ Ā’isha that have been considered in some length in this chapter 
not only provide a historical account but another way of framing her. It must be acknowledged 
that most of the sources cited, in the main early Muslim sources, are still secondary sources, 
penned by scholars already steeped in intra-Muslim and inter-faith polemics. As such, then, 
how ʿ Ā’isha’s story is told is at the service of the demands made by the political contexts. Thus, 
it can be argued that these retellings are not driven only by the pursuit of knowing ʿĀ’isha, but 
also by the pursuit of constructing the ideal Muslimah. Her story is told as a response to Shiʿa 
accusations, to non-Muslim denigrations, orientalist constructions, and to the need of Muslims 
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to find role models in the earliest generations, not least of female role models for Muslim 
women.  
 
By re-reading the key incidents in her life, it is possible to not only re-evaluate how the story 
is told, but to also deconstruct it, mining it for what Derrida (1997) called the ‘trace’. For 
Derrida deconstruction is a means to questioning the self-construction, or rather the ‘official’ 
stories told, to utilise them in order to illustrate how they can be reconstructed in alternative 
ways. The stories around ʿĀ’isha regarding her age at marriage, the slander, and the Battle of 
the camel have each been re-engaged with on numerous occasions to formulate new official 
versions. Each time the same sources have been used, but different constructs of the story are 
formulated by different omissions and emphases. This re-engagement and reconstruction of 
ʿĀ’isha’s stories, is inextricably linked with how Muslim women perform their piety. 
Furthermore, whilst Derrida wrote of the signifier from a linguistic perspective, one can also 
extend this as a means to discussing the wider implications of how iconic figures are 
constructed for teleological purposes. If the signifier is about determining what the signified is 
and is not, then the constructions of ʿĀ’isha are also about determining what she was and was 
not, in addition to what the Muslim woman can and cannot be.  
 
ʿĀ’isha becomes a historical figure, a signifier for the ideal Muslim woman, meaning her story 
is not only told by the events of what occurred in her life and how she responded to each, but 
is also influenced by the external needs those stories could fulfil in developing a narrative for 
Muslim women seeking a paragon of Muslimah piety. She is thus, like the signifier in Saussure 
(Bradley, 2008, pp.71-73), constituted by the elements of the story that make up her own life 
and being, and just as much by her difference from other constructions of her; allegations made 
by the hypocrites in the time of the Prophet, Shiʿas who viewed her unfavourably, and 
orientalists and Islamophobes who project their own negative narratives of her, as well as 
keeping her distant from all manners and actions considered disreputable in a Muslim woman 
by patriarchal standards of varying times. However, importantly, sometimes evidence of the 
very traits and behaviours she is not meant to model happen to be clearly present in her life 
stories. She is not a rebellious woman but a dutiful one, and yet she raised an army against ʿ Alī. 
She is not a woman who opposed male authority, and yet her home was a centre for gathering 
those who were disgruntled by the political climate under ʿUthmān’s caliphate and beyond. 
She is weak and vulnerable, as women are supposed to be, and yet she was protected and 
exonerated through Divine intervention and was a paragon of composure and strength when 
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falsely accused. ʿĀ’isha’s identity is assembled on the building blocks of her history, but also 
the difference between what she is and what others have wrongfully constructed her as. She is 
also constructed in accordance with the ideal Muslim woman as devised by Muslim male 
scholars and in opposition to those attributes deemed unbefitting of the ideal Muslim woman. 
With varying demands bearing down on the construction of ʿĀ’isha, it is unsurprising that so 
much of her personal history is obfuscated, ignored, or sanitised beyond recognition. But the 
traces of who she was or could be, are found in the gaps and omissions, and in the assertions 
and emphases that emerge with her story over time.  
 
Each case study given above has been relayed in a manner that not only illustrates key events 
in her life but also allows alternative readings with varying implications. The issue of her age 
at marriage highlights effectively the informal fluidity of the ḥadīth canon. The incident of the 
slander and the Battle of the Camel both use early sources and demonstrate ʿĀ’isha’s strength, 
independence, autonomy, unfaltering faith, sense of justice, engagement in public life, and the 
merging of the public space with the domestic. Releasing ʿĀ’isha from the constraints of 
patriarchal readings and allowing for another perspective of the stories to emerge, broadens the 
implications and parameters of her as a signifier for Muslimah piety, and thus expands the 
horizon for Muslim women. A Muslim woman who finds herself in a vulnerable domestic 
situation can freely return to her parents’ home and advocate for herself; a Muslim woman can 
aspire to positions hitherto held only or primarily by men in the political, military or other 
domains of life; a Muslim woman can hold Muslim men to account with authority, and so on. 
The release of ʿĀ’isha as signifier for Muslimah piety, is also a release for Muslim women and 
the parameters set by their faith.  
 
Introducing the Author: Imām al-Zarkashī 
 
His full name was Badr al-Dīn Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad b. ʿAbdullah b. Bahādur al-
Zarkashī. He is also known as Abū ʿAbdullah Muḥammad b. Bahādur b. ʿAbdullah al-Minhāji 
al-Shafiʿī. He was born in Mamluk Cairo in 745/1344, witnessing both the Bahri and the Burji 
periods of Mamluk rule, and was of Turkish heritage. He came to be known as al-Zarkashī, the 
embroiderer, due to his mastery of the skill at a young age using golden thread, under the 
tutelage of his father who was a skilled embroiderer. However, he soon turned his attention to 
the study of Islam and was educated under the direction of some of the most illustrious teachers 
of his time, until taking his own seat among such names (Faraj, A. 1990, pp.5-7). He travelled 
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to Damascus to learn ḥadīth with the famed exegete, Imād al-Dīn b. Kathīr (d. 774/1373), to 
Aleppo in 763/1361 at the age of 18 to study fiqh and uṣūl with Shihāb al-Dīn al-Adhraʿī (d. 
783/1381), and back to Cairo to study Quran and fiqh with the then head of the Shafiʿī school 
in Cairo, Jamāl al-Dīn al-Asnawī. He remained in the company of al-Asnawī until he passed 
away in 772/1370. Additionally, he spent a significant number of years with Sirāj al-Dīn al-
Bulqīnī (d. 805/1404), with whom he studied and memorised Imām al-Nawawī’s Minhāj al-
Ṭālibīn, which earned him the agnomen al-Minhājī, alongside al-Zarkashī. He stayed in his 
company until al-Bulqīnī moved to Syria to hold the position of Qāḍi there. Al-Zarkashī was 
also taught ḥadīth under the tutelage of ʿAlā al-Dīn Mughulṭay (d. 762/1362) (Rippin, A. 2012, 
EI2). 
 
Al-Zarkashī was a proliferous writer, earning the title ‘al-Muḥarrir’ (one who writes with 
speed) due to the proliferation with which he authored books (Ahmad, 2014). He is thought to 
have written somewhere between thirty-three and forty-six works, ranging in topics from 
jurisprudence (fiqh), sciences of the Quran (ʿulūm al-Qurʾān), principles of jurisprudence (uṣūl 
al-fiqh), exegesis (tafsīr), Islamic etiquette (adab), Islamic scholasticism (kalām), and ḥadīth 
terminology (muṣṭalah al-ḥadīth). However, only twenty-two works remain extant, and only 
fourteen of them are currently available in published form (Rippin, A. EI2). At the young age 
of nineteen years in the year 764/1362 he penned his first book, ʿUqūd al-Jimān. It was around 
790/1388 that he authored al-Ijāba, making it one of the last books he wrote. It is noted by Arül 
that al-Zarkashī was able to dedicate himself fully to the pursuit of knowledge thanks to the 
generosity of family members who took it upon themselves to provide monetary assistance to 
his family and fulfil their material needs so that he would not need to work. He is often depicted 
as a recluse, seldom engaging in public or social activities, instead preferring to spend 
prolonged periods in seclusion dedicated to the pursuit of knowledge. Ibn Ḥajr (2012, Vol.3 
p.398) writes in his al-Durrur al Kāmina, ‘He [al Zarkashī] detached himself in his house and 
would not frequent anyone except the book market and when he would go there, he wouldn’t 
buy anything. He would spend the whole day studying in the bookshop, noting down that which 
interested him and would then use this in his writings’. 
 
He passed away at the age of forty-nine, in the year 794/1392, and is buried in the smaller 
al-Qarāfah cemetery in Cairo. Before passing away, while on his death bed, he is recorded 
as having gathered his children; ʿĀ’isha, Faṭima, Muḥammad, ʿAlī and Aḥmad, and 
instructed Muḥammad to read his books, beginning with al-Ijāba. Upon completing the 
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readings, he granted them all license (ijāza) to teach his works. Despite his relatively short 
life he is noted as having left behind a great legacy of knowledge, from which scholars of 
his time and after having gained immensely. It is observed that al-Suyūṭi (d. 911/1505), 
benefitted greatly from al-Zarkashī’s works, authoring a number of books which drew 
heavily from his works40, including ʿAyn al-Iṣābah fi istidrāk ʿĀ’isha ʿala al-Ṣaḥābah, 
which he introduces as a summary of al-Zarkashī’s al-Ijāba.  
 
Al-Suyūṭi organises his book into chapters, in the standard fashion of organising chapters in 
books of jurisprudence; in terms of purification, prayer, funeral prayers, fasting, and so on, 
unlike al-Zarkashī, who categorises his book’s chapters according to the various 
Companions to whom ʿĀ’isha is responding. While this is in keeping with the musnad style 
of ordering, whereby traditions are organised and categorised according to the narrator of 
the statements rather than the subject, it is also clearly a more assertive, perhaps even more 
provocative, stance than that taken by al-Suyūṭi. To structure his book with chapters 
assigned according to which Companion ʿĀ’isha was refuting, makes a far stronger 
statement about her engagement with the relating of Prophetic traditions, and her authority 
among the Companions and the generation following them, the Tābiʿūn, than simply 
organising chapters in the customary way of fiqh books, which would allow the book to 
blend in with the myriad of fiqh books, denying it any outstanding feature. Al-Suyūṭi’s work 
further pales before that of al-Zarkashī when considering the former records only fifty-three 
ḥadīth in his work while the latter records two hundred and twenty, due perhaps to the 
concentration of al-Suyūṭi on those ḥadīth which could be organised within jurisprudential 
categories, though al-Suyūṭi asserts that this is because the other traditions beyond the fifty-
three he extracts from al-Ijāba, cannot be considered as ‘corrections’.41 This is a strange 
assertion to make, given that this simply is not the case. It raises questions as to why al-
Suyūṭi is now seeking to construct ʿĀʾisha specifically in terms of jurisprudence concerned 
with personal piety; did he feel al-Zarkashī’s work had the potential to undermine the 
 
40 Another work which al-Suyūṭi heavily benefits from is al-Zarkashī’s al-Burhān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān which he draws from 
extensively in his own better-known book, al-Itqān fī ʿUlūm al-Qurʾān. 
41 Al-Suyūṭi took such liberties with the works of many other scholars too, and yet his works were warmly received rather than 
chastised for their at best unoriginal and at worst plagiaristic, nature. Blecher (2017) argues that this is because his works 
served another purpose to contribute a work that is useful without toil, al-nafʿ bi-lā taʿab. For more on this see, Blecher, J. 
2017. ‘Usefulness without Toil’: Al-Suyūṭi and the Art of Concise Ḥadīth Commentary. Al-Suyūṭi, A Polymath of the Mamluk 
Period. Leiden: Brill. 
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existing canon? Or perhaps he was trying to construct ʿĀ’isha as an authority solely in the 
realm of fiqh. Al-Suyūṭi further claims in his introduction to have not only exhumed those 
statements which are genuine corrections of ʿĀ’isha, but to have included some corrections 
overlooked by al-Zarkashī. Out of fifty-three traditions that he records, only six are 
additional to what is recorded in al-Ijāba, and even then, five of these are a variation of 
others which are recorded by al-Zarkashī, leaving only one to be genuinely additional to al-
Zarkashī’s collection.42   
 
Al-Suyūṭi notes that al-Zarkashī’s work was preceded by that of Abū Manṣūr ʿAbd al-
Muḥsin b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī b. Ṭāhir al-Baghdādi, also known as Abū Manṣūr al-Shiḥī.43  
He notes that his recorded 25 traditions. Again, a small number in comparison to that 
recorded by al-Zarkashī. Arül (2004, p.13) establishes in his edition of al-Ijāba, that al-
Zarkashī utilised this work, among others, to compile his text. Ibn Ḥajar acknowledges Abū 
Manṣūr’s work but affirms the superiority of al-Zarkashī’s work over the former’s stating, 
‘Indeed, the author of al-Ijāba has a better order, more clarification, and it traces back to the 
texts of previous great scholars’. 
 
It is of interest that another book al-Zarkashī penned was al-Tanqīḥ li-Alfāẓ al-Jāmiʿ al-
Ṣaḥīḥ-- Revision of the Words of the Ṣaḥīḥ Collection. In the introduction to the critical 
edition of this book, Yaḥya b. Muḥammad ʿAlī al-Ḥakamī (2003, Vol.1 p.7) states, ‘…this 
is the most important of all books concerned with explaining Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī…there is no 
exegete of Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī that has come after al-Zarkashī, except that he has depended on 
his work’. Al-Afghānī (1970, p.10) in his edition of al-Ijāba makes reference to this book 
explaining that al-Zarkashī had sought to ‘clarify that which is obscure, to make manifest 
that which is hidden, selecting from statements the most authentic…’. That al-Zarkashī 
exerted himself in such an endeavour on al-Bukhārī may also be an indication of his 
occupation with keeping the canon open, maintaining a position of renewed and constant 
engagement with the ḥadīth texts, and pushing at the boundaries of the canon by authoring 
a book such as al-Ijāba while also keeping the internal state of the canon fluid too. 
 
 
42 Al-Suyūṭi (1989, p.43) writes: Muslim records on the authority of ʿUrwah who said, it was said to ʿĀ’isha that people were 
claiming that the Messenger of God had been shrouded in a silken shawl. She said, ‘A silken shawl was brought, but he was 
not shrouded in it’. 
43 Akram Nadawi (2013, p220) notes that this has been reproduced by Ibn Ḥajar in his Muʿjam al-Mufahras. 
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Introducing the Text, al-Ijāba li-Īrādi mā Istadraktahu ʿĀ’isha ʿAla al-Ṣaḥābah—The 
Corrective: ʿĀ’isha’s Rectification of the Companions 
 
Al-Ijāba, the Manuscript 
 
Despite the value of the book, it is remarkable that the manuscript was so neglected. As 
mentioned previously, only two manuscripts are known to exist: the first discovered by Saʿīd 
al-Afghānī at the Zāhiriya Library of Damascus in 1939, and the second by Mehmet 
Bünyamen Arül at the Beyazit Library of Istanbul in 1994, which he came upon whilst 
working on a critical edition from the first manuscript in which he found many errors. This 
second manuscript then worked as an aid in his efforts to verify and source the statements 
that were recorded in the first.  
 
Both al-Afghānī and Arül’s excitement at discovering their respective manuscripts is 
palpable in their introductory remarks in each of their critical editions. Al-Afghānī (1970, 
p.4) states, ‘I was searching the treasures of the Zāhiriya Library in Damascus [looking] 
through all the manuscripts, and at the very end I found a rare treatise by Imām Badr al-Dīn 
al-Zarkashī al-Shafiʿī, written by himself dedicated to one subject matter; the corrections 
the honourable ʿĀ’isha made of the Companions. I had not even finished reading it when I 
had already resolved to publish and share it amongst the people.’ Similarly, Arül (2004, p.6) 
writes ‘I could not believe my eyes’ when he discovered a second manuscript again by 
chance, at the Beyazit Library in Istanbul, whilst working on a tahqīq study of the original 
manuscript. Arül makes no mention as to who wrote the manuscript he found, whether it 
was by the pen of Imām al-Zarkashī as well, or a student or otherwise, nor does he date it, 
but he used the two manuscripts to inform his investigation of the text, and his verification 
of the soundness of those statements recorded therein to complete the critical edition that 
was first published in 2004 and is the text from which I have worked for this study. 
 
Al-Ijāba, the Text 
 
As illustrated by Spellberg, the historiographical journey of ʿĀ’isha has been a long and 
complex one. Intertwined in historiographic debate, the politics of genealogy and 
succession, and sectarian debacles and assertions, her image has been reconstructed time 
and again. The earliest written sources such as those biographies of the Prophet Muḥammad 
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written by Ibn Isḥāq (d. 150/767), Ibn Ḥishām (d. 218/833), al-Wāqidī (d. 207/823), and 
ʿAbd al-Razzāq b. Hammam al-Sanʿāni (d. 211/827), chronicle the life of ʿĀ’isha, much 
like the other thirteen wives of the Prophet, as simply that—wives of the Prophet. Little is 
mentioned of their life prior to marriage to him, and they are viewed only through the prism 
of his life. Their lives are simply recorded as a series of points at which they intersect with 
his.  
 
It is not until the 3rd/9th century, with the emergence of ṭabaqāt dictionaries recording the 
biographies of the Companions of the Prophet, and others found in the transmission of 
Prophetic traditions, that ʿĀ’isha is given a fuller and more outstanding life story. Ibn Sʿad 
(d. 230/845) authored what could be described as the seminal work of that genre, entitled 
Kitāb al-Ṭabaqāt al-Kabīr—The Book of the Classes, in which he mentions 4,259 
individuals, including 600 women (Fück, J.W, EI2). In it he provides ʿĀ’isha with a far 
more detailed biography and enumerates for the first time the qualities that make her distinct 
and superior to the other wives of the Prophet. These qualities are given in the first person 
by ʿĀ’isha herself and detail those attributes and occasions granted to her exclusively from 
among the wives of the Prophet. They include her being the only virgin wife he married, 
that she was the only wife whose parents were both emigrants to Medina (muhājir), that the 
Prophet received revelation in her presence, and that he passed away in her arms, to name 
but a few. Ultimately these unique characteristics revolve around five particular themes; her 
genealogy, her proximity to the Prophet during the performance of significant religious 
rituals, in addition to her presence during the final days of his life, the particular aspects of 
their married life, and the intervention of the Divine during the incident of the slander against 
her (Spellberg, 1994). 
 
These virtues remained in popular circulation amongst Muslims and this theme was then 
harnessed a century later by al-Ṭabarī (d. 310/923). This is significant because as Watt 
(1998, pp.333-334) notes, it was in the 4th/10th century that the scholars utilised the term 
‘Sunni’ for the first time to describe the majority Muslim community. The schism between 
the Sunnis and Shiʿas was to rupture, and ʿĀ’isha was one of a number of personalities 
whose virtues and status were to not only be contested by the Sunni and Shiʿa, but to become 
the very battle lines drawn between them. The polemics surrounding ʿĀ’isha, however, 
remained concerned with the assertion of her superiority over the other wives and female 
companions, and then more broadly her superiority among women in general, setting her up 
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as a paragon of virtue and piety. This effort, while exalting the sharpness of her intellect and 
the accuracy of her memory, did little to bring her to the centre of knowledge production. 
Being caught up in the Sunni-Shiʿa conflict which manifests itself in a battle of superiority 
between ʿĀ’isha and Fāṭima, or Abū Bakr and ʿAlī, means that the critical force of ʿĀ’isha 
in the epistemology of Islam remained absent, or at the very least overlooked. 
 
In the 8th/14th century, al-Zarkashī fused the unique and outstanding virtues of ʿĀ’isha with 
her unique and outstanding contribution to Islamic memory (Spellberg, 1994): as a critic of 
ḥadīth narrations, and as a faqih, one who could discern legal conclusions, as well as an 
exegete of the Quran (Sayeed, 2013). In his al-Ijāba he collects all the traditions in which 
ʿĀ’isha responds as a critical traditionist to the reports of other Companions, many of whom 
are held in great esteem such as ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, Ibn ʿAbbās, ʿAlī b. Abū Ṭālib, and Ibn 
Masʿūd. After his praise and brief introduction of ʿĀ’isha, al-Zarkashī states in his 
introduction, ‘This book is devoted to her particular contribution in this field, especially the 
points on which she disagreed with others, the points to which she supplied additional 
information, the points on which she was in complete disagreement with the scholars of her 
time’. It is clear from his introduction that he is advocating a projection of ʿĀ’isha which is 
critical and engaging in the process of formulating knowledge. It is possible that he intended 
for his work to have a deep impact from his dedication of the book to the Qāḍi al-Qudāt, 
Chief Judge, Qāḍi Burḥān al-Dīn b. Jamāʿah (d. 790/1388), who was one of the most 
distinguished Shafiʿī jurists in Mamluk Egypt and descended from a family well established 
within the religio-judicial system of the Mamluk dynasty. To have had his ear, was to 
potentially impact the prevailing judicial system.  
 
He proceeds to enumerate forty-two qualities particular to ʿĀ’isha, expanding the lists 
provided by Ibn Sʿad and al-Ṭabarī. Like al-Ṭabarī, al-Zarkashī too highlights the 
similarities between ʿĀ’isha and Mary mother of Jesus, and as was typical of the Sunni-
Shiʿa polemics, raises ʿĀ’isha and her father, Abū Bakr to the highest levels of praise such 
that to disavow them is to disavow Islam itself. Al-Zarkashī however, moves beyond these 
polemics and sets the grounds to recast ʿ Ā’isha by situating her superiority in her intellectual 
astuteness and her eloquent articulation. Al-Zarkashī states that she ‘was the greatest of his 
[the Prophet’s wives] regarding the science of ḥadīth’, and that she was the ‘most eloquent’ 
of all people, such that her words were considered better and ‘more intelligent’ than the 
Friday sermons of the first four Caliphs. These are not outstanding claims that he makes, 
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they are in fact well expressed by many scholars. Al-Ḥākim records in his al-Mustadrak 
(Vol.4, pp.12-13), that al-Aḥnāf said, ‘I heard the sermons of Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, 
ʿAlī, and other Caliphs besides, but I never heard speech from the mouth of men, more 
splendid or perfect than that which came from the mouth of ʿĀ’isha’. He further records al-
Zuhrī as stating, ‘If the knowledge of all mankind and the wives of the Prophet to be 
gathered, ʿĀ’isha would be more knowledgeable still’. 
 
Her reputation continues to precede her, and yet ʿĀ’isha’s own voice or agency has 
oftentimes been obscured, lost in the polemics of sectarian divisions and debates. This 
translation and study into her correctives seeks to be guided by the personality and 
methodology of ʿĀ’isha and as such, it is imperative that what has been garnered regarding 
her life and how it has been constructed, is considered in the translation process as well as 
textual analysis. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Imām al-Zarkashī would, no doubt, have laboured on al-Ijāba, like any of his works, with the 
intention of benefitting his community and future generations of Muslims. His commitment to 
this text is indicative from the reach he hoped it would attain through his children and students. 
But time proved a cruel master, and instead this work was close to being entirely lost. Yet 
somehow by a tenacity and resilience emblematic of its core protagonist, ʿĀ’isha, it survives, 
almost willing its own discovery. The opportune findings of Saʿīd al-Afghānī and Muhamet 
Bunyamun Arül of their respective manuscripts reads as nothing short of two serendipitous 
findings.  
 
In order to garner the most from the text, it has been this chapter’s effort to examine the 
background and historiography of ʿĀ’isha. Reconstructions of ʿĀ’isha reveal much about the 
historiographical journey her persona has taken conjointly with that of Muslims and Islam. 
Taking her life and story at this juncture allows once more the strength of her character to be 
recalled and to do so in a way that informs the translation of her words and an interrogation of 
her emergent methodology of ḥadīth criticism and jurisprudence, in addition to offering a new 
perspective on ʿĀ’isha herself. However, before this can take place, it is important to also 
understand the history of the ḥadīth tradition and its canonisation, as this process contributes 
to the marginalising of ʿĀ’isha’s positions. 
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Chapter Two: The Classical Ḥadīth Tradition and Its Canonisation 
 
The ḥadīth tradition has a long and complex history. Muslim attitude towards the ḥadīth has 
ranged from disinterest to committed acceptance, cynicism and scepticism to outright 
rejection, with a rich history of scholarly debate to match. This chapter presents an overview 
of that history, of how the science of ḥadīth developed and was applied, as well as the 
canonisation process that the ḥadīth has undergone. The relation of this history to the legal 
judgments of ʿĀ’isha, and their attendant exclusion or inclusion, is crucial to this account. 
 
It is noted in this chapter, that much like the retellings of key incidents in the life of ʿĀ’isha 
in Chapter One are in fact a return to earlier detailed accounts of each, the approach to ḥadīth 
criticism that is suggested as a result of ʿĀ’isha’s emergent methodology in Chapter Seven, 
is also a return to established practices in the science of ḥadīth impugnment and validation, 
and the expansion of such methods to go beyond their current application. Additionally, the 
interrogation of the ḥadīth canon has already been illustrated as taking place in Chapter One, 
particularly in the account of how ʿĀ’isha’s age at marriage has been handled by Islamic 
scholars. In this chapter, I argue for this interrogative engagement with the canon that seeks 
to simultaneously critically engage its content as well as expand its boundaries, to be 
formally recognised, proposing a new conceptualisation of the ḥadīth canon in Islam. 
 
Though there may be an appeal to established practices in the science of impugnment and 
validation of ḥadīth, the process and its history is relayed in this chapter to reveal how the 
process has also been utilised to overlook statements of ḥadīth. The criteria are, of course, 
only as effective as those applying them. This is not to assert that there was an anti- ʿĀ’isha 
sentiment, but that socio-political contexts within which ḥadīth were being scrutinised, and 
compilations authored and canonised, foreclosed the possibility of centring many of her 
statements and actions. As has already been presented in Chapter One, polemical and 
sectarian divisions as well as outside accusations and threats, in addition to the fact that the 
entire endeavour of ḥadīth collection, commentary and canonisation has been done by men, 
has resulted in only a partial presentation of  ʿĀ’isha. 
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The Classical Ḥadīth Tradition and The Science of Impugnment and Validation of 
Narrators 
 
Gautier Juynboll (1996, p.119) opines that Muslims are entirely deferential to the canonical 
collections of ḥadīth, and that the interrogation of ḥadīth found in any of these collections is 
unnecessary in the Muslim imaginary. Indeed, he claims Muslims would see such endeavour 
as ‘superfluous’, further adding, ‘in their [Muslim] view a tradition listed in any of the 
canonical collections al-kutub al-sitta, is not in need of historical analysis, but especially 
not if found in more than one collection, including that of al-Bukhārī or Muslim. Its 
occurrence there constitutes for these Muslims sufficient evidence for the historicity of its 
ascription to the prophet Muḥammad’. He continues with the assertion that it is the works 
of Goldziher and Schacht that have been cause for reflection among Muslims, and the 
impetus for questioning their own absolute deference. Whilst the canonical collections of 
ḥadīth do hold a paramount status amongst Muslims, and particularly the laity, the claim of 
Juynboll ignores the historical and contemporary engagements of Muslim scholars with the 
canonical ḥadīth that interrogate their chain of narration, the individual reports and 
investigate their historicity. Evidence of this has been given in the scholarly engagement 
regarding the age of ʿ Ā’isha upon her marriage to the Prophet in Chapter One. Al-Ijāba itself 
constitutes an endeavour that challenges the canonical ḥadīth texts, and some of al-
Zarkashī’s work on a number of ʿ Ā’isha’s ḥadīth involve the strengthening of her statements 
through interrogation of the chain of narration (isnād), as well as taking to task the actual 
text (matn) of the ḥadīth.  
 
Admittedly, however, though these endeavours exist, there are limitations; they tend to be 
done sporadically and there is no overarching methodology or organised approach, and none 
of these attempts have compromised the ultimate status of the canonical ḥadīth collections. 
Attempts at scrutinising individual ḥadīth within the canonical corpus are often met with 
fierce resistance. Al-Dāraquṭni challenged the status of a number of ḥadīth found in both al-
Bukhārī and Muslim in his works Kitāb al-ilzāmāt and Kitāb al-tatabbuʿ - sometimes 
presented as one work, rather than two - in which he sought to scrutinise chains of narrations 
found in the Ṣaḥiḥayn. While this was not a particularly exceptional endeavour for its time, 
he was met with strong rebuttals from al-Nawawī and Ibn Ḥajar. Later scholars like Ibn al-
Qayyim and Ibn al-Jawzī dedicated studies to the scrutiny of ḥadīth on the basis of their 
chains of narrations but went further to scrutinise the content of the ḥadīth (matn) too. 
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Despite the existence of these texts and the advocacy of scholars such as Abū Ḥanīfa, al-
Shafiʿī and Ibn al-Jawzī to establish a universal set of principles by which to critically 
authenticate a ḥadīth by its text as well as its chain—including by weighing up its content 
with the Quran—serious attempts at probing the content of ḥadīth is largely absent (Khan, 
I.A, 2010, p.38). Khan argues no works of ḥadīth can be found in which both the chain of 
narrators and the text of the ḥadīth have been interrogated. He argues (ibid, p.31), ‘scattered 
comments and observations on certain aḥadīth, from a textual perspective, can be attributed 
to some scholars, but on the whole, serious efforts are missing from scholastic legacy’. He 
further identifies Ibn al-Qayyim as the first Muslim scholar to have attempted to construct 
a textual analysis of ḥadīth in the process of authentication (ibid, p.38). The criteria Ibn al-
Qayyim developed for authenticating ḥadīth by way of their content are: 
 
• The ḥadīth must not contradict the Quran; 
• The ḥadīth must not contradict highly authentic ḥadīth; 
• The ḥadīth should not be in opposition to true observations; 
• The ḥadīth should not promote reward and punishment in a disproportionate manner;  
• The ḥadīth should not contain an unsound statement;  
• The ḥadīth should not exaggerate or be illogical in its praise or condemnation of a 
place, person, profession or thing (ibid, p.39). 
 
Despite proffering this criteria and despite the existence of some attempts at scrutinising the 
content of ḥadīth, the approach was seldom engaged for the major canonical collections, 
instead focussing primarily on the chain of narrators for their critical authentication of 
prophetic traditions. It is for this reason that al-Zarkashī’s al-Ijāba is invaluable, in its 
endeavour to engage in scrutinising the actual text of the ḥadīth (naqd al-matn). As will be 
seen, interrogation of the alleged prophetic tradition in terms of its actual content is a regular 
practice of ʿĀ’isha in verifying ḥadīth. This research, then, seeks to not only engage with 
the texts of the ḥadīth scrutinised by ʿĀ’isha, in keeping with her own approach to ḥadīth 
criticism, but will also seek to extend the established methods for interrogation of ḥadīth as 
formulated by ḥadīth scholars, so that they are applied to the Companions, in order to fully 
realise the authenticity they were meant to achieve.  
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The Principles of Impugnment and Validation (al-Jarḥ wa al-Taʿdīl) in Ḥadīth  
 
In order to consider the implications of a study of al-Ijāba, it is important to have an 
understanding of some of the principles of the classical ḥadīth tradition regarding the 
techniques developed for ḥadīth criticism. In particular the process and criteria for al-jarḥ 
wa al-taʿdīl, the impugnment and validation of narrators in a chain of transmission for a 
tradition, and the premise of ʿadālat al-Ṣaḥāba, the equal reliability of the Companions in 
terms of their trustworthiness and uprightness, excludes them from being appraised by the 
process of al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl. 
 
A narrator is considered impugned if they meet any of the following conditions: 
 
• Kadhib: They have been found to have lied or falsely attributed sayings to the 
Prophet. 
• Ittihām bi al-kadhib: They have been accused of lying or falsifying traditions. 
• Fisq: They are guilty of immoral actions. 
• Bidʿa: They have advocated pernicious innovation. 
• Jahāla: The narrator is anonymous. 
• Sū’ al-ḥifdh: The narrator is known for having a bad memory. 
• Mukhālif al-thiqāt: Opposition to established, reliable authorities.  
• Kathara al-ghalaṭ: Reputation of frequent errors. 
• Ghafla: The narrator has been known to be neglectful with the tradition. 
• Wahm: The narrator is guilty of incredulity and imaginary indulgence. 
 
To be considered reliable as a narrator, one needed to avoid being impugned by any of the 
aforementioned criteria, while meeting two essential criteria: 
 
1. Al-ʿAdālah, Truthfulness: which encompasses being Muslim, having reached 
adulthood, being of sound intellect, and safe from all immoral actions.  
2. Al-Ḍabṭ, Precision: Meaning that the narrator should not have any opposition from 
or disagreement with a narrator considered a reliable authority (thiqah), to not have 
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poor memory, to not be heedless and prone to mistakes, nor be one who has 
indulged the imagination in recounting prophetic traditions (al-Tahhān, 1996, 
p.111). 
 
The criteria of both impugnment and validation therefore have some overlap, but most 
significantly are not applied to Companions. Narrators other than the Companions are 
considered impugned until exonerated by the majority of traditionists. The only exception 
to this is the opinion of Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr who believed, conversely, that narrators were to 
be trusted unless found to be otherwise (Siddiqi, 1993).  
 
To be impugned as a ḥadīth narrator did not relegate or decrease the piety and righteousness 
of an individual; it simply meant that they were not qualified to narrate the traditions. Neither 
did it preclude them from being authorities in other fields. One such example is Ḥafṣ b. 
Sulayman (d. 796/1393): though he was an esteemed and central authority in the 
transmission of the Quran, when it came to ḥadīth transmission, his traditions were 
considered weak, as noted by classical scholars such as Yaḥya b. Maʿīn (d. 233/847), al-
Nasā’i (d. 303/915) and ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Abī Hātim (d. 321/938). Indeed, it is reported 
in Muslim that Abū al-Zinād commented that in his time in Madinah there were 
approximately one hundred people who were not considered reliable in ḥadīth but were still 
considered from amongst the most pious of people (Khan, I.A, 2010, p.30). 
 
It is acknowledged that the application of the conditions of al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl have not 
been uniformly applied. As Kamali (2005, pp.85-86) notes, there has been a far more lenient 
approach to accountability on the required terms relating to well-known figures in general, 
while narrators higher up in the chain of transmission were deemed more credible than those 
lower down in the chain. It seems, then, that the level of scrutiny is inversely proportional 
to where in the chain of transmission a narrator was situated; the higher up they were in the 
chain, the lower the level of scrutiny they were exposed to. This scrutiny all but disappears 
for anyone deemed a Companion. 
 
The principle of ʿadālat al-Ṣaḥābah, is one that asserts that all Companions are equally 
reliable and trustworthy. Ibn Ṣalāḥ stated in hisʿUlūm al-Ḥadīth (1986, p.294), ‘The 
Companions are all just and trustworthy, whether they took part in the Fitnah [the war 
between ʿĀ’isha and ʿAlī] or not, according to the consensus of the reliable scholars.’. Ibn 
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Ṣalāḥ thus elucidates the standard position on the Companions taken by ḥadīth scholars. 
This continues to be the accepted practice amongst Sunni scholars, who believe that the 
Companions have been exonerated by none other than God, in the Quran, and therefore to 
discredit a Companion is to discredit Islam itself. Such is the view of scholars such as the 
Yemeni, Shaykh ʿAbd al-Mālik b. Ḥusayn al-Tāj (2010), who, when asked about applying 
al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl on the Companions, commented, ‘Indeed all of the Companions are 
reliable by the testimony of God for their reliability; there is no need for impugnment after 
that, and there is no one who interrogates them except that he interrogates Islam’.   
 
Those upholding this view cite verses such as verse one hundred and ten of the chapter Āl 
ʿImrān as evidence of God’s having credited all the Companions with virtue: ‘You were the 
best of nations produced [as an example] for mankind, you enjoin what is good and forbid 
what is wrong…’ However, there is no consensus on who is being referred to in this verse, 
and indeed al-Ṭabarī (1994, Vol.2, pp.303-304) in his exegesis reports both ʿUmar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb and Ibn ʿAbbās as specifying the muhājirūn, those who emigrated with the Prophet 
from Makkah to Medina, as the referents in the verse. ʿUmar is reported to have said, ‘This 
[refers to] the first of us [Companions], and not the last of us’, thereby implying that the 
Companions are by no means equal in virtue.  
 
Kamali (2005, p.187) similarly contends, ‘The qualification of ‘adāla is established for all 
the Companions of the Prophet regardless of their juristic or political views’. He goes on to 
assert that this is on the basis of the Quran’s statement, ‘God is well-pleased with them, as 
they are pleased with Him’.44 However, as with the previous verse, there is no consensus on 
who is being specified, and, further still, there is always a possibility of exceptions to the 
rule. While the position that all the Companions are equally reliable may be the normative 
view, contradictions in reports from the Prophet and manifestations of complicating factors 
in his lifetime, such as the presence of hypocrites among the believers in Madinah whose 
identities remained concealed, have not gone unnoticed. Aḥmad b. Muḥammad b. ʿAlī al-
Wazīr (1996, pp.223-232) in his book, al-Muṣaffa fi Uṣūl al-Fiqh notes this in his chapter 
on ʿadālat al-Ṣaḥābah, stating that the Sunni position in fact asserts the Companions are 
considered trustworthy reliable narrators as long as they have not committed an immoral act 
(fisq) for which they have not repented. As such, he argues that the status of ʿ adālah afforded 
 
44 Quran, al-Tawba, 9:100. 
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to the Companions by God or the Prophet can only ever be taken as a general statement; 
individual Companions must still be scrutinised, as the possibility of them all being equally 
trustworthy, reliable, and indeed knowledgeable on a matter is implausible.  
 
It becomes apparent through reading al-Ijāba that whilst ʿĀ’isha is not explicit about a 
methodology to approaching ḥadīth, she certainly seems to rely on particular means of 
testing Prophetic traditions before accepting or rejecting them. These, in brief, are: 
 
• Measuring the ḥadīth against the Quran; 
• Measuring the ḥadīth against Prophetic practice that she witnessed; 
• Measuring the ḥadīth against her own intellect and logical reasoning - including 
considering the lived practice and experience of her community and how best to 
engage in interpretation that was conducive to granting them ease within the 
realms of what is permissible. 
 
In addition to this, she brings to attention the shortcomings of particular Companions in their 
recalling of a tradition, in their understanding and comprehension of the statement and in 
the limitation of their knowledge of the context of the ḥadīth which on many occasions gave 
the opposite message to what was originally relayed without contextualisation. This 
approach of ʿĀ’isha’s then also supports the endeavour to extend the tools of al-jarḥ wa al-
ta’dil to the Companions. 
 
In light of the conditions of impugnment stated above, the traditions collected by al-Zarkashī 
in al-Ijāba will be presented in this study, in the form of sections identifying whom ʿĀ’isha 
is correcting, in keeping with the Musnad tradition, in which ḥadīth are collected and 
presented according to the primary narrator. This research is concerned with critical ḥadīth 
study, and so each Companion’s section will be presented in themes of impugnment and the 
emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha in dealing with Prophetic traditions.  
 
A Brief History of The Science of Impugnment  
 
It is well known that the science of ḥadīth and the principles within al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl were 
not developed until sectarianism had become widespread amongst the Muslim community 
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and the Sunni-Shiʿa divide reached an acrimonious high. Until this point the ḥadīth corpus 
was a blend of authentic and inauthentic statements. Particularly proliferous narrators, such 
as Abū Hurayra, became easy entrance points to whom fabricators of traditions could 
attribute their statements. Fabricated ḥadīth have always been a threat to the integrity of the 
ḥadīth corpus, hence perhaps the Prophet’s initial dissuasion of his Companions in recording 
his statements. Siddiqi (1993, p.32) holds that, while authors such as William Muir believe 
that forgery of ḥadīth began during the caliphate of ʿUthmān, in actual fact such forgery 
began in the very lifetime of the Prophet himself. He notes an incident narrated by Ibn Ḥazm 
in his al-Iḥkām fi Uṣūl al-Aḥkām whereby a man approached an outlying district of Medina, 
claiming the Prophet had sent him with his authority over them. It is believed he did so in 
order to win over a girl living in that district in marriage, who had previously declined his 
proposals. The people however sent a messenger to the Prophet to verify the man’s claims, 
to which the Prophet replied that this man had received no such authority and was in fact a 
liar and imposter. Other such incidents are also noted by Siddiqi (ibid. pp.53-59), who 
queries that perhaps such pervasive spread of false traditions is what caused the earliest 
Caliphs and most senior Companions to be so resolutely sceptical of and resistant to 
supposed Prophetic traditions, and preferred instead to engage in ijtihād, reasoning. 
 
Over time traditions were fabricated from a number of different quarters, including the so-
called heretics (zanādiqa), who were accused of undermining Islam through the forgery of 
thousands of traditions, and the well-intentioned pious, who were embroiled in this practice 
hoping to encourage the believers towards good and deterring them from bad. Forgeries 
formed part of propaganda campaigns to prop up authorities, and even appeared at the hands 
of students seeking to enhance the position of their own teachers or to bring down the 
position of their opponents. For example, al-Muḥallab (d. 83/702), staunch opponent of the 
Khawārij and esteemed general, who admitted to forging traditions against the self-same 
secessionists; or ʿAwāna b. al-Ḥakam (d. 158/774), who fabricated  traditions foretelling the 
rule of the Ummayads and praising them; similarly, Ghiyāth b. Ibrahīm, who fabricated 
ḥadīth to earn favour with the Caliph. In fact, Siddiqi goes as far as to say that most traditions 
that praise particular individuals, tribes, geographic places or leaders find their origin in one 
or other deliberate forger and are but mere concoctions that were politically expedient at a 
given time and place. This echoes the position of Ibn al-Qayyim aforementioned, that ḥadīth 
that single out a particular person or place for praise are not to be considered authentic. 
Another source of forgery was the quṣṣās, storytellers and street-preachers, who held no 
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official posts but could amass sizeable followings for themselves and had to retain such 
attention by being able to supply their audiences with innovative, inspiring, and new stories, 
for which they would often resort to concocting prophetic traditions (Siddiqi, 1993). 
 
Kamali (2005) frames Abū Bakr, ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, ʿAlī b. Abū al-Tālib, ʿAbdallah b. 
ʿAbbās, Anas b. Mālik, ʿUbāda b. al-Ṣāmit and ʿĀ’isha as Companions who were known to 
be particularly strict regarding the narration of prophetic traditions and could be considered 
as proto-ḥadīth scholars. Of them, ʿUmar, Ibn ʿAbbās, ʿAlī, and ʿĀ’isha, all denied, refuted, 
rebuked, or opposed statements made by Abū Hurayra. This is particularly important when 
considering the terms they used when responding critically to the statements of Abū 
Hurayra, to whom Chapter Five is dedicated. 
 
This is not to say that all of the traditions of Abū Hurayra must be rejected, but that caution 
must be exercised, and that the methodology of ʿUmar and ʿĀ’isha should be adopted when 
engaging with problematic traditions related from Abū Hurayra and others. ʿUmar was 
famed for seeking corroboration of traditions before accepting them, and this indeed is a 
practice used by classical ḥadīth scholars when seeking to strengthen a tradition. As is 
illustrated in the second ḥadīth of Chapter Five, al-Bukhārī used this method to strengthen 
the tradition narrated by Abū Huryara, whereas al-Zarkashī utilised the same method to 
strengthen that of ʿĀ’isha. In the end, as al-Shāfiʿī and Abū Hanifa are reported to have said, 
and as merit would deem fit, the statements of ʿĀ’isha should be given precedence. 
Additionally, I argue that one should apply the emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha in her 
correctives of the Companions. There are a number of features to be considered as an 
emergent methodology towards ḥadīth, as espoused by ʿĀ’isha, and these will be 
enumerated in Chapter Seven. 
 
The mechanisms utilised to marginalise and silence certain statements of ʿĀ’isha though are 
not exclusively the process of validating ḥadīth. There are many ḥadīth of ʿĀ’isha that are 
verified but not valued for their being situated outside the canonical corpus of ḥadīth, such 
as those found in al-Ijābah, and the collections it relies on. Indeed, of the thirty-nine 
statements selected from the work to be translated for this thesis, half are from outside of 
the canonised ḥadīth collections. As such, then, it is important to interrogate the canonisation 
process and consider the intention of al-Zarkashī in penning this collection as a possible 
pushback against the closure that canonising can cause, and the possibilities the text holds 
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now in re-opening the canon and fulfilling what may have been al-Zarkashī’s vision in the 
first place. Even if it were not a vision of al-Zarkashī’s though, it is certainly a potential of 
the text that warrants actualising. 
 
Canonisation 
 
While the concept of ‘canon’ has grown out of the Christian tradition, where it finds it roots in 
the Greek word kanon, meaning, ‘any straight rod of bar; rule; standard of excellence’, it is one 
that has been appropriated in the study of other religious texts, in the arts, in secular legal 
contexts, and in literature too, to define central texts that are deemed exemplary or authoritative 
among the community of their readership. 
 
The process which a body of texts undergoes in the transition from literary text to canonical 
status is a triangulated one between the text, authority (in this case both religious and state 
authority) and the communal identity of those amongst whom it is to take pride of place as 
canon. The process of canonisation creates a circle of validation between given authorities and 
the canon. A text cannot profess itself to be canon, nor can its author wield such power either. 
It is up to the prevailing authority of any given time, usually in response to a current need of 
its community, to identify a text as being of enough import to warrant such investment. A canon 
is born through the interpretations of an authority. Such attention grants a text a standing in the 
community, which is further augmented the more said authority engages with this text. 
Jonathan Brown (2007, p.26) argues, ‘Through canonising a set of texts, a tradition can deposit 
religious authority in a manageable and durable form. Later interpreters can then bring the 
authority embodied in this canon to bear on new issues’. A text, once canonised, enters a new 
realm of sacredness, created by the canonical culture within which it exists, which means that 
readers, both lay and specialist, will approach the text with reverence and hallowed awe, not 
criticism and critique. As a result, the canon becomes invested with authority and then reasserts 
this same authority on subsequent communities and scholars who may engage with it. It 
therefore acts as a means by which boundaries are defined and maintained; they become the 
criteria by which inclusion into and exclusion from a community is performed.  
 
While the canon then plays a central role in the communal experience of its community, it also 
plays an exclusionary one. It entails the exclusion of other works, or at least the oversight of 
these works in favour of the canonised texts and thus the stances best supported by them, and 
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it silences certain voices not represented by those involved in the collation and interpretation 
of the canon. If the canon is then supported, nurtured and crystallised in a canonical culture 
that exists within one that is patriarchal too, it is not likely that voices of women that challenge 
the patriarchy, whether from within the canon or without, will be heard. When the process of 
canonisation has taken place at the hands of men, the perspectives and interpretation of women 
have not been privileged with a contribution to this process, and those voices that may exist 
within the canon may have been silenced. Lillian Robinson (1983, p.84) questions the nature 
of the canonisation process as surely being more like a ‘gentlemen’s agreement than a 
repressive instrument’, though she then states, ‘but a gentleman is inescapably - that is by 
definition - a member of a privileged class and of the male sex. From this perspective, it is 
probably quite accurate to think of the canon as an entirely gentlemanly artefact’. Thus, it is 
with the ḥadīth canon too: a gentleman's agreement that by its very nature means women’s 
voices within the text have been buried, whilst those outside of the text were never given an 
opportunity.  
 
The literary canon has been interrogated by many scholars who have called for marginalised 
voices, such as the writings of People of Colour or women, to be given attention and granted 
entry into the literary canon. Stephen Behrendt (2008) stated, regarding the literary canon, that 
‘…any traditional canon is first undermined by activists and revisionists who want to de-bunk 
the canon by redrawing the landscape in a more historically accurate fashion that makes very 
clear how different the reality is from the inherited misconception’. The works of feminist 
scholars previously mentioned, such as Mernissi, Chaudhry, Sheikh and others, are a concerted 
effort towards this goal, but can only go so far in their contributions to ‘de-bunk the canon’ in 
a way that is more historically accurate of the contributions of Muslim women, and their 
position within Islam. Hence the urgency in the need to reopen the canon, to uplift the female 
voices within it, to incorporate extra-canonical ḥadīth that challenge patriarchal norms 
established through canonisation in Islam, and to allow interpretation of the ḥadīth literature 
by female scholars to take place. The sacred canon may share traits with the literary canon; 
indeed, interrogating and reopening the sacred canon may methodologically appear to be a 
similar process. However, in practical terms, the sacred canon’s status vis-a-vis the Divine and 
its attendant authority, in addition to its use in the religious community as a resource for a 
variety of religious needs—from  liturgical usage to the extrapolation of Islamic law—means 
that the formal process will be distinct from the decanonisation of the literary canon.  
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Reopening the canon to incorporate more female voices is not to deny that there are statements 
of the Prophet within the canonised ḥadīth which can be read as being favourable towards 
women. Many cite instances such as the Prophet’s praise for those who raise daughters, or the 
status of mothers in Islam as evidence of the high status of women in Islam.45  Arguably, 
however, these constructions of the ‘ideal Muslim woman’, who is granted the high status 
promised in such statements, is one that is shallow in scope for women—it almost entirely 
reduces their roles to mothers, wives and daughters, while overlooking the plethora of ways in 
which a Muslim woman may seek to find fulfilment or even religious expression, outside of 
their roles as mothers, wives, and daughters—all  of which are roles inextricably granted by 
their connection  to a male family member in the form of sons, husbands, or fathers. Nor is the 
desire to reopen the canon done in naive hope that the extra-canonical ḥadīth literature might 
ultimately affirm the equal status of women in Islam as opposed to misogynistic traditions. It 
is also not to deny that chapters exist in the canonised collections that speak specifically of 
issues pertaining to women, such as the chapters on menstruation and on issues pertaining to 
the suckling of a baby. Even in such instances, not all traditions recorded are instructions for 
women regarding their menses, and while it is true that the Muslim stance on women not 
becoming intrinsically defiled by their menses was unusual for its time, some of the traditions 
appear to be far from focused on the needs of women. To make this point clearer, prior to Islam, 
many Arabs had believed in the inherent defilement of a woman when she was on her menses, 
thus restricting her movement and sometimes even evicting her from the home until her period 
was complete. The ruling in Islam was that woman remained pure even whilst on her period, 
but that she was exempt from prayer and fasting as a dispensation from God. She was also not 
to engage in penetrative intimacy, though all other forms of intimacy were made permissible. 
Thus it could be argued that while the Islamic attitude towards menstruating women is freed 
from the pre-Islamic phobic attitude towards menstruating women, it then seems almost to 
undermine the gender justice nature of such a stance with the emphasis being on what a 
husband’s rights to his wife’s body during this period are, rather than on the liberation of 
 
45 For example: Abū Hurayra reported that someone asked the Prophet, who amongst the people is most deserving of my 
good treatment? He said, ‘Your mother, again your mother, again your mother, then your father, then those closest in 
relation to you after them, and then those closest after them’ (Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Chapter: Piety, Maintaining ties of Kinship, and 
Good Manners, Section; Filial piety and which Parent is most entitled, ḥadīth No.2548). Also, ʿAbdallah b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ 
reported the Prophet as having said, ‘The world is but a [quick passing] enjoyment, and the best enjoyment of the world is a 
pious and virtuous woman’ (Riyāḍ al-Ṣāliḥīn, ḥadīth No. 280). Additionally, Abū Bakr b. ‘Ubaydullah b. Anas b. Mālik 
narrated that the Prophet said, ‘Whoever raises two girls then he and I will enter Paradise like these two’ and he indicated 
with his two fingers [being side by side] (Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī, Book 27, Ḥadīth 20). 
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women from the exclusionary practices that had been enacted previously. The rest of the 
chapters in ḥadīth collections are more generic, addressing both men and women. 
 
Canon as Canon I and Canon II 
 
In Biblical Studies, where the nature of holy scripture as canon was first developed, Sheppard 
(1987, pp.62-69) identified two realities in the formation of Jewish and Christian canon. The 
first reality, which he named ‘Canon I’, referred to that ‘authoritative voice in written or oral 
form that was read and received as having the authority of God in it.’  Canon I is essentially 
where the formation of a body of materials occurs, which do not of themselves hold any 
authority but find their authority imparted on to them by the scholars that engage with them 
and are themselves the source of authority. In contrast, Sheppard identifies a second type of 
canon, ‘Canon II’, which is what is primarily assumed when mention of canon is made. It is 
that body of works which has become standardised and perpetually fixed. These Canon II 
works do not rely on the engagement of accredited religious authority to validate them, they 
have become invested with religious authority of their own. They are independently valid and 
as such are deemed to be closed and complete.  
 
Brannon Wheeler (1996) studies the Islamic legal tradition with particular attention to the 
Ḥanafi school. He views the Islamic canon primarily as of Canon I type, where the whole of 
the amorphous body of the prophetic traditions, the Sunnah, are what compose the canon. In 
his view therefore, the Six Books, the Ṣaḥīḥ Sitta,46 were in fact ‘different attempts to delineate 
in ‘written’ form what was, at that time, considered to be the ‘text’ of the Sunnah’. Wheeler 
thus argues that the canon is not to be restricted to the Six Books, or even to the two books of 
al-Bukhārī and Muslim, but that the whole of the prophetic tradition must be considered canon. 
Importantly, he argues that the canon should not be conflated with text for a tradition that was 
primarily an oral one. While this would be an ideal scenario, particularly for the research at 
hand, it appears to ignore the reality of what has occurred. Those six written collections were 
invested with authority by both the religious scholars and the community of believers who saw 
these works fulfilling their needs. As such, then, they do emerge as a Canon II type canon, 
particularly the Ṣaḥīḥayn (i.e. the collections of al-Bukhārī and Muslim). I would argue that 
 
46  Widely acknowledged as, Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī, Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, Jāmiʿ al-Tirmidhī, Sunan Abū Dāwūd, Sunan al-Sughra by al-
Nisā'ī (often simply referred to as al-Nisā'ī), and either Sunan Ibn Mājah or al-Muwaṭṭa of Imām Mālik. 
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the Ṣaḥīḥayn are in fact regarded as superior to the remaining four canonical books of ḥadīth 
and so the conceptualisation of canon of Prophetic tradition in Islam may require some 
reconfiguration.  
 
Folkert (1989), a scholar of Jainism, illustrates the problem of western scholarship imposing 
this model of canon on a tradition that is not western or Christian. He notes that in Jainism 
there exists a forty-nine-book canon, while some of the most influential Jain scriptures do not 
in fact constitute part of this corpus. Folkert (1989) therefore asserts that ‘Western scholars 
superimposed a Canon II model of scripture onto a tradition whose literature was of the Canon 
I variety’. It may then be prudent to consider how ḥadīth texts are canonised and if the model 
of canon would benefit from adaptation to best model what occurs with the ḥadīth corpus. 
 
Folkert presents three cautionary premises in the study of canon formation. Firstly, he cautions 
against what he sees as a tendency ‘endemic in scholarship’ to inaccurately treat Canon I 
traditions as Canon II. Secondly, he encourages caution and consideration of whether or not 
canon is even an adequate genus for the tradition being scrutinised. This is particularly the case 
when evaluating traditions that predate religious organisation allowing for the 
institutionalisation of scriptures. In this regard, Smith (1998) gives the example of there being 
‘no scriptural canons, in the sense of Canon II, in the varied configurations of Christianity until 
some of the forms of Christianity appeared in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries’. Thirdly, he 
argues that the social aspect of the formation of canons should be given more consideration 
and that rather than being approached from the perspective of doctrine, that it would perhaps 
be more fruitful to consider them from an ethnographical approach instead.  
 
This third and final precaution in the study of canon is an important one and gives rise to the 
nature of the canon: Is the ḥadīth canon more a ‘compendium of excellence’ or a ‘record of 
cultural history.’ As has already been elaborated, the process of canonisation is not simply 
theological, but social too. The canonical process, and its 7th/9th century setting for ḥadīth 
canonisation, meant there was no input from women in terms of knowledge generation, though 
they may make guest appearances as narrators, and that collections such as that of al-Bukhārī’s 
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which gained patronage from Nizām al-Mulk Awliya (d. 474/1092)47 to be taught in madrasahs 
were granted authority and status that other, possibly more meritorious collections, did not 
benefit from. Interestingly Nizām al-Mulk, patron of al-Bukhārī, also authored Siyāsat Nama—
The Book of Government, also known as Siyār al-Mulūk—Rules for the Kings, in which he 
dedicated the forty-second chapter to the issue of ‘the veiled ones’, where he robustly argued 
for the exclusion of women from the political domain ‘to avoid disaster’. He invokes examples 
of pre-Islamic women who gained direct or even indirect access to power, and the disastrous 
effects this had on the rulership and people. His only Muslim example is ʿĀ’isha (1960, pp-
188-189). 
 
Folkert’s work inspired much reconsideration of how canons are to be understood, particularly 
in the study of South Asian religions. Smith (1998) builds on this work when considering 
canons formulated as ‘lists’, which in turn make up catalogues of texts, some of which are 
catalogues of canonised texts, and some which are catalogues of lists, which contain canonised 
material. Therefore, a number of texts can be canonised and organised into subjects. Smith 
gives the example of classics and how they have been developed in literary scholarship. But 
the efficacy of such conceptualisation of canon in understanding the ḥadīth, may be 
questionable. The ḥadīth are meant to be secondary to the Quran, and yet the authority invested 
in the canonised ḥadīth texts of al-Bukhārī and Muslim in communal practice, would suggest 
otherwise. Al-Azmeh (1998, p.191) points out that the ḥadīth was canonised before the Quran. 
This is significant and warrants investigation, particularly as the Quran is what is professed as 
being the ultimate authority, but it would appear that the ḥadīth’s amenability for the 
development of jurisprudence made it the subject of scholars’ attention, over the Quran which 
is too vague for utilisation in political, juridical, and sectarian debates. This is an important 
point and one that will be returned to in Chapter Four. 
 
The notion of scholarly consensus (ijmā’) is at the heart of the commissioning of ḥadīth as 
authentic and consequently as part of the canon, but this notion is one that is highly flawed. 
Both Rahman and al-Azmeh highlight the use of ijmā’ to validate traditions, and the problems 
 
47 His actual name was Abū ʿAlī Ḥasan b. ʿAlī Tusī. Nizām al-Mulk was an honorific bestowed upon him, meaning ‘Order of 
the Realm’. He began his political career as a vizier to the Seljuk ruler, Alp Arsalan, upon whose death, Nizām al-Mulk became 
ruler.  He is well known for his success as a leader and rule as a monarch. He was a patron of the famed Abū Ḥāmīd al-Ghazālī 
too and was also well known for establishing a number of madrasahs which were committed to the Shafiʿī school of thought, 
as was he. For more information see, Bowen, H. and Bosworth, C.E, in EI2. 
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that lie therein. Rahman notes the differentiation made by early Muslims between Sunnah and 
Ijmā’: Sunnah is the way and example of the Prophet as narrated by his Companions and 
recorded by later scholars; to contravene the Sunnah is to stray into heretical innovation 
(bidʿah). Ijmā’ is the consensus upon which the community of believers, or its religious 
scholars, arrive and is the means by which boundaries are defined and arbitrary opinions are 
rejected. However, Rahman notes that the Sunnah as made available to Muslims, does itself 
include the interpretation of religious scholars. As has been noted above, the canonisation 
process necessitates the engagement of authority with the text. This means that in reality the 
Sunnah and ijmā are in fact much closer to each other than may first be observed. The Sunnah 
provides the contents of the ḥadīth texts, while ijmā’ plays a long and crucial role in Muslim 
methodology; there is a symbiotic relationship between them. It may then be asserted that 
biases are therefore structurally built into the conceptualisation of Sunnah and then further 
perpetuated by the process of canonisation. 
 
Ḥadīth Canon Re-conceptualised  
 
While the development of canonisation as an analytical tool is most helpful in observing the 
process of canonisation of the ḥadīth texts, it seems useful to expand the current casting of 
Canon I and Canon II. As such, then, when investigating the ḥadīth canon, I propose a new 
conceptualisation of the ḥadīth canon, wherein it is represented as containing the ḥadīth 
tradition as a whole, as envisioned by Wheeler, as well as acknowledging the different types 
of canon. I posit a conceptualisation of the ḥadīth canon that is best modelled as spheres, at the 
core of which is Canon III, representing the Ṣaḥīḥayn of al-Bukhārī and Muslim. Canon II 
represents the other four books of ḥadīth—Tirmidhī, Aḥmad, al Nisā’ī, and Ibn Mājah or the 
Muwaṭṭa of Imām Mālik—that have also been canonised but do not hold the same status as the 
Ṣaḥīḥs of al-Bukhārī and Muslim. These books are all designated as Canon II, but do not hold 
the same authority as Canon III. The outer sphere is that of Canon I, which would incorporate, 
as Wheeler suggests, all of the ḥadīth corpus. This conceptualisation is best illustrated as shown 
in figure 1. 
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Figure 1: Conceptualising Ḥadīth Canon 
 
Acknowledging a wider body of work as being within the canon allows for a greater pool of 
traditions and fluidity of the spheres of canonisation. As this research demonstrates, 
particularly as has been presented in Chapter One, in regard to controversial issues such as the 
age of ʿĀ’isha upon marriage, the canon is already informally open to critique. By 
conceptualising the canon so, it is hoped that this informal process can be acknowledged and 
formalised. Dogmatic devotion to al-Bukhārī and Muslim are not religious requirements; they 
are not ordained by God and their supreme position is not sanctioned by anything other than 
human processes. It follows, then, that Muslims should seek out the most authentic of traditions 
- and by authentic I do not only mean those that are sound in their chain of narration and 
content, but also as per ʿĀ’isha’s emergent methodology - and seek to give these traditions 
central importance even if that means displacing those currently considered Canon III. This 
reconceptualisation of the ḥadīth canon is not only closer to the reality of how ḥadīth are 
engaged with, but also allows for the formal acceptance of this approach and thereby a rigorous 
commitment to re-engaging with the ḥadīth in a systematic manner. 
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Conclusion 
 
The notion that ʿĀ’isha bint Abū Bakr has been silenced or marginalised for the Muslim, 
whether lay or learned, is at first glance likely preposterous. The burden of proof lies with the 
one making such a claim to an audience who is convinced that ʿĀ’isha is fully honoured both 
as the beloved of the Prophet and Mother to the Believers. In an effort to show how it is possible 
for ʿĀ’isha to both be present within the ḥadīth corpus and absent, I began with an account of 
how the ḥadīth came to become a discipline in the venture of Islam, and what its methods to 
ensure rigour were. Secondly, it was important to understand how the most authoritative 
collections, the so-called canonical corpus, came into being; the context, in particular the socio-
political context, in which the canonisation process occurred and how that effected the 
statements and positions of ʿĀ’isha; which of her statements were included and which 
excluded, and how those that were included were subsequently treated. This chapter has 
illustrated both the process of ḥadīth methodology and canonisation and has gone further by 
proposing a new conceptualisation of the ḥadīth canon that is more representative of the actual 
engagement of traditionist scholars with the ḥadīth corpus. At the same time, this allows for 
and encourages a re-opening of the canon, and pragmatism with respect to the entire body of 
sound ḥadīth collections, so as to ensure Muslim scholarship is being loyal first to statements 
of the Prophet that are in line with the ethic of the Quran and Prophetic mission. With the 
history of ḥadīth as a developing science and its canonisation process considered, the 
translation of ḥadīth is next explored.  
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Chapter Three: Thinking Translation 
 
When I began the task of translating al-Ijāba, it was my expectation that I would translate the 
text using the formal equivalence method for translation; that is, one that is as literal as possible, 
starting with a literal translation of each word first, then constructing the sentence, believing at 
the time that this is how to attain the most authentic translation with the least scope for criticism 
and the best course of action to protect the translation from accusations of subjectivity. Having 
begun the process, though, it became clear to me that such an approach is not the most effective, 
and that the pursuit of as literal a translation as possible does not, in fact, necessarily mean the 
most authentic conveyance of what is being said. This chapter began as, ‘a note on translation 
methodology’ but has developed into its own chapter for the need to engage with current ḥadīth 
translations and the lack of transparency on translation methodologies. This lack of 
transparency and a coherent methodology in translating ḥadīth has meant that this chapter 
proposes a methodology that was applied first to the translation of al-Ijāba, but that can be 
extended to the translation of ḥadīth works more generally as well. Furthermore, the chapter 
highlights the sections of al-Ijāba that have been selected for translation in this thesis and 
explains the justification for this selection. 
 
Translating the Ḥadīth 
 
A literal translation of a text does not ipso facto result in a loyal translation. It does not take 
into consideration the number of ways in which a sentence could be translated to convey the 
feelings, personality or character of the speaker. It is important to give these aspects which 
transcend syntax and linguistics pause for thought, especially as ḥadīth was originally an oral 
tradition in which all of these aspects of conversation contribute to the conveyance of a 
message. This is something that does not appear to have been considered in translations of 
ḥadīth and does not seem to have been addressed by those translating ḥadīth. Amongst the most 
popular ḥadīth translation is that of Imām al-Bukhārī’s Ṣaḥīḥ, published by Darussalam. The 
nine-volume work is preceded by a certification of the validity of the translation which was 
undertaken by Muhammad Muhsin Khan, and a list of academics who have reviewed and 
corrected the translation where necessary. The note penned by Muhammad Amin al-Misri, 
Head of Higher Studies Department at the Islamic University of al-Madina, states, ‘I have 
pursued a portion of this translation and found that the translator has succeeded in rendering 
the meanings of al-Jāmiʿ al-Ṣaḥīḥ (Ṣaḥīḥ al-Bukhārī) into English in a simple comprehensible 
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style, free from complications. I have also noticed that he has chosen successfully the best and 
most authentic interpretation of some Aḥadīth that are interpreted differently by different 
scholars’ (Khan, M.M, 1997, Vol 1. P.6). No attempt is made to explain the approach used in 
translating the text, nor is any justification given to the merit assumed of translating a sacred 
text into ‘simple’ English, nor any explanation of how such a complex text is rendered ‘free 
from complications’, and certainly nothing further is offered in illustrating how a translation 
has been deemed in line with the ‘most authentic interpretation’. In short, there is no 
transparency, alternative readings available nor signposted, nor any express methodology.  
 
For the translation of al-Ijāba, while still trying to retain a translation as close to the wording 
of the original Arabic text, room has been made for some liberty in order to better reflect the 
context and ambience of the statement or circumstance being relayed; the connotative meaning 
has at times been preferred, having accepted that a literal translation can be stylistically odd in 
the translated language. The process of translation and what one can reasonably expect from 
the process is beautifully expressed by John Ciardi in his translator’s note for his translation of 
Dante’s Inferno, wherein he states: ‘When the violin repeats what the piano has just played, it 
cannot make the same sounds and it can only approximate the same chords. It can, however, 
make recognisably the same ‘music’, the same air. But it can do so only when it is as faithful 
to the self-logic of the violin as it is to the self-logic of the piano’ (2007, p.ix).48  
 
Before embarking on the translation, then, it is important to consider the source text, in this 
case a compilation of ḥadīth. Alarmingly little attention has been given to the translation of 
ḥadīth in the existing literature in Translation Studies, with scholarship almost exclusively 
focusing on translations of the Quran. While this is disappointing from the perspective of the 
research at hand, it is not surprising given the centrality and supremacy of the Quran for 
Muslims. Despite this, many translations of the Quran rely on ḥadīth in para-text, often in the 
form of footnotes in order to make sense or provide context/meaning to the translation, so the 
need for study into the translation of ḥadīth is long overdue, and somewhat bound into the 
translation of the Quran. Accordingly then, one shall consider positions on translations of the 
Quran before progressing on to discussion of ḥadīth translation. 
 
48 Ciardi goes on to argue that languages have their own logic, and therefore prefers to think of the process as ‘transposition’ 
rather than ‘translation’ to overcome the notion that a word-for-word equivalent from one language to another can ever be 
achieved. 
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Laleh Bakthiar, in her translation of the Quran, prefaces her translation with a discussion of her 
translation approach. She notes, ‘The Quran is not a historical text, frozen in the time period of 
its revelation’ (2009, p.xiv), thereby justifying a literal translation that does not require 
parenthetical phrases for explanation, nor does it make room for translation influenced by 
transient influences such as political, denominational or doctrinal ones. This is not to say that 
the Quran was not responding to its context, Causes for revelation (asbāb al nuzūl), and the 
Quran’s referencing events contemporary to its period of revelation, clearly indicates 
otherwise, but Bakhtiar is of the opinion held by many scholars of Islam, such as Fazlur 
Rahman (1979, p.257) and Nasr Abu Zayd (1995, pp.203-206), who argued that the Quran 
needs to be constantly reinterpreted for the times and circumstances in which it is being read. 
Thus the historicity of the source text, which is usually imposed on translations through 
parenthetical explanations or footnotes, is rejected, allowing for the reader’s own subjectivity 
to guide their reading of the Quran in their own context; reading the Quran afresh. She does, 
however, capitulate to the fact that sometimes words may not appear in the original Arabic text, 
but may be required to make sense in English, therefore she goes to the effort of italicising 
them in order that such additional words are identifiable.  
 
Bakthiar’s argument that the Quran should not be read historically in order to allow the reader 
to experience and process its messages from their own socio-historical positionality without 
the interference of the social, political, economic, historical context of the Quran, is somewhat 
flawed, given that the Quran so often is obviously responding to and negotiating the 
circumstances faced by its first audience. Additionally, there is the ongoing problem of reading 
the Quran in an atomistic manner, rather than from an ethical standpoint. While it is not the 
focus of this chapter to discuss readings of the Quran, it is critical to understand the interplay 
between the Quran and the ḥadīth in making sense of each, given that the ḥadīth are what so 
often give the Quran context and explanatory commentary. The ḥadīth, quite unlike the Quran, 
cannot be divorced from its historical context, nor should this be sought; it is deeply historical, 
and without understanding of the context and the characters involved, much of what is being 
relayed could be lost in translation. Indeed, it is the ḥadīth that often provide context to the 
Quran, and ʿĀ’isha’s ḥadīth in particular are often providing such context for other ḥadīth. On 
numerous occasions in al-Ijāba her utilising of context, often further bolstered by recourse to 
Quranic verses, is the method by which she corrects the Companions. Context is of great 
significance when attempting to understand either the Quran or the ḥadīth. Fazlur Rahman 
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bemoaned the atomistic approach to understanding the Quran where piecemeal readings are 
done at the expense of attempting to engage in readings motivated by the overall 
Weltanschauung of the Quran, what he refers to as the ‘underlying unity’ (1982, p.6), the core 
messages and objectives of the Quran. This overall moral compass that is provided by the 
Quran is what should guide the reading of the Quran, but considering the interplay between the 
Quran and the ḥadīth, it is this moral compass that should also be guiding the reading of ḥadīth 
too, given that the Quran is the text with ultimate authority. It was the view of Fazlur Rahman, 
among others, that the core message of the Quran was the unity of God, and the imperative to 
strive for the establishment of social justice. If the sacred texts do not aid in the establishment 
of social justice, then either the authenticity of such statements must be questioned, or the 
process of interpretation that they have undergone must be scrutinised to identify the 
shortcomings and mistakes that have led to an incongruous reading to occur. Therefore it is 
important for the translation to be guided by this objective for the unity of God and the 
establishment of social justice, and for the expression of this objective to be best achieved in 
the translation so that if the literal translation has to be compromised in order to express this in 
a more comprehensible manner in English, then this will be given priority.  
 
Additionally, it is worth noting here the effort of Megrab (1997, p.232) in identifying 
Beaugrande and Dressler’s seven standards of textuality as a means by which to develop a 
criteria to aid in translating ḥadīth into English in a manner which keeps the religious and 
sensitive tone. The seven standards are a list of criteria that are a requisite in achieving a 
successfully communicative text. In the case of translation then, there are two texts to be 
considered and it is the role of the translator to masterfully transfer the communication of the 
source to the target language. The seven standards of textuality are: 
 
1. Cohesion: This is related to the ways in which connectivity between the actual words of a 
text (the surface text) is produced and is usually language specific. Though it is language 
specific, it is not generally seen as a source of difficulty in translation by translation 
theorists.  
 
2.  Coherence: Coherence is concerned with the ordering of concepts and relations in the 
source text. Neubert and Shreve (1992, p.94) define coherence as the connection of 
individual information elements with a certain logical structure. Megrab notes that when 
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translating ḥadīth, this coherence should be maintained as much as is possible, as to do 
otherwise will result in a failure to communicate the point in translation. 
 
3. Intentionality: This is concerned with the intention of the original producer of the source 
text, and the translator’s role in conveying this in the target language. Given that ḥadīth, 
and in particular the ḥadīth of ʿĀ’isha with which this research is concerned, are largely 
instructive or explanatory, it is not only important to understand ʿĀ’isha and her intentions 
but to utilise these when attempting to understand and translate the words of the Prophet 
himself. She, in effect, becomes the attentive translator’s tool in better understanding the 
intentions of the Prophet and in the translation of his words as well. This is very much in 
line with the previous argument to let the core objectives of the Quran be the motivation 
when making decisions in the translation process too. An additional consideration with 
regards to ḥadīth collections which are accompanied by the commentary of the compiler, 
as is the case with al-Ijāba, is the role and intention of the compiler. Al-Zarkashī authored 
this text in a given socio-political context with his own objectives in mind, some of these 
may be in agreement with the needs and religious demands of today’s context, and in line 
with contemporary understandings of the world, while others may be irrelevant or even in 
tension with our demands. It is therefore the role of the translator to navigate the intrusions 
of the compiler of the ḥadīth and his interpretations and interventions, in light of the 
intentionality of ʿĀ’isha and the Prophet Muḥammad. 
 
Megrab notes that, in this regard, the translator has to balance between two options: to 
‘manage’ or to ‘monitor’. In the former, the translator does their utmost to transmit the 
message in a way that would achieve in the reader of the target text, the same outcome as 
the Prophet had desired in his primary receiver. He notes, however that while this is an 
effective way of translation, it can be criticised for the potential interference of the 
translator’s subjectivity. In the latter, the translator maintains loyalty to objectivity and 
therefore literal translation, but this can result in a translation that has compromised the 
communicative goal of the source text. 
 
Megrab uses the following ḥadīth as an example and can be utilised to consider the 
importance of taking both coherence and intentionality into consideration when translating:  
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لنفسه  يحب  ما  لاخيه  يحب  حتى  احدكم  يؤمن  لا 
 
If the translation does not maintain the coherence of the source text, it will lose the condition 
relation, and thereby alter the meaning to one that is not intended. Removing the condition 
relation may result in the following translation, ‘He who wishes for his brother what he 
wishes for himself truly believes in God’. In a translation which gives priority to literal 
commitment over commitment to the message of the original text, one may find the 
following result, ‘Not one of you believes until he wishes for his brother what he wishes for 
himself’. Neither of these statements can be said to be faithful translations. The former’s 
removal of the condition relation would make it seem that it is the act of wishing for their 
brother what they wish for themselves that makes someone a true believer in God, when of 
course, this is only one aspect. And in the latter, where the condition relation is reinstated, 
but priority is given to literal translation, it is clear it is insufficient still in conveying the 
intention of the original text, as it still appears to give the same message as the first 
translation, thereby restricting the act to kinship. A more accurate translation would be, 
‘None of you [truly] believes, until he loves for his brother [in faith], what he loves for 
himself’. Thus, the consideration of coherence and intention together allow for the insertion 
of words not literally present in the source text, but certainly intended in the message being 
communicated. 
 
4. Acceptability: Tied in with considering the intention of the producer, the translator also has 
to take into consideration the acceptability of the message by the receiver. i.e the receiver’s 
response to the message in the original language, should be similarly achieved in the 
response of the one receiving the message in translation.  
 
5. Informativity: Neubert and Shreve argue that informativity is a function of what is delivered 
by the text, and the role of the translator is to create a linguistic surface that would allow a 
reader of the translated text to receive the same knowledge content as that received by the 
one conducting the message in the source language. Megrab observes that the ḥadīth often 
utilise rhetorical devices which in the source language may add a poetic or aesthetic charm, 
but which is not delivered into the target language when retained, while also sacrificing a 
comprehensible delivery of its message. Megrab, sensibly argues that in this case it is 
preferable to accept the loss of the rhetorical device, in order to profit from the gain of 
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delivering the message of the statement. This is particularly applicable to the ḥadīth which 
make no claim of inimitability or poetic standard as is made by the Quran and which 
therefore suffers far more loss in translation. An example of such translation can be found 
in ḥadīth 2 of Chapter Five where ʿĀ’isha’s anger is described in metaphorical terms that 
would not work well in English if literally translated. The Arabic states:  
 
فطار شقة منها في السماء وطار منها في الأرض 
 
Translated literally this would be rendered, ‘A fissure went up from her to the sky and down 
to the earth’. While the imagery is powerful in the Arabic, it loses its potency in English. 
Instead in the English translation I have chosen to translate this statement as ʿĀ’isha being 
‘visibly enraged’ thus capturing the essence of what she was feeling and conveying the 
immensity of what she was reacting too. 
 
6. Situationality: Neubert and Shreve define situationality as the location of a text in a discrete 
sociocultural context in a real time and place. In other words, it is concerned beyond the 
linguistic text, and considers the situation of occurrence. Again, ʿĀ’isha becomes important 
not only in providing corrections, but her statements can contribute to providing the situation 
of occurrence for other prophetic traditions too. Mikchi considers situationality as the 
central issue in translatability. He argues that if a translation is going to be successful, there 
must be a situation that requires it, but notes that the situationality of the source text is not 
going to be replicated in the situationality of the translation piece. This being the case, then, 
he contends that the translation should be adjusted accordingly. For the translation of al-
Ijāba, I have preferred to retain the original situationality, and then use footnotes to provide 
explanation of the context. 
 
7. Intertextuality: This considers the relationship of the source text and other related texts, in 
this case the ḥadīth and its relationship to the Quran. Given that ʿĀ’isha regularly refers to 
the Quran as a support to her correctives, the intertextual relationship between the Quran 
and the ḥadīth are made evident in the process, but also once again, her statements lend 
themselves to better understanding of ḥadīth beyond the given collection too. 
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Though not discussing ḥadīth texts, Dickins, Hervey and Higgins (2016, p.15), addressing the 
translation of Arabic into English, identify a scale for translation, with bias towards the source 
language—in this case Arabic—on one extreme, and bias towards the target language—in this 
case, English—on the other extreme. There are five points along the scale going from literal, 
to faithful, then balanced in the middle, before moving across to idiomising, and then to free 
translation. A literal translation is one seeking to remain as close to the source language, and 
may present as grammatically or stylistically odd, even losing much of its coherence in the 
target language. A faithful translation still retains a bias towards the source language but is 
clearly understandable in the target language albeit not necessarily most comprehensively 
expressed. A balanced translation attempts to keep consideration of the source and target 
languages equal; it may allow for the substitution of some source language words with 
synonyms in the target language and some adjustments for grammatical validity in the target 
language so that the translation isn't entirely literal, but has not diverted greatly from the source 
text. An idiomising translation respects the message of the source text but prioritises flow and 
‘naturalness’ in the target language. It is my experience that the translation of al-Ijāba will vary 
between faithful, balanced, and idiomising, depending on the needs presented by the sentence 
at hand. 
 
Dickins et al. also highlight the issue of translation loss, offering an analogy with the concept 
of ‘energy loss’ in engineering, whereby it is recognised that the transfer of energy through a 
machine inevitably incurs some loss. The job of an engineer is not to eliminate this inevitability 
entirely, but to seek to minimise it as much as is possible. This, then, would be the task of the 
translator too; to minimise the loss of meaning in translation to the best of one’s ability. I would 
posit further that the whole question of loss in translation and what is considered a loss is an 
interesting one. Is loss only considered so when words are not literally translated?  And are 
words that are additional in the target language and not found in the source text—which Laleh 
Bakhtiar goes to the trouble of italicising in her translation of the Quran—considered a type of 
loss to the original text too?  Is loss always so intrinsically tied to the syntax of a sentence?  I 
would argue this is not the case, and that if the meaning has been effectively transmitted, then 
the loss in a literal translation is made up for in the gain of clearly expressing the intended 
message of the source text in the target language.  
 
Indeed, this is not an issue only now realised, but one that has been raised previously regarding 
the transmission of ḥadīth. The earliest scholars and learned amongst the faithful, questioned 
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whether ḥadīth, when they were in their oral form alone, could only be accepted when they 
could be proven to be verbatim the words of the Prophet, not just an approximation of the 
words that he stated; there was the issue of riwāyah bi-l maʿna, transmission of meaning. There 
were many from the earliest generation of Muslims, who approved of such transmissions. Imām 
al-Tirmidhī writes, ‘As for one who has established and memorised the chain of narration, but 
changed the wording, then this is permissible according to the scholars, as long as the meaning 
has not been changed’ (Ibn Rajab, 2008, p.145). Evidence for the permissibility of such 
transmission of ḥadīth is supported by statements regarding the behaviour of the Companions. 
Zarrārah b. Awfa stated, ‘I met a number of the Companions of the Prophet, and they would 
differ in their wording, but be united in the meaning [conveyed]’  (ibid. p.147). The 
Companions themselves, including well-established names such as Ibn Masʿūd, Abū Dardā’, 
Anas b. Mālik, are well noted for making statements attributed to the Prophet and then suffixing 
their statements with, شبهه  أو  هذا،  نحو  أو  , قال  كما  أو , the like thereof/something to that effect 
(ibid. p149). Of course, such dispensation came with conditions. The narrator was expected to 
be knowledgeable in Arabic, able to discern the discrete and layered meanings of the language, 
while the statements being narrated, if they are regarding the permissible and impermissible in 
Islam, then the narrator should have no confusion as to what is designated as permissible and 
what is not, so as to not fall into the peril of incorrectly designating an act permissible or 
otherwise. Knowing that even in the transmission of ḥadīth in their original language, permitted 
some lenience regarding the wording, as long as the meaning was maintained, then in 
translation such dispensation becomes even more critical.  
 
Such dispensations are important given that ḥadīth are uniquely problematic to translate. Unlike 
the Quran, which is one unified text that allows for self-referencing in order to corroborate and 
to ensure consistency in how a particular word or phrase may be translated, the ḥadīth texts are 
a conglomeration of individual statements, each one of which will have been transmitted by a 
number of varying individuals, each of whom may have expressed statements in their own 
unique register. The ḥadīth, then, do not necessarily lend themselves to intra-textual referencing 
to corroborate meaning and to create consistency in the manner that the Quran does. Though 
this doesn’t preclude the possibility in its entirety, it does mean each statement has to be 
considered individually and intra-textual referencing requires more consideration. Perhaps this, 
in addition to the secondary status of the ḥadīth to the Quran, is why there is virtually no 
literature on translating ḥadīth, while literature on translating the Quran is profuse.  
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It is worth reiterating once more that the ḥadīth are approached as texts for translation but were, 
of course, originally oral statements, so a loss in addition to the possibility of approximate 
transmissions has also already taken place on an intralingual level. While still in Arabic, 
converting the oral statements into written ones takes away from the visual cues that oral 
statements have at their disposal; body language, gestures, or facial expression. Furthermore, 
there is the intent of the writer who captures these airborne words, and sets them in ink onto 
paper; with what objective does he write these words? Who is their target audience? What 
message does the writer wish to communicate to the audience thereby? Then there are the same 
questions to consider again when translating from the Arabic to English. A probing into the 
authorial intent as well as the intended target audience and their reception of the works, at both 
points of writing and translation should be undertaken. 
 
In an attempt then, to reduce the losses in translation, a number of issues have been taken into 
consideration. Firstly, as previously addressed, I am conscious of ḥadīth literature needing to 
be contextualised and given as much expression as is legitimately possible without betraying 
the original statements. Secondly, with particular reference to al-Ijāba, while I cannot with 
certainty assert that its author, al-Zarkashī, had specific objectives that led him to produce the 
work, there are certainly objectives that his text can be utilised towards: to re-centre ʿĀ’isha’s 
voice, to foreground the power of her statements and the strength of her correctives. It would 
be my intention, as the translator of the text to achieve this. It becomes clear from a reading of 
the text that gender is a striking factor; ʿ Ā’isha is a sole woman, refuting an entirely male cohort 
of Companions. As a female translator and as someone committed to the establishment of social 
justice, I would be sensitive to gendered language and interpretations of the text too, and so for 
these reasons, I will take a feminist hermeneutical approach to translation which is sensitive to 
gendered readings of the tradition, in particular readings or expressions that are inherently 
gendered in a manner that could be construed as lending religious legitimacy to sexist 
interpretations/translations of the text. Or as wadud states, ‘Instead of trying to change the 
immutable words, we grapple with and challenge the inherent sexist biases of the historicity of 
words. As agents we surmise what are particulars and what are universals to establish general 
mechanisms for achieving the fullest justice of our time’ (2006, p.206).  
 
The translation will also be considerate of the character of ʿĀ’isha herself, made more possible 
by the analysis of the reconstructions of ʿĀ’isha, which has been presented in Chapter One. 
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While I am aware that to claim to have an entirely authentic and true representation of ʿĀ’isha 
would be an audacious and even contentious one, considering key events and occurrences in 
her life and the multiple narratives around them, are an attempt at seeing ʿĀ’isha in a more 
holistic way and utilising this information in the translation process is a means to ensuring that 
she retains her own agency, as the subject of the translation, and does not become what Edward 
Said called a ‘representation or object without history’ (1978, p.11). 49  In other words, 
presenting her words without providing the context and without considering her own 
personality and the experiences that made her, would make for a translation that is inadequate 
in purveying the totality of her intention. Furthermore, one must be acutely aware that the act 
of translation is never in and of itself an act of neutrality. Sherry Simon (1996, p.viii) notes that 
translation is a mode of engagement with a given text, and that this engagement means that 
translators are ipso facto involved in a politics of transmission, in perpetuating or contesting 
values which sustain the status quo. This translation too is committed to a manner which best 
expresses the challenging and mobilising nature of the text.  
 
It may be then, at this juncture, that original preoccupations with seeking to avoid accusations 
of subjectivity become less of a priority, and that a recognition and embrace of the 
inescapability of subjectivity and one’s positionality takes root. Hans-Georg Gadamer rejected 
the objectivity school of understanding hermeneutics, and accepted subjectivity as an asset in 
the process, not a hindrance. In fact, Wachterhauser asserted that, ‘Only if we are deeply 
formed by a tradition are we capable of modifying those traditions in meaningful ways. There 
is a sense in which anyone who wishes to make a contribution to some sphere of human 
understanding must have already been formed by that tradition of inquiry…We belong to 
history long before it belongs to us’ (Dostal, R. 2002, p.63). Thus the positionality of this 
translator as a believing Muslim woman invested in just readings of the sacred text, to bring 
about understandings that are faithful to the teachings of the Quran, and to the fulfilment of the 
 
49 I.e. it is important for the conscientious translator to be aware of the power dynamic between the translator and their reader, 
and the translated, in this case ʿĀ’isha. The translator and their audience have to be aware not to collude in a manner that 
undermines the representation of the translated. For more on this see, Batchelor, K. 2009. Decolonizing Translation: 
Francophone African Novels in English Translation. Manchester: St. Jerome Publisher. 
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achievement of the full agency of women, is one that can be harnessed as an advantage, rather 
than falsely denied as being of any significance or influence in the process.50  
 
Gadamer (2013, pp.313-317) speaks of the limits of people’s understandings of their own 
contexts, coloured by their individual effective histories, as their individual horizons. These 
horizons are the limits to which their vision can extend, these can be narrowed or expanded. 
Indeed, new horizons can be opened up, but the fact remains, there are limits to these horizons. 
In terms of a hermeneutical approach to tradition or history, Gadamer argues that one is not 
communicating between two separate, closed horizons but from inside a historic horizon within 
which the individual is situated. Gadamer states, ‘When our historical consciousness transposes 
itself into historical horizons, this does not entail passing into alien worlds unconnected in 
anyway with our own; instead they together constitute the one great horizon that moves from 
within and that, beyond the frontiers of the present, embraces the historical depths of our self-
conscious’ (1989, p.303). This very notion of horizons is continued by Gadamer when 
considering the relationship between the translator and the source text; each is in a conversation 
with the other.  
 
Building on Gadamer’s approach to understanding history, I argue that we cannot transpose 
ourselves to a previous time, disregarding ourselves, but rather we go to this historic moment 
with our full selves. And while Gadamer may have been saying as much while being primarily 
concerned with the hermeneutics of language, he considered the task of the translator as 
different by only a small degree from the general task presented for hermeneutics by all texts. 
What Gadamer (2013, pp.402-406) does assert though, when it comes to the translation of a 
text, is that the hermeneutical process is doubled, as the process occurs first between the 
text/original author and the translation, and then between the translator/translated text and the 
reader of that text. It is then the translator’s duty to keep the hermeneutical distance between 
 
50 Barbara Godard (1986, p.7) writes, ‘The feminist translator affirming her critical difference, her delight in interminable re-
reading and re-writing, flaunts the signs of her manipulation of the text. Womanhandling the text in translation means replacing 
the modest, self-effacing translator. The translator becomes an active participant in the creation of meaning.’.Many feminist 
translators view the translation process and the harnessing of language so as to centre the female lived experience, paramount 
in dismantling patriarchy as the normative mode of life and living, hence acknowledging and embracing one’s positionality. 
For more on this, see, von Flotow, L. 1991. Feminist Translation: Contexts, Practices and Theories. Traduction, Terminologie, 
Rédaction. 4(2), pp.69-84 
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the source text and the target text narrowed, while recognising that the gap cannot be entirely 
overcome. 
 
Gadamer draws attention to the limitations of translatability, and notes that some 
words/expressions do not lend themselves to neat translations in the target language. Where 
this has occurred in the translation of al-Ijāba, footnotes have been used to explain concepts in 
English. For example, taqwa is often translated as ‘fear of God’ but encompasses much more 
than simply fear; it includes mindfulness, consciousness, and an intimate awareness of being 
held within the gaze of God.51 Also, where a single word may have been used in the English 
translation in order to keep the target text from becoming verbose, an attempt to relay the depth 
of the meaning may also be expressed in the footnotes. For example,  as mentioned earlier, in 
one tradition the intensity of ʿĀ’isha’s response to a statement of Abū Hurayra is described as: 
faṭāra shiqatu minha fi al-samā’ wa shiqatu minha fi al-arḍ, which is translated simply as 
‘visibly enraged’, but is clarified in footnotes as literally meaning ‘A fissure emanated from 
her up to the sky, and from her down through the earth’. The literal makes for too verbose, too 
florid a translation in the target text. It is hoped that by engaging the footnotes to some of the 
translation in this manner, that something of the ‘superficial’, ‘flat’ nature that Gadamer 
charges translations with is remedied. Gadamer also supports the idea that to merely reconstruct 
a translation by taking words from one as building blocks to recreate the same word pattern 
into the target language as in the source language, is to only recreate the formal/superficial 
structure of the text, and that for the translator to really overcome a shallow translation, the 
translator must penetrate the deeper meanings of the source text, and then relate this meaning 
to the situation in which the target text is being produced. Only then, can it be hoped that a text 
be rendered in such a way so as to allow for the reader of the target text to be enabled to 
experience a proper understanding of the original source text. 
 
Furthermore, to allow for better readability and flow, the decision has been taken to make the 
translation more literary in style. Having considered the types of losses that can take place in 
the transmission of ḥadīth and in their translation, it becomes evident that literal loss of words 
is the least damaging and worrisome part in the process of translation, as long as such loss is 
suffered in the pursuit of achieving accuracy of transmitting the meaning of the message, 
without taking too much liberty with the literal wording. By way of example, instead of 
 
51 For more, see the entry for ‘Taqwa’ in, Esposito. J. 2003. The Oxford Dictionary of Islam. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
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repeatedly translating قال  as ‘said’, I am using the context and my knowledge of the individuals 
involved, in conjunction with the intended message and impact of the statement to use more 
relevant and less repetitive terms like ‘responded’ or ‘replied,’ or more expressive terms like 
‘shouted’ or ‘exclaimed’, where such responses are indicated by the text. In fact, there are a 
number of phrases or words in addition to قال  that are repeatedly used in the original Arabic 
text, which when translated into English make for a clumsy, repetitive read, and which is 
stylistically at odds with well written prose in English. Arabic sentences tend to be longer than 
English ones, often connected through the basic connectives, و،  ف،  ، ثم  or by secondary 
connectives such as حيث  اذ،  etc. This, in addition to the lack of use of punctuation in classical 
Arabic, means that in the translation process, judgements have to be made with regard to the 
splitting of sentences and textual restructuring to allow for grammatical cohesion in the target 
language which results in a more cogent read.  
 
While I had initially committed to as-literal-a-translation-as-possible, the aforementioned 
considerations have justified a move away from such a stance. This is particularly so when 
considering that the text to be translated is most likely already some steps removed from the 
original oral statements. Beeston warns that the Quran and ḥadīth, what he refers to as the 
Tradition literature, was often forged much later than its first oral manifestation and recording, 
and as such absorbs the language of its own context into that of the oral tradition. He argues 
that the Tradition literature, ‘was at first transmitted orally and only written down at a later 
stage; and although later scholars who handled it then laid stress on verbal accuracy, it is 
manifest that the contemporaries of the Prophet had no such idea, but concerned themselves 
only with the content of the record, not with its precise linguistic form of expression. We can 
see this in the fact that traditions are sometimes recorded by later scholars in several forms 
which, while conveying the same ultimate sense, differ in verbal expression’ (Beeston, 2006, 
p.4). In other words, variance in expression has always been inherent to the process of 
transmitting these statements, as has simultaneously striving for a loyalty to conveying the core 
message, even in the source language of Arabic. Therefore, allowing for some liberty in the 
breakdown of sentences, in less repetitive expressions which allow for flow in reading and 
expression of non-verbal cues, and in grammatical restructuring, in the target language of 
English, is still very much in the same tradition of transmission of these ḥadīth as it is in Arabic.  
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Anna Livia writes on the role of the translator, ‘In their dual role as linguistic interpreters and 
cultural guides, translators must decide what to naturalise, what to explain and what to 
exoticise’ (2003, p.154). Therefore, while it is desirable to translate al-Ijāba in a manner that 
lends more fluency in the target language, it will not be homogenised into the culture of the 
target language; it will retain its distinct historical and cultural location, and yet as the translator 
of the text, one is acutely aware that this does not mean that the translation piece will be an 
exactly equivalent one. Rather, it is creating its own distinct text reflecting those aspects of the 
original text as deemed most congruent with the possible intentions of the original author al-
Zarkashī, the intentions and objectives of ʿĀ’isha, the context and historicity of the moment, 
and the objectives of this research. It can be seen as creating a ‘third space’ that Homi Bhabha 
(2004, p.54) writes of: the product of an encounter between different cultural, linguistic, 
political, and even theological positions, a process that not only delivers those involved to a 
new intellectual space, but also transforms the subjects involved. The translation will shed new 
light on ʿĀ’isha and advocate for the relocation of the female voice to the very centre of 
knowledge production and generation in Islam, as well as positioning al-Ijāba as a text that 
challenges the notion of a closed ḥadīth canon and an agent by which to keep it open, while 
also interrogating the positions of specific Companions of the Prophet and the legal positions 
that have been arrived at and reified in legal theory on the basis of preferential treatment granted 
to the statements of these Companions over those of ʿĀ’isha. 
 
It is hoped that by having a style of translation that is as close to the original literal meanings, 
while allowing flexibility to somewhat accommodate the emotion, atmosphere, and other non-
verbal cues that would also have been present, as well as producing a translated text that is 
more readable for its literary style, would mean that not only can ʿĀ’isha’s voice be centred in 
a manner that is authentic and closely reflective of her personality, but that also makes for a 
more satisfying reading experience. Furthermore, in creating a text that allows for a wider 
readership and does not restrict itself to only a scholarly elite, it is hoped that it will lend itself 
to the democratisation of religious engagement.  
 
The translation of texts has been noted as a historically important aspect of any movement of 
ideas, and as having made distinct contributions to the spiritual life of the times and a site from 
which dominant norms could be challenged and resisted (Simon, S. 1996, p.40-46). It is this 
translator’s intent too to amplify the voice of ʿĀ’isha and to centre it in discourses challenging 
the current status quo as well, in particular patriarchal interpretations of the religion. If these 
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intentions are to be fully realised in the translation of this text, then it must be one that is as 
inclusive in its audience as is possible. And if the voice of ʿĀ’isha is to become as powerful 
and as amplified as is possible, then it must be given avenues to the ears of as many Muslims 
as is possible, not confined once more to a scholarly elite. 
 
When translating the text, both the 1939 edition by Saʿīd al-Afghānī, and the 1999 critical 
edition of al-Ijāba were used in case of any variance between the two editions. 
 
Selecting the Text 
 
While a complete translation of al-Ijāba remains an ambition of this researcher, for the 
purposes of this project a number of sections have been selected for analysis. The chapters 
translated are those in which ʿĀ’isha is addressing the statements of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, 
ʿAbdullah b. ʿ Abbās, ʿ Abdullah b. ʿ Amr b. al-ʿĀṣ, Abū Hurayra, Abū Saʿīd al-Khuḍri and Zayd 
b. Thābit, due to their seniority and status amongst Muslims in general, and the authority they 
are ascribed in narrating ḥadīth. An additional translation is made of the chapter regarding 
Shaybah b. ʿUthmān which is interesting for its being entitled Rujuʿ Shaybah b. ʿUthmān 
ilayha—Shaybah b. ʿUthmān’s deference to her, as opposed to ʿĀ’isha’s Correction of 
Shaybah, as is al-Zarkashī’s formula for the headings of all the other chapters. Additionally, 
the only chapter in which ʿĀ’isha is refuting a particular female companion, Faṭima bint Qayṣ, 
is also included. The case of Faṭima is intriguing due to its concern with the treatment of a 
woman newly divorced and the obligations of her ex-husband towards her in the immediate 
aftermath, which has implications in the precedent it could set for Muslim women and their 
experience following a divorce. More excitingly though, it also provides a scenario in which 
ʿĀ’isha is engaging with the words of Faṭima, a female engagement with a female claim, thus 
not only providing a precedent for women’s voices being central to the formation and 
epistemological understanding of the religion, but also provides a case study for how a 
statement perceived as problematic is dealt with when it emanates from a woman as compared 
to how problematic statements made by male Companions have been handled, and how their 
gender has been considered, or not, in the process. 
 
Furthermore, the topics covered in the translated section are a good reflection of the topics 
covered overall by al-Ijāba. The table below presents all of the chapters of the book dealing 
with her correctives and the themes presented in each, with the translated Companions and 
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their topics highlighted in order to clearly illustrate the representational value of the selected 
translation with regard to the rest of the text. 
 
 
Chapter Title  Topics 
Her Correction of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb • Punishment of the deceased for the 
exaggerated lamentations of the mourning. 
• Purification after sexual intercourse. 
• Gifting the wife as an act of charity. 
• Perfuming the pilgrim, Muḥrim. 
• The Prophet’s prediction that Zaynab would 
be the first of his wives to pass away after 
him. 
• ʿUmar’s forbidding prayer after ʿAsr until 
sunset. 
• On the issue of ḥijāb. 
Her Correction of ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib The issue of masḥ52 
Her Correction of ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās • What is forbidden for the pilgrim on the 
smaller pilgrimage, ʿUmrah. 
• On when such a pilgrim should 
circumambulate the Kaʿba. 
• Excessively long durations in prayer. 
• The legal status of praying after ʿAsr. 
• Regarding the shroud of the Prophet. 
• Dispute over whether the Prophet saw God 
directly or not. 
• The form of the Witr prayer. 
• Discussion of verse 214 in Sūrah al-Baqarah 
 
52 Masḥ literally means to wipe over. In this context it is referring to particular circumstances in which a Muslim may pass 
their wet hand over their shoes/socks instead of washing the feet to perform wuḍūʾ. See, Pella, C, ‘al-Masḥ ʿAlā ’l-
K̲h̲uffayn’, EI2. 
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Chapter Title  Topics 
Her Correction of ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar • Punishment of the deceased for the 
exaggerated lamentations of the mourning. 
• Perfuming the pilgrim, Muḥrim. 
• When the Prophet performed ʿUmrah in his 
lifetime. 
• The reward for following a funeral 
procession. 
• The permissibility for women to wear leather 
socks, khuff. 
• Whether a kiss nullifies one’s ablution, wuḍū’ 
• Death and the Believer 
• Adhān of Bilāl vs. Adhān of Ibn Umm 
Maktūm at the predawn prayer, Fajr. 
• The number of days in a month. 
• Can the dead hear the living: The Prophet’s 
addressing the enemies’ dead at Badr. 
Her Correction of ʿAbdullah b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ • The legal ruling on whether or not women 
must undo their braids when doing ghusl. 
Her Correction of Abū Hurayra • The legal ruling on whether one who has 
awoken in a state of sexual impurity janābah, 
can fast or not. 
• Regarding the status of the house, woman, 
and riding beast as carriers of bad luck. 
• Was a believing woman punished for her 
maltreatment of a cat? 
• The status of the child born out of wedlock 
• Punishment of the deceased for the 
exaggerated lamentations of the mourning. 
• On the legal status of the Witr prayer. 
• ʿĀ’isha’s direct criticism of Abū Hurayra’s 
verbosity in narrating ḥadīth. 
• The requirement for the one who has bathed 
the deceased in preparation for the funeral, to 
perform ablution, wuḍūʾ upon completion. 
• Regarding poetry. 
• Death and the Believer 
• A woman nullifies the prayer if she walks in 
front of the person engaged in prayer. 
• The impermissibility of wearing only one 
shoe. 
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Chapter Title  Topics 
Her Correction of Marwān b. al-Ḥakam • On the exegesis tafsīr of verse 17 in Sūrah al-
Aḥqāf 
Her Correction of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī • The impermissibility of women travelling 
without a male guardian maḥram. 
• A person is resurrected in the clothes in which 
they died. 
Her Correction of Ibn Masʿūd • Whoever loves to meet Allāh, Allāh loves to 
meet them. 
Her Correction of Abū Mūsa al-Ashʿari • On the question of whether the prayer and 
breaking the fast, Ifṭār, should be hastened or 
delayed. 
Her Correction of Zayd b. Arqam • Contractual agreements 
Her Correction of al-Barāʾ b. al-ʿĀzib • When the Prophet performed ʿUmrah in his 
lifetime. 
Her Correction of ʿAbdullah b. al-Zubayr • Separating the Ḥajj and the ʿUmrah. 
• How much hair a female pilgrim needs to trim 
in order to come out of the state of 
pilgrimage, iḥrām. 
Her Correction of ʿUrwah b. al-Zubayr • Going between Ṣafā and Marwa. 
Her Correction of Jābir • Purification after sexual intercourse. 
Her Correction of Abū Ṯalḥa • Angels do not enter a home in which there is 
a dog or idols. 
Her Correction of Abū Dardāʾ • The timings within which Witr prayer can be 
performed. 
Shaybah b. ʿUthmān’s referring to her authority • On how to dispose of the fabric covering the 
Kaʿba, the Kiswah. 
Her Correction of ʿAbdul Raḥmān b. ʿAwf • Warning against ostentatious displays of 
one’s wealth. 
Her Correction of ʿAbdul Raḥmān b. Abū Bakr • Thoroughness when making ablution, Wuḍū’. 
Her Correction of Fāṭima bint Qayṣ • The obligations of an ex-husband towards his 
wife following divorce. 
Her Correction of the Wives of the Prophet • The wealth and property of the Prophet is 
inherited by the community as charity. 
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Chapter Title  Topics 
Her General Corrections • A woman does not nullify the prayer if she 
walks in front of the person engaged in 
prayer. 
• The funeral prayer takes place in the masjid. 
• Standing for the funeral processions. 
• The impermissibility of temporary marriages, 
mutʿah. 
• Discouraging men from standing while 
urinating due to concerns over personal 
hygiene. 
• Salat al-Ḍuḥa 
• Bathing, ghusl for Friday prayers. 
• Cleaning after relieving one’s self al-istinjāʾ 
with water. 
• The Prophet’s fasting on 10th Dhul-Ḥijjah 
• The Prophet’s night prayers in and outside of 
Ramaḍān.  
Table 1: al-Ijabāh Contents and Selection for Translation 
 
As the above table illustrates, the selected portion for translation not only constitutes a 
significant portion of the overall text, but also covers many of the recurring themes, and perhaps 
most pertinently for this study, all of the statements that concern women. 
 
Finally, in the spirit of transparency and ease of referencing, the Arabic text for the ḥadīth 
translated will be provided. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has clarified the methodology towards translating these ḥadīth; the acceptance and 
embracing of my positionality and subjectivity as a believing Muslim woman committed to 
translating the text with as much loyalty to the intentions of ʿĀ’isha and the Prophet, as well 
as al-Zarkashī, and to the overall ethic of the Quran. It is also evident, that while in the first 
instance a literal translation may instinctively appear as the most effective approach to 
translation, there is a great deal more to consider in the translation of texts than simply 
transferring words from one language into another. Of these considerations there is the 
commitment to a translation that is sensitive to gendered language that can be read in ways that 
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exclude or negatively exceptionalise women. This ability of language to exclude is also 
considered in ensuring that the translations are not only easily understood in the language 
utilised but also granted a literary form that makes them informative and enjoyable, so as to 
make it widely accessible and useful. The content of al-Ijāba has been clearly outlined and 
those ḥadīth selected for this thesis have been justified. They are a good representation of all 
the themes covered in the collection, whilst also ensuring that all statements pertaining to 
women are translated for analysis.  
 
Chapter Two elucidated the history of the ḥadīth tradition and explored some of the key 
principles in ḥadīth criticism. It also highlighted that the marginalising of much of ʿĀ’isha’s 
life and correctives are not solely as a result of the history and study of ḥadīth, but also the 
treatment of her statements in Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). Therefore, the next chapter will 
now consider how the legal tradition formed and what role this played in the marginalisation 
of ʿ Ā’isha’s interventions. This is tragic for the fact that many of her correctives serve to amend 
erroneous statements attributed to the Prophet that are of a juridical nature. Having now 
developed and presented the translation methodology to be applied for this thesis, Chapter Four 
will begin to present and analyse those statements of a juridical nature from al-Ijāba. 
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Chapter Four: ʿĀ’isha the Jurist 
 
The legal (fiqh) and the ḥadīth tradition have a mutual history with the legal tradition being 
birthed through the ḥadīth tradition. In fact, Siddiqi (1993, p13) notes that the word fiqh itself 
had been used synonymously with ḥadīth. An example of this is found in the works of Ibn ʿAbd 
al-Barr who cites a tradition and notes that the word fiqh was being used to denote ḥadīth. Much 
of the early period of Islamic law found itself comprised primarily of Prophetic traditions 
concerned with legal issues (ḥadīth al-aḥkām) (ibid, p.14). Therefore, any discussion on the 
approach of A’isha towards ḥadīth without a simultaneous consideration of the legal tradition, 
would be severely limiting. Whilst Chapter Two has expounded on the role of the ḥadīth 
tradition and its history in the marginalising of  ʿĀ’isha’s correctives, this chapter will consider 
the role of the legal tradition. In this chapter, I illustrate how the fate of ʿĀ’isha as an authority 
resident and rooted in Medina meant that she was not taken up as a central authority for a legal 
school of thought in the manner that occurred in Basra and Kufa. Medina had its own 
intellectual trajectory, preferring to rely on the living tradition that coursed through its 
inhabitants as Companions and their descendants. Having not been taken up as the central 
authority for any of the four major Sunni legal schools of thought, ʿĀ’isha has been 
marginalised with respect to her opinions, contradictions and methodology.  
 
Despite this, however, as a senior Companion and most beloved and astute wife of the Prophet, 
who was intelligent and engaged with her community, she appears to have developed a 
methodology in approaching the ḥadīth that could be harnessed and applied again today, giving 
rise to the possibility of an approach to the legal tradition as well as to ḥadīth that is liberatory 
and counter-hegemonic. Therefore, having considered the lost opportunity of ʿĀ’isha as a 
central authority for a legal school of thought, this chapter proceeds to an analysis of those 
ḥadīth in al-Ijāba concerned with jurisprudential matters, presenting the correctives along with 
a brief analysis for each. This analysis is then drawn upon to present the ʿĀ’isha’s emergent 
juristic framework. 
 
A Brief History of the Law (Fiqh) 
 
The fiqh tradition as currently recognised in Sunni Islam, represented by four main schools of 
thought, the Ḥanafi, Mālikī, Shafiʿī, and Hanbali schools, named after the scholars upon whose 
work they centred around, did not begin to come into formation until a few decades into the 
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second century of Islam. Even in their earliest formation they were largely organised by 
geographical location, rather than any strict adherence to particular notions regarding doctrine. 
Variances that occurred between them tended therefore, to be born out of differences in social 
conditions, customary laws and practice, and less out of principles and methods, or doctrinal 
disagreement.  
 
According to Wael Hallaq, the leaders of the first community of believers after the death of the 
Prophet relied primarily on two sources of principles and laws to guide their conduct: the Quran 
and pre-Islamic Arab customary law. However, as Muslim conquests of lands grew, the 
limitations of these sources became apparent. During this early period, the Quran was collected 
and codified, transforming it from an oral and scattered ‘text’ to a written one. This project was 
carried out by the first and second caliphs, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, and then finally 
concluded by the third Caliph, ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān, who established one authoritative codified 
Quran in text and had all variants destroyed. Despite this endeavour to vulgate the Quran, it 
was still limited in what it offered as a legal source; it only offers some five-hundred legal 
verses, covering a relatively limited number of legal scenarios (Hallaq, W. 1997, p.10). As such 
then, the Sunnah, began to gain more prominence in the development of legal theory. 
 
Whilst the practice of the Prophet had always been considered from the earliest Muslims, due 
to its importance established by the Quran itself, and by the very recalling of Prophetic practice 
by his Companions as a means to establishing Muslim praxis, what was understood by the term 
Sunnah, has varied over time. Hallaq asserts that the earliest use of the term as used by the 
Companions and in particular, the first two Caliphs, Abū Bakr and ʿUmar, didn’t refer to any 
particular or substantive matter but to any ‘right and just practice’ (ibid. p.12). However, by 
the end of the first century of Islam, with the expansion of the Islamic empire and the 
establishment of Damascus as its capital, an assimilation process took place via the work of 
judges and religious scholars. Story-tellers, whose subject matter was made up of ethico-legal 
content about the Prophet and his Companions, played an essential role too in successfully 
integrating local practices and norms prevailing in the newly conquered territories, into the 
authoritative sources of Islam; the newly introduced religion through conquest, by asserting an 
attribution to the Prophet or one of his Companions, the Sunnah. This resulted in a swelling in 
the number of statements ascribed to the Prophet, which in turn galvanised religious scholars 
into investigating the authenticity and validity of such statements and those purported to report 
them, inaugurating two fundamental concepts; the ḥadīth, and their isnād, chain of narrators. 
  99 
This process of investigation and authentication continued over the next two centuries, finally 
fine-tuning to an established science of ḥadīth that encapsulated the Sunnah within it.  
 
Brown (2009, p.151) also elucidates the history of the Sunnah stating that Sunnah and ḥadīth 
are not synonymous and have distinct histories, albeit one that converges. He writes that in the 
first century and a half after the Prophet, Muslims understood the Sunnah to encapsulate the 
practices and beliefs of the Muslim community as passed down from the Companions, while 
the ḥadīth were concerned with reports from the Prophet, which may or may not have been 
acted upon by Muslims in daily life. He then further differentiates between the two stating, 
‘Shuʿba b. al-Ḥajjāj was thus considered a master of Ḥadīths but not of Sunna while Sufyān al-
Thawrī (d. 161/778) was considered a master of both’, and that ‘Mālik believed that the practice 
of the people of Medina which he felt had been transmitted en masse from the time of the 
Prophet, was a much more reliable source for discovering the Prophet’s Sunna than a solitary 
ḥadīth narrated by one isnād’. Thus, the ḥadīth literature as it has now emerged has had its own 
particular historical journey, which then intertwines with that of the development of Islamic 
jurisprudence.  
 
As the processes around ḥadīth became more sophisticated, and the expansion and 
establishment of the legal system of the Islamic empire became more in want of Islamic 
validation that the Quran alone could not provide, religious jurists increasingly began to rely 
on ḥadīth, and to imitate the validation process in ḥadīth, by seeking to project their legal 
conclusions retrospectively back to the second generation of Muslims, the Successors or 
Tabiʿīn, and through them to the first generation of Muslims, the Companions, and through 
them to the Prophet himself. This was a venture that began around the end of the first century 
of Islam and continued into the third century (Hallaq, p.17). 
 
Mapping the formation of the schools of Islamic law is a difficult task, not least because there 
is no one agreed upon account, neither by Western academics nor Muslim scholars. As 
Melchert (1997, p.xvii) writes, ‘There is no easy way to tell when the schools of law came to 
be. None of the schools of law is associated with anything like a datable charter. Neither is any 
of the Sufi orders or other institutions of Islam: the Muslims recognise no authority that might 
issue such charters, beyond the consensus of the community’. Nonetheless scholars such as 
George Makdisi (1991), Joseph Schacht (1979), Rumee Ahmed (2012), Wael Hallaq (2005), 
and others have attempted to develop histories for the formation of the legal schools of law. 
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There are some areas of agreement, or at the very least, little disagreement, and these are what 
will be focused upon to try to create an understanding of the processes that led to the four 
dominant schools of law in Sunni Islam as is pertinent to our understanding of how ʿĀ’isha 
and her statements were configured. 
 
Under Umayyad rule, in the second century of Islam, religious law and Islamic jurisprudence 
were to be formalised. As explained by Schacht, the ancient schools of law had originally relied 
heavily on the notion of the ‘living tradition of the school’, represented by the constant doctrine 
of its authoritative representatives (1964, p.29).  In other words, there was a belief that the 
practice of the Muslim community was one that encompassed within it the continuous carrying 
forward of the practice of the Prophet himself through the caliphs and scholars, a view similar 
to that expressed above, held by Mālik. The Sunnah was thus both synchronous in how it 
absorbed the prevailing customs, laws and practices of local regions, and increasingly 
retrospective in how it sought to attach itself theoretically to an ideal established by Prophetic 
practice. Schacht is useful in exploring this genealogy that is forged between second century 
scholars of Islamic law back to the Prophet. However, because Schacht asserts this from a 
position of suspicion and epistemic distrust of Muslim scholarship, and hence projects 
untrustworthiness upon their endeavour to do so, it is important to take heed of criticisms 
formulated by scholars such as Motzki (2002) and Azami (1996) when considering how 
Schacht uses this notion of retrospectively connecting back to the Prophet to analyse specific 
chains of narration.53  
 
As Motzki (2002, p.xi) states and deftly demonstrates in his The Origins of Islamic 
Jurisprudence, ‘Schacht’s conceptions, in substantive points, are no longer tenable or are 
greatly in need of modification’. Indeed, it has been well evidenced that classical Muslim 
scholars were well aware of the increase in retrospective isnād building and were mindful and 
active in seeking to address any inauthentic statements, albeit with some shortcomings. 
Nonetheless, for the purpose of exploring how legal schools of thought were built around 
particular scholars and Companions of the Prophet, Schacht’s (1964) analysis proves useful. 
In this regard, Melchert (1997, p.xvii-xviii) notes that Schacht’s views on when and how the 
 
53 A particularly robust response to Schacht on this point can be found in, Brown. J. 2007. Critical Rigor vs. Juridical 
Pragmatism: How Legal Theorists and Ḥadīth Scholars Approached the Backgrowth of Isnāds in the Genre of ‘Ilal Al-Hadīth. 
Islamic Law and Society 14(1). 
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schools of Islamic law came to formalise and personalise under the name of particular jurists 
is not too dissimilar to the view held by Ibn Khaldūn (d. 806/1408). Ibn Khaldūn, when 
discussing the origins of the schools of Islamic law in his seminal work, al-Muqaddima, begins 
with the jurists of Iraq whom he credits with skilfulness at analogy (qiyās) and those of the 
Hijaz, whom he credits with superior knowledge of ḥadīth. Amongst the scholars of Iraq, Abū 
Ḥanīfa was deemed foremost and so the legal school to emerge from there was the one attached 
to him and his students. In the Hijaz, the same process coalesced around Mālik. As for the 
Shafiʿī school of law, then Ibn Khaldūn argued that he blended the two schools of Iraq and the 
Hijaz to formulate his own. So, while Schacht has been well refuted in his argument regarding 
retrospective chain building in ḥadīth, his assertions referring to the development and 
formalisation of the schools of thought appear well founded and corroborated. It is useful for 
what it provides in terms of information regarding the Companions that emerge as central 
authorities for each school, or as in the case of ʿĀ’isha, those Companions who do not. 
 
As mentioned previously, the main centres of learning where the dominant schools of thought 
were able to develop were geographically dispersed; they were based in Makkah, Medina, and 
Kufa and Basra.54 In Kufa the doctrine of the school that developed there was retrospectively 
attributed to the second generation scholar, Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, a companion of the first 
generation Muslim, Ibn Masʿūd who had been a Companion of the Prophet. But proximity to 
a second-generation scholar was not enough, and so association with ‘Companions of Ibn 
Masʿūd’, was asserted instead until eventually, ‘Companions of’ was replaced with an explicit 
reference to Ibn Masʿūd himself. As noted by Schacht (1964, p.31), a great deal of Kufan 
doctrine is attributed to Ibn Masʿūd via Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, even though the historical Ibrāhīm 
is not known to ever have been in actual direct contact with the historical Ibn Masʿūd, though 
later it was asserted that members of the original group of ‘Companions of Ibn Masʿūd’ were 
in fact maternal uncles of Ibrāhīm’s, hence connecting the two authorities.55 
 
As such then, Ibn Masʿūd became what Schacht refers to as the ‘eponym of the doctrine of the 
school of Kufa’. In like manner the other centres of learning had also developed their own 
 
54 See, Hallaq, H. 2009. An Introduction to Islamic Law. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p.37, for an explanation of 
where each school was formed and in what geographical directions each travelled. 
55 A poetic illustration of a genealogy for the Ḥanafī school was penned by Ibn ‘Ābidīn who wrote fiqh ‘was planted by 
ʿAbdallah b. Masʿūd, irrigated by ʿAlqama, harvested by Ibrāhīm al-Nakhaʿī, threshed by Ḥammād, milled by Abū Ḥanīfa, 
kneaded by Abū Yusuf, and baked by Shaybānī. The Muslims are nourished by this bread’ (Hallaq, W. 2004, p.320). 
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incremental retrospective reach for authority. Schacht (1964, p.32) writes, ‘The corresponding 
eponym of the Makkans was Ibn ʿAbbās, another Companion of the Prophet, and references to 
him, too, alternate with references to the Companions of Ibn ʿAbbās. The two main authorities 
of the Medinese among the Companions of the Prophet were the caliph ʿ Umar and his son ʿ Abd 
Allah b. ʿUmar. Each ancient school of law, having projected its doctrine back to its own 
eponym, a local Companion of the Prophet, claimed his authority as the basis of its teaching’.  
With each centre of learning and thereby each developing legal school of thought staking its 
claim to an authority amongst the Companions, any opposition to their position would need to 
be met by a position supported by a Companion of at least equal, though ideally, superior 
authority. In Kufa, for example, this happened by opposition movements putting forward ʿAlī 
as their authoritative source. He was not only more senior than Ibn Masʿūd, he was also 
accessible as a likely authority for his having established Kufa as his headquarters while Caliph. 
 
This development of the schools of thought, albeit a brief outline, makes stark the lack of 
invocation of ʿĀ’isha as a central authority by any school. This may be because Medina, where 
she lived, adjudicated, taught, and passed away, relied on the lived tradition, the Sunnah, which 
it is believed coursed through the practice of its inhabitants through generational inheritance of 
prophetic and Companions’ practice, and as such did not develop its legal tradition in the 
manner of the Iraqi schools, who could not rely on the same privilege and needed to establish 
those links to the Prophet that Medina took for granted. In taking this link for granted though, 
an opportunity for the centring of ʿĀ’isha is lost, as this meant that ʿĀ’isha retained a central 
and legitimate position within the tradition but did not benefit from attaining legal authority as 
a jurist, or central figure for a legal school of thought. But perhaps this was due to more than 
mere bad luck. ʿĀ’isha had already engaged in a civil war by this point and had repeatedly 
taken up opposing stances to those of other prominent Companions. It is possible that her 
omission was deliberate and that the establishment of the schools of law and their subsequent 
impositions, such as the belief in the equal reliability and trustworthiness of all the 
Companions, acted as a sanitisation process. Thereby cleansing opinions too variant with other 
opinions that were more expedient in the socio-political context in which the schools were 
developing and operating. This will be considered some more now. 
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ʿĀ’isha and the Legal Tradition 
 
Medina is where ʿĀ’isha had resided since childhood, through her marriage to the Prophet, and 
beyond his passing away, until she too died having lived a life invested in the spiritual growth 
and religious understanding of her immediate community. While the schools of law developed 
at high speed and with great strength in Kufa and Basra, opposition from Medina rooted itself 
in the tradition, and found itself becoming the centre of activity for the Traditionist movement, 
Ahl al-ḥadīth. Schacht (1964, p.34) described the movement of the Traditionists as ‘the most 
important single event in the history of Islamic law in the second century of the hijra,’ and few 
would be found to dispute this. The Traditionist movement was a response in opposition to the 
legal schools of thought. While the legal schools of thought were based on the living tradition, 
the Traditionist movement argued that this was not sufficient as a basis upon which to rest 
religious verdicts. They instead propagated and advocated for ear/eye-witness accounts of 
statements and actions of the Prophet, orally passed on through an uninterrupted chain of 
reliable and trustworthy narrators. As such then, while Traditionists were dispersed across the 
great centres of the Islamic empire, Medina became the spiritual centre for the movement. It is 
not far-fetched to posit that the intellectual trajectory of Medina’s religious scholarly class 
seeking to present an opposition to the legally minded approach of the other scholarly centres, 
would have assisted in the lack of establishing ʿĀ’isha as a central and primary authority figure 
of a legal school of thought. With her legacy so intertwined in the living tradition of Medina 
and its community, its scholars’ resistance to the position of non-Medinan scholars, 
inadvertently contributed to her marginalisation. Firstly, the Traditionist commitment to a valid 
chain of narration to the Prophet invested its authority in the chains of narration and in the 
statements of the Prophet, rather than in the intellectual authority of a single Companion. This 
not only had the effect of obscuring the particular superiority of ʿĀ’isha in her knowledge, but 
also allowed for the ascent of less learned Companions as long as their statements were 
supported with a strong continuous (tawāṭur) chain of narration. Secondly, Traditionists 
disliked human reasoning and personal opinion, and as is seen in some of the ways in which 
ʿĀ’isha’s assertions have been explained away, this left much of her legacy vulnerable to 
marginalisation. 
 
Even with provisions within the development of the principles of Islamic jurisprudence, Uṣūl 
al-Fiqh, for the consideration of opinions and rulings of Companions, the Ra’y/Fatwā al-
Ṣaḥāba, there is still not enough for the recovery of ʿĀ’isha as a central authority distinguished 
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from others; she remains an opinion amongst others. The only Companions who warrant a 
discussion on possible superiority amongst their peers are the four Rightly Guided Caliphs, 
Khulafā’ al-Rashidūn, Abū Bakr, ʿUmar, ʿUthmān, and ʿAlī, and furthermore in some 
discussions that of these four, it is the first two who are most preferred (Kamali, 2003, p.319). 
Interestingly though, despite their proximity to the Prophet and affirmed emotional and 
spiritual relationship with him, neither Abū Bakr nor ʿUmar narrates many ḥadīth.  
 
Spellberg (1994) argues that al-Zarkashī’s work was effectively too little, too late in redeeming 
and resurrecting ʿĀ’isha’s voice, verdicts, and even status. The next section will consider a 
section of ḥadīth from al-Ijāba, noting the method applied by ʿĀ’isha in responding to various 
Companions, and also the jurisprudential considerations of each and how her legal positions 
have been considered before considering a possible proto-uṣūlī approach to the ḥadīth 
regarding legal matters that is also emerging.  In the following section, and in Chapter Five, I 
have worked closely with my translation of al-Ijāba. Each section is presented in the Musnad 
style as observed by al-Zarkashī, i.e. in accordance to which Companion is being responded to 
by ʿĀ’isha. Within each section, groups of translations are presented with brief explanatory 
discussions of the ḥadīth that illustrate a common criteria from the validation or impugnment 
of narrators, as established in the science of ḥadīth. Each group is then discussed to draw 
together what has been learned, culminating in the extraction of an emergent juristic framework 
based on ʿĀ’isha’s correctives in this chapter. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Responses to ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb 
 
Impugnment due to Imaginary Indulgence (wahm) 
ʿĀ’isha’s Corrective with Reference to the Quran to Support her Stance 
 
Ḥadīths 1 and 7 both report ʿĀ’isha as accusing ʿUmar of having imagined a tradition. Though 
both traditions could be invalidated on the basis of carelessness, ghaflah, the presence of 
ʿĀ’isha’s specific accusations of wahm, means they are categorised as such. In ḥadīth 1 ʿ Ā’isha 
is seen correcting ʿUmar by providing the full statement of the Prophet, with additional support 
for her statement by the sentiment of the Quran on the issue.  
 
Ḥadīth One 
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 :setats īhsakraZ-lA
 
 :dias ohw akyaluM ūbA .b halludbAʿ fo noitidart eht sdrocer milsuM dna īrāhkuB-lA
 
 اَهََرضَحَو ،اَهَدَهْشَنِل اَنْئِجَو َةَّكَمِب َناَمْثُعِل ٌَةنْبا ِتَيِّفُُوت َلاَق ،ََةكْيَلُم يِبَأ ِنْب ِللها ِدْيَُبع ُنْب ِللها ُدْبَع
 ،َُرخلآا َءاَج َّمُث .َاِمهَِدحَأ َىِلإ ُتَْسَلج َلاَق َْوأ ـ اَمَُهنْيَب ٌسِلاَجَل يِِّنإَو ٍساَّبَع ُنْباَو َرَمُع ُنْبا
 ،ِءاَُكبْلا ِنَع َىهْنَت َلاَأ :ُهُهِجاوُم َوُه َناَْمُثع ِنْب وِرْمَعِل َرَمَع ُنْب ِللها ُدْبَع َلاَقَف يِبْنَج ىَلِإ َسَلَجَف
 ٍساََّبع ُنْبا َلاَقَف .ِهْيََلع ِهِْلهَأ ِءاَُكبِب ُبََّذعُيَل َتِّيَلما َّنِإ ‘ َلاَق ملسو هيلع للها ىلص ِللها َلوُسَر َّنِإَف
 للها ىضر ـ َرَمُع َعَم ُتْرَدَص َلاَق َثَّدَح َّمُث ،َكِلَذ َضْعَب ُلوُقَي ـ هنع للها ىضر ـ ُرَمُع َناَك ْدَق
 ْنَم ُْرظْناَف ،ْبَهْذا َلاََقف ٍةَرَُمس ِّلِظ َْتحَت ٍْبكَرِب َوُه َاذِإ ،ِءاَدْيَبْلاِب اَّنُك اَذِإ ىَّتَح َةَّكَم ْنِم ـ هنع
 ُتْلُقَف ٍبْيَهُص ىَلِإ ُتْعَجَرَف .يِل ُهُعْدا َلاََقف ُهُتَْربَْخأَف ،ٌبْيَُهص اَِذإَف ُتَْرظَنَف َلاَق ُبْكَّرلا َِءلاُؤَه
 .ُهباحصاَو ،هاخأو ُلوَُقي يِكْبَي ٌْبيَهُص ََلَعج َُرمُع َبيُِصأ اَّمَلَف .َينِنِمْؤُلما َريِمَأ ْقَحْلاَف ْلِحَتْرا
 ُبََّذعُي َتِّيَلما َّنِإ ‘ ملسو هيلع للها ىلص ِللها ُلوَُسر َلاَق َْدَقو ََّىَلع ِيْكبََتأ ُبْيَُهص اَي ُرَمُع َلاَقَف
 ُللها َمِحَر ْتَلاَقَف َةَشِئاَعِل َكِلَذ ُتْرَكَذ ُرَمُع َتَام اَّمَلَف ٍساَّبَع ُنْبا َلاَق .‘ ِْهيَلَع ِهِلْهَأ ِءاَكُب ِْضعَبِب
 .ِهَْيلَع ِِهلْهَأ ِءَاُكبِب َنِْمُؤلما ُبِّذَُعيَل َللها َّنِإ ملسو هيلع للها ىلص ِللها ُلُوسَر َثَّدَح اَم ِللهاَو ،َرَُمع
 .‘ ِهْيَلَع ِهِْلهَأ ِءاَُكبِب اًباَذَع َرِفاَْكلا ُديَِزيَل َللها َّنِإ ‘ َلاَق ملسو هيلع للها ىلص ِللها َلوَُسر َّنِكَلَو
 ََكْحضَأ َوُه ُللهاَو َكِلَذ َدْنِع ٍساَّبَع ُنْبا َلاَق .{ىَرُْخأ َرْزِو ٌةَرِزاَو ُرِزَت َلاَو} ُنآْرُْقلا ُمُكُبَْسح ْتَلَاقَو
 اًْئيَش َرَمُع ُنْبا َلاَق اَم ِللهاَو ََةكْيَلُم يِبَأ ُنْبا َلاَق .َىكْبَأَو
 
 ot tnew ew os ,hakkaM ni yawa dessap nāffAʿ .b nāmhtUʿ fo rethguad A
 I .tneserp ]osla[ erew sābbAʿ nbI dna ramUʿ nbI .]reyarp larenuf[ reh dnetta
 .meht fo eno ediseb tas I‘ dias eh ro( meht fo owt eht neewteb gnittis saw
 ot dias ramUʿ .b halludbAʿ .)’em ediseb tas dna emac nam rehtona nehT
 eht deedni rof ,gniyrc morf elpoep eht pots ton uoy lliW‘ ,nāmhtUʿ .b rmAʿ
 ylimaf sih fo gniyrc eht rof dehsinup si desaeced ehT‘ ,dias doG fo regnesseM
 eh neht ,’esiwekil yas ot desu ramUʿ ,dednopser sābbAʿ nbI ’.’mih revo
 dehcaer ew litnu hakkaM morf yenruoj a no ramUʿ deinapmocca I‘ ,detarran
 ,dias dna eert a fo edahs eht rednu ]esroh sih no[ detnuom saw eH .’ādyaB-la
 ]meht fo eno[ taht was dna tnew I ,oS .’era srellevart esoht ohw ees dna oG‘
 ot denruter I .’em ot mih llaC‘ ,dias eh dna ]ramUʿ[ demrofni I .byahuS saw
 ,]retaL[ .’sreveileB eht fo redaeL eht wollof dna trapeD‘ ,dias dna byahuS
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when ʿUmar was stabbed, Suhayb came weeping saying, ‘Oh my brother! 
Oh, my friend!’ [To which] ʿUmar responded, ‘Suhayb, do you cry over me 
when the Messenger of Allah said, the deceased is punished for some of the 
weeping of his relatives?’ Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘When ʿUmar died, I mentioned 
this to ʿĀ’isha. She said, ‘May God have mercy on ʿUmar. By God, the 
Messenger of Allah did not say that.’ And in Muslim’s narration she is 
reported to have additionally said, ‘The Messenger of Allah did not say that 
the deceased is punished for the crying of anyone, but rather, he said, ‘God 
increases a disbeliever in punishment for the crying of his relatives over him’. 
ʿĀ’isha continued, ‘The Quran is sufficient for you as God has stated, ‘No 
soul shall bear the burden of another’ (35:18)’. Ibn ʿAbbās thereupon said, 
‘It is God who makes one laugh or cry’. Ibn Abū Mulayka said, ‘By God, Ibn 
ʿUmar didn’t say anything after that’. 
 
Al-Zarkashī goes on to note that Muslim also records this tradition from Abū Mulayka, in 
which there is the additional statement of ʿĀ’isha, whereby she states, ‘By God, you are 
narrating on the authority of two people [ʿUmar and Ibn ʿ Umar] who cannot be deemed as liars, 
but rather it is a case of mistaken hearing’. Furthermore, al-Zarkashī states, ʿĀ’isha is recorded 
by Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādi as having said, ‘Ibn ʿUmar imagined (wahala) it’. 
 
Similarly, this ḥadīth is narrated in Muslim on the authority of Hāshim on the authority of his 
father who said it was mentioned to ʿĀ’isha that Ibn ʿUmar was claiming that the Prophet had 
said that the deceased is punished by his/her family’s crying. She responded with ‘He 
misunderstood (wahila)!’ and went on to correct it as above.56 As such, she has given both 
context and a Quranic verse in defence of her opposition and yet, curiously, Imām al-Nawawī 
(2002, p.730) in his commentary of Ṣaḥīḥ Muslim, argues that Ibn ʿUmar and ʿUmar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb could not have been mistaken because they heard the statement from the Prophet, and 
that if she had heard it at a later date, towards the end of his life, then surely she would have 
clarified this. When she heard this from the Prophet is less important than the fact that she did 
at all, and that much she has stated, whilst also giving the Quranic verse as an evidence too in 
support of her position. In an attempt to reconcile both statements, then, he argues that the 
statement of Ibn ʿUmar and ʿUmar is regarding making a display of one’s grief, or that the 
 
56 Muslim, Chapter: Funerals, ḥadīth No. 2154. 
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deceased leaves behind a request that their family members do so—a practice that is still 
prevalent in many cultures to inform people of the importance of the one who has passed to 
those left behind.  
 
However, it is well established and recorded in al-Bukhārī and Muslim too, that when the 
Prophet’s son Ibrāhīm passed away, he cried. Anas b. Mālik reported, ‘The Prophet was 
holding his son, Ibrāhīm, kissing him and smelling him. Then we entered upon him and a short 
while later Ibrāhīm passed away and the Messenger of Allah’s eyes filled [with tears]  and 
began to flow. Ibn ʿAwf said, ‘You, Messenger of Allah [are crying]?’ And he responded, ‘Oh, 
Ibn ʿAwf, this is a mercy, and it will be followed by another one’. Then the Prophet said, 
‘Indeed the eyes shed tears, and the heart is grieved, but we do not say anything except that 
which pleases our Lord, though indeed at your departure oh Ibrāhīm, we are deeply 
saddened’.57  Similarly, in al-Bayhaqī’s Sunan, ʿ Ā’isha relates how her father, Abū Bakr, spoke 
to no one and made his way directly to her home upon hearing about the Prophet’s worsening 
condition when he was on his deathbed. When Abū Bakr saw the Prophet lying lifeless, ʿ Ā’isha 
recalls her father kissing his old friend and crying.  
 
Prophetic statements and practice, as well as actions of Companions and the verse of the Quran 
all support the position of ʿĀ’isha in her rebuttal of ʿUmar and Ibn ʿUmar’s statements. 
 
Ḥadīth Seven 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Muslim narrates on the authority of Anas who said: 
 
كَانَ عُمَرُ يَضْرِبُ الأَيْدِي عَلَى صَلاَةٍ بَعْدَ اْلَعْصِر 
 
‘ʿUmar would bind his hands [on his chest] in prayer after the ʿAsr prayer.’ 
 
 
57 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Funerals, Section; The Saying of the Prophet; ‘Indeed we are deeply saddened at your departure’, 
ḥadīth No. 1303, and Muslim, Chapter: Virtues, ḥadīth No. 2315. 
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Muslim also records on the authority of Ṭāwūs, on the authority of ʿĀ’isha, who said, ‘ʿUmar 
is mistaken (wahama ʿUmar); the Messenger of God prohibited prayer as the sun is rising and 
as it sets’. Ibn ʿAbd al-Barr asserts on the authority of ʿĀ’isha that Ibn ʿUmar and others said 
likewise. It was also the position of Zayd b. Khālid al-Juḥanī because [on one occasion] ʿUmar 
saw him praying two units after ʿAsr. ʿUmar walked over to him and hit him with a whip. Zayd 
said to him, ‘Oh leader of the faithful, whip away, for by God I will never abandon them [the 
two units of prayer] after I have seen the Prophet offer them.’ ʿUmar replied to him, ‘Oh Zayd, 
if it wasn’t for the fact that I fear that people will assume these a stairway to praying unto the 
night, I wouldn’t punish [on this basis].’ 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Corrective Due to Her Superior Knowledge of the Sunnah 
 
Ḥadīths 2, 3, 4 and 7 are all correctives established on ʿĀ’isha’s intimate relationship with the 
Prophet, allowing her a more nuanced understanding of his practice. Ḥadīth 7 has been 
presented above so will not be repeated in this section. 
 
Ḥadīth Two 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Ṭaḥāwi in Mushkil al-Āthār Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbdul Raḥmān stated to us, that Muʿammar b. Abu 
Ḥuyayyah said I heard ʿUbayd b. Rifāʿa al-Anṣāri saying: 
 
مَعمَر بن أبي حيية قال: سمعتُ عبيد بن ِرفاعة الأنصاري يقول: كنا في مجلس فيه زيُد بن 
ثابت، فتذاكروا الغسَل ِمن الإنزال، فقال زيد: ما على أحدكم إذا جَامَعَ، فلم ُينزل إلا أن 
يغسل فرجَهُ ويتوضأ ووضوؤه للصلاة، فقام رجل ِمن أهل المجلس، فأتى عمَر فأخبره بذلك، 
فقال عمر للرجل: اذهْب أنَت بنفسك، فأتني به حتى تكوَن أنَت الشهَد عليه، فذهب فجاءه به، 
وعند عمر َناس من أصحاب رسول الله منهم علي ُبن أبي طالب ومعيذ ُبن جبل، فقال له 
عمر: أي ُعدي نفسه تفتي الناَس بهـذا؟ فقال زيد: أما والله ما ابتدعته ُولكن سمعُته من 
أعمامي رفاعة َبن ِرافع، ومن أبي أيوب الأنصاري. 
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فقال عمر لمن عنده ِمن أصحاب رسول الله: ما تقولون؟ فاختلفوا عليه فقال عمر: يا عبَد الله ِ
قد اختلفُتم وأْنُتم أهُل بدِر الأخيار، فقال له علي: فأرسل إلى أزواج النبيِّ فإنه إن كان شيء 
مِن ذلك ظَهَرْنَ عليه، فأرسل الى حفصة فسأَلها، فقالت: لا ِعْلَم لي بذلك، ثم أرسل إلى 
عائشة، فقالت: إذا جاوز الختاُن الختاَن، فقد َوَجَب الغسُل، فقال ُعمُر عنَد ذلك: لا أعلم أحدَا 
فعله، ثم لم يغتسل إلا جعلته نكاَلا 
 
We were in a gathering in which Zayd b. Thābit was [present], and they 
mentioned bathing (ghusl) due to ejaculation. So Zayd said, ‘It is not 
incumbent on any of you to bathe upon intercourse if there is no ejaculate 
(yunzil). Instead the private parts should be washed and ablution (wuḍu’) 
should be performed as is done for the prayer’. A man from the gathering 
rose and went to ʿUmar and informed him of this. ʿUmar replied to the man, 
‘Go and get him so that you may bear witness [to what he has said].’ The 
man went and returned with Zayd. Accompanying ʿUmar were some of the 
Companions of the Prophet, including ʿAlī b. Abī Ṭālib and Muʿādh b. Jabal. 
ʿUmar said to him, ‘Which enemy of his own self has given this verdict?’ 
Zayd responded, ‘By God, I have not invented this, but rather I heard it from 
my paternal uncles, Rifāʿa b. Rāfiʿ and Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣāri’. 
 
ʿUmar said to those who were with him, from among the Companions of the 
Messenger of God, ‘And what do you say?’ But they disagreed [on the 
matter], to which ʿUmar responded, ‘Oh Servants of God, you have differed, 
and you are from the People of Badr, the best of generations!’ ʿAlī then said 
to him, ‘Go to the wives of the Prophet, for if there is something to be known, 
they will clarify it’. He went to Ḥafṣa and asked her, but she had no 
knowledge of this, so he went to ʿĀ’isha and she informed him, ‘If the two 
private parts meet, then bathing becomes mandatory’. ʿUmar replied, ‘I do 
not know anyone who does this, and then does not bathe, except that I will 
make an example of him.’  
 
This tradition is interesting not only for the acknowledgement of the status of ʿĀ’isha as the 
ultimate authority amongst the Companions, but also for the discrepancies that emerged 
between them and how they dealt with these. When Zayd’s statement is brought to ʿUmar’s 
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attention he is perturbed by the content of the statement, its matn, despite it being made by a 
noble and well-respected Companion.58 ʿUmar takes a number of steps to verify his claim. 
First, he seeks to verify it by interrogating who it is Zayd heard it from. Having established that 
Zayd in turn had heard it from reliable and trustworthy Companions, ʿUmar seeks to 
corroborate the statement further by seeking the opinions of those in audience. When they fail 
to return a unanimous decision but instead descend into disagreement too, he is advised by ʿAlī 
to take this to the wives of the Prophet for the final word, which is found with ʿĀ’isha, and 
overrides the statement of Zayd and his two sources, despite their own honourable status 
amongst the Muslim community both in their time and ever since. This is an important example 
too of the rank and status amongst the Companions that clearly established a hierarchy based 
on understanding and knowledge, at the top of which were situated the wives of the Prophet, 
and from amongst whom ʿĀ’isha was most exceptional and most knowledgeable. 
 
Ḥadīth Three 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Ḥāfiẓ Abū Bakr al-Bazzār states in his Musnad, ʿAbdullah b. ʿAmr b. Umayyah reported 
on the authority of his father that: 
 
 يسوم  وهو  السُّوق  في  عليه  أتى  عمر  أن  أبيه  عن  أمية،  بن  عمرو  بن  الله  عبد  قال
 إذا،  أنَت  فأنتَ  : عمر  له  فقال  به،  فأتصدقُ  أشتريه  مرط  : قال  مرو؟ ع يا  هذا  ما  : فقال  بمرط
 على  : قال  مَن؟  على  : قال  به،  تصدقُت  : قال  المرُط؟  صنع  ما  عمرو  اي : فقال  بعد،  عليه  أتى
 ما  : يقول  الله  رسول  سمعت  ولكني  بلى،  : قال  به؟  تَصدَُّق  أنك  زعمَت  أليس  : ال ق مَُزينة،  رفيقة
 : فقال  الله،  رسول  على  تْكذبْ  لا عمرو  يا  : عمر  فقال  صدقة،  كم ل فهو  شيء،  مِن  أعطيتموهن
 الله،  رسول  على  تْكذبْ  لا عمرو  يا  : فقال  عائشة  المؤمنين  أم  نأتي  حتى  أُفارقَك  لا والله
 
58 Zayd b. Thābit was one of the primary scribes of the Prophet during his lifetime, writing down the Quran as it was revealed, 
and writing letters on behalf of the Prophet to rulers and other powerful people. He had a mastery of arithmetic as well as 
literacy and was considered an expert in the issue of inheritance and calendrical calculations. His honesty, diligence, 
intelligence and piety meant he was held in high esteem and bestowed with many high-ranking positions. Abū Bakr employed 
him as an official accountant of sorts, while ʿUmar tasked him with the responsibility of overseeing the fair distribution of 
food supplies in Egypt. Most importantly, he was appointed by ʿ Uthmān as the main overseer of the project to codify the Quran 
into a single unified text. For more see, Lecker, M. EI2. 
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 أعطيتموهن  ما  : يقول  الله  رسول  أسمعِت  الله  أنشدِك  : عمرو  فقال  شة، عائ  علي  فاستأْذنوا
 هذا؟  عن  ُكنَت  أين  : عمر  فقال  نعم،  اللهم  ، م نع  م الله  : ،قالت  صدقة  لكم  فهو  شيء،  مِن
بالأسواق  الصفُق  ألهاني  
 
ʿUmar came across him in the market while he was haggling over a garment. 
He asked him, ‘What is this ʿAmr?’ He replied, ‘A garment I shall buy and 
then give in charity.’ ʿUmar responded, ‘You live up to your name!’ At a 
later time ʿUmar came across him [again] and asked him, ‘ʿAmr, what 
became of the garment?’ He replied, ‘I gave it in charity.’ ‘To whom?’ ʿ Umar 
enquired. He said, ‘To my wife.’ ʿUmar questioned him, ‘Didn’t you claim 
you were giving it away in charity?’ ʿAmr replied, ‘Indeed, I heard the 
Messenger of God say, ‘Whatever you bestow upon them [womenfolk], that 
is charity for you’.’ ʿUmar remarked, ‘ʿAmr, do not lie about the Messenger 
of God!’ ʿAmr retorted, ‘By God, I will not leave you until we go to ʿĀ’isha 
[to decide on the matter].’ ʿUmar repeated his warning, ‘ʿAmr, do not lie 
about the Messenger of God!’ They sought permission to enter upon ʿĀ’isha, 
[whereupon] ʿAmr said, ‘I implore you by God, did you hear the Messenger 
of God say, ‘Whatever you bestow upon them [womenfolk], that is charity 
for you’?’ She responded, ‘By God, yes! By God, yes!’ ʿUmar said to 
himself, ‘Where were you on this [matter]? I was distracted by the business 
of the markets.’ 
 
Once again, as in the previous ḥadīth, it is the matn of the ḥadīth that has unsettled ʿUmar, and 
the status of ʿAmr is not sufficient cause to dismiss enquiry. ʿAmr in turn is not deterred by the 
seniority of ʿUmar and his disbelief in the statement. Verification and interrogation of each of 
their positions leads to seeking out the authority of ʿĀ’isha who verifies that it is indeed a 
statement of the Prophet’s. No further validation is sought.  
 
Ḥadīth Four 
 
Al-Zarkashī writes: 
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Al-Bayhaqī records in his Sunan on the authority of Muʿammar on the authority of Ibn ʿUmar, 
who said: 
 
قال ابن عمر سمعِت عمر يقول: إذا رميتُم وحلقتُم، فقد حلَّ لكم ُكلُّ شيء إلا النساَء والطيَب، 
قال سالم: وقالت عائشة: ُكلُّ شيء إلا النساَء، أنا طيبت ُرسول الله لِحلِِّه 
 
I heard ʿ Umar say, ‘When you have done the stoning and shaved [your heads] 
then everything is permissible for you except women and perfume.’ Sālim 
said that ʿĀ’isha said, ‘Everything except women. I perfumed the Messenger 
of God as he came out of the state of ritual consecration (taḥlīl)’. 
 
Al-Zarkashī strengthens this report by narrating a similar tradition from different chains. See 
also Ḥadīth 6 from the section on ʿĀ’isha’s refutations of ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar below. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Responses to ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās 
ʿĀ’isha’s Corrective Due to Her Superior Knowledge of the Sunnah 
 
Ḥadīths 1 and 7 are examples of ʿĀ’isha’s authoritative knowledge of the Sunnah. While in 
Ḥadīth 1 she is directly responding to a statement made by Ibn ʿAbbās, in Ḥadīth 7 it is Ibn 
ʿAbbās himself who is suggesting seeking her counsel on the issue of the Witr prayer, for her 
better understanding on matters pertaining to the religion.  
 
Ḥadīth One 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Bukhārī and Muslim record on the authority of ʿAmra bint ʿAbd al-Rahmān that Zayād b. 
Abū Sufyān wrote the following to ʿĀ’isha: 
 
أَنَّ زِيَادَ بْنَ أَبِي سُفْيَانَ كَتَبَ إِلَى عَائِشَةَ ـ رضى الله عنها ـ إِنَّ عَبْدَ الله ِبْن َعَبَّاسٍ ـ رضى 
الله عنهما ـ َقاَل َمْن َأْهَدى َهْدًيا َحُرَم َعَلْيِه َما َيْحُرُم َعَلى اْلَحاجِّ َحتَّى ُيْنَحَر َهْديُه.ُ قَالَتْ عَمْرَةُ 
فَقَالَتْ عَائِشَةُ ـ رضى الله عنها ـ لَيْسَ كَمَا قَالَ ابْنُ عَبَّاسٍ، أَنَا فَتَلْت ُقَلاَئِدَ هَدْى ِرَسُول ِالله ِ
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صلى الله عليه وسلم بيدي، ُثمَّ َقلََّدَها َرُسوُل اِلله صلى الله عليه وسلم ِبَيَدْيِه، ُثمَّ َبَعَث ِبَها َمَع 
أَبِي فَلَمْ يَحْرُمْ عَلَى رَسُولِ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم شيء أَحَلَّهُ اللهُ حَتَّى نُحِر َالْهَدْىُ 
 
‘ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās has said whoever has acquired their sacrificial animal, 
all that is impermissible for the one in a state of pilgrimage (al-Hāj), is 
impermissible for this individual too, until the sacrificial animal has been 
slaughtered (i.e on the 10th of Dhul-Hijjah). I have sent my sacrificial animal, 
so please write to me with your instruction.’  
 
ʿAmra said that ʿĀ’isha replied, ‘It is not as Ibn ʿAbbās has stated. I twisted 
the garlands of the Messenger of God’s sacrificial animals, which he then 
placed around their necks with his own hands, and then sent them with Abū 
Bakr. But nothing was made impermissible upon the Messenger of God from 
that which God has made permissible, until the Day of Sacrifice’. 
 
Ibn Ḥajr (n.d, Vol.1, p.978) notes in his explanation of this ḥadīth as recorded by al-Bukhārī, 
in his Fatḥ al-Bārī, that al-Ṭaḥāwī records a similar tradition in which another Companion has 
made the same claim as Ibn ʿAbbās, to which she amusingly responds, ‘And does he have a 
Kaʿbah around which he circumambulates too?’ This style of witty questioning as a response 
to ridiculous claims made in the name of the Prophet is a familiar reaction from ʿĀ’isha.  She 
responds to claims about touching the deceased as a cause for requiring ghusl, to the need to 
undo braids for ghusl to be valid and to the insistence that women not travel without a male 
guardian, with brassy but important questioning that disclose the untenable nature of the 
commands being made. While these interventions are amusing and revealing for what they 
offer by way of correctives, they also represent the importance which ʿĀ’isha afforded critical 
discernment of facts. Further still, she beckons her community to think and critically question 
positions that are being asserted, no matter the source and seniority of the claimants.  
 
To my knowledge, there is no disagreement in the fiqh tradition with this position of ʿĀ’isha 
and her intervention in this instance. In terms of al-Zarkashī’s treatment of the case, he further 
fortifies it by presenting a number of similar ḥadīth through a variety of strong chains of 
narration. 
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Ḥadīth Seven 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Muslim records in his Ṣaḥīḥ on the authority of Qatādah, on the authority of Zurārah b. Abū 
Awfa: 
 
عَنْ زُرَارَةَ، عَن سَعْدَ بْنَ هِشَام:ِ انَّه َطلََّق امرأَته َفَأتـى المدينَة لَيِبيَع بها َعَقاًرا َلُه ِبَها َفَيْجَعَلُه 
فِي السِّلاَحِ وَالْكُرَاعِ، فذكر الَحديَث وأنه َلِقَي اْبَن َعبَّاٍس َفَسَأَلُه عَنْ الوِتْرِ، فَقَال:َ أَلا َأُنبِّئُكَ 
بَأْعَلِم َأْهِل اَلأْرض ِِبِوْتِر َرسُوِل الله ِصلى الله عليه وسلم؟ َقاَل: نعم قَالَ: عَائِشَةُ. فَأْتِهَا فَاسْأَلْهَا 
ثُمَّ ارجعْ ْإليَّ فَأَخْبِرْنِي بِرَدِّهَا عَلَيْكَ، قال: فَأَتَيْتُ عَلَى حَكِيم ِبْن ِأَفْلَحَ فَاسْتَلْحَقْتُهُ إِلَيْهَا فَقَال َ
مَا أَنَا بِقَارِبِهَا إنِّي نَهَيْتُهَا أَن ْتَقُول َفِي هَاتَين ِالشِّيعَتَين ِشَيْئًا فَأَبَت ْفِيهِمَا إِلاَّ مُضِيًّا فيه، 
فَأَقْسَمْتُ عَلَيْهِ، فَجَاءَ معي، فَدَخَلْنَا عَلَيْهَا، فقال: يَا أُمَّ المُؤْمِنِينَ أَنْبِئِينِي عَن ْوِتْرِ رَسُول ِاللهِ 
صلى الله عليه وسلم. َفَقاَلْت ُكنَّا ُنِعدُّ َلُه ِسَواَكُه َوَطُهوَرُه َفَيْبَعُثُه اُلله َما َشاَء َأْن َيْبَعَثُه ِمَن اللَّْيِل 
فَيَتَسَوَّكُ وَيَتَوَضَّأُ ، ثُم يُصَلِّي ثَماني َرَكَعاٍت َلا َيْجِلُس ِفيهِنَّ إِلاَّ عند الثَّامِنَةِ  ، فَيجلس ُويَذْكُر ُ
اَلله َوَيْدُعوُه ُثمَّ َيْنَهُض َوَلا ُيَسلُِّم ُثمَّ ُيَصلِّي التَّاِسَعَة َفَيْقُعُد ، فيحمد الله،  َوَيْدُعوُه ُثمَّ ُيسَلِّم ُ
تَسْلِيمًا يُسْمِعُنَا، ثُمَّ يُصَلِّي رَكْعَتَينِ، وَهُوَ قَاعِدٌ فَتِلْكَ إِحْدَى عَشْرَة َرَكْعَة ًيَا بُنَىَّ فَلَمَّا أَسَنَّ نَبِيُّ 
الله ِصلى الله عليه وسلم وَأَخَذ َاللَّحْم َأَوْتَر َبِسَبْع ٍوَصَلَّى ركْعَتَين ِوهو جالسُ ُبعدما سَلِّم،  
فَتِلْكَ تِسْعٌ يَا بُنَىَّ  
 
On Saʿd b. Hishām’s own authority, that he divorced his wife and came to 
Medina to sell his property there in order to purchase weapons and horses 
instead. He remembered a ḥadīth while he was in the presence of Ibn ʿAbbās, 
so asked him regarding the Witr prayer. Ibn ʿAbbās responded, ‘Shall I tell 
you who is the most knowledgeable regarding the Witr prayer of the 
Messenger of Allah?’ Ibn Hishām said yes, and Ibn ʿAbbās responded, 
‘ʿĀ’isha. Go to her, and ask of her, then come back and inform me of her 
response to you.’ Ibn Hishām said I then approached Hākim b. Aflah and 
asked him to take me to her, but Hākim responded, ‘No, I will not approach 
her. I dissuaded her from speaking on the conflict between the two sides [of 
ʿAlī and those who opposed him] but she rejected my advice and went ahead 
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into the conflict.’ I compelled him though by taking an oath, so he went with 
me and we entered upon her. Ibn Hishām asked, ‘Mother of the Believers, 
inform me of the Witr prayer of the Messenger of Allah.’ She replied, ‘I used 
to prepare for him his tooth stick (miswāk) and ablution water, and God 
would arouse him from sleep at whatever time of night He willed, and he 
would use the tooth stick and water for ablution. Then he would pray nine 
units of prayer without sitting, except for in the eighth unit. He would then 
make remembrance of God and supplicate to Him. After that, he would rise 
without uttering the salutation, and pray the ninth unit before sitting again 
and praising and supplicating to God. He would then say the salutation 
audibly and proceed to stand to pray two more units, so that there were eleven 
in total, my son. But as he got older and put on weight, he would perform 
seven units for the Witr prayer, followed by the two units and he would 
remain seated after saying the salutation, so it was a total of nine, my son.’ 
 
On the issue of how many units of prayer the Prophet performed for the Witr prayer, al-
Zarkashī acknowledges that a number of traditions exist, reported on the authority of ʿĀ’isha 
and recorded as authentic giving different numbers of units prayed by the Prophet. In a tradition 
recorded by Muslim, ʿĀ’isha is reported to have said, ‘The Messenger of God prayed thirteen 
units of night prayer and then prayed five units for Witr.’59 Al-Zarkashī justifies this apparent 
discrepancy by asserting that each report is correct and a reflection of the varying factors that 
will have influenced how many units the Prophet may have prayed: time restraints, illness, age, 
etc.  With the Witr not being an obligatory prayer, the number of units prayed are naturally 
flexible. 
 
 ʿĀ’isha’s Corrective with Reference to the Quran to Support her Stance 
 
Ḥadīths six and eight both demonstrate ʿĀ’isha’s intimate knowledge of the Quran in different 
ways. The former is an illustration of her recourse to the Quran when spurious claims are made 
about the Prophet, in this case whether he saw God directly or not. In the discussion on this 
ḥadīth an indirect impugnment of Ibn ʿAbbās, and anyone else espousing his stance on the 
 
59 Muslim, Chapter: Prayer of Travellers, Section; Night prayers and the number of units offered by the Prophet at night, and 
that the Witr is one unit, and a one-unit prayer is correct, ḥadith No. 1720. 
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matter, occurs when ʿĀ’isha denounced anyone taking up this wayward stance as having lied. 
While the latter ḥadīth is an example of her knowledge of Muslim history and context, as well 
as her knowledge of the Arabic language and how best it be engaged to relay the Message of 
God with integrity. 
 
Ḥadīth Six 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Tirmidhī records in his exegesis of the Quran, from Salām b. Jaʿfar on the authority of 
ʿIkrimah that, 
 
قال عكرمة، قال ابن عباس: رأى محمد ربَّه، فقلُت: أليس الله يقول: ))لا تُدْرِكُه ُٱلأَبَْٰصر(ُ( 
فقال: ويحك، ذاك إذا تجلَّى بنوره الذي هو نوره، وقد رأى محمد ربه مرتين 
 
Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘Muḥammad saw his Lord.’ So, I [ʿIkrimah] said, ‘Did God 
not state, ‘No vision can grasp Him, but His grasp is over all vision: He is 
above all comprehension yet is acquainted with all things?’’60 Ibn ʿAbbās 
responded, ‘Shame on you! That is when He manifests as the essence of His 
Divine light. Indeed, Muḥammad did see his Lord twice.’ 
 
There is no direct response from ʿĀ’isha to Ibn ʿAbbās’s statement but al- Zarkashī illustrates 
firstly how the statement of Ibn ʿAbbās has been strengthened by various chains, but that 
equally strong chains with a contradictory stance on whether or not the Prophet saw God are 
also available on the authority of ʿĀ’isha, who is unequivocal about the fact that the Prophet 
did not in fact see God at all in his lifetime. In fact, she is quite stern in her warning to those 
who hold a view contrary to her own on the issue. Al-Zarkashī records the ḥadīth of Masrūq, 
recorded by both al-Bukhārī and Muslim, whereby he asks ʿĀ’isha if the Prophet had indeed 
seen God. She responded ‘You have made my hairs stand on end by what you have uttered. 
Who has said to you that Muḥammad saw his Lord, for he has certainly lied.’ She went on to 
recite from the Quran, ‘No vision can grasp Him, but His grasp is over all vision: He is above 
 
60 Quran, al-Anʿām, 6:103. 
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all comprehension, yet is acquainted with all things’ then stating, ‘Rather he saw Gabriel in his 
natural form twice.’ In another tradition, she is reported to have said about those who claim the 
Prophet saw God that, ‘…they have uttered a great falsity against God’. She was then 
respectfully challenged on her stance, as to what then the Quran was referring to when it says, 
‘and he [Muḥammad] has seen him on a clear horizon’ and ‘…he [Muḥammad] certainly saw 
him on another descent’. She explained, ‘I am the first of this community of Muslims (Ummah) 
to question the Messenger of God about this and he said, ‘It was in fact Gabriel, whom I did 
not see in his natural form on any occasion other than these two’…’ The ḥadīth continues with 
her reciting the verse she mentions in the previous ḥadīth. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s position on this point is supported by that of other Companions too, to the extent that 
Ibn al-Qayyim (2009, p.316) claimed that there was consensus amongst the Companions that 
the Prophet had not in fact seen God, and that when Ibn Abbās said that he had, he meant with 
his heart, not his eyes. 
 
Ḥadīth Eight 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
She refuted Ibn ʿ Abbās’s recitation of the verse one hundred and ten of Sūrah 
Yusuf which he recited as: 
وََظنُّوْا أَنَّهُْم َقْد ُكذُِبواْ 
Al-Bukhārī in his chapter on Quranic Exegesis records on the authority of 
Ibn Abū Mulaykah that Ibn ʿAbbās had recited the verse: 
 
حَتَّٰى إَِذا اسَْتيْأََس الرُّسُُل وََظنُّوا أَنَّهُْم َقْد ُكذُِبوا جَاءَُهْم نَْصرَُنا َفنُجِّيَ مَن نَّشَاء ُ ۖوَلا يَُردُّ 
بَْأسُنَا َعن ِاْلَقوِْم اُلمجِْرمِينَ 
‘…until, when the messengers despaired and were certain that they had been 
denied, kudhibū [lit. lied to], there came to them Our victory, and whoever 
We willed was saved. And Our punishment cannot be repelled from the 
people who are criminals’61 
 
61 Quran, Yūsuf, 12:110. 
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Then he [Ibn ʿAbbās] went on to recite the verse: 
 
حَتَّىٰ إِذَا اسْتَيْأَسَ الرُّسُلُ وَظَنُّوا أَنَّهُمْ قَدْ كُذِبُوا جَاءَهُم ْنَصْرُنَا فَنُجِّي َمَن نَّشَاءُ  ۖوَلا يُرَدُّ 
بَأْسُنَا عَنِ الْقَوْمِ المُجْرِمِينَ 
 
‘They were touched by poverty and hardship and were shaken until [even 
their] messenger and those who believed with him said, ‘When will the help 
of Allah come?’’62 
 
Abū Mulaykah says, ‘I met ʿUrwah b. al-Zubayr and mentioned this to him. 
He said, ʿĀ’isha said, ‘Allah forbid! By Allah, never did Allah make a 
promise to His Prophet, except that the Prophet would be sure of it occurring 
before he died. But trials always descended on the Prophets until they feared 
that those around them would start to accuse them of lying’ so she would 
recite it ُكذُِّبوا  kudhibū. 
 
The variation in the pronunciation of the word ﺬﺑُﻮا ُﻛ with or without the emphatic dh sound 
necessarily affects the meaning of the word.63 In Ibn ʿAbbās’s reading it would imply that the 
Prophets began to doubt the promise of God and wondered if perhaps they had been denied, 
though literally the term means ‘lied to’. ʿĀ’isha’s reading, however, implies that the fear was 
that the Prophets would be accused of lying by their followers for the delay of the promises 
made to them. Whilst the discrepancy in pronunciation of the word was acknowledged in the 
earlier generations, with the reciters of the Hijāz, Basra, and Shām all reciting it in accordance 
with ʿĀ’isha’s recitation, while those from Kufa adopted Ibn ʿAbbās’ reading. Interestingly, 
Muhammad Asad, Yusuf Ali, Maramduke Picktall, Talal Itani and Abdel Haleem all relay the 
verse in Arabic as recited by Ibn ʿAbbās but offer translations in line with ʿĀ’isha’s recitation. 
Yusuf Ali (2006, p.668) is the only one who offers an explanation, stating that there is an 
alternative reading of the verse held on strong authority and his translation is based on it.  
 
 
62 Quran, al-Baqarah, 2:214. 
63 For more on textual variants in early manuscripts of the Quran, see, Small, K.E, 2012. Textual Criticism and Qur’an 
Manuscripts. Maryland: Lexington Books. 
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ʿĀ’isha’s Responses to ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar 
Impugnment due to Bad Memory (Sū’ al-Ḥifdh) 
 
Ḥadīth 1, 3, 7, 8 and 9 condemn the statements of Ibn ʿUmar on the basis of poor memory or 
mistakenness on his part, though ʿĀ’isha is also clear that he is not a liar by any means but that 
on these occasions he has erred. 
 
Ḥadīth One 
 
Al-Zarkashī writes: 
 
Al-Bukhārī and Muslim both report on the authority of ʿAmrah bint ʿAbdul Rahmān that she 
heard the following from ʿĀ’isha: 
 
عَن ْعَمْرَةَ بِنْتِ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَن،ِ أَنَّهَا سَمِعَتْ عَائِشَةَ، وَذُكِرَ، لَهَا أَنَّ عَبْد َالله ِبْن َعُمَرَ، يَقُول ُإِنَّ 
المَيِّتَ لَيُعَذَّبُ بِبُكَاءِ الْحَىِّ. فَقَالَتْ عَائِشَةُ يَغْفِرُ اللهُ لأَبِي عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ أَمَا إِنَّهُ لَم ْيَكْذِبْ وَلَكِنَّهُ 
نَسِيَ أَوْ أَخْطَأَ إِنَّمَا مَرَّ رَسُولُ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم َعَلى َيُهوِديٍَّة ُيْبَكى َعَلْيَها َفَقاَل ِإنَُّهْم 
لبيكون َعَلْيَها َوِإنََّها َلُتعَذَّبُ فِي قَبْرِهَا 
 
It was mentioned to ʿĀ’isha that ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar had stated that the 
deceased is punished for the crying of the living. ʿĀ’isha responded, ‘May 
God forgive Abū ʿAbdul Rahmān, assuredly he has not lied, but he has 
forgotten or been mistaken. In fact, the Messenger of God passed by some 
Jews who were crying over a deceased Jewish woman, when he said, ‘They 
are crying over her, all the while she is being punished in her grave’.’ 
 
The cause of punishment for the deceased in this instance was not the mourning of those who 
had been succeeded, but the misdeeds of the deceased herself. This ḥadīth is in keeping with 
ʿĀ’isha’s refutation of ʿUmar b. al Khaṭṭāb in the first ḥadīth of his section, and the fourth 
ḥadīth given in her refutations of Abū Hurayra, wherein she explains on both occasions how 
such a statement is incorrect due to the lack of context they provide, and also on the basis of 
the Quranic principle that ‘no soul shall bear the burdens of another soul’. 
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On this particular ḥadīth, al-Zarkashī states that it appears that the identity of the deceased was 
not known to Ibn ʿUmar, hence he made a generalisation based on the statement, thereby 
extending a specific instance to all such situations generally. Similar to this is the instance when 
the Prophet witnessed a trader cheating customers by lessening the items they received without 
their knowledge, to which he said, ‘The trader is corrupt’, meaning, specifically, the trader he 
had just observed, not all who are engaged in the occupation of trade. However, there were 
some Companions who narrated this as a general statement, unaware of the specificity in which 
the statement was made. Al- Zarkashī notes that Fakhr al-Dīn al-Rāzī (d.1795/1210) considers 
this a cause for impugnment by way of mistakenness in narration (ghalaṭ fi-l-riwāya).  
 
Ḥadīth Three 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Bukhārī records on the authority of Manṣūr, on the authority of Mujāhid who said, 
 
عَنْ مَنْصُور،ٍ عَنْ مُجَاهِدٍ، قَالَ دَخَلْتُ أَنَا وَعُرْوَةُ بْنُ الزُّبَيْرِ المَسْجِدَ،، فَإِذَا عَبْد ُاللهِ بْن ُعُمَرَ 
جَالِسٌ إِلَى حُجْرَةِ عَائِشَةَ، وَالنَّاسٌ يُصَلُّون َالضُّحَى فِي المَسْجِد ِ، فَقَال َبِدْعَة ٌ،  فَقال َعُروة: 
يا أبا عبد الرحمان  َكِم اْعَتَمَر َرسُوُل اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم قَالَ أَرْبَعً عُمَر ،  إِحْدَاهُنَّ فِي 
رَجَبٍ، فَكَرِهْنَا أَنْ نكذبه ونردَّ عَلَيْهِ ، وَسَمِعْنَا اسْتِنَانَ، عَائِشَةَ فِي الْحُجْرَةِ، فَقَال َعُرْوَةُ: أَلاَ 
تَسْمَعِين َيَا أُمَّ المُؤْمِنِينَ إلى مَا يَقُولُ أَبُو عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ؟ قَالَت:ْ ومَا يَقُولُ؟  قَالَ: يَقُولُ إِنَّ رَسُولَ 
اِلله صلى الله عليه وسلم اْعَتَمَر َأْرَبَع ُعَمَراٍت ِإْحَداُهنَّ ِفي َرَجٍب. َقاَلْت َيْرَحُم اُلله َأَبا َعْبِد 
الرَّْحَمِن، َما اعْتَمَر َرَسُول َالله ِصلى الله عليه وسلم إِلاَّ وَهُو َمعه وَمَا اعْتَمَر َفِي رَجَب ٍقَطُّ 
 
ʿUrwah b. al-Zubayr and I entered the masjid and found ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar 
sitting at the chamber of ʿĀ’isha. There were people praying the Ḍuḥa64 
 
64 The Ḍuḥa prayer (Ṣalāh al-Ḍuḥa) is a supererogatory prayer (nafl) outside of the five daily prayers, that is performed 
between Fajr and Dhuhr, the first two prayers of the day. It is also known as Ṣalāh al-Awābīn, the prayer of the oft-returning, 
because commitment to the prayer is a sign of one’s continual returning to God. In a tradition recorded by Muslim, the Prophet 
is reported to have said, ‘In the morning a charity (ṣadaqa) is required from every single joint of yours. Every utterance of 
Subḥān Allah is a charity, every utterance of Alḥamdulillāh is a charity, every utterance of Lā Ilāha Illa Allah is a charity, 
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prayer in the masjid too, so we asked him regarding this prayer of theirs. He 
simply replied, ‘Innovation!’ ʿUrwah then asked him, ‘Abū ʿAbdul Rahmān, 
how many times did the Messenger of God perform ʿUmrah?’ He replied, 
‘Four times, one of which was in Rajab.’ We felt uncomfortable to deny what 
he said and to challenge it, but then we heard the sound of ʿĀ’isha cleaning 
her teeth in her room, so ʿUrwah called out, ‘Did you hear, oh Mother of the 
Believers, what Abū ʿAbdul Rahmān declared?’ ‘And what was it that he 
said?’ she responded. They explained, ‘He said that the Messenger of God 
performed ʿUmrah four times, one of which was done in the month of Rajab.’ 
She replied, ‘May God have mercy on Abū ʿAbd al- Rahmān, the Messenger 
of God did not perform ʿUmrah except that he was with him, but the Prophet 
never performed ʿUmrah in the month of Rajab, ever.’ 
 
Al-Zarkashī strengthens ʿĀ’isha’s position using other chains and by narrating another ḥadīth 
whereby Abū Dāwūd, al-Nisā'ī and Ibn Mājah record on the authority of Mujāhid who said, 
‘Ibn ʿUmar was asked how many times the Messenger of God performed ʿUmrah and he 
responded ‘twice’. ʿĀ’isha then said, ‘Ibn ʿUmar knows well that the Messenger of God 
performed ʿUmrah three times, with the additional fourth ʿUmrah that was done during the 
Final Ḥajj’.’ Once again calling into question the sharpness of Ibn ʿ Umar’s memory in recalling 
ḥadīth. 
 
Ḥadīth Seven  
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Ṭabarānī records in his Muʿjam al-Waṣṭ, on the authority of Mūsa b. Ṭalḥa, 
 
بلغ عائشَة أن ابن عمر يقول: إن موت الفجأة سخطة على المؤمنين، فقالت: يَغْفرُ اللهُ لابن 
عمر، إنما قال رسول الله: موت الفجأة تخفيف على المؤمنين وسخطة على الكافرين 
 
 
every utterance of Allahu Akbar is a charity, every commanding good is a charity, and every forbidding evil is a charity, and 
all of this can also be achieved  through praying two rakʿahs of ṣalāh al-Duha’ (Riyāḍ al-Ṣālihīn, Chapter: Remembrance of 
God, ḥadīth No.1432). 
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It came to ʿĀ’isha’s attention that Ibn ʿUmar had said, ‘A sudden death is a 
loss to the believer’. She retorted, ‘May God forgive Ibn ʿUmar. In fact, the 
Messenger of God said, ‘A sudden death is a relief for the believer and a loss 
for the disbeliever’.’ 
 
Similar to what occurs in Ḥadīth One of this section, Ibn ʿUmar has heard only a part of a 
Prophetic statement, and without its context has given it a universal application, one which 
ʿĀ’isha is quick to delimit by providing the circumstances in which the Prophet made his 
statement.65 
 
Ḥadīth Eight 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Bukhārī records from Ibn ʿUmar that, 
 
عَنْ سَالِمِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللهِ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم قَالَ: إِنَّ بِلاَلاً يُؤَذُِّن بِلَيْلٍ، 
فَكُلُوا وَاشْرَبُوا حَتَّى يُؤَذِّنُ ابْنُ أُمِّ مَكْتُومٍ  
 
The Messenger of God said, ‘Bilāl makes the call to prayer (adhān) while it 
is still night, so eat and drink until Ibn Umm Maktūm makes the call’. 
 
Al-Bayhaqī records in his Sunan, on the authority of Hāshim, on the authority of his father that 
ʿĀ’isha said that the Messenger of God said, ‘Ibn Umm Maktūm is a blind man, so when he 
makes the call to prayer continue to eat and drink until Bilāl gives the call to prayer.’ She said, 
‘Bilāl was a man who could see the sunrise. Ibn ʿUmar is incorrect (ghalaṭa).’ 
 
Al-Zarkashī strengthens the stance of ʿĀ’isha through a number of other chains transmitting 
the same tradition. This is the second ḥadīth in which Ibn ʿUmar’s statement has been 
discounted for his having erred (ghalaṭa). Additionally, this ḥadīth could also be seen as the 
simple application of logic on ʿĀ’isha’s part as there are other ḥadīth in which it is stated that 
 
65 See Chapter Five for more examples of such correctives. 
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sometimes Bilāl would make the call to prayer first, while other times Ibn Umm Maktūm 
would, and it was not clear whose call should be responded to. The call to prayer at dawn is 
pronounced on the first signs of sunrise, thus entirely dependent on the vision of the mu’adhin. 
In this case Bilāl had perfect vision, whereas Ibn Umm Maktūm was a blind man. ʿĀ’isha’s 
pointing out of these bare facts suggests a reasoned argument to follow the adhān of Bilāl. 
 
Ḥadīth Nine 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdadi reports: 
 
أُْخبِرَت عائشُة بقول ابن عمر: إن الشهر تسع وعشرون، فأنكرت ذلك عليه، وقالت: يغفر الله 
لأبي عبد الرحمان، ما هكـذا قال رسول الله ولكن قال: إن الشهر قد يكون تسعا وعشرين 
 
ʿĀ’isha was informed about Ibn ʿUmar’s statement, ‘A month is twenty-nine 
days,’ and she refuted this, saying, ‘May God forgive Abū ʿAbdul al-
Rahmān, the Messenger of God did not say that, rather he stated, ‘a month 
may be twenty-nine days’.’  
 
It appears that a number of Companions in their commitment not to miss a day of fasting in 
Ramadan took to fasting thirty days to err on the side of caution. In response to this the Prophet 
informed them that the lunar calendar month may be twenty-nine days and if it is confirmed as 
such then twenty-nine days of fasting are sufficient and the extra day of fasting was an 
unnecessary precaution (Ibn Ḥajr, n.d, Vol.1, p.1058).  
 
As with the above Ḥadīth Eight, this corrective of ʿĀ’isha’s is a combination of both a 
statement of fact as witnessed by her from the Prophet, and an application of logical reasoning 
on the basis of what is known of the moon’s orbit and the number of days that can take.  
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ʿĀ’isha’s Corrective with Reference to the Sunnah to Support her Stance 
 
Both Ḥadīths 2 and 6 are correctives by way of ʿĀ’isha’s superior knowledge of the Sunnah 
due to her position in the life of the Prophet.  
 
Ḥadīth Two 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Bukhārī and Muslim record on the authority of Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. al Muntashir, on 
the authority of his father who said: 
 
َعن ْإِْبرَاِهيم َبِْن مُحَمَِّد بِْن اُلمنْتَشِِر، َعن ْأَِبيِه، َقاَل سمعُت ابن ُعمر يقول: لأن يُصبَح مطليا 
بقطِران أحبُّ إلى من أن أُْصبَِح مُحِْرمًا أَْنضَُخ طِيًبا، قال فدخلُت على َعائِشَُة، فأخبرُتها 
بقوله، فقالْت: طَيَّْبتُ َرسُول َاِلله صلى الله عليه وسلم ثُمَّ طَاف َِفي نِسَائِِه ثُمَّ أَْصبََح مُحِْرمًا 
 
I heard Ibn ʿUmar saying, ‘That I should be daubed with a trickle of water is 
preferable to me than to be a Muḥrim66 doused in perfume.’ Then I entered 
upon ʿĀ’isha and informed her of what Ibn ʿUmar had said. She responded, 
‘I perfumed the Messenger of God, and he would visit his wives, and he 
would then enter into iḥrām67‘. 
 
ʿĀ’isha saw no reason for a muḥrim not to apply perfume on themselves and their clothes 
before entering into the state of iḥrām and continuing to benefit from the effects of the perfume 
 
66 A muḥrim is one who is in a state of iḥrām, a holy state indicating one’s intention and engagement in performing the Ḥajj 
or ʿUmrah pilgrimage.  
67 Iḥrām is the technical term denoting an individual’s temporary consecration whilst performing pilgrimage.  This is achieved 
by any Muslim by making the intention to perform either Ḥajj or ʿ Umrah. There are six designated points (mīqāts) from which 
the pilgrim is expected to make their intention and for men to don their garments constituting two plain white pieces of seamless 
cloth. Having done this, remaining in a state of iḥrām requires the pilgrim to refrain from certain worldly activities; clipping 
the nails, sexual intercourse, shaving/trimming hair, applying perfume, argumentation and hunting. The opposite of iḥrām is 
iḥlāl, the act of declaring oneself out of the state of iḥrām, and now permitted to engage in those things that were temporarily 
not sanctioned. This is usually done by the symbolic act of men shaving their heads and women trimming their hair, if they so 
wish to, though simply intending to exit the state of iḥrām is sufficient. 
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on their skin and clothes even once they have entered into that state. She is reported by Ibn Abī 
Shaybah in his Muṣannaf as preferring to daub her head and clothes in perfume before entering 
into iḥrām, while al-Ṭahāwī mentions in his Sharḥ Maʿānī al-Āthār, that ʿĀ’isha liked to cover 
her hair in musk and ‘anbar before entering iḥrām. 
 
Though it is an accepted condition whilst in iḥrām that one not apply any perfume or use 
perfumed products, ʿĀ’isha saw no reason to disallow the application of perfume before 
formally entering into a state of pilgrimage and becoming beholden to its particular conditions. 
 
This ḥadīth can be compared with Ḥadīth 4 in her corrective of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, where the 
same issue of perfuming the pilgrim was addressed in the same manner. In both instances 
Ā’isha is safeguarding against an excessive attitude towards the religious rites and rituals; 
which if one becomes too prescriptive regarding it, can become a distraction from the spiritual 
activity at hand.  
 
Ḥadīth Six 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Dārquṭnī records in his Sunan on the authority of ʿAlī b. ʿAbdul al-ʿAzīz, on the authority 
of ʿĀṣim b. ʿAlī, on the authority of Abū Owais, Hāshim b. ʿUrwah reported on the authority 
of his father: 
 
عن عائشة: أنه بلغها قوُل ابن عمر: في الُقبلة الوضوُء، فقالت: كان رسول الله يَُقبُِّل وهو 
صائِم ثم لا يتوضأُ 
 
On the authority of ʿĀ’isha, a statement of Ibn ʿUmar reached her, whereby 
he had said, ‘A kiss requires the replenishing of wuḍū’.68 ʿĀ’isha responded, 
 
68 Wuḍū’ is the minor/partial act of purification, whilst ghusl (see, footnote 79) is the major/full act of purification. Purification 
plays a vital role in Muslim praxis and is the topic of much discussion in juristic (fiqhi) treatises. It was established as a 
requirement before the offering of prayer, by the verse of the Quran, ‘O you who believe! When you intend to offer Al-
Ṣalāh (the prayer), wash your faces and your hands (forearms) up to the elbows, rub (by passing wet hands over) your heads, 
and (wash) your feet up to ankles…’ (al-Mā’ida, 5:6). It requires, therefore, the washing of the hands, mouth, nostrils, arms, 
and feet, with a wiping over the head, though there is some variation on this. For more, see, Chaumont, EI2. 
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‘The Messenger of Allah would kiss while he was fasting and would not 
renew his wuḍū’.’ 
 
Elsewhere it is also reported on the authority of ʿĀ’isha that the Prophet ‘kissed one of his 
wives then went out to pray, and he did not do wuḍū’.’ 69  
 
Ibn ʿUmar’s position is not one without support as indeed the formal position of the Shafiʿī 
school of thought is one that upholds that touching the opposite sex, whether with lustful 
intentions or not, necessitates the replenishing of wuḍū’. This is concluded on the basis of a 
literal reading of the verse, ‘If you have touched women (lāmastum al-nisā’) and you don’t 
find water, then go to high clean soil and rub your faces and your hands (therewith). Indeed, 
Allah is Benign, Forgiving.’70 Al-Shafiʿī interpreted the word lāmasa literally as ‘to touch’, 
whereas other scholars such as Abū Ḥanīfa interpreted it as ‘sexual intercourse’. The latter 
interpretation is in keeping with other instances in the Quran where lāmasa is used. For 
example, in chapter Āl ʿImrān, verse 47, on the news that Mary is to give birth to Jesus, it 
states, ‘She said, ‘My Lord, how shall I have a son when no man has touched (lāmasa) me?’ 
Additionally, elsewhere, God says, ‘But do not touch your wives while you are in retreat in the 
mosques, those are limits set by Allah.’71 In both of these verses the word lāmasa is widely 
interpreted as sexual intercourse. This is corroborated by other companions like Ibn ʿAbbās 
who said that whenever lāmasa is mentioned in the Quran in reference to touch between men 
and women, then it is referring to sexual intercourse.  
 
The fact that ʿĀ’isha has also mentioned in another ḥadīth that the Prophet would pray in her 
room while she was lying in front of him, and he would push her feet out while prostrating and 
then pull them back in when sitting, evidence the fact that merely touching a woman does not 
invalidate the wuḍū’.72 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to ʿAbdullah b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ 
Impugnment due to Carelessness 
 
 
69 Al-Tirmidhī, Chapter: Purification, Section; On not needing to replenish wuḍū’ after kissing, ḥadīth No. 86. 
70 Quran, al-Nisā’, 4:43. 
71 Quran, al-Baqarah, 2:187. 
72 This ḥadīth is mentioned also in Chapter Five, on ʿĀ’isha’s correction of Abū Hurayra. 
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There is only one ḥadīth in this section and ʿĀ’isha can be seen to correct Ibn al-ʿĀṣ both on 
the basis of the practice of the Prophet and on the illogical nature of his demand and the 
difficulty it would pose for female believers in particular. 
 
Ḥadīth One 
 
Al-Zarkashī writes: 
 
Muslim records in his Ṣaḥīḥ, on the authority of ʿUbayd b. ʿUmayr: 
 
َعن ُْعبَيِْد بِْن ُعمَيْرٍ، َقاَل: بََلغ ََعائِشََة أَنَّ ابن َعمْرٍو يَْأمُر ُالنِّسَاَء إَِذا اْغتَسَْلنَ أَْن يَنُْقْضنَ 
رؤوسهن َفَقاَلْت يَا َعجَبًا ِلابْن َِعمٍْرو َهَذا يَْأمُر ُالنِّسَاَء إَِذا اْغتَسَْلنَ أَْن يَنُْقْضن َرؤوسهن أََفَلا 
يَْأمُرُُهنَّ أَْن يَحِْلْقنَ رؤوسهن لََقْد ُكنُْت أَْغتَسُِل أََنا وََرسُول ُاِلله صلى الله عليه وسلم مِن ْإَِناء ٍ
وَاحٍِد وََلا أَِزيُد َعلَى أَْن أُْفِرَغ َعلَى َرأْسِي ثََلاث َإِْفَراَغاتٍ 
 
It came to ʿĀ’isha’s attention that Ibn ʿAmr had instructed the womenfolk to 
undo their braids when they perform their ghusl73. She remarked, ‘How 
strange Ibn ʿAmr’s instruction! He orders the women to undo their braids 
when doing their ghusl! Why doesn’t he just order them to shave their heads! 
The Messenger of God and I used to bathe from the one same vessel, and I 
would not exceed pouring it over my head three times.’ 
 
This same ḥadīth is also narrated in Muslim, but the claim is made by Ibn ʿUmar.74 The 
response from ʿĀ’isha is also the same. Al-Nisā'ī narrates this same ḥadīth also but with the 
 
73 Ghusl is the major/full act of purification which requires the whole body, including the hair to be washed. It was mandated 
by the revelation of the verse, ‘O you who have believed, do not approach prayer while you are in a state of drowsiness until 
you know what you are saying or in a state of sexual impurity (janābah), except those passing through [a place of prayer], 
until you have washed [your whole body]. And if you are ill or on a journey or one of you comes from the place of relieving 
himself or you have contacted women and find no water, then seek clean earth and wipe over your faces and your hands [with 
it]. Indeed, Allah is ever Pardoning and Forgiving’. (Quran, al-Nisā’, 4:43). Ghusl is performed by the living following sexual 
intercourse, menstruation, postpartum bleeding, or irregular bleeding in women, and is performed on the dead before the 
funeral prayer. For more see, Bousquet, G.H, EI2. 
74 Muslim, Chapter: Menstruation, Section; Ruling regarding braids of the one doing ghusl, ḥadīth No. 331. 
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addition of her saying, ‘…And I did not undo my hair’75. Al-Zarkashī further corroborates the 
position of ʿĀ’isha by narrating that Umm Salamah was also in agreement and had in turn 
narrated a ḥadīth recorded in Muslim whereby she reported questioning the Prophet saying, 
‘Oh Messenger of God, I am a woman with many braids, do I need to undo them for the 
purification bath after menses?’ The Prophet responded, ‘No, it is sufficient that you sprinkle 
water over your head three times, and that water will do in purifying you.’76 Some have argued 
that a woman is not obliged to undo her braids unless it prevents the water from reaching every 
single strand of hair and the roots. Even if a woman were to undo all her braids, a sprinkling of 
water three times over the head, as the Prophet instructed Umm Salamah, and as ʿĀ’isha attests 
to doing in the given statement, it is unlikely that every strand of hair and the root would be 
covered. Thus, it would appear that the issue is one of difficulty for women and having to wash 
their hair frequently and granting them some relief in this regard.  
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī 
 
Al-Zarkashī only records one ḥadīth in this section. It is interesting not least for its corrective 
of Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī but also as an illustration of how scholarly interventions in interpreting 
this report, which can only be described as patriarchal, have lessened the original impact of 
ʿĀ’isha’s response and thereby distorted the impact of her retort. 
 
Impugnment due to Opposition from Reliable Authorities (Mukhālif al-Thiqāt) 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān records in his Ṣaḥīḥ, on the authority of ʿAmrah bint ʿAbd al-Raḥmān: 
 
أن عائشة أُْخبِرَت ْأن أبا سعيد الخدري قال: نهى رسول الله المرأةَ أن تُسافر إلا ومعها ذو 
محرم، قالت عمرُة: فالتفتت عائشُة إلي بعض النساء وقالت: ما لِكلكن ذو محرم 
 
 
75 Al-Nisā’ī, Chapter: Ghusl, Section; A woman’s leaving her braids in whilst performing ghusl, ḥadīth No. 416. 
76 Muslim, Chapter: Menstruation, Section; Ruling on the braids of she who is performing ghusl, ḥadīth No. 744. 
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ʿĀ’isha was informed that Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī said, ‘The Messenger of God 
forbids a woman from travelling unless she is accompanied by a maḥram.’77 
ʿAmrah said, ʿĀ’isha then turned to the womenfolk and said, ‘Not all of you 
has a maḥram!’ 
 
Ibn Abū Shaybah (2008, Vol.5. p.93) also narrates in his Muṣannaf, that it was mentioned to 
ʿĀ’isha that a woman cannot travel without a maḥram, and she responded, ‘Not all women 
have a maḥram.’78 
 
A perusal of internet fatwa sites run by a range of schools illustrates how widespread the view 
is that women should not travel unaccompanied by a male relative. Reasons given vary from 
the fear of ‘corruption’ of a lone woman travelling, to the weakness and fragility of women 
making it a requirement for them to need a male chaperone whilst travelling. This of course 
poses a great obstacle in the mobility of women. An obstacle that ʿĀ’isha has clearly identified 
and raises by turning to the women in her audience to state the obvious: not all women have a 
male companion at their disposal. Surely such a response is to highlight the untenable nature 
of the demand that is being made in Abū Saʿīd al Khudrī’s assertion. It is not unusual for 
ʿĀ’isha to pose the problem by posing a question or, as in this case, stating the obvious. Such 
an approach can be seen in her responses to Abū Hurayra in Ḥadīths 7 and 10 by way of further 
examples. However, instead of addressing the difficulty she has exposed, scholars, including 
al-Zarkashī, engage patriarchal interpretations to keep ʿĀ’isha’s reaction in line with the 
outcome they want to support. 
 
Al-Zarkashī comments on the ḥadīth saying that the position of al-Bayhaqī is sufficient on the 
matter. Al-Bayhaqī wrote in his Sunan that Abū Ḥātim comments, ‘ʿĀ’isha was not casting 
doubt over the truth of what Abū Saʿīd said, but rather what she intended by saying ‘Not all of 
you has a maḥram’, is that not all of you have a maḥram to travel with, so therefore you should 
 
77 The term maḥram applies to both men and women and refers to someone who is not permitted in marriage, either through 
blood ties, such as a siblings, or through marriage such as a father-in-law to a daughter-in-law, or through having been breastfed 
by the same woman, whether there is any blood tie or not. However, in this particular instance, maḥram has come to denote a 
legal guardian or escort whilst a woman is travelling. Who qualifies as a maḥram is defined by the aforementioned stipulations 
and includes her husband.  
78 See also, al-Dakhīl, F. 1989. Mawsū’ah Fiqh ʿĀ’isha; Hayātuha wa Fiqhuha. Beirut: Dār al-Nafā’is. p.542. 
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have god consciousness (taqwa) and not travel alone, until you can do so with the company of 
a maḥram.’ 
 
He then continues to attempt to strengthen this stance by giving the opinion of al-Ṭaḥāwī, who 
argued in his Maʿānī al-Athār, ‘Those who do not stipulate a maḥram for Ḥajj, use this 
statement of ʿĀ’isha as evidence, but there is no evidence that can overrule the statement of 
the Prophet, ‘It is not permissible for a woman to travel a distance of more than three days, 
unless she has a maḥram with her’.’ While it is possible that the Prophet may have made such 
a statement, it overlooks previously outlined problems, where a statement of the Prophet based 
on a particular circumstance then becomes generalised into a universal maxim. It is highly 
probable that if the Prophet made such a comment it would have been contingent on the context 
in which these words were uttered, not meant for eternal adherence. In fact the Prophet is 
recorded by al-Bukhārī to have said to ʿAdiyy b. Ḥātim, ‘If you live long, you will see women 
travel from Hirah (a city in Iraq) to circumambulate the Kaʿbah fearing none but Allah.’79 Other 
such statements of an eschatological hue also make mention of women travelling without 
supervision in complete safety. This only serves to further strengthen the argument that the 
Prophet’s prohibition of independent travel for women was contingent on the unsafe 
circumstances prevailing in his time, which he expected to be resolved within the lifetime of 
his companions, if not his own, as illustrated by his remark to ʿ Adiyy b. Ḥātim, and furthermore 
by the example of ʿĀ’isha herself.  
 
Moreover, it is noted that the verse of the Quran demanding that all Muslims make the 
pilgrimage of Ḥajj to Makkah, does not differentiate between men and women. Chapter Āl 
ʿImrān verse 97 states ‘And [due] to Allah from the people is a pilgrimage to the House - for 
whoever is able to find thereto a way’. Al-Ṭabarī (1994, Vol. 2 p.294) in his exegesis of this 
verse gives the ḥadīth whereby a man asked the Prophet what is meant by ‘whoever is able to 
find thereto a way’, and the Prophet replied, ‘Money and transport’. He even gives Ibn ʿAbbās 
a more precise monetary response to the question being, ‘300 dirhams’. Ibn Kathīr (1999, 
Vol.2, p.81) in his exegesis of this verse provides the statements of the Prophet whereby he 
adjured Muslims, ‘Prioritise the Ḥajj for none of you knows what may prevent them’, and 
‘Whoever has intended to perform Ḥajj, then do so quickly’. In none of the responses of the 
Prophet to what is meant by this verse, does he add the criteria of a maḥram for female Muslims 
 
79 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Book of Virtues, Section; The Signs of Prophethood in Islam, ḥadīth No. 3595. 
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who have both means and wealth to fund their Ḥajj. Al-Shafiʿī (2001. Vol.3, p.269) thereby 
also writes in his al-Umm, ‘If all that is found of conditions from the Prophet is wealth and 
means and a woman has both, and travels with trustworthy women, travel on safe pathways, 
then such a woman is amongst those from whom Ḥajj is required, in my opinion and God 
knows best, even if she does not have a maḥram with her as the Prophet did not place conditions 
other than wealth and means.’ 
 
It is established that ʿĀ’isha performed Ḥajj on her own, after the Prophet passed away, during 
the caliphate of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb. In response to this, al-Zarkashī writes, ‘Indeed, it was 
said to Abū Ḥanīfa that ʿĀ’isha did travel without a maḥram, and he responded, ‘The people 
were the maḥram of ʿĀ’isha, so she could travel with any one of them, and there is no woman 
other than her that is like this’’. It seems the old adage of when in doubt, raise the 
exceptionalism of the woman rather than the exceptionalism of the Prophetic tradition in 
question is invoked. If ʿĀ’isha has deemed it safe enough, now that Muslims are no longer 
being persecuted but are in fact by her time at the helms of power and governance, then surely 
the precedent she is setting is for all women thereafter. Furthermore, there seems to be no 
methodology behind when a woman like ʿĀ’isha is made exceptional and when she is the 
example for all other women, other than the arbitrary whims of a society’s patriarchal 
standards.  
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to Zayd b. Thābit 
 
This section also features only a single ḥadīth. Similar to the previous ḥadīth correcting Abū 
Saʿīd al-Khudrī, this ḥadīth too presents restrictions specific to female believers. 
 
Impugnment due to Opposition from Reliable Authorities, Mukhālif al-Thiqāt 
 
Al-Zarkashī writes: 
 
Al-Bazzār states in his Musnad, Muḥammad b. al-Muthanna said…on the authority of ʿ Ikrimah 
that, 
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 ثم  الواجب،  الطوافَ  النحر  يومَ  تطوُف  التي  في  اختلفا  ثابت  بن  وزيَد  عباس  ابن  نأ
 طافت  إذا  ُرف تَن  : عباس  ابنُ  وقال  بالبيت،  عهِدها  آخرُ  يكوَن  حتى  تُقيم  : زيد  فقال  تحيض،
 : عباس  ابنُ  فقال  نتابعك،  لم  زيدا،  خالفت  إذا  إنَّكَ  عباس  ابنَ  يا  : الأنصاُر  فقالت  النحر،  يومَ
 حُيي،  بنت  صفية  حال  مِن  كان  بما  فأخبرت  فسألوها  سليم،  أُمَّ  صاحبكم  ذلك  عن  سلوا
تنِفَر  أن  فأَمرها  للنبي  ذلك  فذكرت  لحابسُتنا،  إنها  : عائشُة  فقالت  
 
Ibn ʿAbbās and Zayd b. Thābit disagreed on the ruling regarding a woman 
who has performed the requisite circumambulation of the Kaʿbah (ṭawāf) on 
Yawm al-Naḥr (the 3rd day of Ḥajj) and her menses begin. Zayd said, ‘she 
should stay in her home until her menses are complete’. Ibn ʿAbbās, however 
said, ‘She should hurry to perform her ṭawāf on Yawm al-Naḥr’. The Anṣār 
present said, ‘Oh Ibn ʿAbbās, if you continue to conflict with Zayd, we will 
not follow you.’ Ibn ʿAbbās responded, ‘Ok, go and ask your companion on 
the matter, Umm Salīm’. So, they went and questioned her, and she informed 
them of what had happened to Safiyyah bint Huyyay. She reported that 
ʿĀ’isha said, ‘She prevented us’ (i.e. came on her period), so she mentioned 
this to the Prophet, and he ordered to her to be hasty’. 
 
As is mentioned later in Chapter Five, Mernissi identifies a phobic attitude prevalent amongst 
pre-Islamic Arabs towards menstruation. ʿĀ’isha and Umm Salamah become ardent defenders 
of the Muslim community, urging them not to regress into old conventions and attitudes 
towards menses. Here, once again, the topic of a menstruating woman and the implications 
when this occurs during a particular point in her Ḥajj is the subject of conversation. Zayd b. 
Thābit and Ibn ʿAbbās have opposing opinions on the matter, while the people are siding with 
Zayd’s position, which is also most comfortable according to customary attitudes towards 
menses and the menstruating woman. While ʿĀ’isha does not directly respond to the dispute, 
it is her established position that is used to corroborate the stance of Ibn ʿAbbās—namely that 
the onset of a period need not deprive a woman from completing what could be a once in a 
lifetime opportunity to complete a valid Ḥajj because of a bodily function that is outside of her 
control. 
 
However, al-Zarkashī gives additional support to the given ḥadīth, by mentioning a similar 
tradition narrated by a different chain on the authority of ʿAbdul Razāq, on the authority of 
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Muʿammar, on the authority of Ibn Ṭāwūs on the authority of his father, that Zayd b. Thābit 
and Ibn ʿAbbās were disputing on this matter, whereby Ibn ʿAbbās advocated that the woman 
should speedily complete the ṭawāf, while Zayd disagreed. The ḥadīth states, ‘…so Zayd went 
to ʿĀ’isha and asked her. She said, ‘she should [complete her ṭawāf with] haste’. Zayd left, and 
smiling he said, ‘There is no statement [on the matter] except hers’. Abū ʿUmar said ‘This is 
uprightness. Zayd informed Ibn ʿAbbās, and it is for us to emulate them’.  
 
The Companions prove their status well deserved in this display of submission to what is the 
most authoritative position. This does not become a battle of wills and egos but a determination 
to arrive at the correct position, knowing that ʿĀ’isha’s opinion will be the most definitive of 
all. 
 
Shaybah b. ʿUthmān’s Consulting ʿĀ’isha 
 
This is an exceptional section for its not being a corrective but an example of ʿĀ’isha’s verdict 
being sought out. 
 
al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Bayhaqī records in his Sunan, on the authority of ʿAlī al-Madinī on the authority of 
ʿAlqamah b. ʿAlqamah on the authority of his mother, who said, 
 
 علينا  تجتمِعُ  الكعبة  ثيابَ  إن  المؤمنين  أُمَّ  يا  : فقال  ئشة، اع على  عثمان  بُن  شيبة  دخل
 الجنُب  يَْلبَسَها  كيلا  فيها  الكعبة  ثيابَ  نَْدفنُ  ثم  فنعمقها،  فنحفرها  آبار  إلى  َفنَْعمَُد  فتكثر،
 لم  منها،  نُِزعَْت  إذا  الكعبة  ثيابَ  إن  صنعَت،  ما  وبئَس  أحسنت  ما  : عائشة  فقالت  ،ض والحائ
 سبيل  وفي  ،ين المساك  في  ثمنَها  واجعل  بعها  ولكن  والحائضُ؛  الجنُب  سَها يَْلبَ  أن  يضرها
السبيل  وابن  الله  
 
Shaybah b. ʿUthmān entered into the presence of ʿĀ’isha and said, ‘Mother 
of the Believers, we have collected a lot of the [discarded] cloth from the 
Kaʿbah so we intend to prepare some wells and bury it deep within in order 
that no person in a state of sexual or menstrual impurity may wear it’. ʿ Ā’isha 
advised, ‘You have not done well, in fact you have instead done a bad thing. 
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If the cloth of the Kaʿbah has been removed from it, there is no harm in one 
who is in a state of sexual or menstrual impurity to wear it. So, sell it, and 
whatever profit is made, spend it on the poor, and in the way of God, and on 
the wayfarer’. 
 
This incident is exemplary of an attempt by Ibn ʿUthmān to show unnecessary amounts of 
reverence for the Kaʿbah by seeking to dispose of its cloth in a manner that is most concerned 
with preventing its use by those in a state of sexual or menstrual impurity, rather than 
considering the wastefulness of the proposal he is making when there are still poverty stricken 
people on the streets, who could benefit from the cloth instead. In fact ʿĀ’isha displays real 
business acumen in suggesting the cloth be sold and the profits spent on the poor, knowing that 
the cloth of the Kaʿbah would be guaranteed to attract high bids, returning a large profit that 
could allow for generous expenditure on the poor, rather than simply ordering that the cloth be 
given to them.80 
 
The Emergent Juristic Framework of ʿĀ’isha 
 
All of the ḥadīth of this chapter, apart from five, are explicitly concerned with juridical issues 
that fall within the remit of fiqh. As such it is possible to extract from these an emergent 
framework that ʿĀ’isha relies on in measuring the statements and predicaments brought before 
her. As with the ḥadīth, it becomes manifest that she has certain criteria upon which she relies 
when engaging in a juridical exercise. Whilst a detailed exploration of a possible framework 
for deducing juristic conclusions from the statements of ʿĀ’isha is not possible within the 
remits of this study, a brief outline will now be considered. 
 
1. Measuring Ḥadīth against the Quran 
 ʿĀ’isha is repeatedly seen to measure statements against the Quran, constantly seen returning 
to the Quran as her primary yardstick in the measure of how to enact one’s life as a Muslim. 
Ḥadīths one of her refutations of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb and of ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās are prime 
examples of such, as well as her refutation of ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās’ claim in ḥadīth six, that the 
Prophet saw God directly.  
 
80 See also Ḥadīth 3 of the chapter on ʿĀ’isha’s Corrective of Abū Hurayra for a similar discussion on the merits of inward 
submission to God over acts of outward piety. And also, previous ḥadīth on the perfuming of one entering into a state of iḥrām. 
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2. Measuring Ḥadīth against the Sunnah as she witnessed it. 
ʿĀ’isha is shown repeatedly and unabatedly rejecting ḥadīth for which she found no sound 
basis, especially if they run counter to the Quran and to her knowledge of the ḥadīth and 
Sunnah. In addition to this, she is also shown to ensure ḥadīth are transmitted in their entirety 
in terms of wording and contextualisation, such that misunderstandings do not develop, as is 
the case in the first ḥadīth she refutes of ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar in this section. She is careful to 
note on this occasion, and in others that she is not impugning Ibn ʿUmar nor his father, but that 
a mistake has been made, and that part of the rectification of this mistake is to provide 
clarification by way of the context that is missing. 
 
3. Istiḥsān and Maṣlaḥa 
The principle of istiḥsān, as a means to arriving at juristic conclusions is one that is found 
across the various schools of thought. However, as Hashim Kamali (2004, p.562) illustrates, 
the term is construed in slightly differing ways by various scholars, whilst all seek to attain its 
linguist meaning of striving to achieve what is good, preferable or beautiful. Kamali states, 
‘Whereas the Mālikī jurist Ibn al-ʿArabī (d. 534/1328) has simply described istiḥsān as acting 
on the stronger of two evidences, (aqwa al-dalīlayn), the Ḥanafi jurist al-Jaṣṣās (d. 370/980) 
defined it as departure from a ruling of deductive analogy (qiyās) in favour of another ruling 
which is considered preferable. The preference so exercised is prompted by the desire to 
achieve a more equitable solution because of the rigidity or unfairness that is brought about by 
strict adherence to the existing law. Ibn Taymiyya’s (d. 728/1328) definition of istiḥsān seeks 
to relate this doctrine more closely to the textual sources and consensus (ijmāʿ). Istiḥsān is thus 
defined as ‘the abandonment of one legal ruling for another which is considered better on the 
basis of the Quran, Sunna or ijmāʿ.’ This principle in turn is heavily reliant on the principle of 
seeking benefit or interest for the wider Muslim community (maṣlaḥa), and is articulated as so 
in the Mālikī school of thought. As Kamali (ibid. p.563) notes, the Ḥanafi scholar, Sarakshī 
considered ‘the attainment of ease and convenience in legal injunction’, the hallmark of 
istiḥsān.  
 
Though developed as principles of Islamic legal theory, centuries after ʿĀ’isha, it is evident 
that similar objectives were guiding ideals in her own approach to extracting rulings and 
deciphering truths. Each one of the aforementioned interventions of ʿĀ’isha in this chapter 
alone, can be seen to be acting in ways that allow for ease and a practicable approach to the 
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application of Islam, but is particularly evident in her responses to ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ, Abū Saʿīd 
al-Khudrī, and Zayd b. Thābit. In the latter example in particular, this is all the more notable. 
In normal circumstances the first sight of menstrual bleeding would excuse a Muslim woman 
from continuing with her ritual acts of worship such as fasting and praying, but in the instance 
of performing Ḥajj, where for so many people life presents only a single opportunity to fulfil 
this pillar of the faith, to have this corrective from ʿĀ’isha is vital. This is especially so given 
that this was before medical interventions which could aid in the delaying of a period, or for 
those women for whom these medical interventions prove futile even now. While being 
excused from acts of worship is usually a welcome reprieve in the day to day of Muslim 
women’s lives, to be so suddenly severed from the opportunity of completing the Ḥajj, would 
be an unbearable strike for a Muslim woman for whom it may well be unlikely another chance 
will arise. As such then to allow for her to hastily finish the ṭawāf, is a thoughtful and fair-
minded permission, and one that ʿĀ’isha is keen to protect.  
 
Whilst there is no formal theory of jurisprudence put forth by ʿĀ’isha, there is little to dispute 
that a framework is emerging through the collation and study of her positions and correctives 
that could be seen as ʿĀ’isha’s principles for jurisprudence. In works outside of al-Ijāba, 
statements of ʿĀ’isha’s can be found whereby she is engaging in other juridical tools, such as 
deductive analogy (qiyās) and the strong use of logic that is aware of women’s lived 
experiences resulting in different outcomes to those which have become standard for the male 
dominated branch of study. Even in al-Ijāba, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, when 
ʿĀ’isha’s response to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī’s insistence that women cannot travel without a 
male chaperone and her response to ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ’s assertion that one must braid their hair 
when performing ghusl, both expose the difficulty and limitations they pose for women. 
 
A future study exploring the potential development of a fiqh approach based on the conclusions 
of ʿĀ’isha and applying her methodology to juridical interpretation on contemporary issues, 
whilst centring the female lived experience as a central episteme in this approach, would make 
for an illuminating and much needed topic of research.  
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has sought to give a brief overview of the history and development of Islamic 
jurisprudence and built on the history and development of the discipline of ḥadīth from Chapter 
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Two, to illustrate how the respective development of each intersected with the other. The 
implication of this lay in both the trajectory of Medinan legal scholarship and its reliance on 
the lived tradition, and the codification of jurisprudence around the four main schools of 
thought that acted as a process by which to mine and organise traditions according to 
established juridical conclusions, often leading to the overlooking of ʿ Ā’isha’s dissenting voice 
in favour of those more aligned. 
 
The correctives of ʿĀ’isha presented in this chapter and organised on the basis of the 
conventional criteria of impugnment and validation in ḥadīth, as well as the reoccurring 
techniques she engages in her arguments, provide an insight into her emergent juristic 
framework too. She displays a deep insight into the Quran and the Prophetic mission, she shows 
business acumen, sensitivity to the lived experiences of Muslims - particularly women - and 
harnesses all of her knowledge in deducing the most accommodating and advantageous 
conclusion for the Muslim community.  
 
Whilst this chapter focused on her correctives concerning jurisprudential matters in a bid to 
extract her methodological approach to analysing juridical traditions, the next chapter seeks to 
extract her methodology in ḥadīth criticism. This chapter focused on her correctives of seven 
Companions, the next chapter considers her correctives of only one, Abū Hurayra, whose 
chapter in al-Ijāba is the most extensive. Chapter Five will analyse and present the translation 
of  Abū Hurayra’s chapter from al-Ijāba, in the same manner as have been done for this chapter. 
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Chapter Five: ʿĀ’isha the Ḥadīth Master 
 
This chapter presents the section of al-Ijāba wherein ʿĀ’isha directs her critique towards Abū 
Hurayra as a case study for understanding her approach to impugnment of Companions’ 
statements. Abū Hurayra remains the most contentious character in the history of ḥadīth. He is 
without doubt the most proliferous narrator of ḥadīth among the Companions despite spending 
only three years in the company of the Prophet. His time with the Prophet was hardly 
intimate—he was never described as close—and he missed virtually all the major events, from 
the migration to the many battles which meant he lacked both authority and seniority.   
 
The chapter in al-Ijāba dedicated to ʿĀ’isha’s correctives of Abū Hurayra is at once the most 
extensive chapter in the book and revealing of the kind of relationship the man had with 
ʿĀ’isha. More importantly, the traditions collected in the chapter reveal important aspects of 
her emerging methodology, particularly in considering how to evaluate the statements of 
Companions. They provide a foundation for extending the scope of impugnment such that it 
includes Companions themselves, deemed by the dictum of orthodoxy as above critique; this 
is an important move for any attempt that seeks to centralise ʿĀ’isha’s ḥadīths. This chapter 
then, demonstrates not only how ʿĀ’isha’s methodology can continue to be witnessed through 
her correctives, but also the need and ways in which individual Companions can be critiqued. 
 
Whilst the doctrine that the Companions are above critique and equally reliable is an important 
one for Sunni Muslims, as has been considered in Chapter Two, the necessity to prefer some 
over others has been unavoidable for the preferential treatment that the Prophet and the Quran 
have shown to some. Tarjīḥ al-Ṣaḥāba, the preference of some Ṣaḥāba over others is 
recognised and established. In fact, many ḥadīth collections have chapters dedicated to the 
virtues of the Companions (faḍā’il al-Ṣaḥāba) picking out particular individuals for praise, and 
many books doing likewise have been authored, often concentrating on one particular 
Companion and what distinguished them amongst their peers. There are many reports of ḥadīth 
regarding the Prophet’s conduct and those of his most senior Companions after his death, 
indulging in preferential treatment of the Companions. One such example is recorded in both 
al-Bukhārī and Muslim whereby ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ narrated that the Prophet appointed him as the 
commander of the army of Dhāt al-Salāsil. Encouraged by this attainment, ʿAmr sought to 
capitalise on this opportune moment and reports asking the Prophet, ‘Which of the people is 
dearest to you?’ He said, ‘ʿĀ’isha.’ I said, ‘Who among men?’ He said, ‘Her father.’ I said, 
  139 
‘Then who?’ He said, ‘Then ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb’.81 It is interesting to note how the Prophet 
first answers with ʿĀ’isha, and when implored who amongst men, he says her father, 
emphasising the link still to her. On the basis of this statement, Ibn Ḥazm  stated in his al-
Aḥkām fī Uṣūl al-Aḥkām,(1983, Vol.1, p138) that because the Prophet had preferred ʿĀ’isha 
above all others, including her father, Abū Bakr, ʿUthmān, ʿAlī, and the Prophet’s own 
daughter, Faṭima whom he is also known to have loved immensely, then she should be given 
preference over all others as a re-enactment and establishment of the Prophet’s practice. 
 
In another instance, the Prophet is reported to have been standing upon Mount Uḥud when it 
began to tremble. He called out to the mountain to calm it saying, ‘Stand firm, O Uḥud, for 
there is no one on you but a Prophet, a most truthful one and two martyrs.’ At that moment, he 
was accompanied by Abū Bakr, ʿUmar and ʿUthmān.82 There are also more overt references to 
some Companions being superior to others on the basis of their knowledge of Islam. It was 
narrated that ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar said that he heard the Prophet say, ‘I dreamt, a cup of milk 
was brought to me and I drank until I saw its moisture coming out of my nails. Then I gave the 
rest to ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb.’ When asked how he understood the dream, the Prophet replied, 
‘[The moisture symbolises] knowledge.’83  
 
The Prophet set the precedent for being cautious and discretionary about whom knowledge was 
to be accepted from; he was also circumspect about any information he received. For example, 
it is recorded by al-Bukhārī that the Prophet once remarked  to ʿĀ’isha about some of those 
around him, ‘I do not think that so and so, and so and so, have understood anything of our 
religion.’84 Whilst some had opined that the Prophet was referring to hypocrites amongst the 
Muslims who feigned their belief in Islam, others, such as Ibn Ḥajar al-Asqalāni (2012, Vol.3, 
p.2666), in his Fatḥ al-Bārī, argued that the Prophet was not referring to hypocrites alone. The 
point being that one should exercise caution when receiving knowledge on religious affairs 
from anyone. 
 
 
81 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Virtues of the Companions of the Prophet, ḥadīth No. 3662; Muslim, Chapter: Book of Zakāh, ḥadīth 
No. 2384. 
82 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Virtues of the Companions of the Prophet, The Merits of Abū Bakr ḥadīth No. 3675. 
83 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: The Interpretation of Dreams, Section; On Milk, ḥadīth No.7007. 
84 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: On Etiquette, Section; Permissible Suspicion, ḥadīth No. 6068. 
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This develops into an obvious modus operandi  amongst the earliest generations of Muslims: 
they exercise a clear preference to defer to the opinions of some Companions over those of 
others without doing harm to the reputations of those who have been overlooked, but in keeping 
the pursuit of authentic and most sound positions the objective. In his commentary, al-Zarkashī 
writes that Abū Mūsa al-Ashʿarī is recorded by al-Tirmidhī to have stated, ‘Whenever a ḥadīth 
was difficult for us—the Companions—we would ask ʿĀ’isha about it, and she would always 
be knowledgeable regarding it.’ Similarly, another Companion, Masrūq said, ‘I saw the most 
senior of Muḥammad’s Companions ask her regarding [religious] obligations.’ 
 
It follows, then, that the Companions were cautious in their acceptance of ḥadīth. Al-Tirmidhī 
records Asma’ bint al-Ḥakam al-Fazārī as saying, ‘I heard ʿ Alī say, ‘I was a man who, if I heard 
a ḥadīth from the Messenger of God, God would benefit me thereby as much as He willed to 
benefit me. If a man from among his companions told me a ḥadīth I would ask him to swear to 
it. If he swore to it then I would believe him.’’85 In a similar vein, Abū Bakr is reported to have 
been sought out by an elderly woman who was claiming her right to inheritance as a 
grandmother. Remorsefully, Abū Bakr said to her, ‘I do not find anything for you in the Book 
of Allah.’ At which point al-Mughīra b. Shaʿbah stood and claimed that the Prophet would 
have granted her a sixth. Abū Bakr asked him if he had a witness to this claim. It was only 
when al-Mughīra was able to corroborate his statement by means of bringing other witnesses 
to this practice of the Prophet, that Abū Bakr accepted it. This is despite al-Mughīra b. al-
Shuʿba being a prominent Companion in his own right who served as an administrator under 
Abū Bakr’s leadership. Similarly, it is recorded in al-Bukhārī that Abū Mūsa al-Ashʿarī 
knocked on the door of ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb three times. Failing to receive a response on his 
third knock, he departed from ʿUmar’s door. ʿUmar later asked him why he had done so, to 
which he replied that he had heard the Prophet instruct the same: if a person does not respond 
to one’s greetings three times, then they should leave. ʿUmar demanded he bring evidence of 
this or else be prepared to face the consequences. Saʿīd al-Khudrī, who narrates this occurrence, 
says, Abū Mūsa ‘came to us discoloured [from anxiety]’ causing those around him to seek after 
what had happened to him. When he revealed his concerns, he was able to find amongst the 
group one who was able to corroborate his statement before ʿUmar.86 
 
85 Al-Tirmidhī, Chapter: The Book of Prayer, Section; What has been narrated regarding prayer with repentance, ḥadīth No. 
406. 
86 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Seeking Permission, Section; To Greet and Seek Permission to Enter Three Times, ḥadīth No. 6245. 
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What these examples illustrate well is that there was a concern from the time of the Prophet 
himself that not every individual is capable of grasping, retaining and relating information 
regarding Islam. This was a concern that was inherited by those closest to him. In focusing on 
ʿĀ’isha’s critique of Abū Hurayra’s ḥadīth, the most extensive chapter in al-Ijāba, her 
methodology in critically interrogating Companion’s narrations can be elicited; a methodology 
that she likely adopted and adapted from the Prophet, who, as has already been noted, was 
concerned about the capacity various individuals had for understanding the faith. In keeping 
the discourse around ḥadīth open to critique, ʿĀ’isha’s approach should have resulted in the 
canon remaining open, fluid and less fixed. 
 
Fatima Mernissi in her seminal work, The Veil and the Male Elite, focussed on Abū Hurayra 
but made claims regarding him based on only two ḥadīth collected by Imām al-Zarkashī, and 
another revealing his disdain for cats despite his eponym, Abū Hurayra, owner of the kitten. 
Mernissi makes bold assertions on the basis of these ḥadīth and statements of other 
Companions. She focuses primarily on problematising Abū Hurayra by contextualising him 
amongst his peers. This chapter acknowledges the efforts of Mernissi, but builds further upon 
her work by centring ʿĀ’isha’s critiques and what they reveal of her methodological approach 
in accepting and rejecting ḥadīth, whilst seeking a more robust critical interrogation of the 
ḥadīth of Abū Huraryra contested by ʿ Ā’isha and his ability to claim authority in those instances 
where she contradicts him. Once again it becomes clear that whilst she rejects many statements 
made by Abū Hurayra, it is not an absolute impugnment of him, as there are other instances 
when she corroborates and validates his positions over others. As such, then, it is not simply 
the case that she exceptionalises his statements, but that she clearly has a criteria by which she 
accepts and rejects ḥadīth, even if she does hold him in particular disdain with regards to his 
proliferate narrating of ḥadīth. In fact, one would argue that maintaining the discourse at the 
level of a partisan personal conflict between ʿĀ’isha and Abū Hurayra undermines and neglects 
the intellectual and scholarly model to be found in ʿĀ’isha because the framing of their conflict 
becomes focused on personalities and not the substance of the arguments put forth. It also 
neglects other instances wherein ʿ Ā’isha corroborates and agrees with Abū Hurayra’s positions 
over those of others.  
 
Abū Hurayra’s ḥadīth have also been presented in this chapter on the basis of which criteria of 
ḥadīth acceptance or rejection have been applied in ʿĀ’isha’s response to his statements, and 
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her commonly occurring techniques to correcting statements she disagrees with. Before 
addressing the ḥadīth, it is useful to have a brief introduction to the man, Abū Hurayra. 
 
The Case of Abū Hurayra 
 
He was ʿAbdul Shams b. Sakhr al-Dawsi al-Yamānī, but his name was changed to ʿAbdullah 
or ʿAbd al-Raḥmān by the Prophet upon his conversion to Islam. He is, however, better known 
by his agnomen, Abū Hurayra, ‘Father of the little kitten’. Various stories exist on how he was 
to attain this title, though Muslim lore most popularly asserts that the Prophet himself bestowed 
this title on him having found him with a kitten up his sleeve. 
 
He arrived in Medina in the year 7/629 while the Prophet was away on an expedition to 
Khaybar. There is some discussion as to whether he arrived in Medina already a Muslim, as 
held by Ibn Ḥajar, or if he accepted Islam after arriving in Medina, but before the conquest of 
Makkah, as recorded by Ibn Sʿad and al-Nawawī. He was among the People of the Bench (Ahl 
al-Ṣuffa), who were the poorest among the Muslim community, residing in the Prophet’s 
mosque in Medina. They were known for their poverty and were cared for by the Prophet, who 
would share any charity he received with them and would encourage other Muslims to give 
charitably to them too. He is said to have died in the year 57/677, 58/678, or 59/679, but with 
it being recorded that he led the funeral prayer of ʿĀ’isha, which took place in 58/678, it must 
be later in 58/678 or 59/679 (Juynboll, G.H.A, 2007, EI3). 
 
Abū Hurayra spent less than four years in the company of the Prophet and is known to have 
witnessed none of the major battles whilst ʿĀ’isha accompanied the Prophet at Uḥud, al-
Ḥudaybiyyah, al-Khandaq and others. Despite this Abū Hurayra was prolific in his narration 
of Prophetic traditions. This earned him the attention of both his peers, and scholars for 
centuries to come. He has been the subject of both bitter criticism and exalted praise. His 
position as the Companion to have narrated the most ḥadīth seats him in a position of great 
prestige, but also opens him up for much scrutiny. He has continued to be the subject of both 
apologia and the target of severe castigation not only among academics but also in popular 
literature. As Robson (EI2) notes, it is completely plausible, given the great number of 
traditions attributed to him that, ‘He may be little more than a convenient authority to whom 
inventions of a later period have been attributed.’ This being the case, his traditions justify 
further investigation, especially when material is available depicting not only a critique of his 
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statements, but particularly ʿĀ’isha’s critique of him. Other Companions such as ʿUmar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb and ʿAlī are also known to have been critical of Abū Hurayra—some examples are 
shared below—but ʿĀ’isha’s critique has greater epistemological value for its ability to be read 
within her broader critiques, allowing for a methodology to be developed in critically analysing 
ḥadīth when: 1) the content of the ḥadīth, its matn, is problematic but the chain has been 
otherwise proven to be sound; and 2) when ḥadīth that lie outside of the canon but are just as 
sound as those within it provide a potentially alternative perspective to those that are within 
the canon and a resolution between the two contradictory positions is required. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Critique of Abū Hurayra 
 
Impugnment due to Bad Memory (Sū’ al-Ḥifdh) 
 
Ḥadīths 1, 2, 3, 4 and 8 all illustrate ʿĀ’isha’s indictment of Abū Hurayra’s memory. However, 
the additional traditions given could validate the assertion of impugnment according to the 
condition of accusations of lying, itihām bi al-kadhib, as is particularly notable in the analysis 
of ḥadīth number 2, and the assertion of impugnment by way of wahm, as noted in the analysis 
of ḥadīth number 1, and the statement of Ibn Kathīr regarding Abū Hurayra’s propensity to 
conjure up traditions. 
 
Ḥadīth One 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
[ʿĀ’isha] opposed his [declaring] the fast of a person in a state of sexual impurity as nullified. 
It is recorded by Muslim on the authority of Ibn Jurayj, on the authority of al-Mālik b. Abū 
Bakr b. ʿAbdul Raḥmān, on the authority of Abū Bakr b. ʿAbdul Raḥmān: 
 
 قال  ، يَُصْم  فلا  ، جنبا  الفجُر  أدركه  من  : قصصه  في  ويقول  يَُقصُّ  هريرة  أبا  سمعت
 الرحمان  عبد  فأنطلق  ، ذلك  فأنكر  ؛ ه لأبي  فذكره  ، الحارث  بن  الرحمان  لِعبد  ذلك  فذكرتُ
 : فقال  ، ذلك  عن  الرحمان  عبد  ما ه فسأل  ، سلمة  وُأمِّ  عائشة  على  دخلنا  حتى  ه مع  وانطلقُت
 على  دخلنا  حتى  فانطلقنا  ، يصوُم  ثم  حُلم  غير  مِن  جنبا  يُصبح  النبيُّ  كان  : قالت  فكلتاهما
 أبي  إلى  ذهبَت  ما  إلا  علطك  عزمُت  : مرواُن  فقال  ، الرحمان  عبدُ  له  ذلك  فذكر  ، مرواَن
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 له  فذكر  ، كلّة  ذلك  حاضر  بكر  وأبو  هريرَة  أبا  فجئنا  : قال  ، يقولُ  ما  عليه  فرددتَ  ُهريرة
 أبو  َردَّ  ثم  ، أعلُم  هما  : قال  ، نََعْم  : قال  لك؟  قالتاه  أُهما  : هريرة  أبو  فقال  ، الرحمان  عبدُ
 من  ذلك  سمعُت  : هريرة  أبو  قال  ’ عباس  بن  الفضل  إلى  ذلك  في  يقول  كان  ما  هريرة
ذلك  من  يقولُ  كان   عما  هريرة  بو ا فرجع  : قال  ، بيِّ الن  من  أسمعه  ولم  ، الفضل  
 
I heard Abū Hurayra narrate a story: ‘If dawn arrives upon one who is in a 
state of sexual impurity (junuban) then he must not fast.’ I mentioned this to 
ʿAbdul Raḥmān b. al Ḥārith, who mentioned it to his father. The latter denied 
this. ʿAbdul Raḥmān and I went to ʿĀ’isha and Umm Salama, and ʿAbdul 
Raḥmān asked them regarding this. Both said, ‘The Prophet would reach the 
morning in a state of sexual impurity not caused by a dream and would 
proceed to fast.’ We then went to Marwān and ʿAbdul Raḥmān relayed this 
to him. Marwān said, ‘I adjure you to go back to Abū Hurayra and refute 
what he said.’ So, we went to Abū Hurayra, and Abū Bakr was present 
through all of this, while ʿAbdul Raḥmān relayed everything to him. Abū 
Hurayra said, ‘Did they both say this?’ He replied, ‘Yes!’ He said, ‘They 
know best!’ and then attributed [the statement] to al-Faḍl b. ʿAbbās, saying, 
‘I heard that from al-Faḍl, I did not hear it from the Prophet.’ The narrator 
said, Abū Hurayra retracted what he had said. 
 
In Muslim’s full narrative account of this incident, the ḥadīth does not stop there but goes on 
to clarify that the one who awakes in a state of sexual impurity is impacted likewise even in 
Ramadan.87 Mernissi (1991, p.73) regarded this ḥadīth as intrinsic to an overall recurrent point 
of contention between the wives of the Prophet and the male Companions: impurity as a result 
of sexual relations or bleeding as a result of menses or labour. She refers to ʿĀ’isha’s rebuking 
of Ibn ʿ Umar for stating women needed to undo their braids when performing the ritual bathing 
(ghusl) saying, ‘Why, when he was about it, didn't he order them to shave their heads? When I 
used to wash myself with the Prophet, we purified ourselves with the same bucket of water. I 
passed my wet hand over my braids three times, and I never undid them!’ Mernissi asserts that 
the vigilance displayed by ʿĀ’isha and the other wives on this issue was due to their acute 
 
87 Muslim, Chapter: Fasting, Section; Validity of the fast one upon whom Fajr arrives and he is in a state of sexual impurity 
(janābah) ḥadīth No. 2589. 
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awareness of the phobic views of pre-Islamic Arabs towards the sullying caused by menstrual 
periods and sexual intercourse, which led to superstitions surrounding these acts. ʿĀ’isha’s 
rebuke, therefore, of Abū Hurayra may not be a personal attack on him, as much as it is a line 
of defence taken up by her and Umm Salamah to protect the Muslim community from 
regressing into familiar pre-Islamic customs and attitudes, which stigmatised women for their 
menses and imposed upon them excessive restrictions, implying an inherent impurity within 
women. 
 
In his critique of Mernissi, Usman Ghani (2011, p.303), in reference to this tradition, argues 
that this ḥadīth is no indication of ʿ Ā’isha refuting Abū Hurayra or declaring him a liar. Instead, 
Ghani asserts, ‘The books of Ḥadīth, that is Bukhārī and Muslim, do not mention explicitly that 
ʿĀ’isha rejected the narration from Abū Hurayrah, nor do they mention anywhere that he was 
under pressure.’ This is an untenable position for a number of reasons: firstly, the 
aforementioned ḥadīth is recorded by Muslim, and while it may be that there is no explicit 
mention of ʿĀ’isha refuting Abū Hurayra, there is evidence of doubt amongst those who hear 
it, regarding his narration in this tradition. It is apparent that when his statement is brought to 
the father of ʿAbdul Raḥmān b. al-Hārith, he is unsatisfied with the statement of Abū Hurayra 
on its own, leading his son and his companion to have this information corroborated by the 
wives of the Prophet. This seems to be a recurring instance in this chapter where many a time 
recipients of traditions narrated by Abū Hurayra seek verification of his statements from the 
wives of the Prophet. Furthermore, when they relay the day’s affairs to Marwān he insists that 
they return and refute Abū Hurayra, ‘faradatta ʿ alayhi’. This exchange highlights the polemical 
discord that existed between the Companions too, which is all too often overlooked in favour 
of tending to the political discord that existed. Again, it becomes evident that an epistemic 
hierarchy has been adopted by the earliest community of Muslims after the Prophet’s passing, 
which prefers the position of ʿĀ’isha over that of other Companions; an epistemic position that 
allows for continued critical engagement with the statements of Companions, following the 
methodology embodied by the most learned of all the Companions, ʿĀ’isha. 
 
It is simply not sufficient to consider ʿĀ’isha’s correction without considering the implications 
of the shift in Abū Hurayra’s attribution of the tradition’s source. In particular, what it reveals 
of the weakness in ḥadīth being uncritically accepted when criteria are applied loosely or not 
at all upon Companions. Indeed, previous scholars have scrutinised Abū Hurayra over such 
sudden changes. Ibn Kathīr, in his famed al-Bidāyah wa al-Nihāya, writes, ‘Yazīd b. Hārūn 
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said, I heard Shuʿbah say, ‘Abū Hurayra would falsify [traditions] - he would narrate that which 
he heard from Kaʿb and not from the Messenger of Allah, but would not distinguish between 
the two’’. Ibn ʿAsākir mentions this and considers Abū Hurayra’s response in the 
aforementioned ḥadīth an indication of this sort of falsification on his part (Abū Rayyah, 1993, 
pp.97-99). 
 
It is interesting to note the jurisprudential implications of Abū Hurarya’s statement, were it to 
be taken as valid. Not only would it impose a hindrance for Muslim men in exercising their 
religious duties, but by extension, women ending their menses or postpartum bleeding would 
also be required to perform ghusl before being able to fast. In fact the 7th/14th century Shafiʿī 
scholar, Imām al-Nawawī (2002, p.842) in his commentary on this ḥadīth, notes that the ḥadīth 
of ʿĀ’isha and Umm Salama are sufficient as ‘an evidence against any contrary [statement]’, 
and that it holds true regarding women at the end of their periods or postpartum bleeding. 
Whether or not ʿĀ’isha had considered this implication for Muslim women’s praxis is not 
articulated, but it once again evidences her practical and pragmatic approach to religious 
practice. But perhaps this is where the subjective position of the narrator comes into play; as a 
woman living in a household of women, engaged with the women of her community, women’s 
lives would be a natural and normative reference for her. Once more knowledge and 
consideration of lived practice and experience as a methodology in how to judge ḥadīth, as well 
as her knowledge of how the Prophet behaved in specific circumstances allow her to reject the 
statement. Knowledge of lived practice and seeking to keep the easiest option within the 
boundaries of what is permissible and available to the community of believers, particularly 
women, is a recurring theme in many of the ḥadīth found in al-Ijāba. Later, as the legal tradition 
of Islam developed, the principle of istiḥsān, juristic preference, that permits exceptions to 
strict and/or literal legal reasoning in favour of the public interest (maṣlaḥah) was formalised. 
It was developed to allow jurists to arrive at verdicts that preferred weaker precedents over 
stronger or more prevalent opinions, if it meant a more just outcome could be achieved. 
ʿĀ’isha’s approach clearly exemplifies this position of seeking the most just and easiest 
outcome.  
 
In his commentary regarding this ḥadīth, al-Zarkashī quotes Ibn al-Mundhir as arguing that the   
two conflicting opinions of ʿĀ’isha and Abū Hurayra can be reconciled by the simple 
explanation that in the earlier period of Islam, the matter had been as Abū Hurayra asserted: 
Muslims were meant to abstain from sex during the nights while fasting during the days of the 
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month of Ramadan. However, later on this stipulation was adapted, and Muslims were 
permitted to have sexual relations during the nights of the fasting days. Neat enough of an 
explanation, but it fails on a number of points. Firstly, Abū Hurayra was a late convert to Islam 
and as such it does not make sense that he had made himself privy to earlier requirements and 
not later ones. Secondly, even if one accepts that he was unaware of the adapted position, it 
only supports the position of scholars like Abū Hanifa who asserted that caution should be 
exercised and juristic statements not taken from Abū Hurayra due to his not having a full grasp 
of the juridical aspects of the faith. ʿĀ’isha, alternatively, remains knowledgeable and reliable 
in the sphere of legal matters. This is discussed in more detail in Chapter Four on ʿĀ’isha and 
the Legal Tradition, and Chapter Seven on ʿĀ’isha’s emergent methodology. 
 
Ḥadīth Two 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Abū Dāwud al-Ṭayālasī stated in his Musnad that Abū Hurayra said: 
 
 والمرأِة  الدارِ  في  : ثلاثة  في  الشؤُم  : الله  رسول  قال  : يقول  هريرة  با أ إن  : لعائشة  قيل
 اليهوَد  الله  قاتل  : يقول  الله  ورسول  دخل  أنه  هريرة،  أبو  يحفظ  لم  : عائشُة  فقالت  والفرسِ،
ثلاثة  في  الشؤُم  : يقولون :  أوَّلَه  يَسْمِْع  ولم  الحديث  آِخرَ  فسمع  والفرسِ،  والمرأِة  الدارِ  في  
 
The Messenger of Allah said, ‘Bad luck is found in three things: the house, 
the woman, and the horse.’ ʿĀ’isha responded, ‘Abū Hurayra has not 
remembered. He entered upon the Messenger of Allah as he was saying, 
‘May Allah curse the Jews [for] saying, bad luck is found in three things: 
the house, the woman, and the horse.’ He heard the last part of the statement 
but not the first.’ 
 
 
Regarding this ḥadīth, Mernissi (1991, pp.75-77) is particularly severe. She notes that al-
Bukhārī records the statement of Abū Hurayra but with the exclusion of ʿĀ’isha’s correction 
and goes on to repeat the statement twice more in his collection, via different chains of 
transmission as is customary practice in seeking to strengthen the transmission of a tradition. 
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Not only is the correction of ʿĀ’isha excluded from al-Bukhārī’s collection, but he exacerbates 
the situation according to Mernissi by including further misogynist traditions attributed to the 
Prophet, such as one in which the Prophet is reported to have said women are the greatest 
source of trouble for men, and that the majority population of the hellfire will be made up of 
women. 
 
Al-Zarkashī records a similar ḥadīth with a different chain of narration recorded by Aḥmad in 
his Musnad, where he states: 
 
‘Rūh reported to us, that Saʿīd reported to us, on the authority of Qatāda, on the authority of 
Abū Ḥassān, that two men entered upon ʿĀ’isha and said, ‘Abū Hurayra is narrating that the 
Prophet of Allah would say, ‘Indeed foreboding is found in woman, riding beasts, and homes’.’ 
He said, ʿĀ’isha became visibly enraged and said, ‘By the One who revealed the Quran upon 
Abū al-Qāsim, he never said such a thing, but rather the Prophet of Allah would say, ‘The 
people of ignorance used to say, calamity lies in the woman, riding beast, and home’.’ Then 
she recited, ‘No calamity can ever befall the earth, and neither your own selves, unless it be 
[laid down] in Our decree before We bring it into being: verily, all this is easy for God.’88 
 
The Arabic for the mood of ʿĀ’isha upon hearing Abū Hurayra’s report is rather more severe 
than the translation perhaps allows. It states, ‘a fissure emanated from her up to the sky, and 
from her down through the earth’ (faṭāra shiqatu minha fi al-samā’ wa shiqatu minha fi al-
arḍ), in other words, a dramatically intense and deep emotion was felt and displayed. It is 
interesting to note that in this version of the tradition, ʿĀ’isha does not honour him with the 
excuse that he heard only part of the statement from the Prophet; instead she invalidates his 
statement and offers the correct stance, while visibly angered. 
 
Al-Zarkashī further supports the ḥadīth of ʿĀ’isha by citing a different tradition in which the 
Prophet is reported to have said, ‘70,000 shall enter paradise without account, they are those 
who do not brand [themselves], do not practise exorcism (ruqya) and who trust entirely on their 
Lord.’ In most narrations of this ḥadīth, there is the additional ‘and do not believe in bad 
omens’. How then could the Prophet be said to be warning Muslims of the bad omens that 
reside within women, the riding animal and the home, whilst also mentioning the elevated 
 
88  Quran, al-Ḥadīd, 57:22. 
  149 
position of those who do not believe in bad omens, amongst those who will enter paradise 
without being held to account? Al-Zarkashī opines that ʿĀ’isha’s objection is regarding the 
generality with which Abū Hurayra’s position could be understood, when in reality it has very 
specific application. He cites Ibn al-Jawzī’s opposition to ʿĀ’isha’s rejection of Abū Hurayra’s 
statement because other reliable narrators have reported similar statements, and they cannot all 
be wrong. Instead, in an attempt to reconcile the two positions, such scholars argue that the 
specific instances that the Prophet may have referred to were those as explained by al-Khaṭṭābī 
who said that the statement does not mean that all women, houses and riding beasts are 
inherently a source of bad omens, but that each of these things that can potentially bring much 
joy to a man, can also become sources of anxiety and worry if the woman is barren, if the home 
has evil neighbours and if the riding beast cannot be used in God’s Path. Whilst this attempt at 
reconciling the Prophetic statements goes some way in mitigating some of the misogyny found 
in the initial statement, it does not do so entirely. If a couple cannot have children, how can it 
be assumed that the ‘bad luck’ is on account of the woman and not the man? It also fails to 
reconcile with another statement of the Prophet whereby he proclaimed, ‘Amazing is the affair 
of the believer, verily all of his affairs are good, and this is for no one except the believer. If 
something of good befalls him he is grateful and that is good for him. If something of harm 
befalls him he is patient and that is good for him’.89 If that is so, then no woman, house, animal 
or any other such thing could be said to be a source of bad luck for the believer who finds in 
all their affairs an opportunity for good, and ultimately believes that everything is from God. 
 
In another version of the ḥadīth recorded by Ibn Qutayba in his Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth, 
ʿĀ’isha is said to have responded in the strongest of terms when told by two men of what Abū 
Hurayra stated, exclaiming, ‘He lied! By the One who revealed the Quran upon Abū al-Qāsim, 
who is it that narrates such a thing from the Messenger of Allah!’ The tradition then continues 
as given above. This is no light response from ʿĀ’isha to a tradition that can only be considered 
misogynistic. In sum, this narration from Abū Hurayra is met with severe reprimand; she 
outright calls him a liar, accuses him of mishearing and refutes him using the Quran. This 
clearly anti-woman sentiment deeply enrages her. By all counts of ḥadīth criteria, his statement 
should be rejected, while hers, supported by the Quran, enriched by knowledge of the context 
and her seniority as a Companion, should be elevated over consideration of Abū Hurayra’s. 
 
 
89 Muslim, Chapter: The Book of Asceticism and Heart Softening, ḥadīth No. 2999. 
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It is worth noting that ʿĀ’isha measures the statement against the Quranic verse reminding the 
faithful that all that comes to pass is only by the Will of God, a strong attempt at stripping the 
believers of their superstitious pre-Islamic beliefs. It is for this reason too, that al-Zarkashī cites 
many scholars as having supported the opinion of ʿĀ’isha, given that the Prophet was known 
to prohibit the seeking of evil omens and other such superstitious behaviours. Her constant 
invocation of the Quran makes this an obvious element to her methodology in approaching 
ḥadīth. 
 
Just as Abū Hurayra’s statement alone is given by al-Bukhārī through different transmissions, 
al-Zarkashī cites the various scholars of ḥadīth who had collected the response of ʿĀ’isha too 
through differing chains of transmission. As well as Muslim and Aḥmad recording ʿĀ’isha’s 
response, al-Tirmidhī also records the ḥadīth via Ibn ʿUmar, and on the authority of Sahl b. 
Saʿd, ʿĀ’isha herself, and Anas b. Mālik, illustrating how her position could just as easily be 
fortified in the same way that Abū Hurayra’s has been, and yet her position did not make it into 
the canonical collections of ḥadīth, whilst his did. If her position is not in the canon it is not 
because it cannot be as robustly supported in its chains of narrations, nor is it because it is in 
conflict with Quranic principles - it has clearly been shown to be closer to both Quranic 
principles and Prophetic teachings. Her exclusion is rather the outcome of an all-too-human 
process of collection and canonisation of ḥadīth that has the mark of patriarchy stamped upon 
it. If this is so, then the demand for a re-engagement of the canonical texts that forced them to 
be re-opened is in order. This move must, among other objectives, bring to the centre hitherto 
marginalised voices, such as that of ʿĀ’isha. Her statements made on the basis of clear 
engagement with the Quran, understanding of context, the Prophetic mission, coupled with the 
strength of the chains through which these statements have been reported, demonstrate the fact 
that they have a rightful place within the canon, to take their place alongside statements that 
have already found their way there with much less justification. 
 
Ḥadīth Four 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Ḥākim records in his Mustadrak, in the chapter on Freeing Slaves, that ʿUrwah said: 
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 َّيلإ ُّبحأ ِللها ِليبس يف طوسب َعَّتمُأ نلأ :لاق للها لوسر نإ :لوقي ةريره ابأ نأ ةشئاع غلب
 ِءاكبب ُبَّذعي َتيلما َّنإو ،ةثلاثلا ُّرش ىنِّزلا ُدََلو :لاق للها لوسر نأو ،ىنِّزلا َدَلو َقِتعُأ نأ نم
 َعَّتمُأ نلأ :هلوق امأ :ةباجإ َءاسأف ،اعمس َءاسأ ةريره ابأ للها َمِحَر :ةشئاع تلاقف ،يحلا
 اََمو ،َةََبقَعْلا َمَحَتْقا لاَف} تلزن الم اهني ،ىنِّزلا َدَلو َقِتعُأ نأ نم َّيلإ ُّبحأ ِللها ِليبس يف طوسب
 [٣١ -١١ :دلبلا ]{ٍةَبَقَر ُّكَف ،ُةََبقَعْلا اَم َكاَرَْدأ
 ،هيلع ىعستو ،هُمِْدخَت ُءادوسلا ُةيراجلا هل اَندحأ َّنأ لاإ ،ُقِتعن ام اندنع ام للها لوسر اي :ليق 
 ِليبس يف طوسب َعَّتمُأ نلأ :للها لوسر لاقف ،مهانقتعأف دلاوأب نئجف ،يننزف ،نُهانرمأ ولف
 ،َدَلو َقِتعُأ مث ؛ىنزلاب رمآ نأ نم َّيلإ ُّبحأ ِللها
 
 يذؤي ينقفانلما نِم لجر ناك امنإ ،اذه ىلع ثيدحلا نكت ملف ةثلاثلا ُّرش ىنِّزلا ُدََلو :هلوق امأو
 وه :لاقف ،ىنز ُدَلو هب ام عم هنإ للها لوسر اي :ليق ؟نلاف نِم يُنرِذْعَي نم :لاقف للها َلوسر
 [ ٤٦١:ماعنلأا ] {َٰىرْخُأ َرِْزو ٌةَِرزاَو ُرَِزت لاَو} :لوقي ىلاعت للهاو ةثلاثلا ُّرش
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but one of us has a Black slave girl who serves him. If we order them to 
fornicate, then they will bear us children whom we could then emancipate.’ 
The Messenger of Allah then said, ‘That I should give a whip in the Path of 
Allah, is more beloved to me than to free the child [born] of adultery.’ 
 
As for his saying, ‘The child [born] of adultery is the worst of [the] three’, 
then there is no such statement of the Messenger. Actually, a man from 
among the hypocrites was troubling the Messenger of Allah, so he said, ‘Who 
will relieve me of [this man]?’ It was [then] said, ‘Oh Messenger of Allah, 
among his other [blameworthy traits] is that he is a child of adultery’, to 
which the Messenger of Allah replied, ‘He is worst of the three’ and Allah 
Most High states, ‘No bearer of burdens shall be made to bear another's 
burden.’91 
 
And, as for his saying, ‘Verily, the deceased is punished for the wailing of 
the living,’ then there is no such statement, but rather the Messenger of Allah 
was walking by the house of a Jew who had died, and his family members 
were lamenting over him. He said, ‘Verily they are crying over him, and he 
is being punished.’. And Allah says, ‘God does not burden any human being 
with more than he is well able to bear.92‘ 
 
Al-Zarkashī contends that while this ḥadīth is not recorded by al-Bukhārī or Muslim, the 
recorder of this tradition, al-Ḥākim, states it meets the conditions of both Imāms. Al-Ḥākim 
further notes that the ḥadīth is also recorded by al-Bayhaqi in his Sunan. There are in this ḥadīth 
three contentious points asserted by Abū Hurayra, each of which is met with rebuke and 
refutation by ʿĀ’isha’s employment, once again, of Quranic verses, and an understanding of 
the statement of the Prophet through contextualisation of his words. The position of the child 
born out of wedlock is brought to ʿĀ’isha as elsewhere, whereby she was asked as to whether 
a person born out of wedlock could take up the role of Imām—i.e. leading the Muslims in 
prayer. It is recorded in Muslim that she responded by saying, ‘There is nothing from the sin 
of his parents upon him’, and then proceeded to quote the Quran, ‘No soul shall bear the 
 
91 Quran, al-Anʿām, 6:164. 
92 Quran, al-Baqarah, 2:286. 
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burdens of another,’93 and, ‘the most honoured of you in the Sight of Allah, is the one with 
most Taqwa,94‘95 and, cited the Prophet, ‘The one who recites [the Quran] best from amongst 
you should lead the prayer, and if they are all equal in recitation, then the one best in manners, 
and if they are all equal in their manners, then the one who is eldest in age.’96 All of these 
criteria established by the Prophet are achievements of the individual. For this reason, many 
jurists such as al-Nakhaʿī, al-Shaʿbī, al-Zuhrī, and al-Hassan al-Baṣrī took her position on the 
matter, and it was the accepted position in the Hanbali school of thought (Ibn Qudāmah, 1997, 
Vol.3, p.248). It is clear that time and again she is exhorting the Muslim community to rid itself 
of the previously held beliefs that sins and crimes can be transferred to or inherited by children, 
and to instead firmly reorient Muslims within the Quranic sanctioned innocence of every 
individual and their freedom from the burdens of others, no matter their proximity by blood or 
location. In a similar vein she argues that the deceased cannot be punished for the behaviours 
of those left behind for no soul is burdened with the responsibility of another over whom they 
have no influence.  
 
Having only spent less than the last five years, with some sources citing a grand total of one 
year and nine months with the Prophet, Abū Hurayra could not have been privileged with first-
hand experience of most of these instances, and as such would have been dependent on: a) his 
having heard from a reliable source himself; b) his having grasped the information accurately; 
and c) the accuracy of his memory when relaying the incident. It is clear from ʿĀ’isha’s 
response, ‘May Allah have mercy on Abū Hurayra, he listened poorly and thus explained 
poorly,’ that she is indicting his ability to listen and thus accurately relay. Abū Hurayra had 
been rebuked for this by a number of Companions, perhaps most notably by ʿUmar b. al-
Khaṭṭāb. Abū Rayyah (1994, pp.173-174), writes in his Aḍwā’ ʿala al-Sunnah al-
Muḥammadiyyah of the severity with which ʿUmar is forced to deal with Abū Hurayra. He 
quotes from Ibn ʿAsākir who reported the tradition of al-Sā’ib b. Yazīd who in turn said that 
ʿUmar had rebuked Abū Hurayra for the many traditions he was narrating, saying, ‘Leave the 
 
93 Quran, al-An’am, 6:164. 
94 Taqwa is often rather reductively translated as simply, ‘fear of God’ or ‘God consciousness’ but is a much more multi-
faceted concept, encompassing both these translations, but also love of God, awareness of God’s watchfulness but to also be 
as if one sees God, to be directed by intentionality in achieving God’s Pleasure, and to be well pleased with God. For a more 
thorough consideration of the ways in which this term is invoked in the Quran, see, Ohlander, E. 2005. Fear of God (taqwā) 
in the Qur'ān: Some Notes on Semantic Shift and Thematic Context. Journal of Semitic Studies. 50(1). pp.137-152. 
95 Quran, al-Hujurāt, 49:13. 
96 Muslim, Chapter: The Mosques and Places of Prayer, Section; Who is most entitled to lead the prayer, ḥadīth No. 673. 
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sayings of the Messenger of Allah or I shall chase you back to Daws!’ a city in Yemen from 
where Abū Hurayra hailed. Other reports talk of ʿ Umar’s threats to have Abū Hurayra whipped, 
beaten or exiled. Abū Rayyah states that as a result of ʿUmar’s strictness on the matter, Abū 
Hurayra did not become proliferate in narrating traditions until after the death of ʿUmar. 
Indeed, Abū Rayyah goes on to quote al- Zuhrī who reported on the authority of Abū Salamah, 
who heard Abū Hurayra state, ‘I was not able to say ‘the Messenger of Allah said…’ until 
ʿUmar died. If I were to narrate these traditions to you and ʿUmar was alive, indeed, ʿUmar 
would say, ‘Occupy yourselves with the Quran, for indeed the Quran is the Word of Allah’’ 
(ibid, p.174). Because of such occurrences, Rashīd Riḍā’ upheld in his Majalla al-Manār, ‘Had 
ʿUmar lived until Abū Hurayra passed away, many of these traditions would not have reached 
us’ (1897, Vol.10, p.851). Ghani, in his defence of Abū Hurayra insists that one of the reasons 
Abū Hurayra narrates so much more than other Companions is because he lived a good fifty 
years longer than many of them, unintentionally corroborating the statement of Rashīd Riḍā’; 
had other senior Companions lived as long, and been able to maintain their restraint of Abū 
Hurayra, perhaps this would not have been the case. ʿĀ’isha lived almost as long as Abū 
Hurayra, and her endeavour to keep his and other Companions’ statements pertaining to the 
Prophet within the bounds of truth continued unwaveringly despite her own personal losses at 
the Battle of the Camel, her diminished political role and the deaths of so many of her co-senior 
Companions.  
 
Ḥadīth Eight 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Abū ʿArūba states on the authority of Abū Ṣāliḥ: 
 
عن أبي هريرة قال: لأنْ يمتلئ جوُف أحدكم قيْحا خير له مِن أن يمتلئ شعرا، فقالت عائشة: 
لم يحفظ الحديث، إنما قال رسول الله: لأنْ يمتلئ جوُف أحدكم قيْحا ودما خير له من أن 
يمتلئ شِعرا ُهجيُت به 
 
Abū Hurayra said, ‘That one of you should fill his stomach with vomit and 
blood is better for him than to fill it with poetry.’ To which ʿĀ’isha 
responded, ‘He has not remembered the saying [of the Prophet]. In fact, the 
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Messenger of Allah said, ‘That one of you should fill his stomach with vomit 
and blood is better for him than to fill it with poetry with which he mocks 
[others].’ 
 
In her response to this claim of Abū Hurayra, ʿĀ’isha is able once more to provide context by 
providing the completed statement, demonstrating thereby that Abū Hurayra’s memory had 
indeed failed him. Al-Zarkashī concurs with the corrective of ʿĀ’isha, citing the opinion of 
various scholars who also supported her position that poetry which was disliked was that in 
which another was mocked or ridiculed. Furthermore, that the Prophet is narrated to have been 
fond of particular poets suggests strongly that this is indeed the sounder position. Muslim 
records in his Ṣaḥīḥ, ʿAmr b. Sharīd reported his father as having spoken of riding behind the 
Prophet one day, when the latter asked him if he knew of any poems by the poet Umayya b. 
Abū Ṣalat. When he replied in the affirmative, the Prophet asked him to recite, and so he 
proceeded to recite couplets, at the behest of the Prophet, until he said he had recited one-
hundred couplets of his poetry.97 The Prophet is recorded to have had an appreciation of pre-
Islamic poets, whose words rang true to him. He is reported by al-Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ as 
having commented on the pre-Islamic poet, Labīd saying, ‘The truest words spoken by a poet 
were the words of Labīd, who said, 
  
أَصْدَقُ كَلِمَةٍ قَالَهَا شَاعِرٌ كَلِمَةُ لَبِيدٍ أَلاَ كُلُّ شيء مَا خَلاَ الله َبَاطِلٌ  
 
 
‘Indeed, everything apart from Allah is vanity and falsehood’.’98 The Prophet was also known 
to have employed the skills of poets such as ʿAbdullah b. Rawwāḥa, Kaʿb b. Mālik, Kaʿb b. 
Zuhayr, and Ḥassan b. Thābit in the service of propagating Islam, in order to undermine the 
propaganda of the poets commissioned by his enemies to spread rumours against him in a bid 
to defame him. Thus, it seems most logical that if he were to admonish his community with 
regards to poetry, he would define a particular genre of poetry which he considered unhealthy. 
Having been the subject of such defamatory poetry, and his dear wife, ʿĀ’isha the centre of a 
terrible slander, the Prophet and the religion he advocated is staunch in its position against such 
speech and is instructive of its followers to verify information that reaches them, especially 
when sourced from one whose character is questionable. Indeed, the Quran asserts, ‘O you who 
 
97 Muslim, Chapter: Poetry, ḥadīth No.2255. 
98 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Book of Manners, Section; What kinds of poetry, singing and chanting are permitted, ḥadīth No. 6147. 
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believe! If a sinful person (fāsiq) comes to you with any news, verify it, lest you should harm 
people in ignorance, and afterwards you become regretful for what you have done.’99 
 
While the teachings of the Prophet and the Quran are explicit in their instruction to Muslims to 
avoid such defamatory accusations and slander, it does not single out poetry as particularly 
problematic; indeed, all forms of such speech are to be avoided. ʿĀ’isha with her history and 
experience of the slander against her that shook the Muslim community to its very core, is most 
likely to have been invested in those teachings of Islam that would restrain or seek to prevent 
such incidents from occurring again at any scale and against any individual. By contextualising 
and completing the statement made by Abū Hurayra, she prevents the weaponisation of ḥadīth 
in targeting certain modes of expression such that the mode of expression becomes vilified, 
instead of the actual immoral action that is being targeted.  
 
Impugnment due to Carelessness in Narrating Prophetic Traditions, Ghafla 
 
Ḥadīths numbers 3, 5, 6 and 9 would explicitly fall under this category, though ḥadīth number 
4 above, could also be considered an impugnment of Abū Hurayra by ʿĀ’isha for his 
carelessness in narrating a prophetic tradition he had clearly not committed to memory 
correctly and was divulging to others with unfounded authority. 
 
Ḥadīth Three 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Abū Bakr al-Bazār stated in his Musnad: 
 
قيل لعائشة: أن أبا هريرة يروي عن النبي: أن امرأةَ َعُذِّبَت ْفي هِرةِِ، فقالت عائشة: إن المرأة 
كانت كافرة 
 
 
99 Quran, al-Hujarāt, 49:6. 
  157 
ʿAlqama said: It was said to ʿĀ’isha, ‘Abū Hurayra narrates the Prophet [as 
saying], ‘A woman was punished because of her [treatment of] a cat’.’ 
ʿĀ’isha replied, ‘The woman was a disbeliever.’ 
 
Mernissi (1991, pp.71-72) presents this ḥadīth as evidence of Abū Hurayra’s fixation with cats 
and women. She claims he somewhat resented the agnomen bestowed upon him by the Prophet, 
and had a general  sense of emasculation brought on by his social position: he had no skill with 
which to derive an income, partook in no trading activities or joined in military expeditions in 
all the years that the Prophet was alive. Instead, he preferred to spend time with the Prophet 
and would sometimes be of service in the women’s apartments. Mernissi, perhaps rather 
cynically, asserts, ‘This fact might clear up the mystery about his hatred of women, and also of 
female cats, the two seemingly to be strangely linked in his mind’ (ibid. p.72).  
 
The statement of Abū Hurayrah, without ʿĀ’isha’s amendment, is reported on the authority of 
Asmā’ bint Abū Bakr in al-Bukhārī’s Ṣaḥīḥ, and by ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar by both al-Bukhārī 
and Muslim in their Ṣaḥīḥs, strengthening its narration, just as the previous ḥadīth was 
indirectly strengthened by al-Bukhārī by his failing to mention the response of ʿĀ’isha. 
However, her response is recorded also by Aḥmad in his Musnad, on the authority of Abū 
Dāwūd al-Ṭayālisi, on the authority of ʿAlqama, who said, ‘We were with ʿĀ’isha when Abū 
Hurayra entered; she said, ‘Are you the one who narrated this report, ‘A woman entered the 
fire of hell because of a cat she had tied up and did not feed, nor did she give it water’?’ Abū 
Hurayra replied, ‘I heard it from the Prophet.’ She said, ‘Do you know who this woman was? 
The woman, regardless of what she did, was a disbeliever and the believer is more honoured 
in the sight of Allah than that He punish him or her regarding a cat, so when you narrate from 
the Prophet ponder and think carefully of how you narrate’. Ghani asserts that this illustrates 
that the dispute is semantic rather than about ʿ Ā’isha’s contention over Abū Hurayra’s narration 
of traditions. Where Mernissi’s remarks seem to go beyond the plausible regarding this ḥadīth, 
Ghani’s are underwhelmingly apologetic. 
 
Al-Zarkashī also records another transmission of ʿĀ’isha’s response, similar to the one 
recorded by Aḥmad given above. He quotes Abū Muḥammad Qāsim b. Thābit al-Sarqustī’s 
statement in his book, Gharīb al-Ḥadīth, via ʿAlqama too, though the final sentence from 
ʿĀ’isha states, ‘The believer is more honoured before Allah than to be punished because of a 
cat. As for the woman, she was a disbeliever. Abū Hurayra! If you are going to narrate from 
  158 
the Messenger of Allah, then be watchful of how you narrate’. This is not a mere argument 
over semantics; this is about the carelessness that is bound to occur in the proliferate nature of 
Abū Hurayra’s narrating of Prophetic traditions, a warning that is delivered to Abū Hurayra by 
other Companions too, such as ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, and which will go on to have grave 
consequences in the future when scholars like Ibrāhīm al Nakhaʿī and his student, Abū Ḥanifah, 
reject the traditions reported by Abū Hurayra, considering him an unreliable source. Their 
position will be discussed later when analysing Ḥadīth 9 of this chapter. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s rejection of the statement is in keeping with the ethos of the Quran, whereby deeds 
are not to be judged in isolation and more importantly that the outwardly apparent does not 
signify the inwardly and less obvious matters of faith. God asks in the Quran, ‘Have you made 
the providing of water for the pilgrim and the maintenance of al-Masjid al-Harām equal to [the 
deeds of] one who believes in God and the Last Day and strives in the cause of God? They are 
not equal in the sight of God. And God does not guide the wrongdoing people.’100 In his 
translation of this verse, Muhammad Asad (2008, p.358) notes, ‘According to an authentic 
Tradition quoted by Muslim, Abū Dawūd and Ibn Ḥibbān (as well as by al-Ṭabarī), one of the 
Prophet’s Companions stated in the mosque of Medina, ‘I would not care, after having accepted 
Islam, to do any good deed beyond providing water to the pilgrims!’ Whereupon another of the 
Companions declared, ‘Nay, [I would rather take charge of] the maintenance of the Inviolable 
House of Worship.’ But yet another Companion declared, ‘Nay, struggle (jihād) in God's cause 
is far better than what you have mentioned!’ A short time afterwards the above Quran-verse 
was revealed to the Prophet. It would, therefore, appear that what is meant here is the superior 
value of faith in God and struggle in His cause as compared with acts which, however 
meritorious, are concerned only with outward forms: in brief, the immense superiority of real 
self-surrender to God over mere ritual.’ Likewise, and somewhat inversely, the outwardly 
odious act of the woman’s cruelty towards the cat cannot mitigate whatever acts of faith and 
good deeds she had amassed that went unwitnessed by other people but are eternally recorded 
with God. 
 
Linked with the now solidly elicited habit of ʿĀ’isha to seek ease for the Muslim community, 
such as in Ḥadīths 1 and 4 above, is her preferential treatment of Muslims and their elevation. 
This is not to say that she was creating a hierarchy based on Muslim supremacy; Muslims are 
 
100 Quran, al-Tawba, 9:19. 
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still compelled to show kindness and care to others and all of God’s creation as God’s 
vicegerents on earth. However, the possibility that a believing woman would be so deeply 
punished and have all her praiseworthy behaviours overlooked and rendered futile over the 
singular act of her unkindness towards a cat, incensed ʿ Ā’isha. This is particularly so given that 
there are many injustices that could have been stated and many tyrants that could have been 
exemplified for such punishment, and would have been a more befitting example. 
 
Ḥadīth Five 
 
Al-Zarkashī states:  
 
Al-Ṭabarī in al-Awṣaṭ states on the authority of Abū Salamah: 
 
عن أبي هريرة: أن رسول الله قال: مَن ْلم يُوتِر، فلا صلاة َله، فبلغ ذلك عائشة، فقالت: مَن ْ
سَمَِع هذا من أبي القاسم؟! ما بَُعَد الَعهُْد وما نسينا، إنما قال أبو القاسم: مَن ْجاء بَِصلوات 
الخمِس يوَم القيامة قد حاَفظَ على وُُضوئها ومواقيِتها وركوِعها وسجوِدها، لم يَنَْتقْص مِنُْهنَّ 
شيئا، كان له عند الله عهد ألا يعذبَه، ومن جاءَ، وقد اْنتقصْ منهن شيئا، فليس له عندَ الله 
عهد، إن شاَء رحمه، وإن شاء عذبه 
 
Abū Hurayra reported, the Messenger of Allah said, ‘Whoever does not pray 
the Witr, then there is no prayer [recorded] for him’. When this reached 
ʿĀ’isha, she asked, ‘Who heard this from Abū al-Qāsim? It is not from such 
a remote past, and nor have we forgotten. In fact, Abū al-Qāsim said, 
‘Whoever comes on the Day of Judgement with his five prayers, having been 
astute regarding his ablution, the timings, the bowing and the prostrating, 
then he has not fallen short with his prayers in any way. He has a promise 
from Allah that He shall not punish him. Who then comes along and 
diminishes this? He does not have a promise from Allah. If He wishes He 
shall have mercy on him, and if He wishes He shall punish him’.’ 
 
Once again, ʿĀ’isha is a guardian over the collective memory of the Muslim community, 
arguing that ‘it is not from such a remote past, and nor have we forgotten’. It appears that she 
does not know who has narrated the tradition, thus allowing for the argument that it is not 
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something necessarily personal that she has against Abū Hurayra—as is sometimes asserted—
that drives her in her corrections, but the much loftier ideal of safeguarding the legacy of her 
husband and the message with which he was entrusted to impart to the growing community of 
Muslims. 
 
In keeping with ʿĀ’isha’s commitment to delivering ease within what is permissible for 
Muslims, she retorted against this statement regarding the Witr prayer, while she herself was 
known for her commitment to performing this prayer. However, she did not consider it 
obligatory, preferring to treat it as a highly recommended supererogatory prayer (Sunnah 
Mu’akkadah), and so did not seek to impose a hardship on her community by validating the 
statement. Interestingly she is recorded by Imām Mālik in his Muwaṭṭa as having counselled 
the Muslims on when to pray the Witr saying, ‘If any of you fears that they will fall asleep 
before the morning [prayer] then let them pray their Witr before sleeping, and those who are 
hopeful of waking up for the last portion of the night then pray it in the last portion of the 
night.’101 And yet, when she heard in another incident recorded by Ibn Abū Shaybah and 
ʿAbdul Razzāq, that Abū Dardā’ had said ‘There is no Witr for the one upon whom the morning 
has arisen’, she responded forcefully, stating, ‘Abū Dardā’ has lied (kadhaba Abū Dardā’), the 
Prophet would arise in the morning and pray his Witr’ (al-Dakhīl, 1989, p.404). Though this 
latter ḥadīth has not been recorded by al-Zarkashī in al-Ijāba, it falls into the genre of ḥadīth 
that he has collected, constituting a refutation of the statement, and in this case also evidencing 
that her concern related to a potential imposition on the community of believers, not necessarily 
the result of a personality clash, and though one cannot entirely preclude this latter as a 
possibility, it could not have been the primary motive for these arguments. 
 
Ḥadīth Six 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Al-Ḥāfidh Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān al-Bustī records in his Ṣaḥīḥ on the authority of ʿUrwah b. al-
Zubayr who says that ʿĀ’isha said: 
 
 
101 Al-Muwaṭṭa Chapter: The Night Prayer, ḥadīth No. 18. 
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أن عائشة قالت: ألا يُعجِبُك أبو هريرة، جاء فجلس َإلى جنب حُجرتي يُحدث عن رسول الله، 
يُسمعني ذلك، وكنت أُسبِّح، فقام قبل أن أقضي سُبْحتي، ولو أدركُته لرددتُ عليه: إن رسول 
الله لم يكن يَسُْرُد الحديَث كسردُِكْم 
 
‘Does Abū Hurayra not bemuse you? He came and sat beside my apartment 
and started to narrate from the Messenger of Allah. I could hear it all, but I 
was engaged in prayer, and he had left before I finished. If I had been able 
to, I would have certainly responded to him that the Messenger of Allah was 
not verbose in speech the way that you are verbose!’ 
 
This ḥadīth is also recorded by Muslim in his Ṣaḥīḥ. Al-Zarkashī attempts to remove the sting 
of ʿĀ’isha’s words by quoting Abū Ḥātim, who argued that ʿĀ’isha’s rebuke is not regarding 
the number of traditions Abū Hurayra was narrating, but rather that she was encouraging him 
to speak at a slower speed—that a measured pace is preferred over hasty speech. Indeed, al-
Tirmidhī in his al-Shamā’il al-Muḥamadiyyah, and both al-Bukhārī and Muslim in their 
Ṣaḥīḥs, narrate the following tradition, on the authority of ʿĀ’isha, who said to Abū Hurayra, 
‘The Messenger of Allah was not verbose in the manner that you are verbose; rather, he would 
speak each word clearly, [such that] those sitting with him could grasp [what he said].’ There 
is, however, evidence of other Companions, and later masters too, expressing alarm and dislike 
for the speed at which Abū Hurayra churned out traditions, which would give support to the 
position of Mernissi, who argued that ʿĀ’isha, and others, reproached him for this, rather than 
for merely speaking quickly. 
 
Mernissi (1991, pp.60-61) cites ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, renowned for his close companionship 
with the Prophet, as being terrified of narrating traditions regarding the Prophet for fear of 
being inaccurate, despite the intimacy of his relationship with the Prophet and his venerated 
status among the Muslim community. It is precisely because of this, she argues, that he 
preferred to engage in his own independent reasoning (ijtihād) on issues, taking full ownership 
of them rather than claiming to be acting on specific sayings or actions of the Prophet. This 
would also be in keeping with the ethos encouraged by the Prophet himself who said, ‘When a 
judge gives judgement and strives to know a ruling (ijtahada) and is correct, he has two 
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rewards. If he gives judgement and strives to know a ruling but is wrong, he has one reward.’102 
He also warned,  ‘Do not write anything from me; whoever has written anything from me other 
than the Quran, let him erase it and narrate [orally] from me, for there is nothing wrong with 
that’.103 In many ways, striving to find the most apt conclusion on an issue as a Muslim would 
require more effort than to simply assume a Prophetic statement has been made on the matter 
and to accept it uncritically and literally. It is of course taken by ʿĀ’isha upon hearing a 
Prophetic tradition; it is one that is labour intensive and requires skills, a level of understanding, 
and an intellectual acumen that not everyone will benefit from. Nonetheless it is one Muslims 
owe to themselves. A religion that displaces clergymen as gatekeepers and middlemen between 
the faithful and the Divine is one that should make space for the intellectual and spiritual rigour 
of the individual to be exercised in good faith to come to the most apt conclusion for them. It 
means they are taking full responsibility too for their behaviours and not able to excuse their 
shortcomings on those upon whom they had relied on to come to those religious verdicts, while 
they themselves suspended their own cognitive and spiritual faculties.  
 
Mernissi (1991, p.79) cites ʿUmar, who said of Abū Hurayra, from Ibn Ḥajr al-Asqalānī’s 
biography of him, ‘We have many things to say, but we are afraid to say them, and that man 
there has no restraint.’ She then posits, ‘For the pious Companion the fallibility of memory was 
an occasion for meditating on the fragility of existence in the face of the flowing river of time, 
which steals not only from youth, but especially memory.’ He was acutely aware, as were many 
of his contemporaries, of the perils of relying on a memory that had traversed time and 
experiences and is accessed through the mediation of hindsight. Indeed, there were 
Companions who would stop narrating traditions as they reached old age for fear of their 
weakened memories causing them to narrate inaccurately, fearing the implications of imprecise 
recollections of prophetic tradition. It is noted by Arül in his preamble to the printed edition of 
al-Ijāba that many of the most seniors Companions disliked narrating prophetic traditions for 
fear of making mistakes. Likewise, just as they showed self-restraint, they expected the same 
of others too, and particularly disliked proliferation in narration of ḥadīths because ‘proliferate 
narration was seen as the precinct of the imagination, al-wahm’ (2004, p.43). In other words, 
being proliferate in disseminating prophetic traditions could give rise to the possibility of 
embellishing those narrations until they no longer resemble the original statement. Perhaps it 
 
102 Muslim, Chapter: Reward of the Judge if they strive to reach a correct decision, whether they are right or wrong: ḥadīth 
No. 1716. 
103 Muslim, Chapter: Ascetism and Heart Softeners, ḥadīth No. 5326. 
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is for this reason that ʿĀ’isha was not shy in using words such as ‘he has lied (kadhaba)’, ‘he 
has been heedless (ghafala)’, ‘he has forgotten (nasiya)’ and so on, for it was understood and 
accepted that the sands of time would fall and that memory would falter, and without the 
promise of God to preserve the ḥadīth as He did the Quran, reliance cannot be on those 
traditions alone. People are fallible, including the Companions of the Prophet, and so a ḥadīth 
tradition that is to be trusted and relied upon for religious guidance cannot be so without a 
robust method of differentiation, discernment and reliance on Quranic principles, and one that 
is not based in uncritical acceptance of traditions from all Companions, even when the chain 
of narration meets the criteria of authenticity.  
 
Abū Hurayra was well aware of the criticism of his peers and their disdain for his many 
narrations of ḥadīth. To remedy this, he offered an explanation: he tells of his complaint to the 
Prophet about his inability to retain the sayings of the Prophet despite listening attentively; the 
Prophet, he continues, directed him to lay down his cloak while he sat and to gather it up after 
they had finished speaking, that this would beckon a miracle that would enable him to retain 
the Prophet’s words. This story is narrated by al-Bukhārī104. However, when considering that 
the Prophet would dissuade his Companions from writing down his words for fear of them 
being mingled with the Quran, this seems an unlikely thing for him to do. Mernissi argues it 
was an unsatisfactory excuse before a community that was being purged of superstitious and 
magical beliefs. As such, Abū Hurayra also offered the explanation that he was not occupied 
by anything else, such as a vocation, or as he rather impertinently suggested to ʿĀ’isha, he was 
not distracted by rouge and eyeliner as she may have been, when the Prophet was instructing 
his community in matters of faith. 
 
It could be argued that it was his willingness to narrate Prophetic traditions to anyone, 
indiscriminately, that was the issue for his more senior contemporaries. Abū Rayyah writes 
that Muslim b. al-Ḥajjāj reports on the authority of Busr b. Saʿīd who said, ‘Fear Allah and 
preserve the ḥadīth. By Allah, we have witnessed sitting with Abū Hurayra, and he would 
narrate from the Messenger of Allah, and he would narrate from Kaʿb al-Aḥbār. Then he would 
stand [and leave] and I heard some of those who had been with us make statements of the 
Messenger of Allah as Kaʿb’s, and that which the Messenger of Allah had said as [statements 
 
104 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Sales and Trade, ḥadīth No. 2047. 
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of] Kaʿb! So, fear Allah and preserve the ḥadīth!’ It would appear here then that Abū Hurayra’s 
generosity in divulging ḥadīth without discernment had undesirable outcomes too. 
 
Ḥadīth Nine 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Muslim and Nisā’ī record on the authority of Shurayḥ b. Hānī: 
 
عن أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول الله: من أحبَّ لقاءَ الله، أحبَّ الله لقاءَه ، ومن َكرَِه لقاءَ الله ؛ 
َكرَِه الله لقاءَه، قال شريح: فأتيُت عائشة فقلُت: يا أُم المؤمنين سمعُت أبا هريرة يذكر عن 
رسول الله حديثا إن كان كذلك فقد هلكنا، فقالت: إن الهالَِك مَن َْهلَك، وما ذاك؟ قال: قال 
رسول الله: من أحبَّ لقاءَ الله، أحبَّ الله لقاءَه، ومن َكرَِه لقاءَ الله، َكرَِه الله لقاءَه، وليَس منا 
أحد إلا وهو يكره الموتَ، فقالت: قد قاله رسول الله ولكن إذا شَخََّص البصرُ، وَحشْرََج الصَّدُر 
واقشعرَّ الجِلُد ، وَتشَنَّجَْت الأصابُع ، فعند ذلك من أحبَّ لقاءَ الله، أحبَّ الله لقاَءه، ومن َكرَِه 
لقاءَ الله، َكرَِه الله لقاءَه  
 
On the authority of Abū Hurayra who said, the Messenger of Allah said, 
‘Whoever loves to meet Allah, Allah loves to meet him, and whoever hates 
to meet Allah, then Allah hates to meet him.’ Shurayḥ said, I went to ʿĀ’isha 
and said, ‘Oh Mother of the Believers, I heard Abū Hurayra mention that the 
Messenger of Allah made a statement, which if true, then we are ruined!’ She 
said, ‘The [one claiming] ruination is the one ruined, and what was this?’ He 
said, ‘The Messenger of Allah said, ‘Whoever loves to meet Allah, Allah 
loves to meet him, and whoever hates to meet Allah, then Allah hates to meet 
him’ and there is not a single one from among us, except that he hates death.’ 
She said, ‘The Messenger of Allah did say this, but when the eyes become 
glazed, the chest begins to rattle, the skin starts to goose bump and the fingers 
begin to twitch, then, at this point, whoever loves to meet Allah, Allah loves 
to meet him, and whoever hates to meet Allah, Allah hates to meet him.’ 
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Al-Zarkashī gives no further commentary on this tradition, but simply narrates another similar 
one. The ḥadīth is evidence once more of Abū Hurayra’s limited understanding on the more 
technical aspects of the religion, in this case the eschatological circumstances of the state of a 
believer at the time of death. His statement alone causes much trepidation in those who hear 
the ḥadīth from him, and as has been seen previously, they take his statement to ʿĀ’isha for 
verification. Her role as authenticator and judge of ḥadīth and statements pertaining to the faith 
further augmented. A picture emerges of her eminence among them; her position of authority 
and the supremacy of her word as the final one. This would be a position she would retain for 
many years and is exemplified in the words of al-Shāfiʿī who would say, ‘If there is a tradition 
contradictory to ʿĀ’isha’s it would be obligatory on both of us to accept her tradition rather 
than another, for her tradition should be the standard according to which you and I make our 
choice’ (Spellberg, 1994). 
 
Here, not only has Abū Hurayra been corrected, he has displayed, at worst, a complete lack of 
understanding, and at best poor communication. It is for such reasons that senior scholars such 
as Abū Ḥanifa, and his teacher Ibrahīm al-Nakhaʿī, did not accept Abū Hurayra’s traditions 
quite so easily. Ibn Kathīr notes in his al-Bidāya wa al-Nihāya that al-Thawrī said on the 
authority of Manṣūr, on the authority of Ibrahīm al-Nakhaʿī that, ‘They would take from 
everything Abū Hurayra narrated, except for those traditions regarding the descriptions of 
paradise and hell, or which encouraged towards a righteous action, or that prohibits doing an 
evil mentioned in the Quran’ (Abū Rayyah, 1994, p.179). This would be well in keeping with 
ʿĀ’isha’s methodological approach to Prophetic ḥadīth: to scrutinise statements and individuals 
who were stating them, including the Companions. In this case, al-Nakhaʿī and his student Abū 
Ḥanīfa, and then others of Abū Ḥanīfa’s students continued to be discerning amongst the 
Companions and what they accepted from them. 
 
Abū Rayyah in Shaykh al-Muḍīra Abū Hurayra (1994, p.159), reports that Abū Ḥanifa 
discouraged his students from accepting the statements of three Companions; Anas b. Mālik, 
Abū Hurayra, and Samrāh b. Jundub. When probed as to why he had taken such a position 
regarding these men, he said, ‘As for Anas, he became senile at the end of his life, and would 
give religious rulings according to his intellect, and I am not a follower of his intellect. And as 
for Abū Hurayra, well, he would narrate everything that he heard without contemplation of the 
meaning, and without knowing what was abrogating, and what was abrogated.’. While later 
scholars would use this ignorance of Abū Hurayra’s as an excuse for his corrected narrations, 
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Abū Ḥanifah made clear that this was a reason not to accept traditions of import to the pillars 
of the religion from him. He simply was not knowledgeable enough to have his traditions taken 
into consideration on such central points of faith.  
  
Impugnment due to Opposition from Reliable Authorities, (Mukhālif al-Thiqāt)  
  
Essentially, all of the traditions recorded in this chapter can be considered an impugnment of 
Abū Hurayra due to ʿĀ’isha’s opposition to his claims, but Ḥadīths 7, 10, and 11 are most 
explicit in this regard: With the statements and actions of ʿĀ’isha being most vociferously so 
in Ḥadīth 11, which is then further corroborated by a similar contention against Abū Hurayra 
by another senior Companion, ʿAlī. 
 
Ḥadīth Seven 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādi mentions, with a chain to Abū ʿArūba al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-
Ḥurāni, who narrates on the authority of Yaḥya b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥāṭib, who narrated:  
 
عن أبي هريرة أنه قال: مَن َْغسَّل َميتا اغتسل، ومن حمله توضأ، فبلغ ذلك عائشة فقالت: 
أَونجس موتى المسلين؟ وما على رجل لو حَمََل عودا؟ 
 
Abū Hurayra said, ‘Whoever performs the ghusl, ritual washing of the 
deceased, must also perform the ghusl, and whoever touched it must perform 
wuḍū’, ablution.’ When this reached ʿĀ’isha, she remarked, ‘Have the 
deceased of the Muslims become impure? And what of a man who has carried 
the body?’ 
 
Al-Zarkashī comments that the majority of the Companions narrate this tradition and none of 
them claim ablution needs to be made upon touching the deceased. It is instead considered a 
marfūʿ ḥadīth, meaning it has a chain going back to Abū Hurayra and is attributed to the 
Prophet, but is not a strong narration. 
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As is reported in al-Qurtubī’s Jāmiʿ Bayān al-ʿIlm (1994, p.915), Ibn Masʿūd also comes to 
hear of this narration from Abū Hurayra and similarly rebukes him for this statement saying, 
‘Oh people! You are not made impure by your dead’. Such narrations caused early scholars to 
look upon the traditions narrated by Abū Hurayra pertaining to jurisprudence, theology, or 
doctrinal beliefs with some wariness, as has been discussed previously in relation to Ḥadīth 9. 
 
ʿĀ’isha displays a real protectiveness (ghīra) for the Muslim community, and one that has also 
been illustrated earlier in this chapter in Ḥadīths 2, 3, 5 and 9, all ḥadīth that would potentially 
cause believers anxiety or difficulty in their praxis. She seeks ease for those Muslims who are 
alive by not requiring those who have washed the deceased to have to perform a full bath, a 
cumbersome task especially if they wish to partake in the funeral prayers for which ritual 
purification is mandatory, and honour for those Muslims who have passed, by rejecting the 
notion that their bodies could now become a source of defilement. Additionally, she also asserts 
her logic by asking ‘and what of a man who has carried the body?’. In other words, she is 
asking for the location and mode of the impurity; is it in the act of washing, or is it in the act 
of touching? The question is meant to expose the illogical and impracticable nature of the 
original statement, much like her response to the attempt at prohibiting women from travelling 
without a male guardian, to which she responded ‘and who here has a male guardian always?’, 
which can be read in Chapter Four under her response to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī. This Socratic 
questioning by ʿ Ā’isha not only undermines the statements she is responding to, but also incites 
and provokes those listening. 
 
Ḥadīth Ten 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbdullah b. ʿAlī al-Baghawi narrates: 
 
بلغ عائشة أن أبا هريرة يقول: إن المرأةَ تَْقطَُع الصَّلاَة، فقالت: كان رسول الله يَُصلِّي، فتقُع 
رجلي بَين يديه أو بحذائه، فيصفها، فأقبضها 
 
It reached ʿĀ’isha that Abū Hurayra said, ‘A woman nullifies the prayer [if 
she walks in front of a person offering the prayer]’. So, she said, ‘The 
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Messenger of Allah would pray and tuck my feet between his hands or his 
thighs. Then he would push them back [when prostrating], and I would 
stretch them forward [when he would raise his head from prostration].’ 
 
Al-Zarkashī makes no further comment on this ḥadīth. The words of ʿĀ’isha are sufficient a 
response to the claim of Abū Hurayra. Muslim and al-Bukhārī both record a similar tradition, 
wherein it is mentioned that ʿĀ’isha is informed of a statement claiming that the prayer is 
nullified by a dog, donkey, or woman passing between the one praying and the Qibla. In 
response she is reported to say, ‘Do you make us like donkeys and dogs! By Allah, I have seen 
the Messenger of Allah pray while I am on the mattress, between him and the Qibla, lying on 
my side. Then I had a need, but I disliked sitting up, thus disturbing the Messenger of Allah, 
so I slipped away slowly by his feet.’ 
 
Both responses of ʿĀ’isha paint a very different picture to that of the one created by Abū 
Hurayra wherein women are merely another nullifier alongside dogs and donkeys—
incidentally, both animals associated with humiliation and lowliness—in the category of beings 
that nullify the prayer. ʿĀ’isha not only refutes such a misogynistic and irrational classification 
of women, but she also offers us an intimate image of a prayerful Prophet who was 
simultaneously a loving and humble husband too. One can only reassert the weakness of Abū 
Hurayra in narrating on matters pertaining to jurisprudence. 
 
Ḥadīth Eleven 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
The two Shaykhs [Muslim and al-Bukhārī] narrate on the authority of Abū Hurayra that the 
Messenger of Allah said: 
 
لا يَمْشِينَّ أحدُكم في نعل واحدة، لَِينَْعلُْهما جميعا، أو لَِيخْلَْعُهما جميعا 
 
‘Not one of you should walk with only one shoe on; either put them both on, 
or take them both off’. 
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While there is no explicit refutation of Abū Hurayra by ʿĀ’isha in this ḥadīth, it is recorded 
here by al-Zarkashī for the fact that ʿĀ’isha had a contradictory tradition attributed to her. Al-
Zarkashī recalls it as a sound tradition narrated on the authority of Abū Bakr b. Abū Shaybah, 
who said, Ibn ʿUyaynah narrated on the authority of ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. al-Qāsim, on the 
authority of his father that ʿĀ’isha was walking around with only one leather sock on saying, 
‘[this] is to provoke Abū Hurayra.’ 
 
Interestingly, al-Zarkashī notes that the refutation of ʿĀ’isha is recorded in the same chapter as 
Abū Hurayra’s ḥadīth, but that ‘the scholars did not give it any attention, because the prophetic 
way, Sunnah, is not to be contradicted by opinion’. This is an almost preposterous statement 
given that it is established that ʿĀ’isha has refuted, rebuked and corrected Abū Hurayra on 
numerous occasions, that she is more knowledgeable and more reliable of the two, and that she 
had a far longer and more intimate relationship with the Prophet than Abū Hurayra did. It is 
questionable that the statement of Abū Hurayra be taken to represent the prophetic Sunnah, 
while the position of ʿĀ’isha is relegated to merely her opinion, thus allowing for her statement 
to be ignored even when set side by side with that of Abū Hurayra in the same chapter of a 
book.  
 
Ibn Qutayba in fact cites in his Kitāb Ta’wīl Mukhtalif al-Ḥadīth that when this tradition of 
Abū Hurayra was reported to ʿĀ’isha she was subsequently found walking around with only 
one shoe on. When questioned about this, she replied. ‘Indeed, I oppose Abū Hurayra’. 
Incidentally, Ibn Qutayba reports a similar occurrence with ʿAlī b. Abū Tālib, whereby it 
reached him that Abū Hurayra was insisting that upon performing the ritual washing (wuḍū’) 
or when putting on clothes, one should begin each step with the right side. ʿAlī responded by 
calling for water in order to make wuḍū’ and started with the left, saying ‘Indeed, I oppose Abū 
Hurayra’.   
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has provided a number of interventions on the basis of ʿĀ’isha’s example that 
would contribute to the strengthening of critical ḥadīth studies. The primary contribution is the 
expansion of the existing understanding of tarjīḥ al-Ṣaḥāba—the preference of the 
Companions above other generations of Muslims—to integrating the also already existing 
understanding that amongst them there is also a variance. This variance is founded on the basis 
  170 
of their seniority, knowledge, experience, length of time spent with the Prophet, participation 
in key events in the history and establishment of Islam as a faith and movement, such that, 
while as a generation they retain their superiority over later generations of Muslims, as the 
generation that aided, strengthened and established Muḥammad as their Prophet and Islam as 
their religion, amongst themselves there are degrees and ranks. Indeed, this too is a concept 
that was not neglected by early scholars and is reflected in the contestation of who constituted 
a Ṣaḥābī.  
 
Ibn Ṣalāh (1986, p.293) writes that there was difference of opinion (ikhtilāf) amongst the 
scholars as to who could be considered a Companion. Two positions emerged: one upheld by 
the scholars of ḥadīth (Ahl al-ḥadīth) and one upheld by the legal theorists (Uṣūliyūn). The 
scholars of ḥadīth agreed with the statement made by al-Bukhārī in his Ṣaḥīḥ as to who could 
be considered a Companion. He wrote, ‘Any Muslim who accompanied the Prophet or saw 
him is a Ṣaḥābī.’ The scope is quite broad as there is no minimum requirement for how long a 
person needed to have accompanied the Prophet. Indeed, the bare minimum requirement 
appears to be to have merely seen the Prophet directly in his lifetime. Ibn Ṣalāh (ibid.) notes 
that legal theorists had a narrower view. He gives the view of Saʿīd b. al-Mūsayyib, a second-
generation Muslim (tābiʿī) and son in law to Abū Hurayra, who was respected in his own right 
as a jurist and one whose piety was celebrated by his peers and Companions who saw him. 105 
Saʿīd b. al-Musayyib had stated that he did not consider anyone a Companion of the Messenger 
of God unless they had spent at least a year or two years in his company and had battled 
alongside him in one or two battles (ibid.). Thereby thoroughly restricting the category of 
Companion. This is precedented by the restriction on the term imposed by some Companions 
themselves. Ibn Ṣalāh (ibid. p.294) writes, on the authority of Shaʿbah who said Mūsa al-
Subulānī said, ‘I went to Anas b. Mālik and said, ‘Is there any Companion of the Messenger of 
Allah left apart from you?’ He said, ‘There are many from amongst the Arabs left who saw 
him, but as for those who accompanied him (ṣāḥabahu), then no [there are no others left].’’ 
This statement is recorded by Muslim too. Anas b. Mālik clearly differentiating between those 
who simply saw the Prophet, and those who actually spent time in his company in deciphering 
who was a Companion and who wasn’t. The question is then raised as to why seek to create 
 
105 He was one of the Seven Fuqaha of Medina, credited for contributing to the transmission of ḥadīth and development of 
legal rulings in Medina in the second century. The other six being, ʿUrwah b. al-Zubayr, Sālim b. ʿAbdallah b. ʿUmar. Al-
Qāsim b. Muḥammad b. Abū Bakr, Abū Salamah b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. ʿAwf, Sulaymān b. Yasār, and Khārija b. Zayd b. 
Thābit. 
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these delineations and demarcate those from amongst that generation on the grounds of criteria 
that differentiated on the basis of proximity to and length of time spent with the Prophet. This 
could only have been because of the rising prominence of Companions as religious authorities 
and the reliance of the following generation upon them for guidance in their lives, both religious 
and otherwise.  
 
ʿĀ’isha’s insistence on holding to account those Companions around her who narrated 
statements of the Prophet supports this. She is all too aware of the limitations of each one of 
their claims and in the particular instance of Abū Hurayra, cites his verbosity as a source of 
dubiousness. Instead, his verbosity comes to be celebrated by later generations of Muslims who 
marvel at the number of ḥadīth he narrates, rather than suspect it. ʿĀ’isha remains a standard 
of integrity against which narrations are tested. It is seen in this chapter on numerous occasions, 
that Companions and second-generation Muslims, were consistently sending Prophetic 
statements back to ʿĀ’isha for verification. It could even be seen as an established practice of 
the earliest generations to do so. She becomes the yard stick by which all statements are 
measured. Where Abū Hurayra is made to change his mind on what he thought the Prophet had 
said—as in Ḥadīth 1—and to re-reference his statement from the Prophet to another 
Companion as shown in the explanation of Ḥadīth 6, ʿĀ’isha remains steadfast and reliable in 
her narrations and in her correctives. Abū Hurayra is shown to be lax in who he narrates to, 
how much he narrates, and upon whose authority he narrates ḥadīth. He is what would be 
referred to by ḥadīth scholars as tasāhul fi riwāyat al-ḥadīth—lax in his narration of ḥadīth—
were he not a Companion but rather a narrator of a later generation. Whereas ʿĀ’isha proves 
herself strict and thoughtful in her narrations—mutashaddidah fi riwāyat al-ḥadīth—a trait 
required by all other narrators of ḥadīth who are not Companions. By opening up the 
Companions to a level of scrutiny that does not undermine their status—after all it is still their 
expertise being sought and their honesty being relied upon to attain Prophetic statements—but 
that does allow differentiation between them in order to extract the most reliable narration, 
would serve only to strengthen understanding and praxis based on ḥadīth. By being able to 
draw out more authentic statements, instead of seeking to reconcile them or, worse yet, 
preferring the statements of a less adept Companion over one of far more knowledgeable, 
contemporary situations that give rise for the need to exercise Ijtihād can also be aided by the 
methodology that emerges through these correctives of ʿĀ’isha’s and the criteria she uses to 
justify her positions. 
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Having considered her extensive correctives of Abū Hurayra, the next chapter will reflect on 
ʿĀ’isha’s response to the claim of Faṭima bint Qayṣ. Unlike Abū Hurayra, Faṭima’s chapter is 
not constituted of a number of correctives on an array of statements, but is concerned with one 
assertion of Faṭima’s concerning the housing and maintenance of a divorced woman on the 
basis of her experience. It warrants its own chapter for the wealth of information it contributes 
to the emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha in evaluating ḥadīth, which in turn contributes to the 
findings of Chapter Seven.  
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Chapter Six: ʿĀ’isha the Compassionate 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s response to Faṭima is unique in the collection presented by al-Zarkashī not least 
because it is the only ḥadīth in which ʿĀ’isha is responding to a female companion, but also 
because of what it reveals of her methodology in approaching ḥadīth from what I would term 
an ethic of care. To this effect, this chapter discusses the theory and practise of an ethic of care 
as expounded by its key developers, Carol Gilligan and Nel Noddings. 
 
This chapter will map the historical treatment of the divergent positions this ḥadīth presents 
and how the gender of Faṭima is treated, if at all, and the various conclusion Islamic 
practitioners of law have come to. Unlike the previous chapter, this one does not offer analysis 
on the basis of the established ḥadīth criteria for acceptance and impugnment of narrators, 
because ʿĀ’isha does not impugn Faṭima, nor does she negate her statement. Instead, ʿĀ’isha’s 
contention lies in Faṭima’s normative assertion of her experience, while ʿĀ’isha insists on it 
being treated as an exceptional case. 
 
The chapter proceeds to expound on the ethic of care as espoused by ʿĀ’isha and as illustrated 
by this ḥadīth. Furthermore, in this chapter, I seek to illustrate that the ethic of care is not only 
the modus operandi of ʿĀ’isha, but that it is one rooted in her experience of being cared for by 
the Prophet, and in her desire to seek to connect the Muslim community to God through a 
safeguarding of the Divine care shown to believers in the Quran. Importantly, the ethic of care 
as a component of ʿĀ’isha’s approach to the ḥadīth allows for a multiplicity of correct 
conclusions, allowing for the full agency of individual Muslims with regards to their praxis, 
but also ensuring their connection to God by removing the necessity for constant referral to 
‘experts’, or those who would fancy themselves representatives of God and assume for 
themselves a position between God and the Muslim. This despite the warning of the Quran to 
remove all intermediaries between God and the worshipper. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to Faṭima bint Qayṣ 
 
Al-Zarkashī states: 
 
Muslim and the four Ṣiḥāḥ record on the authority of Shaʿbī who said, 
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عن الشعبي قال: دخلت على فاطمة َبنِت قيس فسألتها عن قصاء ِرسول الله عليها، فقالت: 
طلقها زوجُها البتة، فخاصمته إلى رسول ِالله في السُّكنى والنفقة، قالت: فلم يجعل لي 
سكنى ولا نفقة 
 
‘I visited Faṭima bint Qayṣ and asked her about the verdict of the Messenger 
of God regarding [the provisions to be provided by her ex-husband to] her. 
She said her husband divorced her with an irrevocable divorce, so she argued 
her case before the Messenger of God, regarding her lodging and 
maintenance but he decreed against her being provided either [by her ex-
husband].’ 
 
Al-Zarkashī relays another ḥadīth in which Faṭima’s stance is considered in ʿ Ā’isha’s presence. 
He writes that al-Bukhārī records the same ḥadīth but with the following addition on the 
authority of Hishām who reported his father as saying that ʿ Ā’isha condemned (ʿābat) Faṭima’s 
statement and its implications in the most severe terms. She said, ‘She was in a secluded place, 
so there was fear for her safety. As a result, the Messenger of God made a concession for her.’ 
 
Al-Zarkashī proceeds to support this position by giving further evidence from a report recorded 
by Muslim on the authority of ʿ Urwah who said, Yaḥya b. Saʿīd b. al-ʿĀṣ, married the daughter 
of ʿAbdul Raḥmān b. al-Ḥakam, but then he divorced her and expelled her from the house. 
They were condemned for this by ʿUrwah, but they simply responded, ‘Faṭima left [her 
husband’s house].’ ʿ Urwah reports seeking out ʿ Ā’isha for clarity on the matter. She responded, 
‘There is no benefit for Faṭima in repeating this ḥadīth.’ In other words, the situation that Faṭima 
found herself in was one that required particular attention and special consideration as it did 
not align with the conventional legal requirements on divorce. ʿĀ’isha describes Faṭima as 
being in a makān waḥsh, translated above as a secluded place, but which can also suggest a 
lonely and anxious place. There was clearly concern for Faṭima’s safety that warranted a 
concession and a legal verdict that was specific to her unusual circumstances. It was not to be 
used as a means by which men could divorce their wives and then dispense of their obligations 
towards their ex-wives as they observed their waiting period (ʿiddah).  
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Faṭima’s position is also rejected by ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, whose criticism of Faṭima’s report 
has received much scrutiny for its apparently partially sexist basis for rejecting her statement.106 
He is reported to have rejected her statement, vociferously arguing, ‘We will not abandon the 
Book of God and the Sunnah of His Prophet for the saying of a woman. We do not know if she 
accurately remembers the situation.’107 In another statement, he is reported to have responded, 
‘We do not give preference to the words of women in matters of religion. The thrice divorced 
[i.e. irrevocably divorced] woman is entitled to lodging and maintenance.’108  Despite the 
overtly sexist language, which does not behove ʿUmar who capitulated on a number of 
occasions to the opinion or reprimand of women,109 his objection is grounded in the fact that 
he believes Faṭima’s statement is in contravention to the requirements stipulated in the Quran 
and Prophetic practice.  
 
Likewise, Marwān b. al-Ḥakam is also reported to have opposed Faṭima’s normative assertion 
of her experience. Al-Sanʿānī records in his Muṣannaf that the story of Faṭima was relayed to 
Marwān and he responded, ‘I have not heard of this statement from anyone other than a woman. 
We will adhere to the custom of the people [i.e that the woman remains in her marital home 
for the waiting period].’ When Faṭima was made aware of his response, she retorted, ‘Between 
us the Quran [is sufficient as a witness]. God, the Almighty, the Most Majestic has said,  
 
 ظََلمَ  َفَقْد  اِلله  حُُدوَد  يَتََعدَّ  وَمَن  اِلله  حُُدوُد  وَِتلْكَ  مُّبَيَِّنةٍ  شٍَة بَِفاحِ  يَْأتِينَ  أَن  إِلا  يَخُْرجَْن  وَلا  بُيُوتِِهنَّ  مِن  تُخِْرجُوُهنَّ  لا
اً أَمْر  َذلِكَ  بَْعَد  يُحِْدثُ  اَلله  لََعلَّ  تَْدرِي  لا نَْفسَُه  
 
‘Do not expel them from their homes; and neither shall they [be made to] leave unless they 
become openly guilty of immoral conduct. These, then, are the bounds set by God - and he who 
 
106 See Sayeed, A, 2009. Gender and Legal Authority: An Examination of Early Juristic Opposition to Women’s Ḥadīth 
Transmission, Islamic Law and Society. 16(2). pp.115-150. 
107 Muslim, Chapter: Divorce, Section; She who is irrevocable divorced, ḥadīth No. 1480. 
108 Interestingly, this ḥadīth is recorded in Muslim’s Ṣaḥīḥ, but is rejected by Aḥmad and others who consider it a weak 
narration.  
109 Imām al-Ghazālī reports in his magnus opus, Ihya’ ‘Ulūm al-Dīn,  a widely circulated incident wherein, as Caliph, ʿUmar 
attempted to instate a limit on how much mahr (money gifted to the bride by the groom upon marriage) could be demanded, 
by delivering a speech in the mosque. Upon hearing his declaration, an old woman from amongst the congregants stood up 
and rebuked ʿ Umar saying ‘You shall not take away from us what God has given us’ and then recited from the Quran to further 
her stance. ʿUmar replied defeated and sufficiently sobered, ‘A woman is right and ʿUmar is wrong’. 
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transgresses the bounds set by God does indeed sin against himself: [for, O man, although] you 
know it not, after that [first breach] God may well cause something new to come about.’110 
 
Faṭima continued, ‘This is for one who can return to her husband [i.e whose divorce is still yet 
revocable], but what can be hoped for after three [pronouncements of divorce]?’ Faṭima 
remained adamant that her experience also provided a normative position in the developing 
legal theory of Islam for the irrevocably divorced woman which did not contradict the Quranic 
verses whose subject matter was in fact the divorcee who could yet still hope for reconciliation 
to occur.111 In fact, Faṭima is recorded as attempting to enact her experience into normativity 
amongst the Muslim community when her niece finds herself irrevocably divorced by her 
husband, ʿAbdullah b. ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān. Faṭima instructed her niece to leave her husband’s 
home and come to her home instead. Marwān came to know of this and commanded that the 
niece be returned to her husband’s home to complete the requisite waiting period. It was on 
this occasion the above report occurred.  
 
The case of Faṭima bint Qayṣ is one that has proven divisive and most difficult to reconcile 
among scholars of Islam. She regularly makes appeal to her experience as a precedent set by 
the Prophet and finds her stance both utterly rejected by dissenters on the basis that it 
contradicts the Quran, and supported by proponents of her statement on the basis that it is 
supported by the Quran. It becomes apparent, then, that the issue is one of legal reasoning 
(ijtihād). Ibn Abū Shaybah (2008, Vol. 6, pp.472-476) writes in his Muṣannaf that the scholars 
of Islam, reflecting the state of affairs of the Companions on the matter, were conflicted. Three 
positions emerge on the issue: 
 
1. If the divorce is irrevocable the divorced woman has neither lodging nor maintenance provided 
for her. This is the opinion held by Aḥmad b. Hanbal, Ibn Rāhawayh, al-Ḥasan al-Baṣri, ʿAṭā’ 
b. Abi Rabāḥ, al-Ṭāwūs and al-Shaʿbī. They have all based their opinion on the full acceptance 
of Faṭima’s narration. 
 
2. The irrevocably divorced woman is entitled to receiving both lodging and maintenance. This 
was the opinion held by ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb, as well as Ibn Masʿūd and the jurists, Sufyān al-
 
110 Quran, al-Ṭalāq, 65:1. 
111 ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Sanʿānī, Muṣannaf ḥadīth No., 12024 and 12025. 
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Thawrī, Ibn Shabramah, Ibn Abū Layla, al-Ḥasan b. Abū Ṣāliḥ, Abū Ḥanīfa, Abū Yusuf and 
Muḥammad al-Shaybānī, all of whom suggested Faṭima’s position was an exceptional case or 
rejected her statement as untenable with the guidelines set forth in the Quran. 
 
3. The woman who has been divorced irrevocably is due to be provided lodging by her ex-
husband, but he is not obliged to provide her with any maintenance. The third position appears 
to attempt a reconciliatory position between the first two. It is the position taken up by Mālik 
b. Anas, al-Layth b. Saʿd and al-Shafiʿī. In fact, al-Shafiʿī concisely illustrates the position, 
contending, ‘We grant her lodging on the basis of the Book of God, since God said, ‘Do not 
drive them out of their homes,’ nor should they themselves leave ‘unless they commit a flagrant 
indecency.’112 She does not receive maintenance on the basis of the statement of the Messenger 
of God concerning the story of Faṭima bint Qayṣ.’ 
 
Al-Shafiʿī, along with many other scholars who were of the opinion that a divorced woman 
was entitled to housing (sakna) during her waiting period after the pronouncement of divorce 
but not maintenance (nafaqa), supported their opinion by the Quranic verse: 
 
أَسِْكنُوُهنَّ مِن ْحَيُْث سََكنتُم مِّن وُْجدُِكْم وَلا تَُضارُّوُهنَّ لُِتضَيُِّقوا َعلَيِْهنَّ وَِإن ُكنَّ أُولات ِحَمٍْل َفأَنفُِقوا َعلَيِْهنَّ حَتَّى 
يََضْعن َحَمَْلهُنَّ َفإِْن أَْرَضْعن َلَُكْم َفآُتوهُنَّ أُُجوَرُهنَّ وَْأتَمُِروا بَيَْنكُم بِمَْعُروٍف وَِإن تََعاسَْرتُْم َفسَتُْرِضع ُلَُه أُْخرَى 
 
‘[Hence,] let the women [who are undergoing a waiting-period] live in the same manner as you 
live yourselves (Askinu-hunna) in accordance with your means; and do not harass them with a 
view to making their lives a misery. And if they happen to be with child, spend freely (anfiqu) 
on them until they deliver their burden; and if they nurse your offspring [after the divorce has 
become final], give them their [due] recompense; and take counsel with one another in a fair 
manner [about the child's future]. And if both of you find it difficult [that the mother should 
nurse the child], let another woman nurse it on behalf of him [who has begotten it].’113 
 
Because the command to house divorced women is given in general terms, while the command 
to spend on them is made conditional on the pregnant state of the divorcee, these scholars have 
argued that the command for sakna is a general one (ʿām), whereas the imperative for nafaqa 
 
112 Quran, al-Ṭalāq 65:1. 
113 Quran, al-Ṭalāq 65:6. 
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is a restricted one (khās). If maintenance was a universal right of irrevocably divorced women, 
so the argument goes, the imperative to spend on their ex-wives would not have been predicated 
on pregnancy and would instead have been made as a general requirement without conditional 
qualifications, in the manner that housing is commanded.  
 
However, there are also scholars like Aḥmad b. Hanbal who took the juridical position that a 
divorcee is not obliged to receive housing or maintenance based on the ḥadīth of Faṭima bint 
Qayṣ.  
 
An Ethic of Care as Ḥadīth Methodology 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s correction of Faṭima in the case of this ḥadīth is interesting for the fact that, despite 
ʿĀ’isha’s ardent opposition of Faṭima’s position, she does not impugn her, neither as an 
unreliable narrator nor in terms of the content of her statement, as she often does with other 
Companions whom she challenged. ʿĀ’isha does not condemn Faṭima’s memory, grasp or 
understanding of her situation. She does not express a deep anger, nor does she deny the 
experience Faṭima had when going through her own divorce, and she certainly does not cast 
doubt on the reliability of her position on the basis of her gender. ʿĀ’isha does not invalidate 
Faṭima on any of these bases, but instead shows concern for the potential damage she foresees 
in the wide uptake of Faṭima’s position on the vulnerability of future generations of Muslim 
women divorcees. 
 
I propose that ʿĀ’isha is exhibiting an ethic of care towards the Muslim community in all her 
responses, but that this case makes for a particularly insightful example. 
 
In her pioneering book, In a Different Voice: Psychological Theory and Women’s Development 
(1982), Gilligan disputes the claims of established forefathers of philosophy, in particular those 
of Lawrence Kohlberg, on moral development and maturity, arguing that whilst their findings 
and assertions were accurate of the male experience, they were, by design, and because of the 
gender bias inherent to them, unable to chart the moral maturity of women—they did not take 
into consideration the female experience. This meant that women were condemned to 
consistently fare poorly in results. According to Gilligan (ibid. p.6), ‘[by] implicitly adopting 
the male life as the norm, they have tried to fashion women out of a masculine cloth,’ further 
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adding that this meant that women’s moral development then simply, ‘falls through the sieve’ 
(ibid. p.18) of such research. 
 
Kohlberg’s model, briefly, is composed of three levels, each constituted by two stages. Each 
stage builds upon the last therefore none can be skipped, as each provides a new and essential 
perspective, both differentiated from the preceding stage, and interconnected. These levels and 
their stages were: 
 
• Level One: Pre-Conventional Morality: At this stage authority is viewed as outside the 
individual and moral reasoning occurs with physical consequences as the primary 
consideration.  
o Stage One: Obedience and Punishment Orientation. The individual is motivated 
in their actions by a desire to avoid punishment. 
o Stage Two: Individualism and Exchange. The individual realises there is more 
than one correct view and begins to take decisions based on self-interest. 
 
• Level Two: Conventional Morality: The moral code as constructed by external 
authority is internalized without question. 
o Stage Three: Good Interpersonal Relationships. Decisions are made in order to 
please others and to be seen as a good person. Approval of others becomes 
primary in the decision-making process. This is the point beyond which 
Kohlberg did not consider women capable of progressing. 
o Stage Four: Maintaining Social Order. Decisions are made in order to comply 
with laws and societal norms to avoid guilt. 
 
• Level Three: Post-Conventional Morality: Judgments are made on the basis of 
personally developed principles, and moral reasoning is premised on rights and justice. 
o Stage Five: Social Contract and Individual Rights. The individual comes to 
realise that rules and laws exist for the greater good for most people and most 
times, but that there are always exceptions in which these rules and laws will 
not achieve the best outcome. 
o Stage Six: Universal Principles. At this stage the individual makes their 
judgements on the basis of their own moral guidelines, which may or may not 
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be congruent with the rules and laws of authority. This moral guideline is 
concerned with universal ethical principles. The individual will do what they 
believe to be right, even if it is against the law. (Papalia, D., Olds, S.W., and 
Feldman, R.D., 2009, pp.376-377) 
 
 In Kohlberg’s model, women were deemed incapable of surpassing the 3rd stage 
(conventional), where the motivation for moral behaviour is to seek approval, whereas men 
could progress to achieving the very highest level of morality on the scale; ascending three 
further stages to arrive at the 6th level, where morality is motivated by an internalised and 
principled moral perspective (Gilligan, 1982, p.18). Using Kohlberg’s model of moral 
development, she demonstrated that the disparity between boys’ and girls’ results did not 
indicate a moral immaturity in the girls but evidenced another way of thinking and engaging 
morality. Gilligan argued that the consideration girls showed to immediate networks of relation 
when presented with a moral dilemma did not represent an inferior way of thinking morally, 
but an alternative one—one that was not inferior, and not necessarily superior either, but 
another way of thinking; a different voice.  
 
In sum, Gilligan posited that there were two approaches to ethical decision making. The first 
is described as the ethics of justice, traditionally associated with how men think, rooting its 
ethical decision making in universal principles which are considered from an impartial position, 
giving results that are verifiable against universal principles such as laws, and that deliver 
equitable results for all people. It is abstract and procedural. The second is the ethic of care, 
whereby the universal is recognised as not always being applicable when taking into 
consideration individual circumstances, the networks of relations affected and the needs of 
others, noting that it is in the differences and not the universal aspects of an experience where 
moral dilemma is encountered. It is more contextual and concerned with narratives. These two 
approaches need not be seen as in conflict, and of course an integrative approach is perfectly 
plausible, as asserted by Gilligan too, but in many instances the ethic of care has not been 
considered for its being mostly and traditionally associated with women. Indeed, Gilligan 
wrote, ‘As we have listened for centuries to the voices of men and the theories of development 
that their experience informs, so we have come more recently to notice not only the silence of 
women, but the difficulty of hearing what they say when they speak. Yet in the different voice 
of women lies the truth of an ethics of care, the tie between relationship and responsibility, and 
the origins of aggression in the failure of connection’ (ibid. p.173). Table 2, composed by 
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Malan and Cilliers, illustrates the key differences between the ethic of care and the logic of 
justice. Whilst ʿĀ’isha’s voice has been preserved in texts, it has been effectively muted by the 
centuries of exclusively male interpretation, classification and mobilisations of the sacred texts 
of Islam, thereby also reducing and even neglecting the consideration of care in her approach. 
 
 
Ethic of Care Logic of Justice 
Relationships Rules 
Interdependence and connections Autonomous individual 
Decision Calculation 
Responsibility Duty 
Responsibility and respect Rights and formal equality 
Context Formal rights and rules 
Table 2: The key differences between the ethic of care and the logic of justice (Malan and 
Cilliers, 2003, p.10) 
 
The ethic of care as espoused by Gilligan has been widely received and applied in various 
disciplines, such as, inter alia, education, international relations, health care and area studies, 
however it has not been without critique too.114 Much of this centres around the implication 
that these differences are inherently gendered, and that this may unintentionally give the 
impression that the root of these gendered differences lies in the notion that women are hard-
wired biologically to think in a certain way, while men in another, instead of turning attention 
to how gender consciousness is formed and the myriad ways in which the physical 
circumstances and condition, education and cultural ideologies that are current meld with 
historical conditions of class, race, age and generation to culminate in creating these differences 
due to ways societies construct gender and thereby the gendered experience.115  
 
 
114 The academic journal, Signs, 1986 11(2) is dedicated to a roundtable discussion which discussed and critiqued In a Different 
Voice from a number of perspectives, along with a response by Carol Gilligan. See also Malan, Y. and Cilliers, P. 2004. 
Gilligan and complexity: reinterpreting the ‘ethic of care’. Acta Academia. 36(3), pp.1-20, for a critical but reconciliatory 
analysis. 
115 For more on this see, Zella, L. 1986, A Methodological Critique. Signs. 11(2), pp.316-321. 
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In the particular case of ʿĀ’isha, however, I would assert that any ethic of care she enacts is 
one  not solely informed by her lived experience but one that is foremost and deeply rooted in 
a theological-philosophical position espoused by the Quran and exemplified in Prophetic 
practice (Sunnah), which she observed first hand. Noddings, one of the pioneers of the ethics 
of care, asserts that, ‘ethical caring depends not upon a rule or principle but upon the 
development of an ideal self’ (1984, p.94) , and not just any ideal self but one which is 
‘developed in congruence with one’s best remembrance of caring and being cared for’. 
Considering ʿĀ’isha’s companionship of the Prophet and the variant ways in which she 
witnessed and experienced his care, her best remembrance of being cared for would have been 
that which she experienced living with the Prophet himself. 
 
Nel Noddings (1984, p.94), argues for the understanding of ‘care’ as a practice, rather than a 
theory, which is engaged in the interconnectivity between individuals concerned with meeting 
the needs of others as well as our own selves, whilst being motivated to care by the desire to 
achieve an ideal of the self which has been developed in congruence with the best memories 
one has of caring and being cared for. Care ethics foregoes the ‘justice perspective’ in favour 
of a moral one. 
 
Rather than focusing on universalised principles and ideals working in the service of 
independent individuals, it allows for a narrative of relations to be considered; a holistic 
analysis of the connections of relationships involved in any act, and the repercussion of the act 
on those relationships. A significant point raised by Noddings is with regard to the attempted 
universifiability of moral principles as being reductive. She argues that this universifiabilty 
relies on what Nietzsche points out as ‘sameness’. In other words, in order to be able to have 
universal moral principles, it also has to be asserted that individual human experiences and 
predicaments have a sufficient amount of sameness to the experiences to allow for this. To 
bring primary focus onto those elements of the experience which are supposedly the same, the 
situation has to be sufficiently abstracted away from. This abstraction from the individual 
experiences is then at a loss of all those qualities in which they differed. This is crucial because 
it is precisely in the differences that moral dilemmas arise. As such then, Noddings (ibid. p.85) 
states, ‘That condition which makes the situation different and thereby induces genuine moral 
puzzlement cannot be satisfied by the application of principles developed in situations of 
sameness’. In fact, an acknowledgement of this is found in the practise of the Prophet. It is 
reported in the Musnad of Aḥmad that a young man came to the Prophet and enquired as to 
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whether or not it was permissible for him to kiss his wife whilst fasting, due to the prohibition 
of intercourse during fasting hours. The Prophet told him no, it was not permissible. Sometime 
later, an elderly man came and posed the same question to the Prophet, to whom he replied in 
the affirmative, telling him he could kiss his wife whilst fasting. Hearing the contradiction in 
answers, those in the Prophet’s company questioned him regarding this discrepancy. He 
responded that the former was young and perhaps unlikely to limit himself to just a kiss, 
whereas the latter was elderly and likely satisfied at just a kiss. In both circumstances there is 
plenty in common; both are Muslim men, married, engaging in active intimate relationships 
with their wives and seeking to understand the boundaries within which they must remain for 
the duration of their fasts. A generalised principle could have been established by the answer 
granted to the first questioner, but the Prophet allowed for the difference in the two situations, 
rather than the overwhelming similarities to guide his answer to each.  
 
Another example is found in the work of Ibn Kathīr’s, Tārīkh, in which he narrates how 
following the Battle of the Trench, the Muslim army was commanded by the Prophet to head 
towards Banū Qurayẓa next. He instructs his Companions that none should pray ʿAṣr until they 
arrive at their destination. However, en route, the Companions noted that the time within which 
to pray ʿAṣr was running short, and some feared that they would run out of time if they waited 
until they arrived at Banu Qurayẓa. Difference of opinion arose between the group and they 
could not refer the matter to the Prophet as he was not travelling with them. Divided on the 
matter, a group of them decided to pause to pray taking the words of the Prophet as a suggestion 
to get to their destination swiftly but not meaning to risk missing the obligatory prayer, whilst 
the others decided that it was an absolute command and that they would continue to delay the 
prayer until they arrived in Banu Qurayẓa. Once the army was reunited with the Prophet, the 
issue was brought to his attention for an ex post facto judgement. He in turn validated both 
interpretations and subsequent actions as valid. While the specifics had been the same, the 
difference lay in the interpretation of his words; both parties in turn were also striving to do 
what was right both by God and the Prophet; they wanted to give to each what they had 
requested of them. They had made their own ijtihād, exerted their own reasoning in concluding 
on their given opinions. Because both positions had been arrived at by careful reasoning that 
sought to stay loyal to God and the Prophet, neither was deemed incorrect. An ethic of care 
therefore allows for a multiplicity of correct responses. 
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This is not to say that general principles have no utility - they are useful in the abstract and 
theoretical discussion of potential predicaments one may wish to consider for scrutiny, but that 
in the consideration of real life events, the application of these general principles may not yield 
optimum results for all parties involved. However, adopting an approach grounded in the ethic 
of care, can be universally applied. 
 
This is consistently exemplified by ʿĀ’isha in a number of her correctives. One example of 
such would be in her refutation of ʿUbayd b. ʿUmayr’s position that women needed to undo 
their braids when performing ghusl. As a general principle, it is expected that in the process of 
taking a full bath, that the hair would be washed too. From the perspective of men in particular, 
with short or unbraided hair, it would seem perhaps therefore reasonable to untie the braids to 
ensure that every hair is washed. How much of a burden this would be for women (and men) 
for whom braids or other such hairstyles as locks, are a longwinded process to do and undo 
may not occur to those for whom such hairstyles are not customary or even familiar. By 
challenging the position, ʿ Ā’isha is exposing the impracticality and undesirability of the general 
principle in the lives of a particular Muslim constituent. She is granting ease in the practise of 
the religion for its adherents, especially women.  
 
A further aspect of the ethic of care is the criteria governing an individual’s obligation to care. 
Noddings (ibid. p.86) enumerates two objectives; firstly, the existence of or the potential for a 
present relation between the caregiver and the cared-for, and secondly, the dynamic potential 
for growth in this relationship - including increased reciprocity. In the Quran, God is reported 
to have told the angels when He created humans, that He was placing upon the earth vicegerents 
of His.116 As such then, when ʿĀ’isha moves to make ease and to question the conclusions of 
Companions that create hardship for any member of the Muslim Ummah, she is acting as the 
vicegerent of God; not so much focusing on the potential relations the act would yield between 
herself and the Muslim community, but the potential relations it could foster between the 
individual Muslim and the One on whose behalf she is acting as vicegerent; God. This is 
particularly important when restrictions are being imposed on the basis of a Muslim woman’s 
gender, as the sexism and misogyny is attributed to God, with whom then the connection for 
the Muslim woman is one riddled with tensions. 
 
116 Quran, al-Baqarah, 2:30, ‘And [mention, O Muhammad], when your Lord said to the angels, ‘Indeed, I will make upon the 
earth a vicegerent (khalīfah)’…’. 
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Noddings (ibid. pp.32-35) elucidates the intentionality of the caregiver, speaking in terms of 
the energy of motivation that they exert. For the one who is aspiring to respond to another from 
a truly caring position, the motivation of energy to respond holds the other at the centre of their 
motivation, not themselves, nor any other ulterior motive. With an ethic of care exerting an 
energy of motivation towards the one being cared for, rather than directing energy towards an 
abstract principle claiming universality and premised on ‘what God wants’, knowing for the 
Muslim that it is only ever what God wants that occurs, the upholding of principles is not given 
preference over the wellbeing of the individual or their community. This in turn allows for the 
multiplicity that the Prophetic example resulted in, rather than committing the multi-variant, 
culturally and generationally diverse Muslim community to the blanket binary answers of 
permissible and impermissible (ḥalāl and ḥarām).  
 
Gilligan (1982, p174) argues, ‘While an ethic of justice proceeds from the premise of 
equality—that everyone should be treated the same—an ethic of care rests on the premise of 
non-violence—that no-one should be hurt’. I would argue that an Islamic perspective of justice, 
a central theme in the Quran and an essential attribute ascribed to God, would encompass both 
these approaches, for justice in the Islamic sense is not just punitive but restorative too, and if 
justice is to be restorative then it must be one that embodies care.117 Thus, for example, even 
though the Quran does prescribe punishment for one who is guilty of murder, and does validate 
the right of the victim’s family to demand justice through retaliation in kind Qiṣāṣ or the 
concept of ‘an eye for an eye’, justifying the family in their demands for the death penalty 
against the murdered, it also exhorts them to forgiveness. In fact, forgiveness as a virtuous act 
is cited numerous times in the Quran as being superior to revenge or punishment.118  As such, 
then, the Quran and the practice of the Prophet call Muslim praxis to an ethic that is rooted in  
justice which in turn is rooted in care. As Gilligan (1983, p47) herself states, ‘…the concept of 
morality sustains a dialectical tension between justice and care, aspiring always toward the 
ideal of a world more caring and more just.’ 
 
 
117  Azizah al-Hibri speaks on the concept of Justice from Western and Muslim perspectives in her talk, ‘The Quranic 
Worldview: A Womanist Perspective’, a keynote speech delivered at Baker Institute for Public Policy, Rice University. A 
recording can be accessed at: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=WI5gLoCoa4c&t=1978s. 
118 See for example, Quran, al-Shūra, 42:40, ‘And the retribution for an evil act is an evil one like it, but whoever pardons and 
makes reconciliation - his reward is [due] from Allah. Indeed, He does not like wrongdoers.’ 
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ʿĀ’isha’s Intervention as an Ethic of Care 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s correction of Faṭima in al-Ijāba is anomalous for it being the only corrective directed 
at a female companion, but beyond that it also illustrates most effectively the care and concern 
ʿĀ’isha exercised in her decision-making process and in issuing religious verdicts (fatwas) to 
the Muslim community. 
 
Within the framework of the ethic of care, morality is a matter of care because networks of 
relationships are considered as an important touchstone in problem-solving. The world is seen 
as a complex network of relationships between individuals, rather than just a system of rules, 
principles, competing rights, and hierarchical ideals. This mirrors closely the Quranic 
conceptualisation of the Ummah, the global Muslim community forged on the foundations of 
religious belief and communal connection, which is required to operate not only on the basis 
of what is good and right for the individual, but also consider the impact it has on the 
community starting from those closest in proximity to one e.g. the family, then the 
neighbourhood, and so on.119  
 
Gilligan also asserts that one’s obligations towards an object of care is ‘limited and delimited 
by relation’ (1983, p.86). In other words, the efficacy and value of care in ones service to 
another is dependent on the nature of the relationship of the carer and the other, and how well 
the carer is aware of, attuned to and considerate of the number of relationships within their 
network that are affected by the outcomes which they generate. Considering the positionality 
of both women in question and their networks of relationships, it is clear that the network of 
relations that ʿĀ’isha would be considering is broader than that of Faṭima’s. While ʿĀ’isha is 
concerned with the immediate effects of applying Faṭima’s experience universally, she is also 
attentive to the longer-term effects of Faṭima’s stance on future generations of Muslim women 
who find themselves divorced. Contrastingly, Faṭima is concerned in the first instance by her 
own experience which involved her, her ex-husband, his family, and then her new husband 
upon emerging from her waiting period, and whilst this is a broad network of relations to 
consider, it is not nearly as wide as the one envisaged by ʿ Ā’isha. In a second reported instance, 
 
119 For more in-depth discussion on the term Ummah, see: Denny, F.M. 1975. The Meaning of ‘Ummah’ in the Qur’ān. History 
of Religions. 15(1), pp.34-70, and al-Ahsan, A. 2007. The Quranic Concept of Ummah. Institute of Muslim Minority Affairs. 
7(2), pp.606-616. 
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wherein Faṭima tried to assert her experience as normative, it was concerning her newly 
divorced niece; again, a situation likely to have a broad network of relations, but still one 
incomparable to that of ʿĀ’isha.  
 
It is quite possible that Faṭima too was aware of the emancipatory potential of her position for 
Muslim women, so that they may experience a full and absolute rupture from their ex-husbands 
and the network of connections which entangled them, including provisions such as lodging 
and maintenance. If this was indeed an assumption of hers, it would require that all women 
have recourse to their own finances, lodging and security, or that they have family to provide 
such for them, and that they live within a society where a woman living independently is a 
culturally accepted norm and will not find herself harassed—an unlikely proposition.  
 
Furthermore, it is clear that ʿĀ’isha’s position is once again aligned with the precedent of the 
Prophet. When he made his pronouncement and judged against Faṭima receiving neither 
lodging nor maintenance from her ex-husband, and not only called for her removal from his 
house, but also arranged an alternative lodging where she could carry out her waiting period, 
he was taking into consideration her immediate network of relationships. Al-Zarkashī writes 
that this removal of her from her ex-husband’s abode was for fear of them breaking into her 
home and insulting or harming her. ʿĀ’isha also confirms this in her statements regarding 
Faṭima’s situation. For this reason, then, Faṭima’s position could not have normative force 
because it was an exceptional case: the family she was departing were unreliable and possibly 
volatile—they could not be regarded as paradigmatic of the experience of divorced Muslim 
women, hence the remedy granted to Faṭima was also exceptional. This distinction is crucial 
as it also demonstrates something of the attitude of the Prophet, and ʿĀ’isha as well, with 
regards to justice. After the Prophet’s migration to Medina, following the mass migration of 
his followers, of whom Faṭima bint Qayṣ was an early member, he was effectively head of a 
modest but steadily growing state, and as with any state boundaries are created through cultural 
practice and norms, as well as legal and state structures, however vastly different these may be 
from time to time and place to place. Regardless of the times and place in which systems lay 
down boundaries, they can never remain in equilibrium; contexts are forever unfolding, and so 
these boundaries are developed, tested, restricted, challenged, expanded in their contact with 
ongoing changes and the tensions they create. The Prophetic example is one of operating in the 
space of those tensions and indeed being an agent of those tensions; much of what he called 
his community to in Makkah was so reprehensible to them because it created tensions by 
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insisting that there were injustices that required resolving. Even in the setting of boundaries by 
the Prophet himself, we see a willingness to treat those boundaries as flexible and variable. 
Again, a crucial element in his practice as this allows the Muslim community the security of 
boundaries but doesn’t set their limits at them.  
 
Boundaries therefore become a place of contestation, where if they continue to provide the 
community with stability, opportunity for growth, and most importantly, justice, then it justifies 
being maintained, but if it fails to deliver these objectives, then it provides for the Muslim 
community a start from which to move forward. Justice cannot be achieved nor bound to a 
system alone, especially not one constructed by the limited endeavour of humans striving to 
best manifest a system inspired by Divine guidance. As Derrida argues, justice cannot be bound 
to any ‘system’; it exceeds the system by demanding from it that which it cannot provide, thus 
forcing a change in the system, if not at least demanding one. As has been asserted by Fazlur 
Rahman, the Prophet was a man, chosen by the Divine as the receptacle of revelation and 
instigator of change, but the community to be changed is also human, and thus incapable of 
achieving Divine objectives overnight. It is a process that is an ongoing endeavour of the 
Muslim, literally one who repeatedly submits because revelation occurs constantly as the 
human capacity to better understand and realise its objectives improves over time, rather than 
corrupts over time. Therefore all that could have been achieved in the time of the Prophet, and 
what could have been demanded by the Quran was a contingent standard, commensurate with 
the capacity, understanding, and socio-political context in which it was revealed, but the Quran 
has set a trajectory for Muslims to continue to develop and ascend in order to reach the ideal, 
and if not reach it then to at least progress in pursuit of it. Therefore, it is crucial that Muslims 
themselves seek to keep the boundaries of laws laid down in the name of Islam adjustable and 
to create tensions by pushing at boundaries that no longer deliver just outcomes. 
 
It has already been stated that Faṭima had attempted to advocate for her niece to be allowed to 
leave her husband following an irrevocable divorce without lodging or maintenance 
requirements so as to allow a clean break. As Noddings (1984, p.33) states, caring expands 
beyond just feelings, ‘there is a motivational shift in energy’, this energy flows towards the 
object of one’s caring, not one’s ego - which is possibly what Faṭima was concerned with when 
wishing to make her experience normative—though, importantly, this does not necessitate an 
outcome that the other will find most palatable or appeasing. She further elaborates that caring 
is an act of ‘receptivity’, and that being in a mode of reception when tending to the other, is to 
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‘have our manipulative efforts at rest…impelled to an attentive quietude’ (ibid. p30). This 
quietening and removal of manipulation though, is perhaps not so easily achieved when one is 
engaging an issue as an assertion of power too. All that can be realistically hoped for is a 
reduction in the use of manipulation so that the most equitable conclusion can be arrived at. 
  
Faṭima appears plagued by the decision that was made for her by the Prophet and unsettled by 
the exceptionalism of her case. She does not have jurisdiction over anyone, but when the 
opportunity arises within her own family, she moves to utilise that situation in her favour. 
ʿĀ’isha is seen to not deny the validity of what was prescribed for Faṭima by the Prophet but 
does contest the universality of it. This is key not only as a practice of care, but in the 
establishment of justice too. Furthermore, it is very much in congruence with the approach 
taken by what Asma Barlas (2002, p.58) terms ‘critical scholars’ of Islam, who, in contrast to 
conservatives, also advocate for a contextualisation of Islam’s sacred texts, in order to 
differentiate between the universals and the particulars within them.  
 
Gilligan (1980, pp.223-249), prior to writing In a Different Voice, argued that unmodifiable 
and concrete ideals and principles of justice, co-exist with intolerance, as they do not take 
consequences into consideration. The removal of the historicity of the Quran and ḥadīth and 
decontextualising them, has meant a sacralising of not only these texts but also the moment in 
history within which they were revealed. This in turn results in readings and interpretations 
that insist on universalising everything in its most literalist form, insisting on a recalling and 
reinitiating of a whole historically placed context and culture in order to best realise this form 
of Islam, culminating in restrictive readings which instead of facilitating the Quran and ḥadīth 
as applicable guides for all places and times, ‘severely limits its application and contradicts the 
stated universal purpose’ (wadud, 1999, p.6) of the Quran, and also the ḥadīth. The approach 
of critical scholars, in contrast, is to argue for contextualisation and historicisation, and not 
only the freedom but the importance of interpretation of sacred texts as an ongoing and cyclical 
process whereby scholars well-versed in the needs and workings of their society are able to 
mine sacred texts for general principles and recontextualising them into the current moment, 
and repeat this process with every passing generation. In other words, they advocate for a 
critical ijtihād to allow for new and more relevant interpretations, allowing for variation in the 
results to exercising informed interpretations, and for this to be an open endeavour, for there is 
no single moment in time when human interpretation of Divine Speech will become perfected, 
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and thereby understanding of those texts that shadow it, including the ḥadīth, will also in turn 
need to be reassessed. 
 
Unfortunately, alternative cases of a similarly complex nature as that of Faṭima’s regarding 
divorce are not available to us, not from the time of the Prophet nor ʿĀ’isha, but given the 
broader examples already presented, it can confidently be asserted and reasonable to assume a 
number of possibilities available to women and men who find themselves irrevocably divorced 
and who have exceptional circumstances that require a deviation from what is standard practice 
or ideal would be sanctioned by the Prophet. Therefore, while this chapter has sought to extract 
from the practice of ʿĀ’isha an establishment of an ethic of care in her approach, it does not 
seek to say that the position of Faṭima is invalid, just that it has no normative function, but in 
cases similar to hers where a woman is vulnerable she should be cared for, housed and protected 
in ways that do not lead to endangerment. The ethic of care allows for a multiplicity of options 
to be developed by those in authority, tending to the individual needs of each case. 
 
Conclusion 
 
Faṭima bint Qayṣ’ ḥadīth and the response of ʿĀ’isha to it are outliers within al-Ijāba, not only 
for the fact that it is the only ḥadīth in which ʿĀ’isha is responding to a woman, but also for 
the manner in which her contestation is made. ʿĀ’isha does not impugn Faṭima; at most, she 
mentions that ‘it does not benefit Faṭima’ to keep repeating her experience in an attempt to 
generalise it amongst the community. The treatment of Faṭima’s ḥadīth also gives some insight 
into the manner in which gender has been weaponised against women, and perhaps is indicative 
of why women did not become producers but only transmitters of knowledge.  
 
Most importantly, the ḥadīth is an effective means by which to illustrate an ethic of care at 
work in ʿĀ’isha’s approach to law. A central component of this is what is described by the 
feminist ethic of care as a consideration for networks of relationships and the impact a single 
individual’s decision can have on these networks. This in turn is an essential aspect of the 
Prophetic notion of community. The Prophet is famously recorded in al-Bukhārī as having 
described the Muslim community as a unified body, saying, ‘The parable of the believers in 
their affection, mercy, and compassion for each other is that of a body. When any limb aches, 
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the whole body reacts with sleeplessness and fever.’ 120  In other words, the actions and 
experiences of one part of the community is impactful on other parts of the community, just as 
when one eye cries, the other cannot sleep. This consideration of the ripple effects of the ways 
in which a ḥadīth are instituted into the community are more broadly considered by ʿĀ’isha 
than Faṭima. Yet even in her refutation of Faṭima’s assertions of the implications of her 
experience on the rest of the community, ʿĀ’isha continues to hold her experience with care, 
and does not undermine, or seek to erase or deny Faṭima’s experience.  
 
This concern for a broader network of relationships that extends beyond her local and temporal 
community, to the Muslims beyond her locale and time, is evidenced through many of her 
responses that have been considered in this research. Each evidences her motivation to ensure 
ease, as well as useful outcomes for her community, as a means also to maintaining their 
positive and healthy relationship with God.  
 
Having considered the existing frameworks for scrutinising ḥadīth in Chapter Two, and 
ʿĀ’isha’s correctives of Companions on juridical issues in Chapter Four, along with her 
correctives of Abū Hurayra and Faṭima in Chapters Five and Six respectively, the next chapter 
will now present her emergent methodology in ḥadīth scrutiny and discuss its implications for 
the study of ḥadīth. 
 
  
 
120 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Book of Manners, Section; Being merciful to humans and animals, ḥadīth No. 6011. 
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Chapter Seven: ʿĀ’isha and the Ḥadīth Tradition: An Emergent Methodology 
 
This research thus far has been invested in analysing the various themes and topics presented 
in al-Ijāba in an attempt to critically engage with ʿĀ’isha’s correctives. Chapters Four through 
Six have foregrounded key reoccurring techniques ʿĀ’isha invoked when responding to ḥadīth. 
This chapter seeks to clearly delineate the emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha in approaching 
the ḥadīth tradition as well as examining her emergent technical terminology (muṣṭalaḥ) as 
well. 
 
The Criteria 
 
The emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha on how to approach the ḥadīth that has been excavated 
through this research is as follows: 
 
1. Measuring Ḥadīth Traditions Against the Quran 
 
It is the belief of Muslims that the Quran is the ultimate and final word of God, holding the 
highest authority in Islam. This being the case, ʿĀ’isha and a number of Companions are found 
to respond to narrations of ḥadīth which they objected to, or found fault with, by measuring up 
those statements against the Quran. In this thesis, ʿĀ’isha is seen to respond to Companions a 
number of times, citing the Quran as an evidence against the veracity or accuracy of what they 
have stated. She is in fact seen to do this with the Prophet himself too, questioning his 
statements against what she knew of the Quran until she was satisfied with his explanation, 
indeed this behaviour of hers is well documented as one of the most endearing traits of hers 
before her beloved husband. Al-Bukhārī records in his Ṣaḥīḥ the following tradition:  
 
‘Whenever ʿĀ’isha heard anything which she did not understand, she used to 
ask again until she understood it completely. ʿĀ’isha said, ‘Once the Prophet 
said, ‘Whoever will be called to account [about his deeds on the Day of 
Resurrection] will surely be punished.’ I said, ‘Doesn't Allah say, ‘He surely 
will receive an easy reckoning.’ The Prophet replied, ‘This means only the 
  193 
presentation of the accounts but whoever will be argued against about his 
account, will certainly be ruined’’.121 
 
She was a most astute student, one who centred her understanding around the words of God 
and set about to best understand the Prophet’s words in their light. Arül mentions in his 
introduction that the Ṣaḥīḥ ḥadīth cannot contradict the statements of the Quran. This is well 
in keeping with the classical ḥadīth tradition, and yet when ʿĀ’isha corrected a statement of 
Ibn ʿUmar’s using the Quran, the majority (jamhūr) of scholars decided in favour of Ibn 
ʿUmar’s statement. It is recorded in al-Bukhārī that Ibn ʿUmar narrated the following tradition, 
 
The Prophet looked at the people of the well (ahl al-Qalīb)122 and said, 
‘Have you found true what your Lord promised you?’ It was said to him, 
‘You are addressing dead people.’ He replied, ‘You do not hear better than 
them, but they cannot reply.’123 
 
The understanding being that the deceased had heard the Prophet’s rebuke of them as clearly 
as the one questioning him. However, the very next tradition recorded by al-Bukhārī is one 
reported by ʿĀ’isha, who sought to clarify this by her statement that,  
 
‘The Prophet said, ‘They now realise that what I used to tell them was the 
truth. And Allah said, ‘Verily! You cannot make the dead to hear (i.e. benefit 
them, and similarly the disbelievers) nor can you make the deaf hear’124.’ 125 
 
ʿĀ’isha seeks, once more, to protect the Muslim community from falling back into a pre-
Islamic belief that the dead could hear the living by reminding the community of the supremacy 
and finality of the words of God as revealed in the Quran. Indeed, it has gone on to be the 
authoritative position in Islam, and yet the ḥadīth of Ibn ʿUmar is given preference and is even 
said to be stronger because of its being strengthened by other chains of narration corroborating 
 
121 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Knowledge, Section; One who heard something and continued to ask questions until they have 
understood, ḥadīth No. 103. 
122 I.e. the bodies of enemy combatants which had been gathered during the Battle of Badr and thrown into a nearby well. 
123 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Funerals, Section; Punishment in the grave, ḥadīth No. 1370. 
124 Quran, al-Naml, 27:80. 
125 Al-Bukhārī, Chapter: Funerals, Section; Punishment in the grave, ḥadīth No. 1371. 
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his narration. The question that arises is: what then of the Quran? It could be asserted that if 
both traditions are considered sound, then surely the seniority of ʿĀ’isha and the support of the 
Quranic verse is what should be given precedence. Instead, we find outrageous statements such 
as those made by Yāsir Aḥmad al-Shamālī, who states in,  Samāʿ al-Mayyit fi Ḍaw’ al-Kitāb 
wa al-Sunnah, that the question of whether the dead could hear the living was something 
outside of the knowledge of ʿĀ’isha, and that despite the fact she was qualified to engage in 
ijtihād, i.e. a mujtahida, this was an occasion when she had been incorrect. It would be more 
prudent to consider the difference in the status of the two Companions with conflicting reports, 
rather than to assume their equal reliability, and to consider whose argument best tallies with 
the statements of the Quran. 
 
2. Measuring Ḥadīth Traditions against the Prophetic Practise (Sunnah) and other 
Prophetic Traditions known to ʿĀ’isha 
 
It was common practice among Companions of the Prophet to measure traditions they heard 
from others against their lived experience with the Prophet during his lifetime. This tool of the 
Companions in the verification of a prophetic tradition would lend itself to the argument that 
the Companions cannot be considered equally reliable; they will have spent different amounts 
of time with the Prophet, witnessed him in different or limited capacities, and had varying 
degrees of proximity and relationship with him. By this standard, there are few that could be 
said to attain the level of ʿĀ’isha, who spent her formative years with the Prophet, not only as 
his wife but as a member of the family of Abū Bakr, one of the first Muslims. She accompanied 
the Prophet on incursions as well as seeing him in the domestic setting, as a leader and advisor 
to his followers, as a husband to her and her co-wives, as a father and so on, both during the 
days and the nights, through his wellness and sickness, and through to his passing away. 
Therefore, she witnessed him and his Sunnah firsthand, and with the broadest range of 
experience. She was not only a narrator of his life, but a key protagonist in his story. Hence, 
after his death she was most knowledgeable of the intricacies of what constituted a good 
Muslim life, and able to support her positions with Prophetic traditions. Siddiqi (1994) notes 
she comes fourth amongst the most proliferous ḥadīth narrators among the Companions.126 
 
126 Of course, first place is awarded to Abū Hurayra who narrates 5374 traditions, while ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar comes in second 
place narrating less than half that number, with 2630 traditions to his name, and Anas b. Mālik in third place with 2286 
traditions to his name. (Siddiqi, 1993, pp.22-27). 
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When a tradition came to her she was able to validate it as correct, to make clear the actual 
meaning from the apparent meaning, as was seen in Ḥadīth 9 of Chapter Five, wherein the 
words would indicate that only those who love to meet God are met by a God who loves to 
meet them too, but no one loves to die in order for that meeting to occur. ʿ Ā’isha deftly provides 
clarification of the meaning of the words of the Prophet: at the point of death the dying knows 
in what state they will find their Lord’s reception of them and as such will love or hate to 
proceed in their meeting with Him. Furthermore, ʿ Ā’isha was able to complete ḥadīth that were 
only partially narrated as was the case in Chapter Five with Ḥadīth 2, wherein Abū Hurayra’s 
incomplete report implied that women are a source of bad luck. This is remedied by ʿĀ’isha’s 
corrective. In the same chapter, we find an example of how she was also able to designate a 
tradition false or inaccurate, such as Ḥadīth 5, narrated by Abū Hurayra, wherein he reports 
that the prayers of those who do not offer the additional witr prayer are not accepted. She 
refutes this claim of his, again building a case based upon the Quran. 
 
This method to measure ḥadīth appears most often in cases of an eschatological nature, such 
as whether or not the deceased is punished for the wailing of those mourning them, as was 
asserted by both ʿ Umar and his son, Ibn ʿ Umar. This also appears in the debate with Ibn ʿ Abbās 
on whether the Prophet saw God when he made his ascent through the seven heavens. 
 
3. Measuring Ḥadīth Traditions against her own reason and intellect  
 
Having resided with the Prophet for many years, and having had her childhood and young adult 
life lived under the tutelage of his love and guidance, she was well primed to judge a situation 
by her intellect, sharpened through her scrutiny and questioning of the Prophet in his lifetime, 
to grasp the very essence of his teachings. A woman so encouraged by her husband to be a 
probing, inquisitive learner, would be nurtured to go on using the sharpness of her mind 
throughout life and in her scrutiny of statements brought before her.  
 
Ḥadīth 3 in Chapter Five exemplifies ʿĀ’isha’s practice of applying her intellect to the reports 
which were brought before her, prior to accepting them. Abū Hurayra claims a woman was 
punished in hell for her neglect of a cat, but ʿĀ’isha insists that this was because the woman in 
question was in fact a disbeliever, whose neglect of the cat was but a compounding feature of 
the many reasons which would have contributed to her ill fate. Arül argues that ʿĀ’isha is 
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mistaken, and that in fact accepting the woman as a Muslim elevates the importance of 
humanity, mercy and kindness as core, obligatory characteristics in a believer; that one who 
does not have mercy, despite having faith, can expect no mercy then from their Lord. It is not 
difficult to see the fallacy of this argument, nor is it becoming to attempt to rationalise the 
process of judgement of the All Knowing by the equally limited judgement of a human being 
against a woman about whom one has only been made privy to one aspect of her life. That a 
woman could possibly be praying, giving in charity, keeping family ties and performing other 
such obligatory rituals yet is still met by an unforgiving God, is to diminish God and God’s 
Mercy. ʿĀ’isha’s argument is therefore more compelling and more befitting of a religious 
tradition in which God is Merciful and makes this mercy the most central of all His attributes. 
 
Similarly, Ḥadīth 7 of Chapter Five also, is a further example of her critical scrutiny of a 
tradition, holding it to account against rationality. When Abū Hurayra claims that the one who 
performs the ritual washing of the dead body is also required to perform the ritual bath, she 
asks, ‘Are the dead Muslims impure?’ probing his assertion thereby. If a Muslim is not 
inherently impure, nor inherently a cause for the defiling of others, such that the simple act of 
touching them would defile another, it is questionable as to how death would bring about such 
changes in a lifeless body. It simply does not stand before rational argument. She further asks, 
‘And what of one who has carried the body?’ probing the source of impurity; is it the body 
itself, or is it the act of purification? In either case, there is no rational or textual support. 
Similarly, in Chapter Four, in her response to Abū Said al-Khudrī, she poses a question to his 
assertion that the Prophet forbade women from performing the pilgrimage without a male 
chaperone; which of the women around her had such a male chaperone at her disposal? The 
intent of this question is embodied in her own travel to perform the pilgrimage with no male 
chaperones, though she did have nephews and brothers available. 
 
Additionally, in Ḥadīth 11 of Chapter Five, she does not articulate an argument against Abū 
Hurayra’s statement that a Muslim should not walk around with only one shoe on. Instead, the 
absurdity of the statement moves her to defiance and protest: she does exactly what Abū 
Hurayra is forbidding, and makes clear her intention is to provoke him for the irrationality of 
the statement he had made, as a means of enacting her objection. 
 
Likewise in Ḥadīth 10 and its explanation, when Abū Hurayra announces that dog, donkey and 
woman are three of a kind, creatures whose walking in front of one offering the prayer nullifies 
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the prayer, astounded she asks, ‘Do you make us [women] as donkeys and dogs!?’ By what 
right is a woman categorised with dogs and donkeys, animals that are associated with the 
lowliest of creatures in Arabian culture? In a religion whereby women have been granted access 
to inheritance, elevated as having Paradise at their feet, having God respond to the outcry of 
one who disputed her husband’s injustice against her by revealing an entire chapter entitled, 
al-Mujādilah, The Disputing Woman, it seems absurd that it would then degrade women to the 
same nullifying status of dogs and donkeys. ʿĀ’isha’s short, shrift question was sufficient a 
response to Abū Hurayra’s statement. 
 
A key feature of the emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha in her approach to critically 
interrogating traditions brought to her is the emergent technical terminology, her own 
muṣṭalaḥ127, vis-a-vis ḥadīth. While some of this terminology has been adopted in classical 
ḥadīth studies, it is clear that she is not using the words as absolute impugnment of the 
individuals, but invalidation of their narrations of particular traditions. For example, despite 
her clear refutations and even at times sheer frustration and anger at Abū Hurayra, she does in 
fact corroborate his version of a tradition over that of Ibn ʿUmar. In the chapter on her 
correctives of Ibn ʿUmar, al-Zarkashī notes an incident whereby it is brought to the attention 
of Ibn ʿUmar that Abū Hurayra had reported the reward for following a funeral procession and 
offering the funeral prayer as being two qirāt128 of rewards with God. Ibn ʿUmar argued that it 
was only one qirāt of reward and not two, and that Abū Hurayra talked ‘of too enormous a 
reward’. When the matter was brought to ʿĀ’isha, she did in fact validate Abū Hurayra’s 
position. 
 
It is useful then to consider the terminology of ʿĀ’isha in her responses to the Companions 
whom she corrected with the understanding that her impugnment may be specific to the 
transmission of that particular ḥadīth, having gone through the above methodology. This is 
considered some more in this chapter, in the section, The Nomenclature: Muṣṭalaḥ of ʿĀ’isha. 
 
 
127 Muṣṭalaḥ al-ḥadīth is a specific branch of ḥadīth studies concerned with the terminology used in accepting and rejecting 
ḥadīth. 
128 It is recorded by al-Bukhārī in his Saḥīḥ that the Prophet said, ‘Whoever attends the funeral procession till he offers the 
funeral prayer for it, will get a reward equal to one Qirat, and whoever accompanies it till burial, will get a reward equal to 
two Qirats.’ It was asked, ‘What are two Qirats?’ He replied, ‘the equivalent of two huge mountains.’ Chapter: Funerals, 
Section; Whoever waits until the deceased is buried, ḥadīth No. 1325. 
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4. Upholding an Ethic of Care Towards the Muslim Community 
 
Perhaps more discreetly, another emergent methodology being established by ʿĀ’isha is what 
could be termed an ethic of care towards the burgeoning Muslim community, especially 
towards its female members. 
 
All of her correctives can be considered as examples of her ethic of care in practice, and 
examples have been presented in Chapter Six of both her and the Prophet’s ethic of care. One 
such example is in her response to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī who argued it was forbidden for women 
to travel without a male relative guardian. ʿĀ’isha simply ‘turned to the womenfolk and said, 
‘not all of you has a maḥram’. She exposes the problem to the women, but by turning to the 
women and addressing them as a collective there are two striking images that are conjured; 
firstly, the number of women with her would give a visual reminder of the number of Muslims 
that would be affected and essentially barred from performing one of the most important and 
central rites in Islam. Secondly, by turning away from Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī and addressing the 
women she is centring those who will be affected and their opinions on the matter. And thirdly, 
there is the image of a provocation. In turning to the women who are listening to the exchange, 
rather than responding singly to the one who has reported Abū Saʿīd’s statement to her, she is 
provoking her audience to a reaction at the marginalisation of their experience and the potential 
reduction in their full participation in the fundamental rites of Islam. The assertion that women 
cannot travel to perform the Ḥajj without a male guardian is not one made from a position of 
care. There is no pause for contemplation on the cumulative effect of this action on women, 
and their connection with God. As discussed previously, ʿĀ’isha defies this imposition in her 
very lifetime by performing the Ḥajj without a maḥram, making it clear that if the Prophet did 
forbid women to travel on their own at one point, the circumstances occasioning that stance 
were no longer in play and that Muslim women were, within a few decades of the Prophet’s 
life, now at liberty to move freely. ʿ Ā’isha keeps the vitality of the religion alive by highlighting 
the adaptability of the religion to new and different circumstances, she also ensured that the 
problem that creates these restrictions is not located in the female Muslim person, but in the 
context surrounding her; when that context is removed, so too is the problem. If the problem is 
located within the person of the Muslim woman, this ensures no progression to her ease. The 
potential damage this can incur on Muslim women includes infantilising her, effectively 
imprisoning her, the stunting of her emotional wellbeing, and preventing her from reaching her 
full potential both in terms of worldly objectives, but also the spiritual.  
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From a patriarchal perspective which is invested in maintaining men’s dominance, there is 
nothing to dispute in asserting this restriction on women’s travel, however from a position 
committed to an ethic of care the wider implications of this would be considered. If women are 
to be prevented from travel because of either the absence of a maḥram in their lives, or the 
presence of one but the inconvenience of escorting her on every journey restricting her 
movement, the negative impact on her as an individual will have a ripple effect within her 
network of relationships, and for a religious people for whom the notion of Ummah, community 
and responsibility towards it is crucial, these considerations are also then, crucial. As Noddings 
(1984, p.45) states in her remarks regarding the story of Abraham’s sacrifice, found in all the 
Abrahamic faiths, the devotion expressed by traditional, masculine ethics is often to the divine, 
but sometimes this devotion is in fact to principle instead. In this case, it is a reliance on freezing 
into place the environment and context of the Prophet, which was still a community in progress; 
there were many ideals yet to be achieved, and many systems of oppression yet to be 
dismantled. In being committed to the replication of that first community of believers, devotion 
to the objectives set by the Divine and still to be realised is forgone in a devotion to this 
replication. As Noddings (ibid. p.100) also argues, ‘caring preserves both the individual and 
the group’. In renouncing devotion to principles influenced more by systems of oppression, 
such as patriarchy than by tenants of the Quran, all members of the Muslim community can 
grow. 
 
The Nomenclature: Muṣṭalaḥ of ʿĀ’isha 
 
It would not be correct to infer from the statements of ʿĀ’isha that she was intending on setting 
a precedent or establishing a methodological standard in the discipline of al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl. 
She was of course engaging a language that was natural to her. However, there are recurring 
words and statements, some of which have been used in ḥadīth criticism as it later developed 
that have been used by her in her responses to Companions. Whether or not she intended to set 
a precedent for future sciences that were yet to be constructed around ḥadīth, some of her most 
severe responses cannot easily be interpreted away. In al-Ijāba, she is found to say, ‘ʿUmar has 
imagined…’ (wahama ʿUmar). As explained in Chapter Two, wahm is one of the conditions 
that impugns a narrator. She also exercises caution in how she responds to ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar 
but is clear that a mistake is being made by him. She says, ‘As for him, he did not lie but rather 
he forgot or made a mistake’ (amma annahu lam yakdhib wa lakinahu nasiya aw akhṭa’a). Her 
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most severe rebukes, though, are reserved for her response to a statement not included in this 
thesis but found in al-Ijāba, by Zayn b. Arqam, about whom she exclaims, ‘He has nullified 
his fighting alongside the Messenger of Allah, unless he repents’ (qad abṭala’a jihādahu maʿa 
rasūl Allah, illa an yatūb), and Abū Dardā’, whom she outright accuses of lying.  
 
While these responses may seem gravely serious and a compromise of any trust to be afforded 
to these narrators, she is also seen to affirm some of their narrations over those of others. It 
would appear then that she is drawing to the attention of her students, and generations to come, 
that the fallibility of her generation is a reality. That they had shortcomings in their memories 
and recollections, as well as understandings, and limitations to their lived experiences with the 
Prophet, despite their piety and trustworthiness. As such, their statements still require scrutiny, 
while not diminishing their status on the basis of their faithfulness and achievements. 
 
Conclusion 
 
This chapter has presented succinctly the methodology of ʿĀ’isha in approaching the ḥadīth as 
a culmination of the chapters preceding it. ʿ Ā’isha’s methodology in measuring ḥadīth has been 
premised on a number of bases. Firstly, the authenticity of the ḥadīth at hand in terms of 
whether or not the Prophet made the statement being claimed as his, or not, the context for it, 
and its complete narration where necessary. Secondly, if he did say it, how is it to be 
understood? This is where some of the most potentially exciting possibilities lie. ʿĀ’isha relies 
on her knowledge of the Quran first and foremost, then her lived experience with the Prophet 
and what she witnessed of his practice, as well as applying her reason to the statement that is 
being examined.  
 
Most interestingly, though, is the foundation upon which all of these approaches build; what 
has been identified as an ethic of care in her methodological approach. This ensured that she 
operated as an agent for not only her immediate community but for generations of believers 
after her, ensuring the most optimistic and positive outcomes that were possible in accordance 
with the Quran and the Sunnah. This in turn safeguards a Muslim experience of God that is 
caring and nurturing—befitting His most oft repeated attributes, Most Merciful (al-Rahmān), 
Most Magnanimous (al-Rahīm)—and that allowed them in turn to have wholesome, fulfilling 
lives, lived in a manner that established justice and fairness for all, as was the objective of the 
Prophetic mission. 
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Conclusion 
 
When Saʿīd al-Afghānī came across the first manuscript of al-Ijāba his reaction was that of 
one who had found an unexpected and unimaginably valuable treasure. This study has sought 
to mine this treasure and has come some way in presenting a number of interventions via an 
interdisciplinary approach. In this final chapter some of the main outcomes of this research will 
be re-visited along with suggesting avenues for further study. 
 
The Past and The Present 
 
This study sought to critically reflect upon the ḥadīth tradition, with a focus on the traditions 
of ʿĀ’isha where she corrected a number of Companions, looking at how ʿĀ’isha approached 
traditions presented to her, attempting to elicit a methodology therefrom. It is clear from this 
study that perhaps the problem is not exclusively in the preservation of ʿĀ’isha’s reports, in 
particular those in which she is correcting a Companion, but in the way her traditions have been 
effectively silenced through the canonisation process that the primary ḥadīth collections 
underwent. This rendered her statements tragically invisible, despite their being recorded. As 
has been shown in this research, ʿ Ā’isha’s correctives are frequently recorded side-by-side with 
those to whom she is responding, but the exegetical studies that form part of the canonising 
process would often reduce her statements to merely her opinion, a faulty ijtihād on her part, 
or simply fade her argument away by presenting the alternative tradition through other chains 
of narration, thereby strengthening the opposing statement.  
Al-Zarkashī attempts to remedy this in al-Ijāba by doing likewise for ʿĀ’isha’s narrations, 
illustrating that her statements could too be strengthened in a similar manner. With the potential 
for traditions to be made sounder through the support of further chains of narration, scrutiny of 
the actual narrators becomes important. Thus, the science of impugnment and validation of 
narrators warrants being reapplied, and in fact having its remit extended to the Companions. 
While in the past this has been applied in such a manner that a narrator is deemed entirely 
acceptable or utterly rejected, this research has considered the possibility of considering 
traditions against the merit of each statement a Companion reports, on the basis of their 
experience, knowledge, proximity to the Prophet and length of time in his company, as well as 
their ability to contextualise a tradition and measure it against the teachings of the Quran. This 
means that a single Companion’s individual traditions are assessed for impugnment or 
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validation, rather than to impugn or validate the Companion themselves, thereby excluding 
from the ḥadīth corpus a great many traditions. This is in line with ʿ Ā’isha’s approach, whereby 
it is clear that her objections and correctives of her peers was not motivated by personal 
grievances, even where these may have been present, but by the pursuit of maintaining and 
protecting the Prophetic legacy. This is made most apparent by her supporting the statements 
of the very Companions whom she corrected elsewhere, when she deemed their narrations 
acceptable. The extension of scrutiny of ḥadīth narrators to include the Companions is also in 
accordance with what the earliest jurists in Islam such as Abū Ḥanīfa and company were 
inclined to do, as discussed above in Chapter Five. This approach does not diminish the status 
of the Companions as an illustrious generation among the Muslims, but does acknowledge their 
human limitations, and safeguards against the weaknesses that their limitations may carry into 
the ḥadīth tradition, whilst not depriving Muslims of this rich heritage of Prophetic statements.  
Beyond the processes of ḥadīth scrutiny, this study has also considered the role of the 
development of the fiqh tradition and the canonisation of the ḥadīth corpus on the obscuring of 
ʿĀ’isha’s voice. Both facets of the Islamic scholarly tradition have had distinct historical 
trajectories that eventually converge and influence the other. As has been argued in Chapters 
Two and Four, whilst historically these processes may have resulted in the marginalising of 
ʿĀ’isha, there is much room for her to be re-centred. Al-Ijāba constituted an alternative position 
on a number of issues as espoused by ʿĀ’isha. Even now it has the potential to act as a 
disruption to the ḥadīth canon, allowing for the opening up of the canon, thereby allowing for 
more robust engagements that allow for the displacement of statements that are untenable when 
scrutinised against the criteria provided by ʿĀ’isha. 
This disruptive potential of al-Ijāba may or may not have been foreseen by al-Zarkashī’s peers, 
or indeed, even fully intended by al-Zarkashī either, but its value holds nonetheless. The ḥadīth 
canon provides a snapshot of a point in the history of Muslims, while al-Ijāba provides another 
voice from within the tradition. The ḥadīth is an archive of Prophetic statements, and archives 
can be thoroughly useful, whilst also simultaneously being terribly limited. Saidiya Hartman 
has lamented that ‘the historian’s relation to the archive is a paradoxical one; it both exposes 
the site of possibility and its failures’ (Connolly, B and Fuentes, M. 2016, p.106). The failure 
lies in the lack of possibility in excavating marginalised voices, knowing that historical 
accounts are the domain of the most powerful. A unique possibility is provided by this study 
of al-Ijāba and the observation of patterns in ʿĀ’isha’s approach to scrutinising ḥadīth and 
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extracting juridical conclusions, as it allows the recovery of ʿĀ’isha’s statements from 
obscurity. 
A crucial aspect of this study is its contributing to expanding the horizons of a number of 
Islamic disciplines. Its contribution to the study of ḥadīth lies in suggestions of re-
conceptualising the canonisation of ḥadīth, in the suggestion to extend the criteria of scrutiny 
of narrators to the Companions, and, most importantly, in the development of an emergent 
methodology of ʿĀ’isha in the scrutiny of the actual statements (matn) of traditions, not just 
the chains of transmission (isnād). The contributions of this study to the development of the 
Muslim legal tradition (fiqh) also lies in a framework that emerges from this research based on 
the pattern of how ʿĀ’isha approaches juridical matters. The implications for this are many, 
especially regarding women and their spiritual and daily life and practice. The study also 
contributes to the translation of ḥadīth and provides a methodological approach to the 
translation of Prophetic statements that can be replicated by other scholars seeking to apply a 
consistent and transparent method to the translation of any ḥadīth collection that is concerned 
with relaying the intent of original statements in a manner that is natural to the target language, 
makes for a pleasant read, but is also conscious of gender issues. This is an important 
consideration especially when translating from a language which is highly gendered like 
Arabic, to one that is not, like English, and also when translating a text that ought to speak to 
the needs of an audience representing the full range of genders and none.  
Another key contribution of this research has been to attempt to correct a potential abuse of 
history. Nietzsche (1874, p.84) wrote about the use and abuse of history, arguing that this is 
partly constituted by an ‘excess measure of history’. If an excess measure of history is distortion 
or misunderstanding, as he explains, then what has happened to ʿĀ’isha’s biographical stories 
and statements have fallen foul to such abuse. And if what is meant by ‘excess measure of 
history’ is also an unhealthy sense of being bound to the past, then this is something that she 
too can be observed as resisting when she denies the assertions of Faṭima bint Qayṣ, because a 
commitment to that moment in the past was not one that would benefit the Muslims 
contemporary to ʿĀ’isha or yet to come, in as far as she judged the matter. Similarly, is her 
resistance, along with Umm Salama’s, to pre-Islamic phobic attitudes towards menses and 
women. If an abuse of history has taken place with ʿĀ’isha’s statements and personhood, then 
so too has an abuse of the Prophetic tradition, for to remove the contribution of ʿĀ’isha is to 
remove a protective watchful spirit over the Prophetic legacy. She bore an authority and 
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intimate understanding of the Sunnah that was unmatched by any of her peers. By translating 
and studying her correctives, not only is her voice reinstated, but so too that of the legacy of 
the Prophet thereby. 
Furthermore, this research contributes to the existing body of scholarship on Islamic 
feminism/gender just readings for its insistence on re-centring a female voice that advocates 
on the basis of women’s lived experiences and is rooted in a commitment to the most just praxis 
of Islam. This research seeks to contribute to the process of de-scandalising the female Muslim 
presence, both in the wider world and within the Ummah, and, more specifically, to the effort 
of generating and producing sacred knowledge. In observing the re-constructions of ʿĀ’isha by 
historians and theologians, and harnessing both this information and what can be gleamed from 
the earliest biographical texts, this study has sought to reconstruct ʿĀ’isha in ways that are 
faithful to her history and that widen the possibilities for Muslim women. This work is not only 
an expansion of the tradition and a new perspective on it, but also an assertion for the expansion 
of the Muslim imaginary. As has been discussed in the introduction to this research, there is 
significant potential for al-Ijāba and its study to become a body of work around which 
collectives of Muslims, especially Muslim women, can gather and raise consciousness. 
Already excerpts of the translation and some of the findings of this research have been shared 
in an outreach impact workshop for Muslim women through the grassroots organisation, the 
Muslim Women’s Council in Bradford. It was received with much enthusiasm and with 
feedback that demonstrated the resounding desire of the participants to learn more on the topic. 
The workshop also illustrated the possibility of this text being one around which groups of 
women, and others who find themselves marginalised in the community, to gather and connect 
around in order to achieve the radical vision of a more egalitarian praxis of Islam. It is hoped 
that the study and partial translation of this text could act as a significant agent in the process 
of consciousness raising, in fuelling the Muslim imaginary to conceive of alternative visions 
for their religion and women’s role in achieving that. 
 
It is hoped that this research will also aid in the development of the Muslim imaginary in which 
an alternative world can be conceived wherein Islamic practice can be free from the un-godly 
interventions of patriarchy, and instead raised on the foundations of a tawhidic world view. 
Amina wadud (2006) sets forth the Tawhidic Paradigm in her work, Inside The Gender Jihad, 
arguing that by authentically activating the cornerstone principle in Islam of Tawhid, the 
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assertion of the irrefutable and unconditional notion of Allah’s Oneness, Muslims can strive 
towards and achieve a just social order, which is not only desirable but the primary objective 
for humans as khalīfas, vicegerents of God on earth. Wadud (ibid, p.29) argues that the concept 
of tawhid creates an overarching ‘trajectory organising Islamic social, economic, moral, 
spiritual, and political systems’. This concept fosters a reciprocity between the creation of God, 
and a oneness with Him in spiritual connection, but a separation from Him for nothing can be 
said to bear any similitude to Him.  
Wadud furthers her conceptualisation of the Tawhidic paradigm, stating that the Quran asserts 
a system at a metaphysical and a material level too; that from every created thing, pairs are 
created and that whenever people come together, God is also amongst them. With the 
presentation of these two verses, she offers the conceptualisation of the Tawhidic paradigm, as 
one where inter-human interactions are represented as taking part within a triad, with God as a 
‘supranatural component’ (ibid, p.30), whereby humans stand in a relationship of horizontal 
reciprocity, while God occupies a transcendent space above the two, in a manner that sustains 
and supports the position of the two in a way that maintains the relationship of equal positioning 
and mutual responsibility between them. To violate this structure, by placing one of the two in 
a position above the other, thus making one superior and the other inferior even if just by 
degrees or in particular circumstances, would reconfigure it extensively, giving a significantly 
different output to that of the Tawhidic paradigm which is justice. The opposite of tawhid, the 
oneness of God, is shirk, attributing partners to God; a practice which undermines God’s 
indivisibility and unity, and the opposite of justice is ẓulm, injustice or oppression.  
When the structure of the Tawhidic paradigm is undermined, it mutates and instead of tawhid, 
there is shirk, and instead of justice, there is oppression. With a now long history of arguably 
exclusively male interpretation of the sacred texts in Islam, an imbalance has been created and 
an unfairly influenced Muslim praxis has been established and legitimised through the male 
gaze, the male world view and experience. This in turn destabilises the tawhidic paradigm 
Muslims ought to be striving for, as the phallocentric experience becomes the prism through 
which sacred text is filtered, taught and practised, thus removing man from the horizontally 
reciprocal relativity to woman, and instead placing him above woman, between her and God, 
while also making the relationship one way; male interpretation as handed down and taught to 
woman, and not reciprocal where woman can be in discussion with man. By asserting the 
female voice from within the sacred text and classical scholarship, as well as through the 
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commitment to a feminist translation of the text, it is hoped that this research will serve also to 
stabilise once more, the tawhidic paradigm in the lives of Muslim readers. 
The Future 
 
By virtue of this study, several pathways for future research are opened up. This research has 
attempted to extract an emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha’s in approaching traditions; it would 
be interesting to see how this could be further developed and how this would affect the ḥadīth 
collections if applied to them, and the consequential impact that may have on other sciences 
such as jurisprudence and exegesis of the Quran.  
Future research could benefit from considering traditions of ʿĀ’isha outside of the canonised 
corpus, especially outside of the Ṣaḥīḥs of al-Bukhārī and Muslim, which remains Shafiʿī-
centric, to examine those traditions considered sound and accepted by the other major Muslim 
schools of thought. This would further aid in the exploration of ʿĀ’isha as a defender of 
Prophetic legacy, and in the endeavour to strengthen the position of her correctives and in the 
potential discovery of more. Whilst this study has presented two emergent methodologies for 
the scrutiny of ḥadīth and the derivation of Islamic law, both of these could also be further 
developed with the aid of exploring traditions outside of al-Ijāba.  
This study has shown that the positions of ʿĀ’isha have been tragically dulled through the 
canonisation process, but not entirely obscured from the historical record. The implementation 
of al-jarḥ wa al-taʿdīl on the Companions would help to better resolve the issue of conflicting 
statements. In addition to this, the emergent methodology of ʿĀ’isha—to check a tradition 
against the lived experience of more senior Companions, to measure statements up against 
those of the Quran and other ḥadīth, to be able to contextualise statements, and to engage the 
intellect in a process of ijtihād when considering a tradition—is crucial for approaching the 
ḥadīth corpus in a manner that would render the tradition more authentic, and possibly less 
exposed to manipulation or inaccurate assertions.  
This study has argued that the generation of the Companions of the Prophet has taken on an 
almost prophetic status of its own. It is a generation that is not subject to scrutiny. This scenario 
has evolved as a result of intra-Muslim conflict and partisanship that emanated from it. Opening 
up the Companions to scrutiny is perhaps the most radical proposal of this study.  
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The study has also demonstrated that ʿĀ’isha took into consideration the implications of 
statements on the lives of a marginalised segment of society—women and sought to do so 
through what would now be called an ethic of care. ʿĀ’isha set the standard for such scrutiny 
and is exemplary in how to pursue this role further which could aid in reinvigorating and 
reshaping the ḥadīth tradition. Similarly, her approach to Islamic law depicts a commitment to 
the Quran and Prophetic tradition, but also to an outcome that provides the most optimum 
results for the community of Believers. 
The excavation of ʿĀ’isha’s scholarly voice and the elevation of her status on the grounds of 
her contribution to the very production of knowledge in Islam, rather than simply in her being 
the only virgin bride, or shown to the Prophet in a dream wrapped in silk and indicated for 
marriage, calls for a re-imaging and re-aligning of the Muslim imaginary too. An imaginary in 
which Muslim women can and do hold their male counterparts and those in authority to 
account, and that their accounting is taken to hold equal validity. Where Muslim women can 
deign to take on roles that have no precedent in the community, because precedent is not 
incumbent in order for it to be a possibility. Where Muslim women contribute to knowledge 
generation and production, and not just the relaying and transmitting of patriarchy approved 
interpretations of the faith. A Muslim imaginary that can consider Muslim women’s lived 
experiences as sound and normative considerations in the development of Islamic law, rather 
than as exceptional and marginal experiences. A Muslim imaginary in which ‘Muslim’ refers 
every part as much to Muslim woman as it does to Muslim man. 
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Appendix: Selected Translation of al-Ijāba li-Īrādi mā Istadrakathu ʿĀ’isha ʿala al 
Ṣahāba 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Responses to ʿUmar b. al-Khaṭṭāb 
 
Ḥadīth One 
Al-Bukhārī and Muslim records the tradition of ʿAbdullah b. Abū Mulayka who said: 
 
عَبْدُ اللهِ بْنُ عُبَيْدِ اللهِ بْنِ أَبِي مُلَيْكَةَ، قَالَ تُوُفِّيَتِ ابْنَةٌ لِعُثْمَانَـ بِمَكَّةَ وَجِئْنَا لِنَشْهَدَهَا، وَحَضَرَهَا ابْنُ عُمَرَ وَابْنُ عَبَّاس ٍ
وَإِنِّي لَجَالِسٌ بَيْنَهُمَا ـ أَوْ قَالَ جَلَسْتُ إِلَى أَحَدِهِمَا. ثُمَّ جَاءَ الآخَرُ، فَجَلَس َإِلَى َجْنِبي َفَقاَل َعْبُد اِلله ْبُن َعَمَر ِلَعْمِرو 
بْنِ عُثْمَانَ هُوَ مُواجِهُه:ُ أَلاَ تَنْهَى عَنِ الْبُكَاءِ، فَإِنَّ رَسُولَ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم قَالَ ‘ إِنَّ المَيِّت َلَيُعَذَّب ُبِبُكَاء ِأَهْلِهِ 
عَلَيْهِ. فَقَالَ ابْنُ عَبَّاسٍ قَدْ كَان َعُمَر ُـ رضى الله عنه ـ َيُقوُل َبْعَض َذِلَك، ُثمَّ َحدََّث َقاَل َصَدْرُت َمَع ُعَمَر ـ رضى الله 
عنه ـ ِمْن َمكََّة َحتَّى ِإَذا ُكنَّا ِباْلَبْيَداِء، ِإَذا ُهَو ِبَرْكٍب َتْحَت ِظلِّ َسُمَرٍة َفَقاَل اْذَهْب، َفاْنُظْر َمنْ هَؤُلاَءِ الرَّكْبُ قَالَ فَنَظَرْتُ 
فَإِذَا صُهَيْبٌ، فَأَخْبَرْتُهُ فَقَالَ ادْعُهُ لِي. فَرَجَعْتُ إِلَى صُهَيْبٍ فَقُلْتُ ارْتَحِل ْفَالْحَق ْأَمِيرَ المُؤْمِنِينَ. فَلَمَّا ُأِصيَب ُعَمُر َجَعَل 
صُهَيْبٌ يَبْكِي يَقُولُ وأخاه، وَاصحابهُ. فَقَالَ عُمَرُ يَا صُهَيْبُ أَتَبْكِي َعَلىَّ َوَقْد َقاَل َرُسولُ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم ‘ 
إِنَّ المَيِّتَ يُعَذَّبُ بِبَعْضِ بُكَاءِ أَهْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ ‘. َقاَل اْبُن َعبَّاٍس َفَلمَّا َماَت ُعَمُر َذَكْرُت َذِلَك ِلَعاِئَشَة َفَقاَلْت َرِحَم اُلله ُعَمَر، 
وَاللهِ مَا حَدَّثَ رَسُولُ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم ِإنَّ اَلله َلُيَعذُِّب اُلمْؤِمَن ِبُبَكاِء َأْهِلِه َعَلْيِه. َوَلِكنَّ َرُسوَل اِلله صلى الله 
عليه وسلم َقاَل ‘ إِنَّ اللهَ لَيَزِيدُ الْكَافِرَ عَذَابًا بِبُكَاءِ أَهْلِهِ عَلَيْهِ ‘. َوَقاَلْت َحْسُبُكُم اْلُقْرآُن }وَلا َتَزِرُ وَازِرَة ٌوِزْرَ أُخْرَى{. 
قَالَ ابْنُ عَبَّاسٍ عِنْدَ ذَلِكَ وَاللهُ هُوَ أَضْحَكَ وَأَبْكَى. قَالَ ابْنُ أَبِي مُلَيْكَة َوَاللهِ مَا قَالَ ابْنُ عُمَرَ شَيْئًا 
 
A daughter of ʿUthmān b. ʿAffān passed away in Makkah, so we went to attend her [funeral 
prayer]. Ibn ʿUmar and Ibn ʿAbbās were [also] present. I was sitting between the two of them 
(or he said ‘I sat beside one of them. Then another man came and sat beside me’). ʿAbdullah 
b. ʿUmar said to ʿAmr b. ʿUthmān, ‘Will you not stop the people from crying, for indeed the 
Messenger of God said, ‘The deceased is punished for the crying of his family over him’.’ Ibn 
ʿAbbās responded, ʿUmar used to say likewise’, then he narrated, ‘I accompanied ʿUmar on a 
journey from Makkah until we reached al-Baydā’. He was mounted [on his horse] under the 
shade of a tree and said, ‘Go and see who those travellers are’. So, I went and saw that [one of 
them] was Suhayb. I informed [ʿUmar] and he said, ‘Call him to me’. I returned to Suhayb and 
said, ‘Depart and follow the Leader of the Believers’. [Later], when ʿUmar was stabbed, 
Suhayb came weeping saying, ‘Oh my brother! Oh, my friend!’ [To which] ʿUmar responded, 
‘Suhayb, do you cry over me when the Messenger of Allah said, the deceased is punished for 
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some of the weeping of his relatives?’  Ibn ʿAbbās said, ‘When ʿUmar died, I mentioned this 
to ʿĀ’isha. She said, ‘May God have mercy on ʿUmar. By God, the Messenger of Allah did not 
say that.’ And in Muslim’s narration she is reported to have additionally said, ‘The Messenger 
of Allah did not say that the deceased is punished for the crying of anyone, but rather, he said, 
‘God increases a disbeliever in punishment for the crying of his relatives over him’. ʿĀ’isha 
continued, ‘The Quran is sufficient for you as God has stated, ‘No soul shall bear the burden 
of another’ (35:18)’. Ibn ʿAbbās thereupon said, ‘It is God who makes one laugh or cry’. Ibn 
Abū Mulayka said, ‘By God, Ibn ʿUmar didn't say anything after that’. 
 
Ḥadīth Two 
Al-Ṭaḥāwi in Mushkil al-Āthār Ṣāliḥ b. ʿAbdul Raḥmān stated to us, that Muʿammar b. Abu 
Ḥuyayyah said I heard ʿUbayd b. Rifāʿa al-Anṣāri saying:  
 
مَعمَر بن أبي حيية قال: سمعتُ عبيد بن رِفاعة الأنصاري يقول: كنا في مجلس فيه زيُد بن ثابت، فتذاكروا الغسَل 
مِن الإنزال، فقال زيد: ما على أحدكم إذا َجاَمعَ، فلم يُنزل إلا أن يغسل فرجَه ُويتوضأ ووضوؤه للصلاة، فقام 
رجل مِن أهل المجلس، فأتى عمر َفأخبره بذلك، فقال عمر للرجل: اذهْب أنَت بنفسك، فأتني به حتى تكوَن أنَت 
الشهَد عليه، فذهب فجاءه به، وعند عمَر ناس من أصحاب رسول الله منهم علُي بن أبي طالب ومعيُذ بن جبل، 
فقال له عمر: أي ُعدي نفسه تفتي الناَس بهـذا؟ فقال زيد: أما والله ما ابتدعته ُولكن سمعتُه من أعمامي رفاعةَ 
بن ِرافع، ومن أبي أيوب الأنصاري. 
 
فقال عمر لمن عنده ِمن أصحاب رسول الله: ما تقولون؟ فاختلفوا عليه فقال عمر: يا عبَد الله ِقد اختلفُتم وأْنُتم أهُل 
بدِر الأخيار، فقال له علي: فأرسل إلى أزواج النبيِّ فإنه إن كان شيء ِمن ذلك َظَهْرَن عليه، فأرسل الى حفصة 
فسأَلها، فقالت: لا ِعْلَم لي بذلك، ثم أرسل إلى عائشة، فقالت: إذا جاوز الختاُن الختاَن، فقد َوَجَب الغسُل، فقال 
عُمرُ عندَ ذلك: لا أعلم أحدا َفعله، ثم لم يغتسل إلا جعلته نكاَلا 
 
We were in a gathering in which Zayd b. Thābit was [present], and they mentioned bathing 
(ghusl) due to ejaculation. So Zayd said, ‘It is not incumbent on any of you to bathe upon 
intercourse if there is no ejaculate (yunzil). Instead the private parts should be washed and 
ablution (wuḍu’) should be performed as is done for the prayer’. A man from the gathering rose 
and went to ʿUmar and informed him of this. ʿUmar replied to the man, ‘Go and get him so 
that you may bear witness [to what he has said].’ The man went and returned with Zayd. 
Accompanying ʿUmar were some of the Companions of the Prophet, including ʿAlī b. Abī 
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Ṭālib and Muʿādh b. Jabal. ʿUmar said to him, ‘Which enemy of his own self has given this 
verdict?’ Zayd responded, ‘By God, I have not invented this, but rather I heard it from my 
paternal uncles, Rifāʿa b. Rāfiʿ and Abū Ayyūb al-Anṣāri’. 
 
ʿUmar said to those who were with him, from among the Companions of the Messenger of 
God, ‘And what do you say?’ But they disagreed [on the matter], to which ʿUmar responded, 
‘Oh Servants of God, you have differed, and you are from the People of Badr, the best of 
generations!’ ʿAlī then said to him, ‘Go to the wives of the Prophet, for if there is something 
to be known, they will clarify it’. He went to Ḥafṣa and asked her, but she had no knowledge 
of this, so he went to ʿĀ’isha and she informed him, ‘If the two private parts meet, then bathing 
becomes mandatory’. ʿUmar replied, ‘I do not know anyone who does this, and then does not 
bathe, except that I will make an example of him.’   
 
 
Ḥadīth Three 
Al-Bayhaqī records in his Sunan on the authority of Muʿammar on the authority of Ibn ʿUmar, 
who said: 
 
قال ابن عمر سمعِت عمر يقول: إذا رميتُم وحلقتُم، فقد حلَّ لكم ُكلُّ شيء إلا النساَء والطيَب، قال سالم: وقالت 
عائشة: ُكلُّ شيء إلا النساَء، أنا طيبت ُرسول الله لِحلِِّه 
 
I heard ʿUmar say, ‘When you have done the stoning and shaved [your heads] then everything 
is permissible for you except women and perfume.’ Sālim said that ʿĀ’isha said, ‘Everything 
except women. I perfumed the Messenger of God as he came out of the state of ritual 
consecration (taḥlīl)’ 
 
Ḥadīth Four 
Al-Bayhaqī records in his Sunan on the authority of Muʿammar on the authority of Ibn ʿUmar, 
who said: 
 
قال ابن عمر سمعِت عمر يقول: إذا رميتُم وحلقتُم، فقد حلَّ لكم ُكلُّ شيء إلا النساَء والطيَب، قال سالم: وقالت 
عائشة: ُكلُّ شيء إلا النساَء، أنا طيبت ُرسول الله لِحلِِّه 
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I heard ʿUmar say, ‘When you have done the stoning and shaved [your heads] then everything 
is permissible for you except women and perfume.’ Sālim said that ʿĀ’isha said, ‘Everything 
except women. I perfumed the Messenger of God as he came out of the state of ritual 
consecration (taḥlīl)’. 
 
Ḥadīth Seven 
Muslim narrates on the authority of Anas who said: 
 
اْلَعصِْر  بَْعَد  َصَلاةٍ  َعلَى  اَلأيِْدي  يَْضرِبُ  مَُر ُع َكاَن  
 
‘ʿUmar would bind his hands [on his chest] in prayer after the ʿAsr prayer.’ 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Responses to ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās 
 
Ḥadīth One 
Al-Bukhārī and Muslim record on the authority of ʿAmra bint ʿAbd al-Rahmān that Zayād b. 
Abū Sufyān wrote the following to ʿĀ’isha: 
 
أَنَّ زِيَادَ بْنَ أَبِي سُفْيَانَ كَتَبَ إِلَى عَائِشَةَ ـ رضى الله عنها ـ إِنَّ عَبْد َاللهِ بْنَ عَبَّاسٍ ـ رضى الله عنهما ـ َقاَل َمْن 
أَهْدَى هَدْيًا حَرُمَ عَلَيْهِ مَا يَحْرُمُ عَلَى اْلَحاجِّ َحتَّى ُيْنَحَر َهْدُيُه. َقاَلْت َعْمَرُة َفَقاَلْت َعاِئَشُة ـ رضى الله عنها ـ َلْيَس 
كَمَا قَالَ ابْنُ عَبَّاسٍ، أَنَا فَتَلْتُ قَلاَئِدَ هَدْىِ رَسُولِ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم بيدي، ثُمَّ قَلَّدَهَا َرُسوُل اِلله صلى الله 
عليه وسلم ِبَيدَيْهِ، ثُمَّ بَعَثَ بِهَا مَعَ أَبِي فَلَمْ يَحْرُمْ عَلَى رَسُولِ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم شيء أَحَلَّهُ اللهُ حَتَّى نُحِر َ
اْلَهْدُى 
 
‘ʿAbdullah b. ʿAbbās has said whoever has acquired their sacrificial animal, all that is 
impermissible for the one in a state of pilgrimage (al-Hāj), is impermissible for this individual 
too, until the sacrificial animal has been slaughtered (i.e. on the 10th of Dhul-Hijjah). I have 
sent my sacrificial animal, so please write to me with your instruction.’  
 
ʿAmra said that ʿĀ’isha replied, ‘It is not as Ibn ʿAbbās has stated. I twisted the garlands of the 
Messenger of God’s sacrificial animals, which he then placed around their necks with his own 
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 eht nopu elbissimrepmi edam saw gnihton tuB .rkaB ūbA htiw meht tnes neht dna ,sdnah
 .’ecifircaS fo yaD eht litnu ,elbissimrep edam sah doG hcihw taht morf doG fo regnesseM
 
 xiS htīdaḤ
 fo ytirohtua eht no rafʿaJ .b mālaS morf ,naruQ eht fo sisegexe sih ni sdrocer īhdimriT-lA
 ,taht hamirkIʿ
 
 اذإ كاذ ،كحيو :لاقف ((ُٰرَصَْبلأٱ ُهُكِْرُدت لا)) :لوقي للها سيلأ :ُتلقف ،هَّبر دمحم ىأر :سابع نبا لاق ،ةمركع لاق
 ينترم هبر دمحم ىأر دقو ،هرون وه يذلا هرونب ىَّلجت
 
 oN‘ ,etats ton doG diD‘ ,dias ]hamirkIʿ[ I ,oS ’.droL sih was dammaḥuM‘ ,dias sābbAʿ nbI
 si tey noisneherpmoc lla evoba si eH :noisiv lla revo si psarg siH tub ,miH psarg nac noisiv
 stsefinam eH nehw si tahT !uoy no emahS‘ ,dednopser sābbA  ʿnbI ’’?sgniht lla htiw detniauqca
 ’.eciwt droL sih ees did dammaḥuM ,deednI .thgil eniviD siH fo ecnesse eht sa
 
 neveS htīdaḤ
 ūbA .b harāruZ fo ytirohtua eht no ,hadātaQ fo ytirohtua eht no ḥīḥaṢ sih ni sdrocer milsuM
 :afwA
 
 ،ِعاَرُكْلاَو ِحَلاِّسلا يِف ُهَلَعْجَيَف اَهِب ُهَل اًراَقَع اهب َعيِبَيل َةنيدلما ىـتَأَف هَتأرما َقَّلَط هَّنا :ِماَشِه َنْب َدَْعس نَع ،َةَراَرُز ْنَع
 للها ىلص ِللها ِلُوسَر ِرِْتِوب ِضْرَلأا ِلْهَأ َِمْلَعأب َكُئِّبُنأ َلاَأ :َلاَقَف ،ِرْتِولا ْنَع ُهَلَأَسَف ٍساَّبَع َنْبا َيِقَل هنأو َثيدَحلا ركذف
 ِنْب ِمِيكَح ىَلَع ُتْيَتَأَف :لاق ،َكَْيَلع اَهَِّدِرب يِْنِرْبخَأَف َّيلإ ْْعجرا َُّمث اَهَْلأْساَف اَهِْتأَف .ُةَشِئاَع :َلاَق معن :َلاَق ؟ملسو هيلع
 اًّيِضُم َّلاِإ اَمِهِيف َْتَبأَف اًْئَيش َِينَتعيِّشلا َِينتاَه يِف َلُوَقت ْنَأ اَهُْتَيهَن يِّنإ اَهِِبراَِقب َانَأ اَم َلاَقَف اَْهيَلِإ ُُهتْقَْحلَتْساَف َحَلْفَأ
 هيلع للها ىلص ِللها ِلُوسَر ِْرتِو ْنَع يِنيِئِبْنَأ َِيننِْمؤُلما َُّمأ اَي :لاقف ،َاهْيَلَع اَنْلَخَدَف ،يعم َءاَجَف ،ِهْيَلَع ُتْمَسْقَأَف ،هيف
 ينامَث يَِّلُصي ُمث ، ُأَّضَوَتَيَو ُكَّوَسَتَيَف ِلْيَّللا َنِم ُهَثَعْبَي ْنَأ َءاَش اَم ُللها ُهُثَعْبَيَف ُهَروُهَطَو ُهَكاَوِس ُهَل ُّدِعُن اَّنُك ْتَلاَقَف .ملسو
 ُُدعَْقيَف َةَِعساَّتلا يِّلَصُي َّمُث ُمِّلَسُي َلاَو ُضَهْنَي َّمُث ُهوُعْدََيو َللها ُُركْذَيو ُسلجيَف ،  ِةَنِماَّثلا دنع َّلاِإ َّنِهيِف ُسِلْجَي َلا ٍتَاعَكَر
 اَّمَلَف َّىَنُب اَي ًةَعْكَر َةَرْشَع ىَدْحِإ َكْلِتَف ٌدِعاَق َوَُهو ،ِينَتَعْكَر يِّلَصُي َّمُث ،اَنُعِمْسُي اًميِلْسَت ُمِّلَسُي َّمُث ُهوُعْدَيَو  ،للها دمحيف ،
 اَي ٌعْسِت َكْلِتَف  ، مَِّلس امدعب ُُسلاج وهو َِينَتعْكر ىََّلصَو ٍْعَبسِب ََرْتوَأ َْمحَّللا ََذخَأَو ملسو هيلع للها ىلص ِللها ُّيَِبن َّنََسأ
  َّىَنُب
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On Saʿd b. Hishām’s own authority, that he divorced his wife and came to Medina to sell his 
property there in order to purchase weapons and horses instead. He remembered a ḥadīth while 
he was in the presence of Ibn ʿAbbās, so asked him regarding the Witr prayer. Ibn ʿAbbās 
responded, ‘Shall I tell you who is the most knowledgeable regarding the Witr prayer of the 
Messenger of Allah?’ Ibn Hishām said yes, and Ibn ʿAbbās responded, ‘ʿĀ’isha. Go to her, and 
ask of her, then come back and inform me of her response to you.’ Ibn Hishām said I then 
approached Hākim b. Aflah and asked him to take me to her, but Hākim responded, ‘No, I will 
not approach her. I dissuaded her from speaking on the conflict between the two sides [of ʿAlī 
and those who opposed him] but she rejected my advice and went ahead into the conflict.’ I 
compelled him though by taking an oath, so he went with me and we entered upon her. Ibn 
Hishām asked, ‘Mother of the Believers, inform me of the Witr prayer of the Messenger of 
Allah.’ She replied, ‘I used to prepare for him his tooth stick (miswāk) and ablution water, and 
God would arouse him from sleep at whatever time of night He willed, and he would use the 
tooth stick and water for ablution. Then he would pray nine units of prayer without sitting, 
except for in the eighth unit. He would then make remembrance of God and supplicate to Him. 
After that, he would rise without uttering the salutation, and pray the ninth unit before sitting 
again and praising and supplicating to God. He would then say the salutation audibly and 
proceed to stand to pray two more units, so that there were eleven in total, my son. But as he 
got older and put on weight, he would perform seven unit for the Witr prayer, followed by the 
two units and he would remain seated after saying the salutation, so it was a total of nine, my 
son.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Eight 
She refuted Ibn ʿAbbās’s recitation of the verse one hundred and ten of Sūrah Yusuf which he 
recited as: 
وََظنُّوْا أَنَّهُْم َقْد ُكذُِبواْ 
Al-Bukhārī in his chapter on Quranic Exegesis records on the authority of Ibn Abū Mulaykah 
that Ibn ʿAbbās had recited the verse: 
 
حَتَّٰى إَِذا اسَْتيْأََس الرُّسُُل وََظنُّوا أَنَّهُْم َقْد ُكذُِبوا جَاءَُهْم نَْصرَُنا َفنُجِّي َمَن نَّشَاء ُ ۖوَلا يَُردُّ بَْأسُنَا َعن ِاْلَقوِْم اُلمجِْرمِينَ 
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‘…until, when the messengers despaired and were certain that they had been denied, kudhibū 
[lit. lied to], there came to them Our victory, and whoever We willed was saved. And Our 
punishment cannot be repelled from the people who are criminals’ 
 
Then he [Ibn ʿAbbās] went on to recite the verse: 
 
حَتَّىٰ إِذَا اسْتَيْأَسَ الرُّسُلُ وَظَنُّوا أَنَّهُمْ قَدْ كُذِبُوا جَاءَهُمْ نَصْرُنَا فَنُجِّيَ مَن نَّشَاء ُ ۖوَلا يُرَدُّ بَأْسُنَا عَنِ الْقَوْمِ المُجْرِمِينَ 
 
‘They were touched by poverty and hardship and were shaken until [even their] messenger and 
those who believed with him said, ‘When will the help of Allah come?’’ 
 
Abū Mulaykah says, ‘I met ʿUrwah b. al-Zubayr and mentioned this to him. He said, ʿĀ’isha 
said, ‘Allah forbid! By Allah, never did Allah make a promise to His Prophet, except that the 
Prophet would be sure of it occurring before he died. But trials always descended on the 
Prophets until they feared that those around them would start to accuse them of lying’ so she 
would recite it ُكذُِّبوا  kudhibū. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Responses to ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar 
 
Ḥadīth One 
Al-Bukhārī and Muslim both report on the authority of ʿAmrah bint ʿAbdul Rahmān that she 
heard the following from ʿĀ’isha: 
 
عَنْ عَمْرَةَ بِنْتِ عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ، أَنَّهَا سَمِعَتْ عَائِشَةَ، وَذُكِر،َ َلَها َأنَّ َعْبَد اِلله ْبَن ُعَمَر، َيُقوُل ِإنَّ اَلميَِّت َلُيَعذَُّب ِبُبَكاِء اْلَحىِّ. 
فَقَالَتْ عَائِشَةُ يَغْفِرُ اللهُ لأَبِي عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ أَمَا إِنَّهُ لَمْ يَكْذِبْ وَلَكِنَّهُ نَسِي َأَو ْأَخْطَأ َإِنَّمَا مَرَّ رَسُولُ الله ِصلى الله عليه 
وسلم َعَلى َيُهوِديٍَّة ُيْبَكى َعَلْيَها َفَقاَل ِإنَُّهْم لبيكون َعَلْيَها َوِإنََّها َلُتَعذَُّب ِفي َقْبِرَها 
 
It was mentioned to ʿĀ’isha that ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar had stated that the deceased is punished 
for the crying of the living. ʿĀ’isha responded, ‘May God forgive Abū ʿAbdul Rahmān, 
assuredly he has not lied, but he has forgotten or been mistaken. In fact, the Messenger of God 
passed by some Jews who were crying over a deceased Jewish woman, when he said, ‘They 
are crying over her, all the while she is being punished in her grave’.’ 
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Ḥadīth Two 
Al-Bukhārī and Muslim record on the authority of Ibrāhīm b. Muḥammad b. al Muntashir, on 
the authority of his father who said: 
 
َعن ْإِْبرَاِهيم َبِْن مُحَمَِّد بِْن اُلمنْتَشِِر، َعنْ أَِبيِه، َقاَل سمعُت ابن ُعمر يقول: لأن يُصبَح مطليا بقطِران أحبُّ إلى من 
أن أُْصبَِح مُحِْرمًا أَْنضَُخ طِيًبا، قال فدخلُت على َعائِشَُة، فأخبرُتها بقوله، فقالْت: طَيَّْبتُ َرسُول َاِلله صلى الله عليه 
وسلم ثُمَّ طَاف َِفي نِسَائِِه ثُمَّ أَْصبََح مُحِْرمًا 
 
I heard Ibn ʿUmar saying, ‘That I should be daubed with a trickle of water is preferable to me 
than to be a Muḥrim doused in perfume.’ Then I entered upon ʿĀ’isha and informed her of 
what Ibn ʿUmar had said. She responded, ‘I perfumed the Messenger of God, and he would 
visit his wives, and he would then enter into iḥrām’. 
 
Ḥadīth Three 
Al-Bukhārī records on the authority of Manṣūr, on the authority of Mujāhid who said, 
 
عَنْ مَنْصُورٍ، عَنْ مُجَاهِدٍ، قَالَ دَخَلْتُ أَنَا وَعُرْوَةُ بْنُ الزُّبَيْرِ المَسْجِدَ،، فَإِذَا عَبْدُ الله ِبْن ُعُمَر َجَالِسٌ إِلَى حُجْرَة ِعَائِشَةَ، 
وَالنَّاسٌ يُصَلُّونَ الضُّحَى فِي المَسْجِدِ ، فَقَالَ بِدْعَةٌ ،  فَقالَ عُروة: يا أبا عبد الرحمان  َكِم اْعَتَمَر َرسُوُل الله ِصلى 
الله عليه وسلم َقاَل َأْرَبًع ُعَمر ،  ِإحْدَاهُنَّ فِي رَجَب،ٍ فَكَرِهْنَا أَنْ نكذبه ونردَّ عَلَيْهِ ، وَسَمِعْنَا اسْتِنَانَ، عَائِشَةَ فِي 
اْلُحْجَرِة، فَقَالَ عُرْوَةُ: أَلاَ تَسْمَعِينَ يَا أُمَّ المُؤْمِنِينَ إلى مَا يَقُولُ أَبُو عَبْد ِالرَّحْمَنِ؟ قَالَت:ْ ومَا يَقُولُ؟  قَالَ: يَقُول ُإِنَّ 
رَسُولَ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم اعْتَمَرَ أَرْبَعَ عُمَرَاتٍ إِحْدَاهُنَّ فِي رَجَبٍ. قَالَتْ يَرْحَمُ الله ُأَبَا عَبْدِ الرَّحْمَنِ، مَا اعْتَمَرَ 
رَسُولَ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم إِلاَّ وَهُوَ معه وَمَا اعْتَمَرَ فِي رَجَبٍ قَطُّ 
 
ʿUrwah b. al-Zubayr and I entered the masjid and found ʿAbdullah b. ʿUmar sitting at the 
chamber of ʿĀ’isha. There were people praying the Ḍuḥa prayer in the masjid too, so we asked 
him regarding this prayer of theirs. He simply replied, ‘Innovation!’ ʿUrwah then asked him, 
‘Abū ʿAbdul Rahmān, how many times did the Messenger of God perform ʿUmrah?’ He 
replied, ‘Four times, one of which was in Rajab.’ We felt uncomfortable to deny what he said 
and to challenge it, but then we heard the sound of ʿĀ’isha cleaning her teeth in her room, so 
ʿUrwah called out, ‘Did you hear, oh Mother of the Believers, what Abū ʿAbdul Rahmān 
declared?’ ‘And what was it that he said?’ she responded. They explained, ‘He said that the 
Messenger of God performed ʿUmrah four times, one of which was done in the month of 
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Rajab.’ She replied, ‘May God have mercy on Abū ʿAbd al- Rahmān, the Messenger of God 
did not perform ʿUmrah except that he was with him, but the Prophet never performed ʿUmrah 
in the month of Rajab, ever.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Six 
Al-Dārquṭnī records in his Sunan on the authority of ʿAlī b. ʿAbdul al-ʿAzīz, on the authority 
of ʿĀṣim b. ʿAlī, on the authority of Abū Owais, Hāshim b. ʿUrwah reported on the authority 
of his father: 
 
عن عائشة: أنه بلغها قوُل ابن عمر: في الُقبلة الوضوُء، فقالت: كان رسول الله يَُقبُِّل وهو صائِم ثم لا يتوضأُ 
 
On the authority of ʿĀ’isha, a statement of Ibn ʿUmar reached her, whereby he had said, ‘A 
kiss requires the replenishing of wuḍū’. ʿĀ’isha responded, ‘The Messenger of Allah would 
kiss while he was fasting and would not renew his wuḍū’.’ 
 
Elsewhere it is also reported on the authority of ʿĀ’isha that the Prophet ‘kissed one of his 
wives then went out to pray, and he did not do wuḍū’.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Seven  
Al-Ṭabarānī records in his Muʿjam al-Waṣṭ, on the authority of Mūsa b. Ṭalḥa, 
 
بلغ عائشَة أن ابن عمر يقول: إن موت الفجأة سخطة على المؤمنين، فقالت: يَغْفر ُاللهُ لابن عمر، إنما قال رسول 
الله: موت الفجأة تخفيف على المؤمنين وسخطة على الكافرين 
 
It came to ʿ Ā’isha’s attention that Ibn ʿ Umar had said, ‘A sudden death is a loss to the believer’. 
She retorted, ‘May God forgive Ibn ʿ Umar. In fact, the Messenger of God said, ‘A sudden death 
is a relief for the believer and a loss for the disbeliever’.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Eight 
Al-Bukhārī records from Ibn ʿUmar that, 
 
عَنْ سَالِمِ بْنِ عَبْدِ اللهِ، عَنْ أَبِيهِ، أَنَّ رَسُولَ اللهِ صلى الله عليه وسلم قَال:َ إِنَّ بِلاَلاً يُؤَذِّن ُبِلَيْلٍ، فَكُلُوا وَاشْرَبُوا حَتَّى 
يُؤَذِّنُ ابْنُ أُمِّ مَكْتُومٍ  
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The Messenger of God said, ‘Bilāl makes the call to prayer (adhān) while it is still night, so 
eat and drink until Ibn Umm Maktūm makes the call’. 
 
Ḥadīth Nine 
Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdadi reports: 
 
أُْخبِرَت عائشُة بقول ابن عمر: إن الشهر تسع وعشرون، فأنكرت ذلك عليه، وقالت: يغفر الله لأبي عبد الرحمان، 
ما هكـذا قال رسول الله ولكن قال: إن الشهر قد يكون تسعا وعشرين 
 
ʿĀ’isha was informed about Ibn ʿUmar’s statement, ‘A month is 29 days,’ and she refuted 
this, saying, ‘May God forgive Abū ʿAbdul al-Rahmān, the Messenger of God did not say 
that, rather he stated, ‘a month may be 29 days’.’ 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to ʿAbdullah b. ʿAmr b. al-ʿĀṣ 
 
Ḥadīth One 
Muslim records in his Ṣaḥīḥ, on the authority of ʿUbayd b. ʿUmayr: 
 
َعن ُْعبَيِْد بِْن ُعمَيْرٍ، َقاَل: بََلغَ َعائِشََة أَنَّ ابن َعمْرٍو يَْأمُر ُالنِّسَاَء إَِذا اْغتَسَْلنَ أَْن يَنُْقْضنَ رؤوسهن َفَقاَلْت يَا َعجَبًا 
ِلابْن َِعمْرٍو َهَذا يَْأمُرُ النِّسَاَء إَِذا اْغتَسَْلنَ أَْن يَنُْقْضنَ رؤوسهن أََفَلا يَْأمُرُُهنَّ أَْن يَحِْلْقنَ رؤوسهن لََقْد ُكنُْت أَْغتَسُِل 
أََنا وََرسُول ُاِلله صلى الله عليه وسلم مِن ْإَِناء ٍوَاحٍِد وََلا أَِزيُد َعلَى أَْن أُْفِرَغ َعلَى َرأْسِي ثََلاث َإِْفَراَغاتٍ 
 
It came to ʿĀ’isha’s attention that Ibn ʿAmr had instructed the womenfolk to undo their braids 
when they perform their ghusl. She remarked, ‘How strange Ibn ʿAmr’s instruction! He orders 
the women to undo their braids when doing their ghusl! Why doesn’t he just order them to 
shave their heads! The Messenger of God and I used to bathe from the one same vessel, and I 
would not exceed pouring it over my head three times.’ 
 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī 
Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān records in his Ṣaḥīḥ, on the authority of ʿAmrah bint ʿAbd al-Raḥmān: 
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أن عائشة أُْخبِرَت ْأن أبا سعيد الخدري قال: نهى رسول الله المرأةَ أن تُسافر إلا ومعها ذو محرم، قالت عمرُة: 
فالتفتت عائشُة إلي بعض النساء وقالت: ما لِكلكن ذو محرم 
 
ʿĀ’isha was informed that Abū Saʿīd al-Khudrī said, ‘The Messenger of God forbids a woman 
from travelling unless she is accompanied by a maḥram.’ ʿAmrah said, ʿĀ’isha then turned to 
the womenfolk and said, ‘Not all of you has a maḥram!’ 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to Zayd b. Thābit 
Al-Bazzār states in his Musnad, Muḥammad b. al-Muthanna said…on the authority of ʿ Ikrimah 
that, 
 
 : زيد  فقال  تحيض،  ثم  الواجب،  الطوافَ  النحر  يومَ  تطوُف  التي  في  اختلفا  ثابت  بن  وزيَد  عباس  ابن  أن
 عباس  ابنَ  يا  : الأنصاُر  فقالت  النحر،  يومَ  طافت  إذا  تَنفُر  : عباس  نُ اب  وقال  بالبيت،  عهِدها  آخرُ  يكوَن  حتى  تُقيم
 كان  بما  فأخبرت  فسألوها  سليم،  أُمَّ  صاحبكم  ذلك  عن  سلوا  : عباس  ابنُ  فقال  نتابعك،  لم  زيدا،  خالفت  إذا  إنَّكَ
تنِفَر  أن  فأَمرها  للنبي  ذلك  فذكرت  حابستُنا، ل إنها  : عائشُة  فقالت  حُيي،  بنت  صفية  حال  مِن  
 
Ibn ʿAbbās and Zayd b. Thābit disagreed on the ruling regarding a woman who has performed 
the requisite circumambulation of the Kaʿbah (ṭawāf) on Yawm al-Naḥr (the 3rd day of Ḥajj) 
and her menses begin. Zayd said, ‘she should stay in her home until her menses are complete’. 
Ibn ʿAbbās, however said, ‘She should hurry to perform her ṭawāf on Yawm al-Naḥr’. The 
Anṣār present said, ‘Oh Ibn ʿAbbās, if you continue to conflict with Zayd, we will not follow 
you.’ Ibn ʿAbbās responded, ‘Ok, go and ask your companion on the matter, Umm Salīm’. So, 
they went and questioned her, and she informed them of what had happened to Safiyyah bint 
Huyyay. She reported that ʿĀ’isha said, ‘She prevented us’ (i.e. came on her period), so she 
mentioned this to the Prophet, and he ordered to her to be hasty’. 
 
 
Shaybah b. ʿUthmān’s Consulting ʿĀ’isha 
Al-Bayhaqī records in his Sunan, on the authority of ʿAlī al-Madinī on the authority of 
ʿAlqamah b. ʿAlqamah on the authority of his mother, who said, 
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 إلى  َفنَْعمَُد  فتكثر،  علينا  تجتمِعُ  الكعبة  ثيابَ  إن  المؤمنين  أُمَّ  يا  : ال فق  عائشة،  على  عثمان  بُن  شيبة  دخل
 أحسنت  ما  : عائشة  فقالت  ،ض والحائ  الجنُب  يَْلبَسَها  كيلا  فيها  ة الكعب  ثيابَ  نَْدفنُ  ثم  فنعمقها،  فنحفرها  آبار
 واجعل  بعها  ولكن  والحائضُ؛  نُب الج  يَْلبَسَها  أن  يضرها  لم  منها،  نُِزعَْت  إذا  الكعبة  ثيابَ  إن  صنعَت،  ما  وبئَس
السبيل  وابن  الله  سبيل  وفي  ،ين المساك  في  ثمنَها  
 
Shaybah b. ʿUthmān entered into the presence of ʿĀ’isha and said, ‘Mother of the Believers, 
we have collected a lot of the [discarded] cloth from the Kaʿbah so we intend to prepare some 
wells and bury it deep within in order that no person in a state of sexual or menstrual impurity 
may wear it’. ʿĀ’isha advised, ‘You have not done well, in fact you have instead done a bad 
thing. If the cloth of the Kaʿbah has been removed from it, there is no harm in one who is in a 
state of sexual or menstrual impurity to wear it. So, sell it, and whatever profit is made, spend 
it on the poor, and in the way of God, and on the wayfarer’. 
 
ʿĀ’isha’s Response to Abū Hurayra 
 
Ḥadīth One 
[ʿĀ’isha] opposed his [declaring] the fast of a person in a state of sexual impurity as nullified. 
It is recorded by Muslim on the authority of Ibn Jurayj, on the authority of al-Mālik b. Abū 
Bakr b. ʿAbdul Raḥmān, on the authority of Abū Bakr b. ʿAbdul Raḥmān: 
 
 لِعبد  ذلك  فذكرتُ  قال  ، يَُصْم  فلا  ، جنبا  الفجُر  أدركه  من  : قصصه  في  ول ويق  يَُقصُّ  هريرة  ا أب  سمعت
 عائشة  على  دخلنا  حتى  معه  وانطلقُت  الرحمان  عبد  فأنطلق  ، ذلك  فأنكر  ؛ لأبية  فذكره  ، الحارث  بن  الرحمان
 ثم  حُلم  غير  مِن  جنبا  يُصبح  نبيُّ ال  كان  : قالت  فكلتاهما  : فقال  ، ذلك  عن  الرحمان  عبد  فسألهما  ، سلمة  وُأمِّ
 ذهبَت  ما  إلا  علطك  عزمُت  : مرواُن  فقال  ، الرحمان  عبدُ  له  ذلك  فذكر  ، مرواَن  على  دخلنا  حتى  فانطلقنا  ، يصوُم
 ، الرحمان  عبدُ  له  فذكر  ، كلّة  ذلك  حاضر  بكر  وأبو  هريرَة  أبا  فجئنا  : قال  ، يقولُ  ما  عليه  فرددتَ  ُهريرة  أبي  إلى
 الفضل  إلى  ذلك  في  يقول  كان  ما  هريرة  أبو  َردَّ  ثم  ، أعلُم  هما  : قال  ، نََعْم  : قال  لك؟  قالتاه  أُهما  : ريرة ه أبو  فقال
 كان   عما  هريرة  ابو  فرجع  : قال  ، النبيِّ  من  أسمعه  ولم  ، الفضل  من  ذلك  سمعُت  : هريرة  أبو  قال  ’ عباس  بن
ذلك  من  يقولُ  
 
I heard Abū Hurayra narrate a story: ‘If dawn arrives upon one who is in a state of sexual 
impurity (junuban) then he must not fast.’ I mentioned this to ʿAbdul Raḥmān b. al Ḥārith, who 
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mentioned it to his father. The latter denied this. ʿAbdul Raḥmān and I went to ʿĀ’isha and 
Umm Salama, and ʿAbdul Raḥmān asked them regarding this. Both said, ‘The Prophet would 
reach the morning in a state of sexual impurity not caused by a dream and would proceed to 
fast.’ We then went to Marwān and ʿAbdul Raḥmān relayed this to him. Marwān said, ‘I adjure 
you to go back to Abū Hurayra and refute what he said.’ So, we went to Abū Hurayra, and Abū 
Bakr was present through all of this, while ʿAbdul Raḥmān relayed everything to him. Abū 
Hurayra said, ‘Did they both say this?’ He replied, ‘Yes!’ He said, ‘They know best!’ and then 
attributed [the statement] to al-Faḍl b. ʿAbbās, saying, ‘I heard that from al-Faḍl, I did not hear 
it from the Prophet.’ The narrator said, Abū Hurayra retracted what he had said. 
 
Ḥadīth Two 
Abū Dāwud al-Ṭayālasī stated in his Musnad that Abū Hurayra said: 
 
 لم  : عائشُة  فقالت  والفرسِ،  والمرأِة  الدارِ  في  : ثلاثة  في  الشؤُم  : الله  رسول  قال  : يقول  هريرة  أبا  إن  : لعائشة  قيل
ة ثلاث  في  الشؤُم  : يقولون  اليهوَد  الله  قاتل  : يقول  الله  ورسول  دخل  أنه  هريرة،  أبو  يحفظ :  والمرأِة  الدارِ  في
 أوَّلَه  يَسْمِْع  ولم  الحديث  آِخرَ  فسمع  والفرسِ،  
 
The Messenger of Allah said, ‘Bad luck is found in three things: the house, the woman, and the 
horse.’ ʿĀ’isha responded, ‘Abū Hurayra has not remembered. He entered upon the Messenger 
of Allah as he was saying, ‘May Allah curse the Jews [for] saying, bad luck is found in three 
things: the house, the woman, and the horse.’ He heard the last part of the statement but not the 
first.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Three 
Abū Bakr al-Bazār stated in his Musnad: 
 
قيل لعائشة: أن أبا هريرة يروي عن النبي: أن امرأةَ َعُذِّبَت ْفي هِرِِة، فقالت عائشة: إن المرأة كانت كافرة 
 
ʿAlqama said: It was said to ʿĀ’isha, ‘Abū Hurayra narrates the Prophet [as saying], ‘A woman 
was punished because of her [treatment of] a cat’.’ ʿĀ’isha replied, ‘The woman was a 
disbeliever.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Four 
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Al-Ḥākim records in his Mustadrak, in the chapter on Freeing Slaves, that ʿUrwah said: 
 
بلغ عائشة أن أبا هريرة يقول: إن رسول الله قال: لأن أُمتَّع َبسوط في سبيِل اِلله أحبُّ إليَّ من أن أُعتَِق وَلد َ
الزِّنى، وأن رسول الله قال: وََلد ُالزِّنى شرُّ الثلاثة، وإنَّ الميَت يعذَّبُ ببكاِء الحي، فقالت عائشة: َرحَِم الله أبا هريرة 
أساء َسمعا، فأساء َإجابة: أما قوله: لأن أُمتَّع َبسوط في سبيِل اِلله أحبُّ إليَّ من أن أُعتَِق وَلدَ الزِّنى، ينها لما 
نزلت }َفلا اْقَتحَمَ اْلَعقََبَة، وَمَا أَْدَراَك مَا اْلَعَقبَُة، َفكُّ َرَقبٍَة{] البلد: ١١- ١٣[ 
 قيل: يا رسول الله ما عندنا ما نعتُِق، إلا أنَّ أحدَنا له الجاريُة السوداُء تَخِْدمُه، وتسعى عليه، فلو أمرناُهن، فزنين، 
فجئن بأولاد فأعتقناهم، فقال رسول الله: لأن أُمتَّع َبسوط في سبيِل اِلله أحبُّ إليَّ من أن آمر بالزنى؛ ثم أُعتَِق 
وَلدَ، 
 
وأما قوله: وََلد ُالزِّنى شرُّ الثلاثة فلم تكن الحديث على هذا، إنما كان رجل مِن المنافقين يؤذي رسولَ الله فقال: 
من يَْعِذرُني مِن فلان؟ قيل: يا رسول الله إنه مع ما به وَلد ُزنى، فقال: هو شرُّ الثلاثة والله تعالى يقول: }وَلا تَِزرُ 
وَازَِرة ٌوِْزَر أُْخرَٰى{ ] الأنعام:١٦٤ [ 
 
وأما قوله: إنَّ الميَت يعذَّب ُببكاِء الحي، فلم يكنِ الحديث على هذا ولكن رسول الله مّر بداِر رجلِ ِمن اليهود قد 
مات، وأهله يبكون عليه، فقال: إنهم لبيكون عليه وإنه ليعذب، والله يقول: }َلا يَُكلُِّف اُلله نَْفسًا إِلاَّ وُسَْعَها{ ]البقرة: 
٢٨٦ [ 
 
It reached ʿĀ’isha that Abū Hurayra said the Messenger of Allah said, ‘That I should give a 
whip in the Path of Allah is more beloved to me than to free the child [born] of adultery’; the 
Messenger of Allah [also] said, ‘The child [born] of adultery is the worst of [the] three.’ [He 
also said], ‘Verily, the deceased is punished for the wailing of the living.’ ʿĀ’isha responded, 
‘May Allah have mercy on Abū Hurayra! He listened poorly and thus explained poorly. As for 
his saying, ‘That I should give a whip in the Path of Allah, is more beloved to me than to free 
the child [born] of adultery,’ this was because when the verses, ‘But he would not try to ascend 
the steep uphill road. And what could make thee conceive what it is, that steep uphill road? It 
is the freeing of a neck [from the bondage of slavery]’ were revealed, it was said to the 
Messenger of Allah, ‘We do not have one that we could emancipate, but one of us has a Black 
slave girl who serves him. If we order them to fornicate, then they will bear us children whom 
we could then emancipate.’ The Messenger of Allah then said, ‘That I should give a whip in 
the Path of Allah, is more beloved to me than to free the child [born] of adultery.’ 
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As for his saying, ‘The child [born] of adultery is the worst of [the] three’, then there is no such 
statement of the Messenger. Actually, a man from among the hypocrites was troubling the 
Messenger of Allah, so he said, ‘Who will relieve me of [this man]?’ It was [then] said, ‘Oh 
Messenger of Allah, among his other [blameworthy traits] is that he is a child of adultery’, to 
which the Messenger of Allah replied, ‘He is worst of the three’ and Allah Most High states, 
‘No bearer of burdens shall be made to bear another's burden.’ 
 
And, as for his saying, ‘Verily, the deceased is punished for the wailing of the living,’ then 
there is no such statement, but rather the Messenger of Allah was walking by the house of a 
Jew who had died, and his family members were lamenting over him. He said, ‘Verily they are 
crying over him, and he is being punished.’. And Allah says, ‘God does not burden any human 
being with more than he is well able to bear.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Five 
Al-Ṭabarī in al-Awṣaṭ states on the authority of Abū Salamah: 
 
عن أبي هريرة: أن رسول الله قال: مَن ْلم يُوتِر، فلا صلاة َله، فبلغ ذلك عائشة، فقالت: مَن ْسَمَِع هذا من أبي 
القاسم؟! ما بَُعَد الَعهُْد وما نسينا، إنما قال أبو القاسم: مَن ْجاء بَِصلوات الخمِس يومَ القيامة قد حاَفظَ على 
وُُضوئها ومواقيِتها وركوِعها وسجوِدها، لم يَنَْتقْص مِنُْهنَّ شيئا، كان له عند الله عهد ألا يعذبَه، ومن جاءَ، وقد 
اْنتقص ْمنهن شيئا، فليس له عندَ الله عهد، إن شاَء رحمه، وإن شاء عذبه 
 
Abū Hurayra reported, the Messenger of Allah said, ‘Whoever does not pray the Witr, then 
there is no prayer [recorded] for him’. When this reached ʿĀ’isha, she asked, ‘Who heard 
this from Abū al-Qāsim? It is not from such a remote past, and nor have we forgotten. In 
fact, Abū al-Qāsim said, ‘Whoever comes on the Day of Judgement with his five prayers, 
having been astute regarding his ablution, the timings, the bowing and the prostrating, then 
he has not fallen short with his prayers in any way. He has a promise from Allah that He 
shall not punish him. Who then comes along and diminishes this? He does not have a 
promise from Allah. If He wishes He shall have mercy on him, and if He wishes He shall 
punish him’.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Six 
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Al-Ḥāfidh Abū Ḥātim b. Ḥibbān al-Bustī records in his Ṣaḥīḥ on the authority of ʿUrwah b. al-
Zubayr who says that ʿĀ’isha said: 
 
أن عائشة قالت: ألا يُعجِبُك أبو هريرة، جاء فجلسَ إلى جنب حُجرتي يُحدث عن رسول الله، يُسمعني ذلك، وكنت 
أُسبِّح، فقام قبل أن أقضي سُبْحتي، ولو أدركُته لرددت ُعليه: إن رسول الله لم يكن يَسُْرُد الحديَث كسردُِكْم 
 
‘Does Abū Hurayra not bemuse you? He came and sat beside my apartment and started to 
narrate from the Messenger of Allah. I could hear it all, but I was engaged in prayer, and he 
had left before I finished. If I had been able to, I would have certainly responded to him that 
the Messenger of Allah was not verbose in speech the way that you are verbose!’ 
 
Ḥadīth Seven 
Abū Manṣūr al-Baghdādi mentions, with a chain to Abū ʿArūba al-Ḥusayn b. Muḥammad al-
Ḥurāni, who narrates on the authority of Yaḥya b. ʿAbd al-Raḥmān b. Ḥāṭib, who narrated:  
 
عن أبي هريرة أنه قال: مَن َْغسَّلَ ميتا اغتسل، ومن حمله توضأ، فبلغ ذلك عائشة فقالت: أَونجس موتى المسلين؟ 
وما على رجل لو حَمََل عودا؟ 
 
Abū Hurayra said, ‘Whoever performs the ghusl, ritual washing of the deceased, must also 
perform the ghusl, and whoever touched it must perform wuḍū’, ablution.’ When this reached 
ʿĀ’isha, she remarked, ‘Have the deceased of the Muslims become impure? And what of a man 
who has carried the body?’ 
 
Ḥadīth Eight 
Abū ʿArūba states on the authority of Abū Ṣāliḥ: 
 
عن أبي هريرة قال: لأنْ يمتلئ جوُف أحدكم قيْحا خير له مِن أن يمتلئ شعرا، فقالت عائشة: لم يحفظ الحديث، 
إنما قال رسول الله: لأنْ يمتلئ جوُف أحدكم قيْحا ودما خير له من أن يمتلئ شِعرا ُهجيُت به 
 
Abū Hurayra said, ‘That one of you should fill his stomach with vomit and blood is better for 
him than to fill it with poetry.’ To which ʿ Ā’isha responded, ‘He has not remembered the saying 
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[of the Prophet]. In fact, the Messenger of Allah said, ‘That one of you should fill his stomach 
with vomit and blood is better for him than to fill it with poetry with which he mocks [others].’ 
 
 
Ḥadīth Nine 
Muslim and Nisā’ī record on the authority of Shurayḥ b. Hānī: 
 
عن أبي هريرة قال: قال رسول الله: من أحبَّ لقاءَ الله، أحبَّ الله لقاءَه ، ومن َكرَِه لقاءَ الله ؛ َكرَِه الله لقاءَه، قال 
شريح: فأتيُت عائشة فقلُت: يا أُم المؤمنين سمعُت أبا هريرة يذكر عن رسول الله حديثا إن كان كذلك فقد هلكنا، 
فقالت: إن الهالَِك مَن َْهلَك، وما ذاك؟ قال: قال رسول الله: من أحبَّ لقاءَ الله، أحبَّ الله لقاءَه، ومن َكرَِه لقاءَ الله، 
َكرَِه الله لقاءَه، وليَس منا أحد إلا وهو يكره الموتَ، فقالت: قد قاله رسول الله ولكن إذا شَخََّص البصرُ، وَحشْرََج 
الصَّدُر واقشعرَّ الجِلُد ، وَتشَنَّجَْت الأصابُع ، فعند ذلك من أحبَّ لقاءَ الله، أحبَّ الله لقاءَه، ومن َكرَِه لقاءَ الله، َكرَِه 
الله لقاءَه  
 
On the authority of Abū Hurayra who said, the Messenger of Allah said, ‘Whoever loves to 
meet Allah, Allah loves to meet him, and whoever hates to meet Allah, then Allah hates to 
meet him.’ Shurayḥ said, I went to ʿĀ’isha and said, ‘Oh Mother of the Believers, I heard Abū 
Hurayra mention that the Messenger of Allah made a statement, which if true, then we are 
ruined!’ She said, ‘The [one claiming] ruination is the one ruined, and what was this?’ He said, 
‘The Messenger of Allah said, ‘Whoever loves to meet Allah, Allah loves to meet him, and 
whoever hates to meet Allah, then Allah hates to meet him’ and there is not a single one from 
among us, except that he hates death.’ She said, ‘The Messenger of Allah did say this, but when 
the eyes become glazed, the chest begins to rattle, the skin starts to goose bump and the fingers 
begin to twitch, then, at this point, whoever loves to meet Allah, Allah loves to meet him, and 
whoever hates to meet Allah, Allah hates to meet him.’ 
 
Ḥadīth Ten 
Abū al-Qāsim ʿAbdullah b. ʿAlī al-Baghawi narrates: 
 
بلغ عائشة أن أبا هريرة يقول: إن المرأة َتَْقطَُع الصَّلاَة، فقالت: كان رسول الله يَُصلِّي، فتقُع رجلي بَين يديه أو 
بحذائه، فيصفها، فأقبضها 
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It reached ʿĀ’isha that Abū Hurayra said, ‘A woman nullifies the prayer [if she walks in front 
of a person offering the prayer]’. So, she said, ‘The Messenger of Allah would pray and tuck 
my feet between his hands or his thighs. Then he would push them back [when prostrating], 
and I would stretch them forward [when he would raise his head from prostration].’ 
 
Ḥadīth Eleven 
The two Shaykhs [Muslim and al-Bukhārī] narrate on the authority of Abū Hurayra that the 
Messenger of Allah said: 
 
لا يَمْشِينَّ أحدُكم في نعل واحدة، لَِينَْعلُْهما جميعا، أو لَِيخْلَْعُهما جميعا 
 
‘Not one of you should walk with only one shoe on; either put them both on, or take them both 
off’. 
 
